The new reality of California is of a more settled, homegrown population. The growth of a population dominated by those born and raised in California represents a sea change in the state’s history. Always before, California’s people were formed largely of migrants from other states and lands. This has significant implications for policy making in education, infrastructure, tax policy, and state budget making.

The rising number of homegrown citizens represent native sons and daughters who have lived their whole lives in California and whose economic careers are a product of the California school systems, for better or worse. Already today more than 70% of the state’s teens and young adults ages 15 to 24 were born and raised in California. As recently as 1990, barely half (53.2%) of that age group was California born.

There are many signs that California-born residents are more attached to the state than earlier generations, and this bodes well for the future of the state. Native Californians are more likely to remain in the state than are residents who were born elsewhere. In fact, California natives are more attached to their state than is typical in other states. While California suffered an unusual loss of its native sons and daughters during the 1990s recession, the losses have been stemmed since about 1996 and the youngest generation is showing stronger attachment than any time since 1980. This generation, across the racial and political spectrum, also expresses stronger support for higher taxes and greater public services for the improvement of California than is found among the older generation.

Less Migration Presence and More Homegrown in Middle Age. Traditionally in California our residents of middle age (45-54) have been mostly born out of state. That includes 78.4% of the generation in 1970 whose youth (15-24) was in 1940, 62.6% of those currently age 45-54 whose youth was in 1980, and likely only 48% of today’s youth when they become middle age. That means today’s youth will be the first generation in California history whose majority will be California born when they assume the positions of leadership in middle age. The most important distinction of the homegrown residents is that their entire lives are shaped by their California experience including, most significantly, the quality of their schooling.

Stronger Retention of the Homegrown in California. The ability to retain your grown children is a powerful measure of a state’s attractions. On this score, California ranks near the top. The California-born move away from California slowly over time, as the natives do from every state of birth. Nationwide, only 50.0% of adults ages 25 and older still resided in their state of birth in 2007. For California natives that figure was 66.9%. California natives are more committed to their state than are the natives of all but four other states: Georgia, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.

Recovery from a Bad Spell in the 1990s. Following a period of accelerated loss of native Californians in the 1990s, due to the deep recession in the state, retention significantly improved from 2000 to 2007. At age 25-34, the retention of California na-
ervatives rose from 68.1% to 70.9%, an increase reflected across all the major racial or ethnic groups.

**Native Sons And Daughters Are More Attached than Other Residents.** Their rate of out-migration from California is roughly one-third that of residents born in other states or nations. Observing California residents age 30-34 in 2007, fully 7.2% of those who had been born in other states left California in a single year. This compared to 5.9% of those who had been born in other nations and only 1.7% of those who were California natives. At older ages the rate of out-migration is lower but similar differences prevail.

**California Natives Have Deeper Roots, Especially Latinos and Asians.** The homegrown residents are more deeply rooted in the state than are migration transplants. By virtue of their birth, the homegrown citizens likely have their parents, siblings and other relatives living in the state as well. And by virtue of growing up in California they also are immersed in networks that include their high school classmates or other old friends. Latino and Asian California natives appear to be more family-anchored than whites or blacks. Observed at age 25-34, fully 82.6% of Latinos and 82.5% of Asian and Pacific Islanders who were born in California remained living in the state in 2007, rather than move elsewhere in the U.S., compared to 75.7% of blacks and 62.1% of whites.

**Younger Generation Shows Stronger Support for Higher Taxes for More Public Services.** Mostly comprised of homegrown citizens, voters under age 45 appear to be more financially committed to improving public services in the state. Overall, just under half of likely voters in 2008 (49.4%) preferred the alternative of higher taxes and more services rather than lower taxes and services. However, 63.1% of those age 18-24 and 59.4% of those age 25-34 shared this preference. Conservative voters, not surprisingly, were much less supportive of higher taxes (28.1%), but even among conservatives, young voters expressed relatively strong support for higher taxes and more services: 51.5% of voters under 25 and 41.0% of voters age 25-34, compared to 19.8% at age 45-54.

**Implications Are Consistent with Other Studies.** These findings support earlier conclusions by the Center for the Study of the California Economy (Levy 2006 and 2009) and the Public Policy Institute of California (Johnson and Reed 2007), as well as scholars at USC (Pastor and Ortiz 2009, Myers, Pitkin and Park 2005 and Myers 2007), or UC-Berkeley (Brady, Hout and Stiles 2005). The future of California rests with the younger generation who will need to replace the baby boomers in the workforce and also pay them a good price for their houses. Whereas in the past we have imported workers to fill the needs of the state’s economy, the consensus now is that the state will have to cultivate its own workers, most of who already live here today.

The present study highlights the growth of a homegrown population and underscores the potential economic benefits they provide because of their strong commitment to California. With much deeper roots in the state, the California-born residents are more likely to remain in the state as workers, taxpayers and home buyers after their education. Accordingly, these are good candidates to repay the public’s educational and social investments made while they were children.

**Part of the New Narrative for California.** The political impasse in Sacramento is a recurring problem that reflects a conflict of visions for the state. What is the compact that the people of California want to negotiate for their governance? The authors above, among others, have been contributing to a new narrative as a guide to California’s future, one that links generations and spans ethnic groups. The present study focuses on the surprising transformation of California from a migration magnet that supplies its needs from outside the state to a more self-contained society that depends on its present members. The younger generation knows only one home, and they appear committed to building their careers in the Golden State. The new reality to be embraced about California is that we have become a land of settled and increasingly committed residents who share a future together. With this good news we can begin to make wise decisions for the Golden State.
The New Homegrown Majority in California

Introduction

The image of California lags a decade or two behind reality, and sometimes evades any historic or future truth. Certainly California’s racial and ethnic changes are well recognized in this state of declining white dominance, where every group is a minority. Nonetheless, perceptions are distorted in popular, albeit short-lived television shows like “The OC” or “Beverly Hills 90210” which highlighted a white leisure class, or in so many movies that depict cities under siege and everyone as an underworld operator. Such exaggerations have clear intent as dramatic entertainment, but it becomes a matter of public concern should these demographic miscalculations lead to misguided public policies.

Most troublesome today are the faulty assumptions about migration into and out of California. One popular myth is that California is the great magnet for migration from across America. A contradictory myth at the same time holds that the middle class is fleeing the state in a massive wave of out-migration. And still another myth warns that California is receiving record levels of immigration from other countries that are driving its population growth. No matter the grains of truth behind these myths, that image of reality is borrowed from earlier decades. The old myths are less appropriate today and are even misleading. They have been bypassed by a new reality that deserves recognition as a more accurate and useful guide for policy making in California.

This report investigates major changes in the migration trends shaping California this decade and that are creating a state with a different future than was assumed before. The demographic momentum behind these trends is so substantial that it likely will not be broken by the current episode of house price collapse and deep economic recession. Indeed, the current recession may only strengthen the trends already under way. In pages to follow we will peel back the layers of demographic change to reveal the inner workings that are leading to a much more promising future.

The new reality of California is of a much more settled population that now is more firmly committed to living in the state. The Pew Research Center expressed recent surprise that California was no longer the “archetypal magnet state” but now was out-ranked by 27 other states whose populations contained a larger share of migrants from other states (Cohn 2009). Attraction to newcomers is only one way of measuring a state’s attraction. Pew also proposed the concept of “stickiness,” namely a state’s retention of its own children, specifically the share of the native sons and daughters born in the state that remain living there as adults. The ability to retain your grown children is a powerful measure of a state’s attractiveness. On this score, as will be described, California ranks near the top.

The growth of a rooted, homegrown population truly represents a sea change in California’s history. Always before, California’s people were formed largely of migrants from other lands. The flip side of lower migration attraction is a much higher share who are native sons and daughters, people who have lived their whole lives in California and whose economic careers are a product of the California school systems, for better or worse. Already today more than 70% of the state’s teens and young adults ages 15 to 24 were born and raised in California. As recently as 1990, barely half (53.2%) of that age group was California born.

These homegrown citizens of California are far more committed to living in the state than are others. As will be shown, their rate of out-migration is roughly one-third that of residents who were born in other states or nations. With much deeper roots in the state, the California-born residents will more likely remain in the state to repay the public’s social investments. The homegrown residents not only are becoming more numerous, but they also are more committed to building their lives in the state than are California residents who come from other states or countries. In fact, the homegrown residents are
exhibiting stronger retention today than at any time since 1980 or before.

This report will explore several features of California’s changing population, some of which may be startling and refreshing. But first we begin by confronting the widely held assumptions about migration to and from the Golden State. These images may be legacies of the past that were once based in fact, but they do not match the new reality of California. Following that we address the differences in lifetime migration that exist between California and other states and how that is changing for more recent generations. As migration declines, the share of native Californians is rising, and accordingly we will next address the meaning of a growing homegrown population. California is very favorably compared to the other 49 states in terms of its continuing attractions for native sons and daughters. Delving deeper, the report traces how this native Californian retention is evolving for each generation as it grows older and shows the improvement in the last decade. Additional signs of growing commitment are visible in public opinion data of the different generations, showing the greater stake of the young, largely-homegrown citizens in making spending investments for the improvement of California. In the conclusion, we take stock of the new reality posed by this more-settled and committed population. The policy implications are very different from what would have been surmised a decade ago.

**Legacy and Image of California Migration**

California’s image as a migration magnet has many formative elements—among them the Gold Rush, the Oklahoma dust bowl, the economic shift to the west coast during World War II, and the longstanding notion of the California dream (Starr 2005). Sustained over so many decades, the expectation of continued migration is deeply rooted in assumptions about California. The rapid rise of immigration to California in recent decades adds further evidence that keeps this migration myth alive.

Different images of California’s people are legacies formed by the experience with prior episodes of migration. The images linger on even though migration and its effects are not constant. In fact, a new reality has emerged in California in the last decade due to some major changes. Foremost, there has been a major shift in the balance between migration and natural increase (i.e. babies born in excess of deaths). Back in the late 1970s the population grew more from migration (268,374 persons per year) than by natural increase (180,426 persons per year). Today, *those figures have been reversed*; for the last four years, population growth has averaged 102,654 people per year from migration and 320,851 from natural increase. The foremost feature of the new reality is that the homegrown children of California have become much more important than migration to the state’s growth. (These figures are from an analysis summarized in Appendix A.)

A second feature of California’s past migration is its great variability from decade to decade. From 1950 to 1965, domestic migration was fairly constant, averaging a net gain of 272,000 people per year (Johnson and Lovelady 1995, Figure 2). A major downturn in the aerospace industry depressed migration to California in the late 1960s and early 70s, and migration continued low through the early 1980s. Meanwhile, immigration began to build. But the high point of migration in recent decades came in the late 1980s when an average of 369,220 people per year were added by newcomers arriving in the state, net of those who left the state. This acceleration of migration stemmed from the cold war buildup of aerospace spending under the Reagan Administration, combined with economic downturns in the Midwest (formation of the “rustbelt”), the oil bust in Texas and neighboring states, and the fiscal crisis in New York. California was one of the few bright spots and it drew migrants in record numbers, especially since the younger half of the giant baby boom generation was still positioned in prime ages for migration (21 to 30 in 1985). The late 1980s were the last great moment that defined California as a migration magnet. Subsequently, the deep California recession of the early 1990s triggered a major downshift in all forms of migration to California.
A final major feature of California’s migration history is the rise and fall of immigration. Immigration to California also peaked in the late 1980s, although those figures are not directly comparable to the rest of Appendix A. Nonetheless, from these immigrant arrival data one can see that immigration to California accelerated by 61.9% between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, after which the rate of arrivals slowed to a 19.2% lower figure in recent years. Nonetheless, many local residents have grown accustomed to believing that immigration is continuing to burgeon the way it once did in earlier decades. The fact of declining immigrant attraction to California belies the current myth of accelerating immigration that was formed in an earlier era.

The foregoing brief history may explain the long-standing attraction of California and how much it has varied, but how do we account for the myth of middle-class masses fleeing the state? In fact, migration brings more middle class residents to California than it loses. Researchers have shown that in-migrants to California have consistently higher education than the out-migrants to other states (Allen and Turner 2007). Further, immigrant adults have a higher share that are college graduates (33% in recent years) than average for the California population (Johnson and Reed 2007). Perhaps it is simply “masses” that are fleeing, i.e. all groups in the state. Certainly, the domestic migration column is full of negative numbers (Appendix A). However, negative net migration could reflect either people who leave the state, or the decision of replacement newcomers to avoid California, or a combination of both. Accelerated departures would have much graver policy implications than reduced newcomers, and these two opposing forces need to be carefully distinguished, as addressed in following sections of this report.

What is clear at this point is that the net losses in migration were especially acute during California’s deep recession of the 1990s. From 1993 through 1996, net losses amounted to more than 100,000 people each year; after adding immigrants, and domestic out-migration was three times greater than overall migration. These losses were especially concentrated in Los Angeles County (although many of the losses from Los Angeles merely spilled into new residential development in the Inland Empire and were not lost from the state). The concentration of the aerospace industry in Southern California made the Reagan build-up of defense spending more intense, and the subsequent crash with the end of the cold war was all the deeper. An enduring image of masses fleeing the state was formed in this period of massive out-migration from the state, but the population losses due to migration since 1996 have been far more modest or even minimal. Masses are not flocking to California as much as before, but neither are they fleeing.

Concerned citizens of California and leaders in the state would do well to grasp these three major features of California migration. Foremost, the birth of a homegrown population now greatly outweighs the addition of migrants to California. The prominence of this rising homegrown population is underscored by the fact that migration, whose variability is the second feature, has now entered a protracted decline. And, finally, after its own rise, immigration now also has subsided in California. This means, again, that the growth of population in California stems primarily from birth of a homegrown citizenry.

How these forces combine to form a new reality for California is addressed next.

The Decline of Lifetime Migration to California

A great deal of noise and confusion surrounds the question of California’s attractions to new residents. Short-term fluctuations get the most attention by far, and these reflect annual changes in both arrivals and departures in some mysterious combination. A more stable perspective on California’s attractions is to focus on lifetime migration. This measures only the arrivals, expressed as the number of people who were born outside California and then moved to the state, settling down over the years. In a later section we will address the departures, because each has a different dynamic and a different story to tell.

The measure of lifetime migration is most meaningful for adults who have had sufficient time in their lives to relocate to another state or nation. The older
people grow the more they will have completed migration during their lifetime, although the most rapid changes occur in early adult years. The analysis that follows will begin with a summary of migration for all adults age 25 and older before examining trends by age from 15-24 to 75-84.

A higher proportion of lifetime migrants in one state rather than another indicates the greater long-term attractions of the state to newcomers. This attraction may be due to many factors but greater employment opportunities are often key. Changes in that proportion from decade to decade suggest relative increases or declines in migrant attraction, but it also can reflect the general maturation of a state as it fills with residents who settle and raise families in the state.

**Comparison of Lifetime Migration to the 50 States**

The proportion of California’s resident adult population that was born elsewhere was 63.5% in 2007, the most recent year available. We can compare the migrant attraction in 2007 for California and all 50 states (Figure 1). The graph displays the percentage of adults ages 25 and older in each state who were born outside their current state of residence and who therefore are lifetime migrants. It also shows how much change there has been in this percentage in each state since 1970. States are arrayed from west to east with ranking of the highest migrant attraction rate within each region. Nevada is the highest in the West, Kansas in the Midwest, Florida in the South and New Hampshire in the Northeast. California is ranked near the middle of the West region but its lifetime migration is higher than any state outside the west with the exception of Florida and New Hampshire (whose southern portion has become a Boston suburb).

California’s lifetime migration has declined from 76.5% to 63.5% of its adult population over these 37 years, a larger decline than in any state except Michigan. This is the largest decline in the West and only Michigan and Ohio have comparable declines in migration over these decades. (Of course, lifetime migration in those states has fallen to less than half the level in California, 30.2% in Ohio and 29.1% in Michigan.) The other noteworthy change in Figure 1 is the extraordinary rise in lifetime migration that reflects the rise of the “new South,” as witnessed in

**Figure 1**

Lifetime Migration in 2007  
% of Adults Age 25+ Born Outside Current State of Residence

![Figure 1: Lifetime Migration in 2007](image)

*Source: Author's analysis of 1970 Census Form 2 State and 2007 American Community Survey data*
states such as Georgia and North Carolina that have experienced rapid increases in economic opportunity and accordingly have drawn in many newcomers. Similarly, the New England states have received suburban spillover from metropolitan Boston and also attracted others who seek an exurban four-seasons lifestyle. In general, the states receiving the largest increases in migration are states that were previously more insular and populated largely by native sons and daughters.

Overall, the changes in attraction of lifetime migrants between 1970 and 2007 cover nearly four decades. From these data we cannot determine if the changes were continuous or if they were concentrated in certain decades. Also, even though we have restricted the data to adults age 25 and older, the changes in migration might be more rapid among younger adults, while the apparent stability is concentrated among older and longer settled adults. A closer examination is required of the California data in particular.

**Changes Over the Decades in California**

Lifetime migration has changed decade to decade, and includes changes among both domestic migrants and the foreign born, as well as in the California-bom population. The dynamics of change are so multifaceted that we inspect them in layers. The impacts of migration vary substantially by age, with many more children being homegrown and with new migrants in each era concentrated among young adults. It is fascinating how these dynamics unfold across the decades, especially when viewed for each major race-ethnic group. In the following sections we view this pattern of change from different vantage points, but the full picture of California population change can be found in Appendix B. The portrait is richly detailed with 25 graphs spreading across five decades and tracing age groups for multiple ethnic groups. Easily understood despite its intricacy, readers may wish to explore the unfolding changes at their leisure.

The short summary is that the graphic portrait makes clear how population change is unfolding by decade and by age within each ethnic group. Children in every decade are more likely to be California-born rather than lifetime migrants. In turn, younger adult age groups reflect the current migration attractions of the state, while the older ages are formed by the accumulation of earlier streams of migration. Viewed across the decades, we find that lifetime migration is subsiding and more of the adults are coming to be California-born. This is especially noteworthy among African Americans and non-Hispanic whites, but the process is also prominent among Latinos. Among Asian and Pacific Islanders, the foreign-born component of lifetime migration is greatest, comprising more than 80% of adults in recent years.

**Generational Differences in Migration to California**

A key question is how does lifetime migration change as people grow older across the decades? And how does the California population change as one generation succeeds another? These different trends need to be distinguished and then combined to reveal their total effects. On the one hand, lifetime migration increases as each generation grows older and slowly accumulates a growing number of new residents. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the more recent generations reflect a newer track of reduced lifetime migration. The combined effect of these trends is visible by tracing each generation as it grows older over the decades. Figure 2 charts the proportion of each generation that is made up of lifetime migrants to California.

Each of the generations in Figure 2 is identified by their year of youth, i.e., ages 15 to 24 when young people are on the threshold of adulthood and just coming of age. For example, for the generation whose youth was in 1940, roughly 78% of residents ages 45 to 54 were migrants from outside California. Among the youthful adults of 1960, who would have been born between 1935 and 1945, before the great baby boom, the share comprised of lifetime migration was somewhat lower but it sloped upward because California’s booming employment attractions of the postwar period drew even middle-aged people to relocate to California. The very next generation, the youth of 1970, contained a markedly lower share that were migrants because these were the children of the massive baby boom, many of whom were born to California residents. More recent generations have
followed a similar lower pattern of lifetime migration, until the newest generation, the youth of 2007, for whom lifetime migration again has dropped markedly below that of preceding generations when they were of similar age.

Figure 2 depicts a dramatic slowing of migration to California. Each generation is set on its own migration track, and the gaps between the generations indicate reductions in the long-term contribution of migration to California. The sizable gap between the 1960 and 1970 generations indicates a substantial downshift as more of the California population was drawn from the state’s homegrown baby boom. Migration has continued to decline each decade since, with one exception. The generation whose youth was in 1990 experienced a boom in migration during the great economic expansion of the late 1980s, and its share of lifetime migrants actually exceeds that in the preceding generation. Thereafter, the lifetime migration share has resumed its decline for subsequent generations, with a particularly steep drop now visible for the youngest generation in 2007. If this generation parallels the trajectory of its predecessors, it would be expected to have about 48% lifetime migrants when it reaches ages 45 to 54. This trend has great significance because it would make today’s young generation the state’s first to be comprised of over half native Californians when it assumes the leadership roles of middle age.

**Figure 2**
Percent Lifetime Migrants to California, by Generation and Aging

Immigration experts have a special term for the homegrown children, calling them second generation residents. Born in California or the U.S., these children are U.S. citizens, fluent English speakers, and beneficiaries of California schools (Rumbaut 2008). Recent evidence suggests they are poised for much greater economic success than their parents (Park and Myers forthcoming). They are also immersed in networks of kin and school friends who also grew up in California.

These social attachments also develop for the California-born children of parents who moved from Iowa...
or Texas, for example. There is a great probability that the parents of native-California children also live here as well. These native sons and daughters of California have grown up with siblings and other relatives surrounding them, and most also have a great many childhood or high school friends living nearby as well. They are immersed in dense, long-rooted social networks. Migrants from outside California often lack such attachments, unless they migrated with their parents at a young age. Those child-aged migrants would be similar to homegrown, but unfortunately there are no available data that permit us to identify them. The best that can be achieved is to identify those who were born in their current state of residence.

The more time that passes after birth and the older people grow, the more likely it is that their life events will have drawn them away from California or their other home states. As children they are subject to out-migration when they accompany their parents who have received corporate transfers or moved for other employment opportunities. As adolescents and young adults, people may relocate on their own for military service, college attendance or exploratory ventures. Once into middle age, people settle down more firmly, but there continues to be a gradual relocation because of unforeseen events and opportunities. Of course, these out-movers also have opportunity to move back to their home state at a later time, and many do, but all across the nation the story is a gradual loss of native sons and daughters and a mixing of populations drawn away from every state.

**Contemporary Theory on Place Attachment**

The literature on place attachment calls attention to a seeming paradox of our current era. We live in an age of globalism and researchers focus on the flows and networks of capital, people, ideas and information (Castells 2000, Lowenthal 2009). However, what has been reiterated at the same time is the importance of the local place, as seen in the emergence of place concepts like ‘global cities,’ ‘glocalism,’ ‘livability,’ and the ‘space of places.’ Place attachment can be usefully summarized in terms of the three themes of time-bound, people-bound and place-bound.

**Time-bound: Global Nomads and Life-Cycle Constraints.** The significance of the importance of a homegrown population must be understood in a global climate of competition for labor. Growing globalization and information technology have encouraged and impelled people to move across international and state borders to seek new life opportunities on a short and/or long-term basis. Migration favors the young and the opposite is also true that the young favor migration. Migration is closely tied to the life-cycle. Young adults are especially prone to explore greener pastures, with long distance moves highly concentrated from ages 18 to 34 (Clark 1986). It is in this age range when the perceived benefits of moving may be greatest.

**People-bound: Emotional Ties and Familial Relationships.** By virtue of their birth in California, the homegrown residents are likely to be bound to both people and places. As noted above, California’s homegrown residents are likely to be embedded in dense social networks. The Pew Research Center found that 74 percent of people who are stayers quoted ‘family ties’ as the “major reason they have lived in their hometowns for their entire lives, and nearly 69 percent say it is because they grew up there” (Taylor et al. 2008:14). Indeed, their survey results show that 25 percent of the mobile Americans define home as ‘the place they were born or raised.’ Other definitions include ‘where their family is from’ and ‘where they went to high school.’ Only 20 percent of the respondents preferred ‘its where they live now’, with another 20 percent saying ‘it’s where they lived the longest.’ At bottom, the old saying still prevails: ‘Home is where the heart is.’

**Place-bound: Opportunities and Contacts.** In migration theory, the decision to relocate has been conceptualized based on ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors of the home and destination. Place characteristics shape relocation decisions, with the footloose migrants most rational in selecting from alternative destinations. Homegrown residents face the “irrational” tug of family ties and friendships, and so they may be less likely to leave a place, even if outsiders do not perceive any attractions in that place. Nonetheless, without sufficient local opportunities for desirable employment, or for lack of affordable housing or
other amenities, local residents may fall prey to the “rational” lure of other destinations.

The Economic Consequences

In the national and global competition, Richard Florida writes that “places that attract young people end up being the winners in the nationwide competition for talent....Places that lose young people will never be able to recoup, since moving slows down with age. The winning places are the ones that establish an edge early on, by attracting residents in their mid-twenties” (2008:227). California may be gradually losing its lifetime migration attraction, but it is gaining a homegrown population. From the above discussion, there may be greater propensity for the homegrown population to be tied to places in California because of the desire to be close to familial relationships and friendships. However, there are many other places seeking California’s workers and consumers, and policy makers need to make California attractive as a place to live if the state hopes to retain its homegrown residents and maintain its advantage.

California’s struggle to produce an adequate workforce is expressed in a widening gap between the growing economic demand for college-educated workers and the faltering trends in college completion among California residents. Continuing the California 2025 research program of the Public Policy Institute of California, Johnson and Reed (2007) have calculated that the state is not likely to import sufficient numbers of college-educated workers and will need to produce its own. At the same time, the Myers (2007) study of the mutual interests of immigrants and baby boomers reached a conclusion that stressed the “homegrown solution” of educating the young, no matter their family ethnic origins, as the only feasible means by which the state could achieve the three goals of producing sufficient skilled workers, invigorating the corps of middle-class taxpayers, and cultivating the home buyers required by the expected home sellers among the baby boomers. A well-conceived economic strategy for California’s future is developed in Levy (2009).

California’s rising homegrown population may be a tremendous resource but it should not be taken for granted. The most basic first step is to count their numbers, understand the changes from the past, and then to closely track their growth into the future.

Will the Homegrown Stay in California?

The most pressing question of concern to California’s employers, parents, and taxpayers may be how likely the state’s children are to remain living in California in their adult years. Does the fact of high lifetime migration to California equate to high probabilities of outmigration as well? Alternatively, does the decline in the state’s attractions for lifetime migrants mean that the state is losing its attraction for the homegrown as well? The annual flux of migration into and out of California might create an impression of rootlessness, but it is possible most of this movement is comprised of non-Californians who have not set down roots. Nonetheless, we cannot expect that all of the state’s native sons and daughters will remain living in the state, because there are many reasons young people explore greener pastures.

The question of homegrown retention has great importance for California’s future for many reasons. Parents and grandparents often wish to keep the next generation close at hand rather than miss out on significant shared events. For their part, employers may wish to preserve as large a workforce as possible, especially in view of the looming retirements of the massive baby boomer generation. And the taxpayers surely would like to see a return on their investment in educating California’s young, a pay-off promised to be roughly four times the amount of public investment, but which is achievable only if California’s young grow up to work in the state (Brady et al. 2005). Certainly, the accelerated departure of the state’s grown children would be widely viewed as a sign of the state’s faltering opportunities and its weakened future. Conversely, a strengthened retention of the native sons and daughters could be judged a favorable sign for the future.
Comparison of Homegrown Retention in the 50 States

Evidence is that 66.9% of California-born children still reside in the state when they are adults age 25 and older. A very favorable sign is that this retention is higher than in all other states in the nation, bested only by Wisconsin in the Midwest and Texas, Georgia and North Carolina in the South (Figure 3). The graph displays the percentage of adults born in each state (ages 25 and older) who still reside in their home state. As in Figure 1, states are arrayed from west to east, with ranking of the highest retention rate in each region. Also shown is the amount of change in each state's retention percentage between 1970 and 2007.

The amount of change in the states' retention percentages is striking, with strong increases in some states and decreases in others. To some degree the losses in homegrown retention may reflect lagging economic opportunities, but losses also could reflect the declining insularity in America. Nationwide, the share of the U.S. adult population that resided in its state of birth fell from 56.1% in 1970 to 50.0% in 2007. All across the nation the story is a gradual loss of native sons and daughters and a mixing of populations drawn away from every state. California's retention share has declined substantially over these 37 years, as have Hawaii and Alaska in the West. All other western states showed gains, save Oregon and Washington. In the Midwest, the large states of Michigan, Ohio and Illinois also experienced substantial losses in retention, as did some of the southern states. But the largest losses in homegrown retention were recorded in the Northeast, led by New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts. The fact that 8 of the 10 largest states in the nation (all save Texas and Georgia) experienced declining retention of their native sons and daughters goes a long way to explaining why the national average retention fell by 6 percentage points.

Generational Differences in Retention of Homegrown Adults in California

The upturn in retention and falling migration at ages 25 to 34 are part of a much broader pattern, and the changes for the next generation may be even greater. It is useful to examine the generational pat-
terns in retention in more detail, tracking the attrition effects that accompany each generation’s maturing age. For this purpose we adopt the cohort framework previously used to track the generational trends in lifetime migration. In this analysis we will see the important damage to California retention that was wrought by the deep and prolonged recession of the 1990s, which was much worse in California than the rest of the nation.\textsuperscript{9} Lasting effects of the current deep recession of 2008-09 are not yet known, but the nationwide, indeed global, nature of the recession suggests that it will not generate as strong an incentive for relocation out of California as created by the more localized 1990s recession.

Looking at the history of retention in California, geographic mobility was far less common among older generations of the California-born. Among those native sons and daughters whose youth was before World War II, 85 to 90\% still resided in California in their 50s and 60s (Figure 4). However, there was a major shift by the time of the generation whose youth was in 1960. For that generation, only 67\% still resided in California while in their 60s. More recent generations have fallen only slightly below that level. In fact, the most recent one or two cohorts, while still experiencing steady losses in California residents as they grow older, have begun to elevate their retention above that of preceding generations.

The improving California retention represents a sustained recovery from the ravages of the 1990s recession. This was a genuinely traumatic decade that created a most dismal outlook for California, as documented in Starr (2004) and Myers (2007, chapter 4). Roughly five percent more of California’s native population was lost in this decade than would have been expected based on the previous decade’s experience. An unusually sharp drop in retention occurred in each generation during the decade of the 1990s, visible in different age groups for each successive generation. This loss is summarized in Table 1 as “excess decline.”

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Generation by Year of Youth} & \textbf{During the 1990s, Passed Between Ages} & \textbf{Excess Decline*} \\
\hline
1950 & 55-64 to 65-74 & 3.0 percent \\
1960 & 45-54 to 55-64 & 4.4 percent \\
1970 & 35-44 to 45-54 & 4.2 percent \\
1980 & 25-34 to 35-44 & 4.9 percent \\
1990 & 15-24 to 25-34 & 5.9 percent \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Excess Decline in California Retention}
\footnotesize{Source: Authors’ analysis of Figure 4}
\end{table}

The youngest generation to be impacted (youth in 1990) fell to the lowest level of native retention in California history, 64\% at age 35-44, and is destined
to sink lower by late middle age. Although these losses appear to be permanent, at least the rate of loss has been stemmed: the decade after the period of accelerated attrition witnessed a more normal, flattened rate of decline in every generation save one (the 1970 generation).

In a startling reversal, for the first time there are now signs of rising retention in California. The cohort whose youth was in 2000 was the first to exhibit higher retention. This improvement is visible at age 25-34 in Figure 4 and it also is found for all racial and ethnic subgroups of the generation except African Americans (data shown in Figure 5 presented in the next section). The very latest generation, ages 15 to 24 in 2007, evidences even higher levels of retention, especially so for whites, and the possible future trajectory is projected in Figure 4 as a dashed line. Should this anticipated trajectory be fulfilled, the newest generation would arrive in middle age with a higher share remaining in California than at any time since the 1980 generation or before.

**Trends by Race and Ethnicity in California**

Taken together, the two trends of homegrown retention and lifetime migration reflect the overall attractions of California and how these have varied over the decades. The age group of 25 to 34 is most sensitive to the current state attractions, because these young adults are making the most current decisions about the place where they want to build their careers. The trends from 1970 to 2007 are portrayed specifically for ages 25 to 34 in Figure 5, and they reflect a great deal of difference between the racial and ethnic groups. The retention of young adults born in California who are white is generally lower than for other groups. African-Americans have experienced the steepest declines, while Latinos and Asians command the highest retention rates of homegrown residents.

What is most important is that all groups have exhibited an upsurge in retention since 2000. The decade from 1990 to 2000 produced especially steep losses in all groups, likely because of the effects of the recession in the 1990s, which weakened employment opportunities more severely in California.
than in other states and caused many Californians to relocate. Once lost, many of those California natives did not return, but the increased retention of young adults ages 25 to 34 in 2007 reflects the more favorable attractions of California after 2000.

In contrast to retention, which is the share of California-born who remain, the measure of lifetime migration reports the share of all current residents who have been attracted to California from other states. These two measures have moved in opposite directions for California since 1990. For the total group of 25-to-34 year-olds in Figure 5, retention slumped in the 1990s while the lifetime migrant share rose. Conversely, after 2000, the lifetime migration share slumped and the retention share rose. To some extent these opposing trends have been driven by the unique experiences of different racial and ethnic groups, but they generally reflect the stronger persistence of retention than migration, because retention is rooted in family attractions and job connections that are California-centered, while migration is more opportunistic in comparing alternative destinations. Thus we note that for both whites and blacks, migration declined more steeply over the decades than did retention, and now retention has rebounded even though migration continues to decline.

Each of the racial and ethnic groups has a different story to tell. Among African-Americans, in 1970 and 1980, over 80% of those ages 25 to 34 were born out of state, after which this ratio plunged. The decline reflects less the conditions particular to California and more the general end of the historic migration by blacks from the south to the north and west (Frey 2004). In the case of Latinos, the elevated lifetime migration in 1990 and 2000 in a noticeable “hump” reflects the accelerated immigration that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, drawing young people who swelled the numbers of lifetime migrants ages 25 to 34 in 1990 and 2000. The downturn post-2000, in turn, reflects the deceleration of immigration in recent years. This pattern of acceleration and deceleration is also reflected in a similar hump-like trend observable for Asians as well.

Following 2000, all of the racial and ethnic groups have experienced a substantial decline in migration that includes both the effects of slowed immigration and slowed domestic migration due to California’s high housing prices (which have now substantially moderated). At the same time, retention was increased in all groups (nearly so among blacks), in a sign that the California born are experiencing growing commitment to living in California. This probability of retention is notably higher among Asians and Latinos than among other groups. As more of the population is comprised of these groups, their high retention will increase the overall commitment of Californians to staying in California.

Will Settled Migrants Stay in California?

The retention of more than just California-born citizens is crucial to the future of the state. Many other residents have moved to California from other states and countries and are now settled. If those residents are not willing to put down roots and commit to the future of California, the state will be greatly disadvantaged. No data exist from any source on people’s length of residence in California, but one way of measuring the commitment of different groups is to estimate their rate of out-migration from the state rather than their length of stay. For the California born we were able to measure their lifetime rate of departure, but for other residents data limitations force us to rely on shorter-term measures. For the last several censuses we have had access to a question on change of state residence between two times separated by 5 years, but after 2000 that question was replaced by a new question that asked about change in residence over a one-year period. Although both questions ask about recent relocation, the differences between 5-year and one-year behavior are substantial and the results from the two questions are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, we can usefully examine the results from both questions.

Out-migration drains residents from the state at a much more rapid pace for some groups than others (Figure 6). We examine these losses at age 30-34, a prime age when people typically settle down as workers, family makers, taxpayers, and voters. California residents who were born in other states leave the state far more readily than any other
group—7.2% in a single year and 16.5% over a 5-year period. It should be noted that these losses are largely matched by replacement flows of in-movers, so there may not be a net loss to the state’s population from these out-migrants. However, the pace of departure leads to faster population turnover and reflects an absence of roots set down by these temporary residents. In general, the longer that people reside in a state the less likely they are to depart, and if they do depart they are more likely to return than if they lived there only a short time (Wilson et al. 2009).

In contrast to the out-of-staters, all other groups—both California-born and foreign-born—depart the state far more slowly (Figure 6). In fact, there is very little difference in the level of commitment to living in California as opposed to other states between immigrants and the California-born residents. Over a 5-year period, only 6.0% of the California-born and 6.3% of the foreign-born depart for other states. However, immigrants are also prone to depart to their home countries or other nations, and this is especially true of very recent arrivals to the U.S.11 If migration is measured between two points in time 5 years apart, much of this circular migration is excluded (just as with short-term domestic residents of California). Nonetheless, it is highly likely that substantial numbers of foreign-born also left the U.S. for other countries, 3.9% per year according to Van Hook et al (2006), although the data used for Figure 6 only include movers within the U.S. In contrast, very few of the California-born or other U.S.-born residents likely have moved to other countries. From these assessments we conclude that the foreign-born might have an annual out-migration rate totaling 5.9% (the sum of interstate and foreign departure rates), leaving the California-born with the lowest rate of out-migration by far and with the surest commitment to remaining in the state.12

Ethnic differences among the California-born with regard to their out-migration hold considerable interest. Just as was found with the lifetime retention, the non-Hispanic white California-born adults are considerably more likely to leave the state than others, whether measured over 5 years or one. Under both measures, black and Latino native-Californians are more likely to stay in the state than are others who may have a greater array of competing alternatives.

One result of this analysis is recognition that it is not adequate to lump California residents into a single category of native-born. This masks tremendous variation between the California born and the natives of other states. Especially for matters of California state policy it would seem essential to distinguish between residents who are California-born and other U.S.-born, as well as distinguishing those who are foreign-born.

**Figure 6**

![Annual Percent Out-Migration from California at Ages 30-34, 2006-2007 by Birthplace and Ethnicity](image)

![5 Year Percent Out-Migration from California at Ages 30-34, 1995-2000, by Birthplace and Ethnicity](image)

*Source: Authors’ analysis of 2000 Census and 2007 American Community Survey data*
Voter Support for Higher Taxes and Spending

Commitment to California is expressed by deeper roots and greater willingness to stay in the state. Another form of commitment is the readiness to support the higher taxes required to fund greater public services for the good of the state’s residents. The recurring budget impasse in Sacramento is based on many factors, but reluctance by a substantial segment to tax and spend is one of the most fundamental. Without getting into the merits of the issue, we can examine how the younger generations compare to the older in terms of their willingness to support higher taxes and greater spending to improve California.

There are a great many factors that lead us to expect that the young will support higher taxes more than older voters. Foremost, the young have a longer expectation of life in the state and therefore will be more likely to reap a return on any tax investments made today. In addition, any budget deficits covered by borrowing in lieu of higher taxes will require future payments to retire the debt that will be borne more heavily by the younger generations than the older. Rapid ethnic change in the state also is leading to a different mix of ethnicities among the young than middle age and older residents, and past research shows that Latino and black voters are more supportive of higher taxes and spending than white voters (Myers 2007, chapter 7). Accordingly, a younger generation comprised of more Latinos would be expected to support higher taxes at a higher rate than an older generation that is more often white. In addition, there has been a swing in recent years to a more liberal political leaning among the younger generation, leaving conservative voters more concentrated among older voters. For that reason as well we would expect the young to support higher taxes and spending more than the older generation.

A final rationale is that we know that the homegrown population is more likely to stay in California than residents who were born in other states or nations, and we suspect that this greater commitment to staying will increase willingness to support higher taxes for improved services needed in the state. Given that the younger generation is much more likely to be made up of homegrown residents, this also could lead to higher tax support among young people.

These expectations can be tested with opinion data collected by the Public Policy Institute of California in two surveys in 2008. The surveys asked an identical question:

“And, in general, which of the following statements do you agree with more—I’d rather pay higher taxes and have a state government that provides more services, or I’d rather pay lower taxes and have a state government that provides fewer services?”

This trade-off does not directly tap the willingness to invest in improvements for benefit in the future, but it does address the basic inclination to tax and spend. We also lack direct measurement of which respondents were born in California, but we know from other data what is the share of citizens in each age group who are California-born rather than other-U.S. born.

The findings from the 2008 surveys are summarized in Figure 7, reporting the opinions only of those adults who are citizens and claim to be regular voters. As expected, a much higher share of the younger voters are willing to support higher taxes to gain greater spending, 59.4% at age 25-34, compared to 42.5% at age 45-54. To eliminate the factor of ethnic change, we separately plot the opinions of non-Hispanic white voters, finding 52.9% support for higher taxes and spending at age 25-34 and 38.4% at age 45-54. As a third test, we take up the question of political leaning. A very high percentage of liberals in all age groups supports greater taxing and spending, but we find much greater variation among the self-professed conservatives. Conservative voters are generally much less supportive of higher taxes, but we find that conservatives age 25-34 support higher taxes at a much greater degree than do conservatives age 45-54, 41.0% compared to 19.8% (Figure 7).

The conclusion to be drawn is that the younger generation expresses much stronger support for higher taxes and greater spending, even when we control...
for ethnic differences or political leaning. The hypothesis that greater homegrown status is leading to this difference cannot be directly tested. However, we note that among all U.S. citizens living in California (a proxy for potential voters), the share that are California-born declines from 79.8% of citizens age 18-24, to 63.8% of those age 25-34, and to 50.9% of those age 35-44. Similarly, among actual voters in the November 2008 election in Los Angeles County, we know that 77.2% were California-born at age 18-24, 62.5% at age 25-34, and 49.5% at age 35-44. Thus, the voters at young ages are much more heavily weighted to homegrown citizens who we know to be more deeply rooted in the state. Their longer outlook on future life in the state likely prompts them to support greater taxation and services than is true of middle-aged citizens belonging to the same ethnic group or with the same political leaning.

**Figure 7**

Percent Preferring Higher Taxes and Services by Age Group Among Likely Voters

![Graph showing percent preferring higher taxes and services by age group among likely voters.](image)

*Source: Authors’ analysis of PPIC Statewide Survey, January & May 2008*

### Conclusions

California is undergoing profound change from a land of migrants to one with a much more settled population. A majority of young adults, and soon the middle aged, are native Californians whose entire lives have been shaped in the state. These homegrown citizens are also much more deeply rooted than other residents and they represent a tremendous resource for California’s future. However, the middle-aged voters and leaders of the state may not have fully appreciated the transformation that has occurred; nor have they fully committed to the new future of the state.

### Implications for Policy Makers and Voters

Reduced migration to California implies that the state is much more dependent on its homegrown residents for future workers, taxpayers and home buyers. To fully develop this potential we will need to invest in the next generation, rather than merely hope that newcomers will arrive who are well-prepared to serve the state’s economic needs.

At the same time, the strong retention of California’s native sons and daughters, increased after the ravages of the 1990s recession, is a promising trend. This is visible across all the state’s race and ethnic groups. This holding power reflects the great strength of California’s attractions. Stronger retention also reflects the deeper roots and stronger commitment to remaining in the state by Californians whose family members and long-time friends also live in the state. Transplants from other states and nations are also likely to have developed deep attachments and commitments to the state after residing for a long period. But the youth of California have special importance.

Investment in the next generation is both encouraged and protected by the strength of retention. The fact that California’s native children are more rooted than other residents—even more than in most states in the nation—means that the next generation is more likely to be engaged and self-invested in the state. Their retention in the state also means that the pay-off for investing in the state’s youth will be recaptured within California and not passed on to other states.
The prominence of California’s homegrown population is a new understanding. It also raises questions about parallel attachments that may exist among the long-settled transplants from other lands. We suffer from a great lack of information about these important issues. Better data are needed if we are to record the growing roots of California residents. At present, we have insufficient information about the characteristics and opinions of the California-born and how they differ from those of other U.S.-born who are longtime residents of the state. Ironically, we actually know more about immigrants’ length of stay in the U.S. and how their characteristics shift with longer residence than we do about these two important segments of the U.S.-born. Given the fresh appreciation about the importance of deep roots in California, new data would seem warranted.

**Need for New Public Dialogue**

The new reality of California’s increasingly settled population requires public discussion. How is this different from what was assumed before—whether the old myth of migration magnet or of fleeing masses—and what does it mean for our state’s future? A general public dialogue is needed about this transformation, but several specific questions suggest themselves.

How is the stance taken by voters with regard to taxation and services different if California is growing because of migration by outsiders rather than growing from California-born residents? What does the shift from a reliance on high migration to a homegrown majority mean for today’s taxpayers?

Are California’s elected leaders adequately responding to the shift in the state from two-thirds migrants, as it still is among the older generation, to two-thirds homegrown, as it is among the youth today? Have they even recognized the shift?

Do the voters and leaders feel a greater responsibility to educate and train the homegrown citizens of the state than they do for residents who moved to California from other states and nations?

We might also ponder who benefits from investment in education needed to create a new middle class of workers and consumers from the new generation—

the children themselves or the older voters? That discussion is sure to be shaped by the great expectations for the next generation of taxpayers to bear the costs of supporting so many retired baby boomers. Will the next generation be equipped to carry the load? The loss of retirement savings in the 401k collapse has raised other doubts among older homeowners, shared among one another as the nagging question, “who’s going to buy your house?” Of some significance, a college-educated workforce will also be able to pay a much better price.

**Toward a Better Future**

From whatever perspective one considers the emergence of California’s majority homegrown population, as a taxpayer, voter, elected leader, young or old, the clear conclusion would seem to be that our collective future has already been born and deserves our commitment to nurture it before it is too late. As Stephen Levy of the Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy wrote in February:

“[O]ur future is connected across age and ethnic groups and geography.... The retiring baby boomers will turn the state’s economy over to a younger generation who must fill the replacement jobs and build our future prosperity. The older generation cannot have a secure retirement unless the generations that follow have the skills to succeed.”

There is no foreseeable wave of migration that is coming from outside California to save us. If we fail to invest in the children of California we will only be shortchanging ourselves.
Immigrant arrivals are derived from end-of-decade census data based on the year residents said they came to the United States. This figure excludes the number that left the country, returning home or moved on to another state or nation. This count is less than gross migration (arrivals) and greater than net migration (arrivals minus departures).

2. This has been described as a process of “extrapolated expectations,” where previous trends are assumed to continue, which stands in sharp contrast to actual immigration in California, as explained in Myers (2007, chapters 2 and 5).

3. See the data on domestic and total migration in Appendix A.

4. The graphic design makes use of repeated elements, or small multiples, as the device is termed by Edward Tufte, the acclaimed master of the visual display of quantitative information (Tufte 1983).

5. Given that our earliest year of data is 1970, we cannot observe the oldest generations until they are already late in life. Conversely, the youngest generations are only observed in 2000 or 2007, before they have had time to advance very far. Data are drawn from the decennial censuses of 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and also from the 2007 American Community Survey. The latter data are used to represent 2010 in a conservative judgment that does not further expand the gap that has opened between 2000 and 2007. Subsequent projections into middle age for the youngest generations are described below.

6. The projection method assumes that the recent cohorts will follow a trajectory through subsequent ages that parallels the trajectory of preceding cohorts. To accomplish this, the incremental gains achieved by the preceding cohorts when they passed through the age ranges are added to the base value observed for the youngest cohort in 2007.

7. Census Bureau surveys ask about state or nation of birth, or else about place of residence either one or five years before the survey. For immigrants the surveys ask about year of arrival in the U.S., but neither immigrants or the native-born are asked year of arrival in the current state of residence. Other sources of information are also limited that could be used to infer about the place of one’s childhood. The national General Social Survey asks periodically about the place where respondents lived at age 16, and a recent Pew Research Center survey asked questions about the community where one grew up. However, neither survey has a large enough sample size to compare individual states and they do not report the residential locations of their respondents.

8. Felicity Chan made a special contribution to writing this section on place attachment.

9. Unemployment and poverty rates in California soared 2 to 3 points higher than the nation’s in 1993, after closely matching the nation’s economic indicators in 1989, and they stayed higher for a full decade (Myers 2007: 261-66, Figure A.1). See also the California analysis in Levy (2006) and the detailed analysis of three waves of demographic change in southern California in Pitkin (2006).

10. One-year mobility includes temporary residents who may have come to California only for a short stay, while the great majority of those temporary residents would not have lived in California five years earlier and so would not be detected by a 5-year mobility question. Hence, the mobility rates from the 1-year question are roughly three times higher than those from the 5-year question, if the 5-year mobility is annualized by dividing by 5.

11. There are very little data on immigrant departures from the U.S. and estimates of emigration rates are highly variable. A recent innovative study made use of the repeated observation design of the Current Population Survey to infer what fraction of foreign-born leave the country instead of relocating elsewhere in the U.S. Foreign-born residents with less than 5 years in the U.S. were three times as likely to emigrate as were those with 10 or more years of residence, and departure varied by age, with 3.9% of foreign born residents in the age group of 25-34 leaving the U.S. each year (Van Hook et al. 2006: table 2).

12. Extension of the one-year Van Hook estimates to the 5-year migration data is accomplished by applying an assumption of proportionality, namely that the total out-migration of the foreign-born over 5 years instead of one year should increase by the same ratio as the 5-year “other states” migration to the one-year “other states” migration.

13. The PPIC Statewide Survey is conducted under the direction of Mark Baldassare and is available at http://www.ppic.org/main/series.asp?i=12. The following analysis and conclusions are the responsibility of the authors and not Mark Baldassare or PPIC. Data for analysis were taken from the January and May surveys of 2008.


15. Tabulated from the Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters (2008).

References


Pastor, Manuel and Rhonda Ortiz (2009) “Immigrant Integration in Los Angeles: Strategic Directions for Funders.” Program for Environmental and Regional Equity, Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration, University of Southern California.


# Appendix A

## Trends in Migration and Natural Increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
<th>Total Migration</th>
<th>Domestic Migration</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>New Immigrant Arrivals per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>California</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>298,836</td>
<td>235,112</td>
<td>33,254</td>
<td>201,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>298,914</td>
<td>290,902</td>
<td>65,293</td>
<td>225,609</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>320,851</td>
<td>102,654</td>
<td>-108,656</td>
<td>211,310</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Los Angeles County</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>81,005</td>
<td>57,115</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>110,880</td>
<td>23,000</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>141,104</td>
<td>-41,122</td>
<td>-139,860</td>
<td>98,739</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>120,219</td>
<td>-108,268</td>
<td>-192,904</td>
<td>84,636</td>
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<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>100,536</td>
<td>17,057</td>
<td>-60,588</td>
<td>77,645</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>91,387</td>
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<td>-107,439</td>
<td>71,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit, E-6 report series; Census Bureau, decennial census and 2007 American Community Survey, reported year of immigrant arrival.
Percent Place of Birth by Race and Age in California, 1970-2007

for more information...

Copies of all project reports are downloadable from the web site of the Population Dynamics Research Group, School of Policy Planning & Development:

http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/popdynamics

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