

2005
Summary Report

California Demographic Futures

Projections to 2030, by Immigrant Generations,
Nativity, and Time of Arrival in U.S.

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About California Demographic Futures

The California Demographic Futures research program at the University of Southern California focuses on projections of population numbers and behaviors. Unlike projections issued by the U.S. Census Bureau or any state government in the nation, California Demographic Futures projections provide information on the nativity, decade of immigrant arrival, and immigrant generation of the population in a manner similar to age structure or racial composition. This new information can provide the public and policy makers a much sounder basis than previously available for understanding of the dimensions and pace of the state's demographic transformation.

The California Demographic Futures research program has been conducted since 1999 through the Population Dynamics Research Group of the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development (<http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/popdynamics/>). Research support for this project has been provided by the Provost's Office through the USC Urban Initiative (<http://urban.usc.edu/>) and through the Dean's Office of the School of Policy, Planning, and Development (<http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd>).

About the Authors

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Obtaining Copies of the Full Report

Information on obtaining copies of the full 2005 report, with methodology and additional exhibits, is available through the USC Urban Initiative or the School of Policy, Planning, and Development (see above).

Report Summary

This report offers a mid-decade view of California's demographic future, including how the state's population has changed in the last 25 years, a detailed profile of the current situation, and a new projection of changes in the coming 25 years, to 2030. We stand at the mid-point of a 50-year span during which the California population is being rapidly transformed. The California Demographic Futures projections place special emphasis on showing the growth and change of the foreign-born population and their native-born children, the "second generation."

The forecast data introduced in this report open a new window of understanding about who are California's residents, who they are becoming, and what are the implications for today's policies. Many taxing and spending decisions today are investments that will reverberate through our future. Such decisions should always be made with a grasp of the foreseeable consequences.

Certain elements of California's demographic transformation are generally understood, such as the growing share that is Latino (projected by the California Department of Finance to be 46.8% percent of the total in 2030). However, knowledge about Latinos is clouded by lack of knowledge about immigration, growing length of settlement and the new second generation. Understanding of the immigrant contribution to the future is weak at best: trends are only known through 2000 or 2004 because there are no projections of the foreign-born population. Without such information on the numbers of immigrants, their characteristics, and their children, over a long period of time, we cannot understand or prepare for the likely consequences of the changes under way today.

This critical information deficiency is addressed by the California Demographic Futures research program. Our results shed new light on the state's demographic transformation and reveal trends that have important implications for the state and everyone who has a stake in its future. This information is needed more urgently here than in any other state. California's foreign-born population has grown rapidly for more than a quarter century, and the foreign-born presence in California is now much greater than in other states. The 2000 census showed that

26.2% of California's population was foreign born, compared to 20.4% in New York, the state with the second highest foreign born percentage.

The immigration wave in recent decades became concentrated in California before spreading to other states. Thus, other states may be able to learn from the experience of California as it adjusts to the demographic transformation that is still ongoing. The impacts of immigrants in California and the state's policies on immigrants have at times been highly contentious issues but the overall demographic situation is widely acknowledged by all sides in these debates. Immigrants and their children will comprise a substantial and growing portion of California's work force, consumers, homebuyers, taxpayers, voters, and political leaders in coming years. For this reason, population projections that take explicit account of the immigrant dimensions in the overall population make-up serve a vital public purpose: they provide a critical information base for policy discussions and, we hope and expect, will also contribute to better public policy results.

KEY FINDINGS

A1. The growth of California's foreign-born population is slowing.

From 3.6 million in 1980 California's foreign-born population grew to 9.8 million in 2005, and, at the current level of immigration, is projected to grow further to 14.1 million in 2030. The share of the population comprised of the foreign born surged from 15.1% in 1980 to 27.0% in 2005 and thereafter is projected to rise much more slowly, reaching 29.8% in 2030 (Exhibit 1).

A2. The growth of the second generation is accelerating.

The second generation (the children of the immigrant first generation) has been much heralded as a feature of California society and it is beginning to grow rapidly (Exhibits 2 and 3). Among children ages 5 to 14, only 9.6% are foreign-born today, while a full 36.0% are second generation, more than double the share in 1980 of 14.8%. In fact, less than 10% of school age children are immigrants: 54.4% are third generation, 36.0% are second generation, and only 9.6% are foreign born. Among adults ages 25 to 34, only 5.6% were second generation in 1980, rising to 13.1% today, and anticipated to reach 26.7% in 2030.

A3. The growth of the working age population will be very different in coming years from the previous decades.

This growth will consist largely of the second generation children of immigrants and much less dependent on new immigrants. From 1980 to 2005, the working age population (18 to 64) in California increased by 8.0 million persons, while in

the period from 2005 to 2030 this growth will moderate to 6.1 million persons, in large part because of the retirement of the large baby boom generation (Exhibit 4). In the last 25 years, immigrants accounted for two-thirds of the working age population growth (66.9%), more than half of that from Latinos (Exhibit 4). In the coming 25 years, even at current levels of immigration, immigrants are projected to account for little more than one-third of working age population growth. Instead, residents of the second generation are projected to account for 59.5% of working age population growth, most of this Latino. When Latinos who are third generation are added to the mix, in the coming phase, Latinos are projected to account for 90.9% of the growth in working age population. Many of these future labor force entrants are in school today preparing for their future labor force roles.

A4. The immigrant population is achieving longer settlement.

Newcomers will be a smaller portion of the population; whereas, the previous waves of newcomers are adding up to much larger numbers of older and long-settled immigrants. Recent immigrant arrivals make up a progressively smaller portion of the foreign born. From 1970 to 1990, during the phase of accelerating immigration, half of all the foreign born were recently arrived (in the previous decade), but even with continued flows of new arrivals that fraction is receding and will decline to only one-third to one-quarter of the total foreign born in coming years (Exhibit 5). The average length of residence in the U.S. of immigrants is rapidly rising. Among Latinos, the average length of U.S. residence of the foreign-born rose from 12.1 years in 1980 to 14.6 in 2005 and is anticipated to rise to 22.5 years in 2030. Among Asians, the comparable figures are 10.0, 22.4, and 25.5 years. As described below, the growing preponderance of long-settled immigrants has several positive implications for a host of future social and economic outcomes.

A5. The California population is composed of layers of previous waves of new immigrants, native-born adults, and new cohorts of second and third generation children.

The complex composition of the California population is best described by the traditional population pyramid, redesigned as age-nativity pyramids to display foreign-born and native-born residents instead of the traditional age-sex format. Further, on each side of the pyramid we display the composite layers of successive arrival waves, among the foreign-born population, and second generation and third or more generations, among the native-born. The changes in California over half a century are portrayed in Exhibit 6, contrasting the age-nativity pyramids of 1980, 2005, and 2030. On the native-born side, the bulge of Baby Boomers grows older over time, and the ranks of the second generation swell in number 20 to 30 years in age below the peak ages of their immigrant parents. In 2005, different profiles are observed for each major race-ethnic group

(Exhibit 7). The African-American population has the fewest immigrants or second generation children in its mix, while the Asian and Pacific Islander group has the highest proportion foreign born. The Latino or Hispanic population group has the greatest prominence of the second generation.

Looking ahead to coming decades, economic, social, and political life in California will be transformed by the growth, settlement, and progress of immigrants and their California-born children.

OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY

The findings and insights presented in this report are made possible through the innovative population projection model of California Demographic Futures. Developed by John Pitkin, over the course of nearly a decade, this model yields projections that are more detailed than any in the nation.¹ A brief overview of the methodology is offered here (with a more detailed explanation contained in the full 2005 report).

B1. General description.

The population of California is modeled and projected using a *cohort-component method*. There are large differences across age-sex-race groups in the per capita rates of mortality, fertility and migration. By tracking the population of different birth cohorts as they age over time, the cohort-component method can therefore model variations over time in the total numbers of births, deaths, and migrants. Our model extends the generally used method to identify the population further by nativity, i.e., whether native- or foreign-born; for the foreign-born, by year of arrival in the U.S.; and, for the native-born, by nativity of mother, the “second” and “third” generations.²

We have made this extension not only because the foreign born have grown to be such an important part of California society, but also for two particular reasons. First, there is a growing body of research finding differences in demographic rates among nativities and arrival cohorts. Substantial differences in fertility between native-born and foreign-born women in California are reported by Johnson, Hill, and Heim (2001).³ Using vital statistics data (birth records) for 2001 and 2002 for California, we find that average lifetime fertility (the “total fertility rate”) for foreign-born Latinas was 1.46 children per woman (72%) above the average for native-born Latinas, and for foreign-born white women was .61 children (40%) higher than the average for native-born white women.

In addition, there are substantial differences in many other dimensions of social, economic, and political status and behavior according to people’s nativity, duration of U.S. residence, and immigrant generation. See for example Duleep and Regets (1997)⁴ on changes in earnings associated with increasing time since

migration, Wong (2004)⁵ on differences in political participation, Myers and Lee (1998)⁶ on homeownership, and Myers and Cranford (1998)⁷ on occupational mobility. Thus the policy relevance of population projections is substantially enhanced by explicitly addressing the immigrant dimensions.

One notable uncertainty is the future number of immigrants newly arrived in California. The model's assumptions hold immigration to the U.S. constant at the average level estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau for 2000-2003 and California's share of U.S. immigration constant at the level observed in 1997-2000, the latest for which detailed data on the composition of immigration is available (Census 2000). Our past research has shown that California's attraction share of the total U.S. immigrants has fallen from 36% in the 1980s to 24% in the 1990s.⁸ The fall-off was likely triggered by the deep recession in the state early in the 1990s, but the available data suggest only a weak resumption of California's attraction share even after economic recovery was long established. In brief, would-be immigrant residents have now discovered more attractive locales across the nation, due to lower housing prices and lower competition from other immigrants. Thus we believe California's current relative attraction of new immigrants will not return to pre-1990 levels and that current trends are likely to persist.

B2. Additional key projection assumptions.

Fertility rates, by age, race, and nativity, calibrated to 2001-2002 vital statistics births and model populations of women, with age-race trends from U.S. Bureau of the Census middle series projection of fertility (Hollman, Mulder, Kallen 2000)⁹;

Mortality rates, by age, sex, and race, calibrated to 2001-2002 vital statistics deaths and model populations, with age-race trends from U.S. Bureau of the Census middle series projection of mortality (Hollman, Mulder, Kallen 2000);

Foreign-born emigration rates, constant at population-based rates by age, sex, origin, and years since immigration (arrival), derived from rates estimated for 1980-1990 by Ahmed and Robinson (1994)¹⁰; and

Domestic migration rates, by age, race, and nativity, calibrated to and constant at 1995-2000 population-based rates from Census 2000 question on residence in 1995.

The resulting components of population change for California are summarized and shown for selected years—2002, 2005, and 2020—in Exhibit 8.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INCREASES IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS.

The result of the evolving transformation is that the immigrant stock (parents and children) of the future will be much more deeply settled and, as a result, more accomplished and civically integrated than witnessed in the recent past. This conclusion is based on an examination of four indicators of social and economic status, educational attainment, access to health insurance, voting participation, and English proficiency. Elsewhere we have addressed additional achievement outcomes such as poverty and homeownership, and the results are similar.¹¹

Failure to distinguish the effects of generation and length of residence creates a substantial risk of error in analysis and policy making. In the brief summaries that follow we identify erroneous inferences and overly pessimistic conclusions that might be drawn without the more detailed population projections.

The Latino population has been the fastest growing, and its average socioeconomic status has been fairly low. Accordingly, we test the impact of deepening immigrant settlement with regard to the changes in the Latino population, focusing especially on ages 25 to 34. This age group of young adults has pivotal importance because they are newly filling the labor force, entering their productive economic years, and establishing their own families. The group is also significant because it represents the most recent product of the state's educational system. Although many have immigrated as adults, increasingly these young Latino adults will be home grown.

The relevant data are summarized in two summary exhibits. Exhibit 9 summarizes the compositional change in this population group between 1980 and 2030. Exhibit 10 then shows the socioeconomic indicators that prevail at each stage of settlement, from recent immigrant to second or third generation. In each case, the indicators for the second generation far surpass the level observed for recent immigrants and are substantially above even the levels for the longest settled immigrants, who came to the U.S. as young children.

C1. Educational attainment and growing demand for higher education.

It is well-known that the Latino population has below average years of education. Some of that low attainment is due to the lower opportunities that were available to Latinos growing up in California, particularly in the older generation. Even among young adults ages 25 to 34 the average rate of high school completion is only 55.4%.¹² What is not recognized is how much of that low attainment is generated by the preponderance of new immigrants in the Latino population. At present, only 37.1% of recent immigrants are likely to be high school graduates, but this share rises to 61.6% of those who have resided 20 or more years in this country, and to 83.5% among the second generation (Exhibit 10). By 2030, a

much greater portion of young-adult Latinos will be long settled or second generation, and, all other things equal, the overall share who are high school graduates would be expected to rise substantially above the current level.

A number of erroneous conclusions can be reached if one relies only on educational data for all Latinos lumped together. For example, the low high school completion rates only partly reflect the failings of California schools.¹³ As researchers at RAND have emphasized, many Latinos immigrated after the age at which they would have entered U.S. high schools, and so they cannot be said to be drop outs here.¹⁴ A second erroneous conclusion is that low attainment levels are evidence of low interest in education or a low propensity to do well in school. In fact, the evidence of sharp increases in educational achievement among those with deeper roots in California indicates a readiness for educational upward mobility. This readiness lays the basis for even stronger gains if stimulated by proactive educational policies. Another erroneous inference is that the current average achievement levels are a good predictor of future achievement and demand for higher education by Latino youth and young adults. Unfortunately, this leads to systematic underestimation of the number of Latino high school graduates. A more consequential error is that this under prediction can lead to an undersizing of the opportunities for higher education. In particular, the community college system has been a particular gateway of opportunity for youth from immigrant families. Any reduction in capacity or quality in the community colleges will only block the achievement potential among Latinos.¹⁵ Given the importance of this group to our future work force, as revealed by our projections, public policy should strive to enhance, not stunt, their potential for higher education.

C2. Health insurance access and public costs of medical care.

The health care industry is in rapid transition, and the current structure of health insurance coverage will surely change markedly in coming decades. Nonetheless, it is instructive to see how much health care access would shift in light of the changing population characteristics we project. Without health insurance, residents place disproportionate reliance on emergency rooms for basic medical services, placing a strain on county budgets. The past surge in new immigrants has had a disproportionate effect on some counties. At present, only 31.4% of recent immigrants are reported to have health insurance, but this share rises to 64.9% of those who have resided 20 or more years in this country, and to 72.2% among the second generation (Exhibit 10).¹⁶ By 2030, a much greater portion of young-adult Latinos will be long settled or second generation, and, all other things equal, the overall share with health insurance would be expected to be substantially above the current level. This anticipated shift would progressively lower the population share who are uninsured and gradually lighten burdens on publicly funded health services.

One error that might follow from the absence of detailed forecast data would be to assume that Latinos in the future would be skewed toward the status of new immigrants and that they would be just as dependent as in the past. Given the growing numbers of Latinos, this would lead to a very discouraging outlook and the despondence could even undermine the public will to address health problems. The opposite error would be to assume that health insurance will automatically materialize for all our residents and that the problems of underinsurance will wither away. Sadly, such is not the case. Nonetheless, we believe our projections create some hope that health care problems are more manageable than implied by simple extrapolations of past trends.

C3. Voter participation and the representation gap.

The foundation of our democracy is self determination most tangibly expressed through the voting process. Children under age 18 are not eligible to vote, and we assume their parents will represent their interests. However, a representation gap has formed in California because immigrant parents who are not yet citizens cannot represent their native-born children. Moreover, the large and growing Latino population is generally underrepresented. Analysis of the 2004 presidential election has shown that Latinos account for 31% of the state's population, 23% of adult citizens eligible to vote, and only 18% of voters in the election.¹⁷ In the interest of an effective democracy it is desirable to have participation that is more equal to population.

As a benchmark, in the nation as a whole only 54.7% of adults are voter participants in a non-presidential year.¹⁸ This number results not only from reduced turnout of registered voters, but also from incomplete registration of those who are eligible to vote, as well as from the rising number of immigrants who have not naturalized to U.S. citizenship. Thus, overall voter participation is the net result of compound behaviors. Nonetheless, the 54.7% participation rate could be a useful benchmark. Among our focus group of California Latinos age 25 to 34, when we average data from surveys pertaining to presidential and non-presidential fall elections, only 0.8% of recent immigrants are likely to have voted, yet this share rises to 14.5% of those who have resided 20 or more years in this country, and to 39.8% among the second generation (Exhibit 10).¹⁹ By 2030, a much greater portion of young-adult Latinos will be long settled or second generation, and, all other things equal, the overall share who are active voters would be expected to be substantially above the current level. This anticipated upward shift in per capita voting participation indicates that the influence of the Latino population in the political process in California will progressively increase. Nonetheless, the current voting rates of second generation Latinos in California remain below the benchmark average for the nation, and so further education and efforts to foster political participation are needed to help bring greater equity in participation.

C4. English reliance.

A core concern of some observers, including the Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington, is that Latinos are immigrating more rapidly than they can be assimilated, resulting in a cultural bifurcation in America.²⁰ The key indicator Huntington uses is Latino immigrants' reliance on Spanish instead of English. In fact, many Latinos speak both English and Spanish, but here we use a measure of English dominance, based on language spoken at home and other factors. Huntington implies in his argument that Latinos will retain the same reliance on Spanish in the future as the past, even though the earlier population had a disproportionate number of new immigrants. Coupled with a growing Latino majority in the population, Huntington derives a future scenario where English use fades away and rising Spanish use divides the nation, beginning with California and the southwest.

Our data shed substantial light on this supposition. Here we focus again on Latinos ages 25 to 34, projected to become 51% of their age group by 2030. The California Demographic Futures projection is for a rising share of Latinos to become longer settled or second generation, not to remain as new immigrants. Data on language use suggest that only about 2% of recent Latino immigrants are likely to be English dominant, while this share is estimated to rise to around 10% of those who have resided 20 or more years in this country, and to 47% among the second generation and 78% in the third (Exhibit 10).²¹ Back in 1980, our data suggest that English dominance was much more prevalent among Latinos (36.2%) than in 2005 (28.2%), due to the greater numbers who were third generation in 1980. By 2005, the numbers of new immigrants had surged and the proportion third generation had declined (see Exhibit 9). Thus, the prevalence of English dominance declined. However, looking forward to 2030, based on the longer residency of immigrant Latinos and the growing second generation, the expected overall share that are English dominant can be expected to rise substantially to 38.4%, a level even higher than in 1980. Huntington's concerns exaggerate past trends and may pertain to only a transitional period in American history.

NEW UNDERSTANDINGS FROM THE NEW DATA

The above examples are but a few indicators of the changes that are implied by the long-term trends spotlighted by the California Demographic Futures projections. In point of fact, we would be hard pressed to identify a policy arena in which the immigrant make-up of California is not making an impact.

In general, measurements of long-term trends enable us to foresee the likely consequences of our actions today. Looking backward 25 years and then forward 25 years, we develop new understandings useful for a wide array of policy making. A few general observations follow.

D1. Immigrants are not Peter Pan.

Immigrants are not frozen in time. For lack of data that traces immigrant cohorts across the decades, many have come to think of them as unchanging. Each decade's wave of newcomers piles on top of the predecessors; no one grows older; and no one assimilates. But immigrants are not Peter Pan; they do evolve; and *their evolution will make as great a contribution to the transformation of the California population as their arrival.*

D2. Past trends should not be extrapolated.

Simple extrapolation of the experience of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s would lead us to expect continued acceleration of immigration, mounting proportions of newcomers, and a continuation of trends in social and economic characteristics that are dominated by newcomers. Instead, many of these trends have abated or even reversed, and the previous newcomers are now taking on the different characteristics of longer settled immigrants.

D3. We must act now to nurture the children of immigrants on whom we will depend.

The majority of our growing work force is going to come from the new second generation. With the Baby Boomers retiring in the next decade, we need skilled replacements. California can't run without more teachers, business leaders, police officers, retail store managers, and all the rest. Hopefully the children of immigrants also will be well prepared for their adult roles as tax payers, customers for California businesses, and buyers of homes that others hope to sell. It is never too soon to start preparing children for more productive futures.

D4. A longer view allows for better planning

We can plan more effectively for California's future if we better understand the demographic transition that we are in the midst of. Indeed, responsible leadership always exhibits prudent foresight.

End Notes

¹ An early version of the model was based on 1990 census data and covered only the U.S. as a whole (Pitkin, John and Patrick Simmons. 1996. "The Foreign-Born Population to 2010: A Prospective Analysis by Country of Birth, Age, and Duration of U.S. Residence." *Journal of Housing Research* 7:1.). The second model generation projected California as a separate region interacting with the rest of the U.S. (Pitkin, John. 2001. "Projecting the Population of California by Nativity and Period of Arrival to 2020." A California Demographic Futures Working Paper. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California). The current, third generation of the model generation draws on tests of the earlier projections against 2000 census data, incorporates those 2000 data and other current vital statistics, adds estimation of the second generation component within the native born, and makes other structural improvements.

² Substantial ambiguity plagues the definition of the second generation: are these the children of two immigrant parents, of one immigrant and one native-born parent, or of immigrant mothers? We opt for the latter definition because of the greater technical precision it enables with birth records and because of research showing that the mother's immigrant status has greater impact on the child's outcomes than does the father's status (Ramakrishnan, Karthick. 2004. "Second-Generation Immigrants? The "2.5 Generation" in the United States." *Social Science Quarterly* 85(2):380-399). According to the 2004 Current Population Survey, fewer adults age 18 or older are classified as second generation under the strict two-parent rule (14.6%) than under the looser, one-parent definition (20.8%). The mother-based definition yields an intermediate prevalence of second generation status (17.6%), and we apply that definition consistently over time in our model.

³ Johnson, Hans P., Laura Hill, and Mary Heim. 2001. "New Trends in Newborns: Fertility Rates and Patterns in California." *California Counts: Population Trends and Profiles* 3(1). San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

⁴ Duleep, Harriet Orcutt and Mark Regets. 1997. "Measuring Immigrant Wage Growth Using Matched CPS Files," *Demography* 34(2):239-249.

⁵ Wong, Janelle. 2000. "The effects of age and political exposure on the development of the party identification among Asian American and Latino immigrants in the United States." *Political Behavior* 22:341-371.

⁶ Myers, Dowell and Seong Woo Lee. 1998. "Immigrant Trajectories into Homeownership: A Temporal Analysis of Residential Assimilation?" *International Migration Review* 32: 593-625.

⁷ Myers, Dowell and Cynthia Cranford. 1998 "Temporal Differentiation in the Occupational Mobility of Immigrant and Native-Born Latino Workers." *American Sociological Review* 63: 68-93.

⁸ The data are highlighted in Myers, Dowell, John Pitkin and Julie Park. 2004. "California's Immigrants Turn the Corner." Urban Initiative Policy Brief. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California.


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- ⁹ Hollman, Frederick W., Tammany J. Mulder, and Jeffrey E. Kallen. 2000. "Methodology and Assumptions for the Population Projections of the United States: 1999 to 2100." *Population Division Working Paper No. 38*. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- ¹⁰ Ahmed, Bashir, and J. Gregory Robinson. 1994. "Estimates of Emigration of the Foreign-Born Population: 1980–1990." *Population Estimates and Projections, Technical Working Paper No. 9*. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- ¹¹ Myers, Dowell. 2004. *Cohorts and Socioeconomic Progress*. The American People series, Population Reference Bureau and Russell Sage Foundation; Myers, Dowell and Julie Park. 2004. "The New Dominance of the First Generation in Post-1965 Immigrant Assimilation." Paper prepared for the meetings of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco, CA.
- ¹² The educational attainment rates reported in this section are derived from the March Current Population Surveys of 1998, 2000, and 2002, pooling these data to achieve a more substantial sample size for California Latinos in this target age group. High school completion is slightly higher in these data than reported in the 2000 census, but the latter does not collect information on the generational status of native-born residents.
- ¹³ These failings are amply documented by the Diversity Scorecard Project conducted at the USC Center for Urban Education.
- ¹⁴ Vernez, George, Allan F. Abrahamse, and Denise D. Quigley. 1996. *How Immigrants Fare in U.S. Education*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
- ¹⁵ Again, the findings from the Diversity Scorecard Project are instructive.
- ¹⁶ March Current Population Surveys 2000 and 2002; A similar effect of duration of U.S. residence was found in a study by Howard Greenwald, Suzanne O’Keefe and Mark DiCamillo, 2003, "California’s Working Latinos and health Insurance: New Facts and Policy Challenges."
- ¹⁷ Table 4 in California Opinion Index. January 2005. "A Digest Summarizing California’s Vote in the 2004 Presidential Election." San Francisco, CA : The Field Research Corporation.
- ¹⁸ Census Bureau. November 2002 Current Population Survey
- ¹⁹ Census Bureau. November 1998, 2000, and 2003 Current Population Survey
- ²⁰ Huntington, Samuel. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- ²¹ Pew Hispanic Center; Census 2000 for language used at home.

Exhibit 1 California's Population by Immigrant Generations, 1980 to 2030

% of Total	1980	2005	2030
Foreign Born	15.1%	27.0%	29.8%
Second Generation	12.0%	17.2%	20.6%
Third+ Generation	73.0%	55.8%	49.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Foreign Born	3,571,600	9,907,635	14,792,364
Second Generation	2,843,080	6,311,642	10,210,851
Third+ Generation	17,309,960	20,469,530	24,586,534
Total	23,724,640	36,688,807	49,589,749

Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0


Exhibit 2 Population Composition, by Recency of Immigration and Generation




Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 3 Population Composition of Age Groups, by Recency of Immigration and Generation


Age 5 to 14




Age 18 to 24



Age 25 to 34



Age 65 to 74



Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 4
Share of Growth in Working Age Population
Accounted for by Different Population Segments

25-year Change

<i>By Nativity and Generation</i>	1980 to 2005	2005 to 2030
Native-Born, Third Generation	22.4	1.1
Native-Born, Second Generation	10.8	59.5
Foreign-Born	66.9	39.3
Total Change	100.0 8,049,383	100.0 6,064,961

<i>By Nativity, Generation, and Hispanic Origin</i>	1980 to 2005	2005 to 2030
Native-Born, Third Generation		
Hispanic	10.1	23.9
Other	12.2	-22.7
Native-Born, Second Generation		
Hispanic	10.5	43.3
Other	0.3	16.2
Foreign-Born		
Hispanic	39.7	23.7
Other	27.1	15.7
Total Change	100.0 8,049,383	100.0 6,064,961


Notes:

"Working age" is defined as 18 to 64;

"Other" race groups include all non-Hispanics (white, black, Asian, etc.)


Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 5 Immigrant Share of the Population, 1970 to 2030







Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 6 Age-Nativity Pyramids, with Arrival Decade and Generation



Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 7 Age-Nativity Pyramids by Race and Hispanic-Origin Population of California, 2005




Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.C

Exhibit 8
Estimated and Projected Annual Components of Change
in California Population, Selected Years

	2002	2005	2020
Births			
Native-born mother	283,268	312,700	405,696
Foreign-born mother	246,089	245,694	247,771
Total	529,357	558,394	653,467
Deaths			
Native-born	185,616	195,574	213,185
Foreign-born	47,560	54,046	88,146
Total	233,176	249,620	301,331
International migration			
Immigration	312,626	341,456	341,456
Foreign-born emigration	60,416	62,625	74,105
Net immigration (emigration) of native-born	(25,286)	(25,203)	(25,234)
Net	226,924	253,628	242,117
Domestic migration			
In			
Native-born population	390,069	330,672	374,680
Foreign-born population	86,570	79,303	102,535
Total	476,639	409,975	477,215
Out			
Native-born population	320,768	409,790	449,303
Foreign-born population	82,260	105,624	121,185
Total	403,028	515,414	570,488
Net			
Native-born population	69,301	(79,118)	(74,623)
Foreign-born population	4,310	(26,321)	(18,650)
Total	73,611	(105,439)	(93,273)
Total change	596,716	456,963	500,980
Projected (estimated) population 1/1	34,996,578	36,688,807	44,352,433

Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 9
Percent of California Latinos Age 25-34 who are Recent Immigrants, Longer Settled, or Second and Third Generation Native-borns



Source: California Demographic Futures, version 5.0

Exhibit 10
Percent of California Latinos Age 25-34 with Each Status by Recency of Immigration or Generation of Native-Born

	Current Average	Recent	10-19 yrs	20+ yrs	2nd gen	3rd gen
High School Graduate	55.4	37.1	39.1	61.6	83.5	82.4
Health Insurance	55.7	31.4	49.1	64.9	72.2	75.6
Voter Participation	14.5	0.8	3.6	14.5	39.8	41
English Dominance	28.2	2	3	11	47	78

Source: Current Population Survey, 1998, 2000, and 2002; Pew Hispanic Center, 2002; 2000 Census