

Distributive politics, the electoral connection, and the antebellum US Congress: The case of military service pensions

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Abstract

We investigate the rise of federal military pensions in the antebellum US Congress to examine whether key aspects of the contemporary electoral connection were present in earlier historical eras. Overall, the political responses of members of Congress to pressures for military service pensions reveal that the quest for credit-claiming opportunities significantly shaped the adoption and evolution of this type of distributive legislation. Analyzing key legislative activity from 1818 to 1832, we find that members' electoral interests gave rise to a particularistic and often inefficient system of benefits. Specifically, what began as a relatively simple program to provide for disabled Revolutionary War veterans grew into a broader entitlement-style program based on military service that legislators carefully cultivated in order to maximize their prospects for subsequent political advantage. Our analysis thus reveals that crucial features of the electoral connection were indeed present in the antebellum-era Congress, a finding that broadens our collective understanding of the early foundations of American political development.

Keywords

Congress; elections; pensions

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I. Introduction

In his seminal work, Mayhew (1974) argues that members of Congress, driven by electoral motivations, actively seek out opportunities to claim credit for government action, often by engaging in distributive politics to steer the flow of government resources to their constituents. While such behavior typifies most contemporary legislators, the extent to which similar dynamics characterized the pre-modern Congress is less clear. As a result, scholars have begun to examine whether nineteenth-century members of Congress (MCs), both before and after the Civil War, were motivated by electoral considerations and rewarded or punished based on their responsiveness to constituents. Research on the antebellum era has focused almost exclusively on electoral accountability for position-taking activity, in essence examining votes on what Carmines and Stimson (1980) term 'easy' issues – those matters, like a congressional pay raise, that elicit a gut response by voters of varying sophistication – to show that members who were out of step with constituent preferences were punished at the polls. Thus, there is some evidence that modern perspectives about legislative-constituent dynamics apply prior to the advent of the electoral reforms and growing careerism of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

We know less, however, about other aspects of the 'electoral connection' that may have existed in the early Congress. While Mayhew argues that position-taking is one method by which MCs carve out a career, he suggests that other activities will be more attractive to and manageable by members. In this paper, we explore whether MCs in the pre-Civil War era shaped policy with an eye to particularism and its corresponding opportunities to claim electoral credit. With few exceptions, accounts of distributive politics in Congress have not probed very far back into the institution's history, leaving its applicability in the antebellum era a largely unexplored aspect of congressional development (Wilson, 1986).

We argue that members in the antebellum Congress possessed compelling incentives not only to respond to constituency preferences, but also to seek out opportunities to provide tangible benefits to voters. In particular, Revolutionary War pensions appear to be an excellent example of electorally-motivated distributive politics during an era in which the electoral connection is typically thought to apply only weakly, if at all. Careful study of the policy and the broader political context reveals striking parallels to the key characteristics of modern distributive politics – both in the US and the comparative context. Additionally, our study speaks to broader issues in the realm of American political development, as it reveals a pattern of policy evolution – from broad to particularistic in scope – that is very similar to that of the Civil War pension system in the postbellum period. The analogous histories suggest that the latter cannot be fully appreciated without incorporating its revolutionary antecedents.

We begin by reviewing the literature on the electoral connection in Congress, with an emphasis on research that focuses on the antebellum era, and move then to a discussion of the key foundations of credit claiming on which we build our analysis: the presence of careerism and, following from that motivation, the

characteristics of a credit-claiming style of distributive politics. Next, we sketch out a brief history of military pensions in the early US, and then delve into our analysis, beginning with the Pension Act of 1818, which we argue laid the foundation for successive rounds of particularistic policymaking. We then examine the continuing evolution of revolutionary pensions as a distributive issue with distinct credit-claiming features, culminating in an analysis of the Pension Act of 1832. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our main findings and their implications for understanding the distributive basis of politics, and the electoral connection more generally, in the antebellum Congress.

2. The electoral connection in US Congressional history

By most accounts, nineteenth-century congressional elections were fundamentally different than their modern counterparts. MCs were not 'single-minded seekers of reelection', but rather served for a limited duration before returning home; as a result, Congress was not a professionalized institution populated by careerists (Polsby, 1968; Price, 1975). Moreover, the institutional elements of electoral politics diverged in significant ways from the contemporary era, as elections were characterized by party ballots, strong presidential tides, and limited independence on the part of candidates (see, e.g., Bense, 2004; Engstrom and Kernell, 2005) – to say nothing of the indirect nature of selection to the US Senate. This has led scholars to question the extent to which present fixtures of Congress, such as electoral accountability and the prominence of the electoral connection, characterized earlier periods of American history (see, e.g., Formisano, 1974; Swift, 1987–88).

Recently, however, a revisionist literature has emerged to counter the traditional accounts, by exploring the implications of Mayhew's (1974) account historically. Scholars in this new tradition contend that pre-Progressive era legislators, while not single-minded reelection seekers, were still careerists within the broader political context in which they operated (Aldrich, 1995; Kernell, 1977; Stewart, 1989). That is, while nineteenth-century legislators may not have focused on a career in Congress, they *were* politically ambitious – and they *were* interested in maintaining a *political career*. And since nineteenth-century political careers were largely built within the party organization (Aldrich, 1995), MCs needed to do things to keep their constituents happy, like taking favorable public positions on roll-call votes and, as we will argue, routinely engaging in credit claiming.¹ This was true for two reasons. First, the nineteenth-century career-building process involved state and local politics. As Kernell (1977: 691) notes: 'A typical career sequence early in the nineteenth century would be local office, state house, US house, and back to the state house'. This meant that the voters that MCs represented might very well be their constituents at some future date when they sought election to a sub-national office.² Second, *party elites* cared about keeping constituents happy; they wanted to insure that congressional districts remained within their particular party column, regardless of whether that district was represented by the same candidate or not. MCs thus needed to satisfy party leaders, since those leaders could affect their




Figure 1. Political experience of freshman House members, 1st (1789–91) through 55th (1897–99) Congresses.

Source: ICPSR and McKibbin (1997).

chances of maintaining a successful political career, whether inside or outside of Congress.³

That early nineteenth-century MCs were political careerists can be illustrated by tracking legislators' political experience before and after they served in Congress. Figure 1 plots the proportion of freshman House members with prior/subsequent political experience between the 1st (1789–91) and 55th (1897–99) Congresses (ICPSR and McKibbin, 1997). As the data demonstrate, a sizeable and stable majority of MCs in the late-eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century – 81.2 percent – possessed political experience before serving in Congress. Moreover, subsequent political experience was also significant and displayed a clear pattern of decline over time. During the First Party System, a majority of House freshmen (51.2 percent) held a political position after their stay in Congress. Averages for the next two periods were 45.6 and 43.6 percent, respectively, and by the late-nineteenth century, during the post-Reconstruction era, members actively sought *congressional* careers; as a result, subsequent political experience among House freshman had declined to 34.9 percent.

Recent studies in the revisionist tradition have focused mostly on explaining one key aspect of the electoral-connection story: whether antebellum MCs took positions on roll calls that corresponded to district preferences (Baughman, 2008a; Meinke, 2007), and related to that, whether divergence from constituent preferences resulted in electoral sanctions (Bianco et al., 1996; Carson and Engstrom, 2005). We build on this responsiveness-based research by exploring the degree to which an equally consequential aspect of the electoral connection existed in the antebellum era: specifically, whether MCs sought opportunities to engage in *credit claiming*, by crafting policies with a particularistic eye to electorally-relevant constituencies. Similar to Baughman (2008b), who focuses on post road provisions, we examine a particular distributive issue – military service pensions – and trace its development over time. Military pensions were a major policy concern in the early-

nineteenth century, and legislators realized the distributive potential (and attendant electoral benefits) of catering to the needs of the Revolutionary War veterans. In his history of federal military pensions, Glasson (1918: 83) characterizes the early development of pension policy as a 'scramble' to the 'pork barrel'.

Of course, pension legislation is not the archetypal distributive policy that contemporary scholarship tends to associate with credit-claiming opportunities; rather, the quintessential portrayal involves an 'earmarked' project and its associated press releases, unveiling ceremonies, and photo opportunities. Lowi (1964: 690) distinguishes 'distributive' benefits from other policies by their allocation system, which does not follow a general rule, and Mayhew (1974: 53) notes the electoral value of such 'particularized benefits' based on the opportunities they afford members to personally claim credit with a specific individual or entity for having brought about a particular government action. While these credit-claiming opportunities are often portrayed narrowly in the context of omnibus legislative programs containing easily divisible projects, we will argue that a more expansive reading of the literature on distributive politics offers many insights regarding how a broad program like military pensions can be leveraged by MCs to claim political credit.

Members of Congress are primarily interested in opportunities to deliver benefits to – and thereby curry favor with – target audiences. Mayhew (1974: 60–61) describes instances in which even programmatic legislation and playing to attentive audiences beyond the 'broad electorate' may reap electoral rewards. Later, Mayhew (2001: 251–252) reflects that while the electoral connection is 'often simplified to say that members ... cater directly to their home-district voters by way of pork-barrel projects, pleasing positions, et cetera' the argument 'entails catering to "relevant political actors"' – those who can bring to bear useful resources on election day. Arnold (1990) amplifies this view, noting the importance of tending to organized interests even in the context of broad policies. These perspectives clearly expand the scope of the electoral connection to incorporate appeals and activities directed at select constituencies, of which veterans have been among the most prominent and well-organized (Skocpol, 1992).

Still others have depicted an even broader realm of distributive politics. In contrast to a narrow rendering of credit-claiming opportunities, one might envision a continuum of distributive benefits. At one extreme are easily divisible – and to coalition leaders, easily packaged – pools of bite-sized particularized benefits. At the other extreme are policies that, while seemingly involving broad 'public goods' based on their programmatic focus, may lend themselves to 'morselization' – a process in which benefits are targeted geographically according to political rather than economic criteria (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). While this latter theme has not received much attention in studies of American politics, a growing body of comparative research demonstrates that legislatures operating in electoral contexts characterized by personal-vote seeking tend toward particularism, resulting in decreased efficiency within even broad categories of spending such as education (Hicken and Simmons, 2008). Moreover, in some instances the inefficiencies of personalistic systems are marked by overt corruption (Chang, 2005; Cox and Thies, 1998), which might be viewed as the most extreme form of particularism. As we will

describe, pension politics in the nineteenth century were consistently (and intentionally) constructed so as to leave significant discretion at the local level and were notorious for corruption, with frequent charges of graft and widespread fraud prevailing.

Legislators who choose fiscal means to deliver electorally-valuable resources – votes, money, publicity, and so forth – are also likely to do so with an eye to the electoral calendar. Tufte (1978) argues that incumbents prefer policies that produce palpable and attributable benefits that can be easily manipulated, targeted, and timed according to the electoral cycle; a considerable amount of evidence suggests that transfer payments such as veterans' benefits and social security fit the bill (Franzese, 2002; see also Levitt and Snyder, 1995).⁴ Since this evidence is based largely on twentieth-century transfer payments, the pattern should be even more evident in the nineteenth century since key modern features – distribution according to rigid statutes among a population that is fairly evenly spread across regions and districts – were not in force. Members seeking to claim credit for government action will likely gravitate toward policies in which benefits are heavily concentrated and costs are more diffuse, 'framing laws to give a particularistic cast to matters that do not obviously require it' (Mayhew, 1974: 128; see also Weingast et al., 1981).⁵ Finally, such policies are likely supplied in 'regular quantities' (Mayhew 1974: 57) through repeated action – in the form of frequent renewals, reauthorizations, upward cost adjustments, and the like – to provide election-year reminders (Tufte, 1978).

For these various reasons, we believe that credit claiming can and does occur on policies beyond those falling into the most restrictive types of particularism, and this motivates our investigation of credit claiming in the realm of military pensions in the early nineteenth century. Our basic account is as follows. As policy develops, we expect MCs to be attentive to the interests not of a broad collective, but rather to narrower, electorally-relevant constituencies – what Arnold (1990) terms 'attentive publics' – who are distributed unevenly across states and districts. Furthermore, growing out of a weak partisan context in which members seek policies of a less programmatic nature in order to differentiate themselves, policy should be 'morse-lized' – essentially drawn up in a way that affords some leeway in implementation, thereby creating opportunities for selectivity and even corruption. Additionally, policies should be adopted in accordance with the electoral cycle, and members will observe and take advantage of electorally-timed credit-claiming opportunities. A key distinction to make here, as well, is that credit claiming is much more credible upon the initial adoption or subsequent modification of a program – even if it is redistributive in nature – than when a policy has been in existence and largely unchanged for a period of time.⁶ Finally, we can draw inferences from the members' own behavior – what they say and do about legislation as it develops. Should we observe MCs accusing their colleagues of bald electioneering, failing to tighten rules for implementation of the legislation, pointing to overt particularism, and advertising their legislative record, then we will consider this to be further evidence in support our account.

The central component of our analysis relies on an examination of the legislative record – both the debates and the disposition of the issues raised in the proceedings

– to detail the evolution of pension policy. We also look beyond Congress to the electoral and public arenas to capture a more complete picture of the nature of pension politics. The observational data drawn from debates, news coverage, members' efforts to advertise their accomplishments, and the nature of the legislation itself – in terms of its timing, particularistic construction, and attentiveness to electorally-relevant constituencies – allow us to assess the distributive nature of antebellum military service pensions. We pair this qualitative evidence with statistical analysis of the roll call record to more systematically explore the determinants of members' decisions and directly assess the role that geographic, distributive interests played in the development of pension policies.

Measuring constituency interests – as a way to track demand for (and supply of) distributive policy – is accomplished in several ways. First, we begin with NOMINATE scores – the ubiquitous measure of the revealed preferences of MCs in roll call voting – recognizing that their substantive meaning during the period of our analysis is unique. As Poole and Rosenthal (2007) describe, roll call votes during the Era of Good Feelings (which lasted from about 1816 to 1824) fit the standard spatial model poorly, with the first NOMINATE dimension embodying the regional division between northeasterners and southerners/westerners – all of whom can be loosely considered Jeffersonians. Throughout history, the second NOMINATE dimension has varied both in substantive content, tapping different issue-based cleavages, and importance. And in fact, the second dimension picks up the issue of military pensions on multiple occasions in the early 1800s (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007). Since NOMINATE is somewhat blunt, we also incorporate a set of regional indicators (Mid-Atlantic, South, and West, with New England as the baseline category) that provide slightly more fine-grained proxies for the sectional interests we describe. Finally, we include measures of the veteran and pensioner populations that more directly tap into geographic-based demand to better capture preferences for pension legislation.⁷ For key roll calls, we compare a range of models – some based on individual factors, others combining factors – to determine which covariates are significant in explaining individual vote choice.⁸ Our expectation is that variables tapping constituency interests (and thereby demand for distributive policy) will play a major role in explaining members' vote choices on pension legislation, especially as the pension issue became increasingly particularistic in nature. The results allow us to determine the degree to which MCs' revealed preferences demonstrate the sort of geographically-targeted motivations we expect to find in the context of a distributive policy aimed at cultivating electoral benefits.

3. The early political history of military service pensions

The history of military pensions in the United States traces its origins to the very beginnings of the nation.⁹ The first national pension law was passed in the early stages of the Revolutionary War, on August 26, 1776, and promised half pay for life to all officers, soldiers, and sailors who suffered injuries in battle that prevented them from subsequently maintaining an independent livelihood. A revision to this law was made in 1778, extending the benefits of the 1776 law to those who had

been injured prior to its enactment (and thus covering all those who were disabled since the Battles of Lexington and Concord on April 9, 1775). A further revision occurred in 1782, clarifying the options that wounded personnel had available to them – a position in the ‘Invalid Corp’ or discharge with a small monthly pension. Thus, the basis of early pension legislation was geared toward the relief of invalids, wherein the federal government accepted responsibility for the disabilities combatants incurred as a result of the war with the British.

A parallel track of service-related pensions also emerged in the 1770s. Advocates like General George Washington pointed to the British system, in which officers received half pay for life upon completion of a defined term of service, and argued that Revolutionary War officers should be granted a similar provision should they remain in service through completion of the war. After a series of heated debates, in which opponents raised concerns about privilege, fairness, and the creation of a class of placemen, Congress passed a compromise law on May 15, 1778 that instituted a half-pay service pension for officers to take effect at the conclusion of the war, but limited its coverage to seven years. A subsequent law in 1780 extended these half-pay provisions to the widows of officers killed in battle. Pensioners were given the option to accept commutation certificates, interest-bearing government securities equal to five years full pay, in lieu of the half-pay benefit. Many chose to do so, although shortly thereafter, the reliability of the certificates declined, forcing some to sell their certificates to private investors at a considerable loss.

These two tracks would define pension legislation into the nineteenth century. Minor administrative alterations were made in 1792, 1803, and 1805, before a major reorganization of invalid pension policy was carried out in 1806. Yet, service-related pensions failed to gain additional traction. Charity and just compensation for wartime disabilities were viewed as the appropriate response by the government; rewards couched in terms of ‘gratitude for service’ only produced contentious discussions and cries of extortion. Service-related pensions would reemerge, however, in the context of promoting ‘national harmony’. Their adoption (and furtherance over time) would result from more particularistic motives. Jensen (2003) argues that the expansion of the pension system in the early nineteenth century established important precedents for American state development in the realm of selective entitlement – particularly in overcoming philosophical objections to entitlement that Skocpol (1992) suggests were surmounted later in the context of Union Army veterans of the Civil War. We contend that the expansion of revolutionary pensions was also characterized by important distributive interests – grounded in the electoral credit-claiming motivations of MCs – that correspond in important ways with the post-Civil War expansion. It is these dynamics that we will highlight in our analysis.

4. The Revolutionary War Pension Act of 1818

After his election to the presidency in November 1816, James Monroe toured the nation, basking in the patriotism of the time, as citizens cheered the end of the War of 1812 and hearkened back to the inspiration of the revolutionary generation.

Monroe, a Revolutionary War veteran himself, played up these patriotic feelings and underscored the contribution of the revolutionary generation, especially the war veterans, in the birth and development of the Republic. This patriotic fervor also served his general political goal of producing a nation free of party strife that would usher in a lengthy 'era of good feelings' (Hofstadter, 1969).

Once in office, Monroe continued to promote his idea of non-partisan unification, and saw the patriotism embodied in the revolutionary spirit as an effective tool. During his travels, he was occasionally approached by veterans, often infirm and indigent, in search of federal relief (Resch, 1999). He made no commitment to them, but saw their travails as a useful issue to undergird his call for national unity. In his opening message to Congress on December 2, 1817, Monroe asked for pension legislation for indigent Revolutionary War veterans, many of whom were not covered under existing federal or state laws, stating: 'These men have a claim on the gratitude of their country, and it will do honor for their country to provide for them' (*Annals of Congress*, 15-1, p. 19).¹⁰ Adding to Monroe's enthusiasm for new pension legislation was the prosperous condition of the nation, as a large federal surplus existed thanks to revenues generated from a new protective tariff instituted in 1816. The call for increased aid for veterans was warmly received by members of the 15th Congress (1817–19), almost 70 percent of whom were new, elected in large part as a refutation of the choice made by members of the previous Congress to vote themselves a sizeable (and retroactive) pay raise.¹¹ Thus, as the 15th Congress opened, members were looking for opportunities to provide for constituents, rather than risk being viewed (in some way) as providing for themselves. The absence of clear partisan demarcations likely made non-ideological, non-programmatic policies of a distributive nature all the more attractive to members. A new pension policy for veterans seemed to fit the bill.

Action began in the House. On December 3, 1817, a committee chaired by Joseph Bloomfield (DR-NJ) was appointed to prepare pension legislation in accordance with the President's message (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 405).¹² Bloomfield was a Revolutionary War veteran, and his selection was viewed as evidence of the House's desire to pass a new pension bill. Just over a week later, on December 12, Bloomfield's committee reported a bill that would create the first general service-related pension in US history. Any soldier who served in the Revolutionary War – whether in the army, a militia, or a state unit – and was either reduced to indigence or unable to support himself through his own labor would receive half-pay (based on war-time rank) for life (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 445). Thus, pensions would be granted to veterans regardless of their length or type of service. It was not *wholly* a service pension, as there was a clear indigence component, and veterans were required to present proof of their 'incapacity' (as well as their service record) to a judge before being placed on the pension rolls. Still, the bill's general thrust was to reward service, rather than provide charity for invalidity, which had been the basis of most pension policies of the past.

Debate on the Bloomfield-committee bill began on December 19. John Linn (DR-NJ) raised concerns about the costs of the pension program and moved that eligibility be limited to those who served in the Continental army. Bloomfield

assuaged Linn's fears, and those of others, about the costs of the program, suggesting that his estimates placed the necessary appropriation within manageable parameters, especially at a time when the Treasury was flush. However, William Henry Harrison (DR-OH) touched on Linn's argument from a different angle, arguing that certain persons should be limited in their eligibility for a pension, not due to concerns regarding program costs, but because their service was not sufficient in comparison to many who fought in the war. Harrison suggested that a requirement of six months military service was prudent, so as to honor the sacrifice of 'true' veterans. Later, John Strother (DR-VA), incensed by Linn and Harrison's arguments, bristled at the suggestion that militia and state troops, even short-timers, would be excluded from the pension rolls. The bulk of said militia and state troops were from the Mid-Atlantic and South, underscoring his resistance to their exclusion (Resch, 1988). Not to be undone, Harrison responded by moving an amendment to the committee bill, calling for pensions to be granted only to those who were part of the 'military establishment' at the end of the war or who had served previously for at least three years (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 499). Bloomfield, sensing the issue getting away from the committee, asked leave for the committee to sit again, which was granted.

On December 23, Harrison's amendment was taken up and rejected. Discussion continued, and additional amendments were considered. One successful amendment was offered by Albion Parris (DR-MA), who added officers and mariners who served in the navy to the eligible list (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 508). The next day, William Lowndes (DR-SC) moved to recommit the bill to committee, with instructions to install a three-year service requirement for pension eligibility, along the lines proposed by Harrison earlier (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 509). This requirement was amended down to one year, but the fate of the legislation was in doubt, as supporters of the original bill feared that recommitment could result in additional provisions being tacked on (Resch, 1999).

These fears proved to be unfounded, however, as Richard Johnson (DR-KY) made an impassioned speech to preserve the sanctity of the committee bill, urging members to forsake their squabbles and recognize that the deserving veterans had waited long enough for their rewards. After some additional debate, the recommitment motion was defeated by a roughly three-to-one margin, and the committee bill, only lightly amended to include navy personnel, was 'decided' in the affirmative without a division' (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 512).¹³

The Senate, however, would prove to be a major hurdle. The House bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and on January 19, 1818, the committee reported back an amended bill, limiting benefits to those who were either 'active' at the end of the war or had served for at least a three-year period during the war. Moreover, benefits were limited to *army and navy veterans*, denying access to those who served in the militia or state units, and proof of indigence or incapacity was no longer required (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 116). In one historian's estimation, the committee, in reporting the legislation as it did, 'upheld a strict interpretation of the Constitution that would deny government the power to create a pension establishment' (Resch, 1999: 106–107).

The Senate membership would be pragmatic, however, recognizing the same broad-based distributive elements in the pension bill that appealed to House members. While Monroe and some MCs presented the proposed pension legislation as a public benefit during a time of large federal surplus, many MCs saw it as a source of particularistic benefits. Stated differently, members saw in the pension legislation the possibility of selectively extending 'goodies' to their constituents, an opportunity made all the more attractive by the increasingly regional divisions of the time.¹⁴ The first example of this occurred on February 13, 1818, when a small group of strict constructionists, led by James Barbour (DR-VA), Nathaniel Macon (DR-NC), and William Smith (DR-SC), moved to postpone the bill indefinitely. The motion failed by a vote of 3–30, with only Barbour, Macon, and Smith voting in favor (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 200). In defeating postponement, the Senate 'resoundingly rejected republican principles opposed to creating a pension establishment. (Resch, 1999: 113). The question now was: what would such a pension establishment look like?

After two amendments were rejected handily, tensions ratcheted up on February 18, when Isham Talbot (DR-KY) moved to add a 'means test' to the bill, which would employ a two-tiered property requirement (one for soldiers, the other for officers) to prevent wealthy veterans from receiving a pension. While Talbot's amendment was viewed by many as elitist, it also played into class-based politics and thus drew some support from members concerned about the costs of the pension program. In the end, Talbot's amendment failed on a 14–18 vote (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 211). The Senate then adjourned.

We begin our systematic look at the legislative record with a logit estimation of the means-test vote, the results of which appear in the first panel of Table 1 and show that the first- and second-dimension D-NOMINATE scores are both statistically significant, together explaining 87.5% of the individual vote choices. A simple party model (reported in the Supporting Information, hereafter SI) captures only 75%.¹⁵ Moreover, a model employing regional indicators and another including all of the preceding variables provide no additional explanatory leverage.¹⁶ Since NOMINATE captures region and various specific issues during this period (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007), the results are suggestive of a geographically-oriented fault line.

The pension bill was picked up once again on February 25, when Abner LaCock (DR-PA) successfully moved an amendment to reduce the eligibility requirement from three years of service to two on an 18–13 vote (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 220). Later that same day, Talbot proposed further reducing the eligibility requirement from two years to nine months. This amendment passed on a 16–15 vote (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 221). With regard to these votes, Resch (1988: 147) states: 'Senators from sections and states expecting to gain the most from the program united to defeat opponents from the states which stood to gain little from the act'.

An analysis of these two votes appears in the second and third panels of Table 1. The logit results on the vote to reduce the service requirement from three to two years seem consistent with Resch's assertion, since in this era the conventional left-right (liberal-conservative) ideological cleavage represented by the first

Table 1. Senate and House votes, 1818.

| | | Senate | | | House | | | |
|---------------------|--------|-------------------|---|--|---------------|----------------------------------|--------|----------|
| | | To add means-test | To reduce service requirement from three to two years | To reduce service requirement from 2 years to 9 mos. | Third reading | Amendment to broaden eligibility | | |
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| D-Nominate 1 | 9.67* | -4.11*** | -4.26* | | | | 7.32 | |
| | (4.77) | (1.23) | (2.00) | | | | (3.97) | |
| D-Nominate 2 | 14.46* | -3.24 | -7.92* | | | | 8.67* | |
| | (6.23) | (3.09) | (3.46) | | | | (3.44) | |
| Eligible/Population | | | -109.40 | | | 216.51 | | |
| Mid-Atlantic | | | (78.82) | | | (131.98) | | |
| South | | | | | -2.53 | -13.23*** | | -0.71 |
| West | | | | | (1.40) | (3.22) | | (0.56) |
| | | | | | -0.76 | -7.55 | | 2.36*** |
| | | | | | (1.32) | (5.34) | | (0.53) |
| | | | | | -2.71* | | | 1.49* |
| | | | | | (1.39) | | | (0.60) |
| Constant | -0.03 | 0.46 | 2.83 | | 1.61 | 5.56 | | -1.17** |
| | (0.72) | (0.50) | (2.62) | | (1.11) | (6.80) | | (0.38) |
| N | 32 | 31 | 19 | | 31 | 19 | | 153 |
| χ^2 | 5.40 | 11.25** | 7.12 | | 6.46 | 306.01*** | | 39.00*** |
| % Corr Pred | 87.5 | 77.4 | 94.7 | | 74.2 | 78.95 | | 77.8 |
| PRE (baseline) | 0.714 | 0.462 | 0.889 | | 0.467 | 0.429 | | 0.433 |

Source: *Annals of Congress*, 15-1, Feb 18, 1818, p. 211; Feb 25, p. 220; Feb 26, pp. 222-23; Mar 5, p. 1109.

Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

D-NOMINATE dimension was not in force. Adding regional variables to the basic NOMINATE model does not add to the explanatory power of the model (see SI). Also interesting are the results in Model 3, based simply on those senators from states that were part of the nation during the Revolutionary War. A model using solely NOMINATE scores reveals that the first dimension captures the vote well (see SI),¹⁷ but when a variable is added as a proxy for those most affected by the enactment of pension legislation – i.e. the ratio of veterans in the state, measured (bluntly) by the number of enlistments during the war divided by the total state population in 1820 – the model's fit improves, as 94.7% of the individual vote choices are correctly predicted versus 74.2% with the basic NOMINATE model, although the direction of the effect is *negative* (see Model 3). This latter result suggests that senators from states with *lower* veteran ratios were *more* likely to vote for the reduction in the service requirement. Thus, it appears that this vote is consistent with the era's general theme, espoused by President Monroe, of honoring the veterans and promoting national harmony.

This changed quickly, however, on the vote to reduce service requirements from two years to nine months. Here again, Resch's claim is validated, as sectional concerns predominated and, more notably, particularistic interests won out. Logit results are reported in the third panel of Table 1. We find that NOMINATE provides *no* leverage in explaining vote choice (see SI). Model 4's specification using solely regional variables, however, results in an increase in the proportional reduction in error (PRE) of nearly 50 percent from 0.333 to 0.467, as the indicators for Mid-Atlantic and South are both negative (as expected, given their lower return relative to New England, the omitted category) and statistically significant at $p < 0.1$.¹⁸ When we, once again, look only at those senators from states that were part of the nation during the Revolutionary War, we find that the cleavages represented by NOMINATE do a poor job of explaining individual vote choices on the amendment (see SI). Once the ratio of veterans by state is included as a covariate alongside the two relevant regional indicators, however, the model's explanatory power increases substantially. Moreover, the veterans-ratio coefficient is *positive*, suggesting that senators from states that stood to gain more from the further liberalization of service requirements were more likely to support the amendment.

On February 26, the amended Senate bill was engrossed and read a third time, passing on a 23–8 vote (*Annals*, 15-1, pp. 222-23). After the flurry of amending, in which the Senate devolved into a group of particularistic 'takers', the NOMINATE cleavages that governed the initial handling of the bill returned. As the fourth panel of Table 1 indicates, a two-dimensional NOMINATE model fits the data well, with 83.9% of individual vote choices correctly predicted. This is a substantial improvement over alternative models based solely on region or veteran ratio (see SI). In the end, the eight 'nay' voters were scattered across the nation – three senators from the Mid-Atlantic (two from Pennsylvania and one from New Jersey), who presumably were unhappy about the militia's exclusion from pension eligibility; the three strict-constructionists from the South (Macon, Barbour, and Smith), who tried to kill the pension bill earlier; and two senators from the West (one each from Indiana and Ohio), who likely saw little that could be gained from their individual perspective.

On March 5, the House took up the amended Senate bill. The main issue was whether to add an amendment that would extend pension eligibility to those who had served in the militia or state units. After arguments were made on both sides, a vote was taken and the amendment failed, 60-93 (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 1109). The House then agreed to the Senate version on a voice vote. Results from a logit estimation of the failed House amendment vote appear in the last panel of Table 1. The vote is captured well by the geographically-oriented first and second D-NOMINATE dimensions (see SI). Model 7 includes only the dichotomous indicators for region and performs almost identically, with most MCs from New England (the baseline category, encompassed in the constant term) and the Mid-Atlantic opposed to the amendment, while most MCs from the South and West supported it. Put simply, members from regions that supplied the most troops to the Continental line, and thus would benefit most (relatively speaking) from keeping the pension legislation narrowly drawn, opposed the amendment, while members from regions that would gain the most by broadening pension eligibility supported the amendment. This suggests that the ideological mapping embodied in NOMINATE at this time was geographically determined, and that geographic considerations best fit the underlying data.

Both chambers having agreed on the various provisions, President Monroe then signed the compromise bill into law on March 18, 1818 (*Annals*, 15-1, pp. 2518-19), less than a month before Congress would adjourn from its first session for the start of an election season that would stretch from April of 1818 into 1819.¹⁹ Additional discussions were had about generating supplemental legislation to extend pension benefits beyond the army and navy; however, when John Holmes (DR-MA) offered a bill along those lines (on April 9, 1818) and asked that it be referred to the Military Affairs committee for consideration, the House rejected his request (*Annals*, 15-1, p. 1698). Support for an exclusionary pension bill was too strong, with members having obtained valuable credit-claiming opportunities to exploit in the electioneering to come. Circular letters sent by congressmen to their constituents during this period are replete with reports of the passage of pension and other particularistic legislation. For instance, Rufus Easton, a delegate from Missouri, noted the acts of Congress that 'passed during the present session which will benefit some of the citizens of our Territory'. Foremost on his list was pension legislation (Cunningham, 1978).

Once enacted, the pension law produced an effect that went far beyond what proponents had (at least in their public comments) anticipated. While it was assumed that a modest number of veterans would come forth to collect their pension, in the range of 2,000 or so, the War Department was overwhelmed by 20,000 requests in 1818, and another 10,000 the following year. The annual budget for pensions was around US\$155,000, while the actual cost approached US\$2,000,000 in the first year. Moreover, reports of thousands of fraudulent claims being filed spread quickly (Resch, 1999). The weak construction of the legislation – which 'prescribed no method of proof of the claimant's need' and left significant discretion at the local level, where claimants simply provided testimony before a local judge or magistrate (Glasson, 1900: 36) – made it impossible for strong central

control of the program in Washington. The administration of pensions served not just the recipients themselves and the interests of veterans; it also became a lucrative business. Claims agents quickly began advertising their services, noting their connections with members of Congress and ability to advance a claim – all for a fee, of course – and in some cases government clerks and even members of Congress ‘moonlighted’ as claims agents.²⁰

5. Aftermath of the 1818 Act

Adding to the nation’s woes were two related conditions. First, at the time the pension legislation was passed, Congress decided to eliminate an internal revenue tax. Second, tariff revenues, which had been flush in 1816–1817, slowed considerably as an industrial and commercial depression took hold. In short order, the nation’s budget surplus evaporated, and loans had to be secured in the millions of dollars to meet a myriad of national obligations (Glasson, 1918). Concerns were also growing that the worst was still ahead – that the pension list would continue to grow and the nation’s obligations would extend for decades, threatening to cripple the American economy.

When the 16th Congress (1819–21) convened in December 1819, the House moved first to deal with the spiraling cost of pensions by instructing the Committee on Revolutionary Pensions to investigate ways to deal with fraudulent practices, and if that proved too difficult, to consider the possibility of repealing the Pension Act of 1818 (*Annals*, 16-1, p. 734). Joseph Bloomfield (DR-NJ), chairman of the committee and architect of the House’s pension legislation in the previous Congress, reported back a resolution on January 4, 1820, stating: ‘That it is not expedient, nor will it comport with the honor and dignity of the American nation, to repeal’ the Pension Act (*Annals*, 16-1, pp. 851-52). The pension issue was largely shelved for the next two and a half months, as the House became embroiled in contested election cases and Missouri-statehood politics. Finally, on March 31, it was taken up again, and with great intensity. Many motions were made: to equalize payments, reduce pension payments (then, or at some point in the future), toughen service requirements, or firm up the indigence component of the initial 1818 Act. An ‘ins’ versus ‘outs’ cleavage emerged, as MCs from the Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic mostly faced off against MCs from the South and West. The former, the main beneficiaries of the Act, fought against changes, while the latter, largely cut out of the distributive arrangement, sought modifications (*Annals*, 16-1, pp. 1703-09).

The debate was contentious and culminated in a motion by Newton Cannon (DR-TN) to repeal the entire Act. This was a significant overreach, however, as the motion was overwhelmingly defeated on a 32–122 vote (*Annals*, 16-1, pp. 1709-10). As Resch (1999: 139) states: ‘By 1820, despite continued criticism of its principles and a nationwide pension scandal, the program remained politically and culturally entrenched and was now considered legally binding by its supporters. It had also become too large, too lucrative, and too popular, particularly in the Northeast, to kill’.

A logit estimation of the failed repeal vote appears in the first panel of Table 2. A model including only NOMINATE (see SI) captures the vote only slightly better than model (1), which is based solely on region. But the latter results reiterate that Southern MCs were the most opposed to the Pension Act, with Westerners only nominally against (negative coefficient, but not significant). Since the spatial distribution of members on the NOMINATE metric was largely geographically based, the issue continued to be characterized by regional cleavages. An alternative specification is to focus on pensioners per capita. If MCs simply responded to external demand by seeking to maintain the distribution of particularistic benefits, this variable should help explain the vote. And we find some evidence of this in Model 2, as the coefficient for the number of pensioners per capita is statistically significant and in the expected direction.²¹ The model's fit is modest, however, and there is no improvement over the naïve benchmark. A final specification (see SI) combines NOMINATE and pensioners per capita; the results indicate that the former is the more significant determinant of the vote, and that pensioners per capita (like region) seems to map well onto the NOMINATE space.

The failure of Cannon's motion did not mean that pension reform was dead, however, as the costs of the pension program and the corruption that emerged around it resonated with many MCs. Eventually the subject of a means test gained momentum and seemed to be a compromise position that could achieve a majority. Thus, a poverty line would be determined by the War Department and indigence would be the key criterion, along with service, to qualify for a pension. Potential pensioners would have to present a sworn, itemized listing of their estates in order to continue drawing their pensions; this stipulation, it was hoped, would reduce the incidence of fraud. Still, those MCs who were wedded to the high levels of particularistic benefits for their districts opposed any such changes. On April 1, Benjamin Adams (F-MA) sought to derail the reform legislation by moving to postpone the bill until the next Congress. His motion failed on a 63–93 vote (*Annals*, 16-1, pp. 1715–16). The reform measure – as embodied in the means-test amendment – was then considered, and it passed narrowly 80–72 (*Annals*, 16-1, p. 1716).

Results from a logit estimation of these two votes appear in the second and third panels of Table 2. There was a distinct regional component to both roll calls, as members of the South and West voted as a bloc against members from the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. Still, eighteen of the ninety members from the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic realized a reform measure was needed, and broke regional ranks to support the passage of the means-test amendment. Looking more broadly at the results, members' geographic orientation was a factor in their vote choices (see SI), and Models 3 and 4 reveal that the number of pensioners per capita is a meaningful explanatory. Of course, the latter closely correlates with region. For both votes, simply regressing the pension population on vote choice produced a significant improvement in fit (as measured by the PRE) relative to a naïve benchmark.

The legislation was then sent to the Senate for approval. The bill was debated on April 25, 1820, and after several minor amendments were defeated, it passed 24–17 (*Annals*, 16-1, p. 640). An analysis of this vote, which appears in the last

Table 2. House and Senate votes, 1820.

| | House | | | Senate | |
|-----------------------|---|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| | To repeal the Pension Act | | | To pass means-test amendment | |
| | To postpone consideration of means-test amendment | | | To pass House means-test amendment | |
| Mid-Atlantic | -0.49 (0.85) | | | | |
| South | 2.41*** (0.68) | | | | |
| West | 0.92 (0.82) | | | | |
| Pensioners/population | | -560.06* (284.49) | 499.84*** (100.71) | -613.47*** (132.17) | -5106.8** (1679.69) |
| Constant | -2.37*** (0.61) | -0.50 (0.36) | -1.48*** (0.26) | 1.29*** (0.26) | 5.18*** (1.57) |
| N | 154 | 154 | 159 | 152 | 41 |
| χ^2 | 27.07*** | 3.88* | 24.63*** | 21.54*** | 9.24** |
| % Corr Pred | 79.9 | 79.2 | 68.6 | 73.7 | 90.2 |
| PRE (baseline) | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.206 | 0.444 | 0.765 |

Source: *Annals of Congress*, 16-1, Mar 31, 1820, pp. 1709-10; Apr 1, pp. 1715-16; Apr 25, p. 640.

Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

panel of Table 2, suggests that geographic considerations were a determining factor. NOMINATE scores provide a good deal of analytical leverage (see SI) – and since voting in the Senate was quite geographically based at this time, an attempt to model the vote with regional variables led to the South being dropped due to lack of variation. Yet as evidenced in Model 5, the number of pensioners per capita does an excellent job capturing the vote. The best model fit (in terms of PRE) is produced by a joint model, where NOMINATE and pensioners per capita are the covariates; but because of moderate correlation between the variables, none are statistically significant in the joint model (see SI).

The amendment had the effect of starting the pension process from scratch. The pension roll, which had swelled over the previous two years, was erased, and claimants had to begin the application process anew. Veterans were required to show proof of both service and indigence, which resulted in thousands of former pensioners under the 1818 Act being shut out under the new system. Anger and resentment spread, much of it directed at the War Department. Finally, thanks to an upsurge in tariff revenues (and a Treasury surplus) in 1822, a move was made to restore pension eligibility to many of those who had been denied under the 1820 pension revision. This resulted in the Act of 1823, which harkened back to the liberal administration of the pension rolls five years earlier. Veterans were actively encouraged to reapply and claim their rightful rewards. And thousands did just that. They would not be disappointed; as Resch (1999: 169) notes: ‘By the end of the decade nearly every applicant received a pension’. In this way, members obtained no less than three separate, electorally-proximate opportunities to highlight their activities in Congress with respect to the pension system. While some, such as Broomfield and those seated on the Committee on Revolutionary Pensions, could claim a leading role,²² others could in the words of Arnold (1990) ensure ‘traceability’ of their efforts by pointing to affirmative votes, supportive remarks in debate, and the positive result obtained for constituents on the government dole. Attentive audiences with valuable electoral resources, such as attorneys, were certain to notice as well.

In summary, the 1818 Pension Act was path-breaking as it established a precedent of rewarding Revolutionary War veterans based on service rather than disability. There was still an indigence component built into the 1818 Act – made all the more relevant in the 1820 revision – but this would quickly become a relic of the past. For example, the 1823 revision was quite liberal in its application, allowing veterans back on the rolls as long as the value of their estates did not exceed US\$300 (US\$220,000 in 2014 dollars, using nominal GDP per capita).²³ With a steady surplus in the Treasury, the Department became increasingly generous in defining indigence (Glasson, 1918), and by December 1828, raised the personal property limitation for claimants to US\$960 (US\$691,000 in 2014 dollars, using nominal GDP per capita).²⁴ The trend was clearly moving toward pension allocations based wholly on military service, and before long this would be realized, as MCs sought further opportunities to claim credit for advancing distributions to constituents.

6. The expansion of the pension system as a distributive issue, 1828 to 1832

Passage of the Pension Act of 1818 and its various revisions by no means silenced the petitions of Revolutionary War veterans. Because the legislation made explicit provision for only certain soldiers – those serving in militias and members of the Continental Army with less than 9 months' service were excluded – and the pension rate of officers exceeded that of enlisted men (US\$20 per month compared to US\$8 per month), Congress faced continued calls for expansion. Such demand was not unwelcome, however, as electorally-minded MCs increasingly recognized the value of pensions as a distributive issue and found regular expansion a fruitful strategy. Thus, President John Quincy Adams' call for a 'debt of justice' payment to the longsuffering soldiers of the revolution did not fall upon deaf ears when presented to Congress in his annual message of 1827 (*Register of Debates*, 20-1, p. 2785).²⁵ On May 15, 1828, a law was enacted to grant full pay for life to all the veterans previously covered under the two entitlements handed down by the Continental Congress: the surviving officers who had been promised half pay for life and the noncommissioned officers who had been awarded an US\$80 lump sum payment.

What is remarkable about this particular piece of legislation is *not* its scope. By the end of 1828, only about 850 additional pensioners had been placed on the rolls,²⁶ and in 1836, the year in which authority for this program was transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War (and the next year for which we were able to obtain relevant data), only about five percent of total pension payments were made under the provisions of this legislation.²⁷ Perhaps it is these characteristics that have relegated the Pension Act of 1828 to relative obscurity, as most studies of federal pensions attach no more than passing mention to it. However, the 1828 Act marked a significant departure from past practice in that it *did not* require that veterans be impoverished to qualify for placement on the rolls. In that sense, it set a major precedent for subsequent action.

The Senate made the initial move in 1828, while the House spent much of the first session dealing with the 'Tariff of Abominations'.²⁸ On January 24, 1828, Levi Woodbury (J-NH), chair of the select committee to consider the memorial of the surviving officers of the Army of the Revolution, reported a bill (S. 44) for their relief.²⁹ Woodbury provided an exhaustive history of commutation, and framed the bill as a 'debt' owed to the venerable men of the revolution (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 128, 133). Debate continued through the week, with a number of senators offering their views of the legislation and whether or not they would support it in its current form. The bill as reported by the select committee left blank the amount to be distributed among the claimants, in part because of the difficulty in determining the number of living veterans who were eligible.³⁰

On January 30, John Berrien (J-GA), the lone southern member of the committee, rose in support of the bill, arguing that while there were others with valid claims, the Senate was not absolved from paying those presented before it in the bill. Berrien went on to say that 'I thank God, Sir, this Government is now solvent, and competent to the payment of all just claims upon its Treasury' (*Register*, 20-1,

p. 211). Berrien was rebuffed by his delegation partner, Thomas W. Cobb (J-GA), who foresaw the difficulty in determining which party would receive the credit for passage of the bill, given ‘the zeal and ability displayed by each’ in its advocacy (*Register*, 20-1, p. 215). With party divisions in Congress having not fully emerged from the Era of Good Feelings, members continued to give a great deal of consideration to the credit-claiming opportunities of such legislation – as it related to their parties’ and, to an even greater degree, their own electoral prospects. The week’s debate closed with additional floor speeches by Martin Van Buren (J-NY), Woodbury, and other advocates of the legislation, while remarks by two southern members foreshadowed the sectional dynamics that would emerge in the votes to come. Nathaniel Macon (J-NC) expressed his disdain for the partisan accounts of the Revolution, which ‘don’t stoop to [include] the militia’, while John Tyler (J-VA) predicted that the bill would be ‘the first fruit of a liberal policy... from which there is no escaping’ (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 226, 228, 232).

After a fairly lengthy interlude, the Senate returned to the ‘surviving officers’ bill on March 11, 1828. Still unresolved was the issue of how much to insert for the cost of the bill. By division vote, the sum of US\$1,100,000 failed to obtain support (*Register*, 20-1, p. 428). This was followed a day later by a vote to fill in the blank with the sum of US\$800,000, which was defeated 19–26 (*Register*, 20-1, p. 448). Perhaps sensing an opportunity to put the issue to rest, Cobb moved the indefinite postponement of the bill. The question was decided in the negative by a razor-thin margin of 22–23 (*Register*, 20-1, p. 448).³¹ Samuel Smith (J-MD) then moved to fill in the blank with the amount of US\$500,000, which also failed (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 448-49). The bill was subsequently tabled, its future very much in doubt, as the Senate was unable to resolve even the most basic of questions. The bill’s proponents were left to plot a course that would frame the bill in a manner palatable to a majority of the Senate – one that would involve more creative distributive options.

To the surprise of some, the measure was resurrected on April 25, 1828, when Woodbury introduced a substitute version. The new bill called for full pay for life (rather than a lump sum) to officers and soldiers of the Continental line (*Register*, 20-1, p. 696). Macon objected to the grants provided in the bill ‘at a time when the distresses of the People were [never] greater’, while Cobb railed against the skillful manipulations of the bill’s managers (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 699-700). Cobb went on to claim that the ‘extravagance’ of the bill was due to the joining of forces between the friends of the administration and their opponents who could ill afford being on the wrong side of a popular issue. Evidence of a discernible electoral connection was offered by Smith of Maryland, who, while counting only 12 officers in his state who would be covered under the bill’s provisions, believed that ‘were he to vote against this bill, he might be certain of never being returned to Congress again’ (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 710-11). As in the case of 1818, the timing was likely not coincidental – MCs were considering the implications of this legislation for attentive audiences back home just over a month before adjourning the session for the start of the 1828 campaign.

In lieu of the blank space for the amount to be distributed, which had previously proven unworkable, the substitute bill left open the date on which the

Table 3. Senate and House votes, 1828.

| | Senate | | House |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Engrossment and third reading of bill | | Passage of 1828 Pension Act |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| D-Nominate 1 | | 0.26 (2.05) | |
| D-Nominate 2 | | 2.21** (0.85) | |
| Mid-Atlantic | 0.47 (1.33) | -1.16 (1.36) | |
| South | -2.71** (1.03) | -3.36* (1.32) | -4.73*** (0.79) |
| West | -1.02 (0.96) | -3.39* (1.47) | -4.59*** (0.80) |
| Party (Adams) | | -1.11 (1.54) | |
| Constant | 1.61* (0.78) | 3.08** (1.02) | 3.82*** (0.72) |
| N | 47 | 47 | 173 |
| χ^2 | 9.83* | 17.37** | 37.99*** |
| % Corr Pred | 76.6 | 76.6 | 85.0 |
| PRE (baseline) | 0.353 | 0.353 | 0.552 |

Source: *Register of Debates*, 20-1, Mar 12, 1828, p. 428; Apr 30, p. 713; May 13, p. 2670.

Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

provision would be made effective. By a 29–19 count, the date of ‘March 3, 1826’ was inserted, making the bill retroactive in its application. Members would therefore be able to campaign not just on an expansion of the program, but a very noticeable (and generous) first installment. Not coincidentally, the roll call elicited a significant regional division that would characterize the eventual vote on accepting the substitute and engrossment and third reading.³² Since our analysis demonstrated consistency in the coalitions and in the statistical results across each of these three votes, we will present only the last here.

As shown in the first panel of Table 3, the vote on engrossment and third reading of the Senate bill, which was agreed to 30–17 (*Register*, 20-1, p. 713), fell starkly along sectional lines. Model 1 reveals that southern senators were significantly less likely than New England senators (the baseline category) to favor the program. Not surprisingly, Mid-Atlantic senators were as prone to support the bill as their New England counterparts (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient). The coefficient on the West variable, while negative, is not significant in this estimation. Additional models presented in the SI corroborate the regional pattern, with a significant coefficient on the second NOMINATE dimension, and – as predicted by Cobb of Georgia – no distinguishable effect of party on the vote. Party attachment

to the measure was, therefore, likely neutralized as an election issue. Finally, the fully specified Model 2 allows us to more precisely partition the effects of region. Since states coded as 'western' included both northern and southern areas, in all likelihood there would be a regional flavor within the coalition. After controlling for the second NOMINATE dimension, western senators were significantly less likely to vote for the bill. The western senators scoring highest on the second dimension hailed from states like Kentucky and Tennessee, both of which had a relatively high concentration of veterans. The Senate's consideration of the bill demonstrates the attractiveness of particularizing distributive legislation, and doing so in tune with the electoral cycle, thereby offering legislators targetable benefits on which to campaign independent of party.

The House briefly took up the issue on May 7, 1828 (*Register*, 20-1, p. 2602), and resumed consideration on May 12, this time using the Senate's measure as the legislative vehicle. John Culpeper (A-NC), one of the few Adams loyalists in the South, pressed the House to pass the bill in a timely fashion, being 'persuaded that it could only pass in its present form, [and entreating] all its friends to refuse every amendment, and to offer none' (*Register*, 20-1, p. 2651). This the House did, in short order. Despite the efforts of a handful of members to expand the legislation or delay its disposition via amendments, the close of the session loomed large and the Committee of the Whole reported the bill without amendment (*Register*, 20-1, p. 2660). The debate in the full House paralleled that of the Senate, with the bill's supporters couching their advocacy as meeting a rightful claim upon the government at a time when the Treasury was flush, while opponents challenged the veracity of the estimated number of pensioners who would be covered. Despite the disagreement, debate was brief compared to the Senate.

Only three recorded votes were taken during House consideration of the bill, all of which occurred directly leading up to and including final passage. Because the results are substantively the same across each of the roll calls, we present logit estimates only for the final-passage vote, which carried 115–58. As the second panel of Table 3 indicates, the findings with regard to region are noteworthy in that *every* New Englander and all but two members from Mid-Atlantic states voted in favor of the bill; as such, we collapsed the two categories to create a regional baseline category that avoids the statistical 'problem' of perfect prediction. Models including NOMINATE and party offer no significant improvement in fit over this regional specification (see SI); it appears that in the case of the Pension Act of 1828, members' particularistic concerns carried the day. Thus, the pension issue was transformed from one debated, at least on its face, on normative partisan and ideological grounds, to one that was openly framed and determined almost exclusively on the basis of geographic distributive interests associated with electoral motivations.

7. The Pension Act of 1832

None of the actions occurring in the years following the 1818 Act matched the scale of the pension bill of 1832. While the 1828 legislation encompassed a more

expansive definition of entitlement, it left out significantly more 'old soldiers' than it included. Thus, on the heels of his election victory and seeking to bolster his support among a growing electorate, President Andrew Jackson proposed in his annual message to Congress in December 1829 a review of federal pensions with an eye toward their expansion to 'every Revolutionary soldier who aided in establishing our liberties, and who is unable to maintain himself in comfort'. Jackson viewed the system's primary defect to be its unequal application, in that it failed to embrace 'within its provisions all those who were, during the last war, disabled from supporting themselves, by manual labor' (*Register*, 21-1, Appendix, p. 14). While the House moved quickly in the 21st Congress (1829–31) to extend the pension system beyond what even Jackson had proposed, the bill stalled in the Senate. Eventually, a motion to postpone Senate consideration was passed on April 30, 1830, effectively killing the bill.

Not to be deterred, Jackson renewed his call to action on behalf of revolutionary soldiers in his message of 1831 (*Register*, 22-1, Appendix, p. 5). The legislation eventually produced by the 22nd Congress (1831–33) shared certain features with the comparatively modest 1828 measure. Like its predecessor, it was a service-pension act and thus did not limit qualification based on economic situation or disability. Most importantly, it extended full pay for life – again, *retroactively*, in this case to March 4, 1831 – to surviving Revolutionary War veterans, regardless of line (Continental, state, volunteer, militia, or navy), who served a total of two years (whether in one or more terms). Those who served between six and twenty-four months were to receive a prorated benefit (Glasson, 1918).

In contrast to the debate over the Pension Act of 1828, controversy erupted quickly in 1832 and centered primarily in the House. The bill was debated over a three month period following its initial floor consideration on February 29, in the midst of a highly competitive election year.³³ After three days of seemingly minor discussion, Thomas Bouldin (J-VA) raised what he perceived to be the sectional nature of the bill and its connection with the tariff (*Register*, 22-1, pp. 2372–74).³⁴ Perhaps not coincidentally, Congress considered the pension and tariff bills concurrently, enacting them within a week of each other. The wedding of tariff policy with pensions became a recurring theme. For example, Warren Davis (N-SC) contended 'that the measures before them, contrary to the avowed wishes and intentions of their advocates, bore upon their front the evidence that they were sectional in their operation, and that they would be, in their consequences, ruinous to one portion of the Union to the precise extent that they were beneficial to another' (*Register*, 22-1, pp. 2388).

On May 1, the lengthy debate drew to a close, when the House considered a handful of amendments typical of pension measures, for instance: to establish or eliminate means tests; to extend benefits to widows, orphans, and those involved in other conflicts (primarily the 'Indian wars' in the west); and to alter the requisite length of service (*Register*, 22-1, p. 2679). The amendments were disposed of quickly, and the House moved to end debate and usher the bill to a final-passage vote, which carried easily the following day, 126-48 (*Register*, 22-1, pp. 2712-13). While there were recorded votes on fourteen different matters, the coalitions were

quite stable across nearly every vote, so our analysis will focus again on passage of the bill.

Logit results are presented in the first panel of Table 4. We find that individual vote choices are closely aligned with both NOMINATE dimensions, suggesting that members' views on the scope of government (the substance of the first dimension in 1832) as well as regional tendencies connected to pension preferences (the second dimension) played a role. In fact, Poole and Rosenthal (2007: 58) indicate that the *specific* substantive content of the second NOMINATE dimension in the 22nd House was 'military pensions'. Model 2 presents estimates from a model based on region. Here again, we employ a baseline that encompasses both the New England and Mid-Atlantic states because the latter perfectly predicts a vote in favor of the bill. The results underscore the stark regional basis of voting on expansion of the pension system. A simple model with party, while significant, performs more poorly than the naïve model, indicating that the division on this question was not grounded in partisan differences (see SI). When estimated in the context of the full model, region continues to exert an impact along with the regionally-based second NOMINATE dimension (see SI). In light of the degree to which these two measures tap sectional interests, it is clear that particularistic policies benefiting targeted constituencies – consistent with the distributive-based, electoral motivations of MCs – characterized this realm of policymaking.

The debate in the Senate paralleled that of the House.³⁵ After lengthy remarks on the potential cost of the program and the sectional implications posed by the legislation, a handful of amendments were considered, including: adding a provision for widows, reducing the minimum term of service, modifying the effective date of the legislation, and adding particular regional forces. Compared to the House, the Senate moved rather quickly, and with significantly less debate, toward passage of its bill (S. 1) on May 18. The final roll call was taken on ordering the third reading, and was decided by a vote of 26–19 (*Register*, 22-1, p. 933).

Results from a logit estimation of this vote are presented in the second panel of Table 4. As we observed for the House roll call, the NOMINATE dimensions are a significant predictor of vote choice, as is party, when included in separate models (see SI). A regional model is no longer fully estimable, as South perfectly aligns with a nay vote while New England perfectly aligns with a yea vote. Only one senator from a Mid-Atlantic state voted against the bill. In light of this, we include a rough, *ex post facto* estimate of constituency interest as measured by the percentage of the state's population that would later be pensioned under the bill.³⁶ (This, of course, presumes that a senator would have been capable of predicting the degree to which citizens of his state would benefit from the bill's provisions – a reasonable assumption given members' recognition of even a handful of affected constituents in the case of the 1828 legislation.) As Model 3 shows, this rough measure is useful in explaining senators' positions on the roll call. When included alongside a subset of regional indicators (Model 4), it allows us to capture the outcome with an even greater degree of accuracy.

Because the House bill was more generous than the Senate bill, and the two versions would have to be reconciled if the issue were to make it to the president's

Table 4. House and Senate votes, 1832.

| | House | | Senate | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--|------------------------|
| | Passage of the 1832 Pension Act | | To order the third reading of S.1, the Pension Act of 1832 | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| D-Nominate 1 | 4.13*** (1.14) | | | |
| D-Nominate 2 | -3.77*** (0.55) | | | |
| Mid-Atlantic | | | | 4.39*** (1.24) |
| South | | -5.49*** (0.83) | | |
| West | | -2.73*** (0.81) | | 2.00*** (1.03) |
| Party (Jackson) | | | | |
| Veteran Population | | | 903.54*** (276.70) | 1280.44*** (348.92) |
| Constant | 1.97*** (0.41) | 3.83*** (0.72) | -1.59* (0.67) | -3.92*** (0.99) |
| N | 174 | 174 | 45 | 45 |
| χ^2 | 50.09*** | 51.08*** | 10.66** | 18.77*** |
| % Corr Pred | 92.0 | 89.7 | 64.4 | 86.7 |
| PRE (baseline) | 0.708 | 0.625 | 0.158 | 0.684 |

Source: *Register of Debates*, 22-1, May 2, 1832, pp. 2712–13; May 18, p. 933.

Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

desk before the close of the session, the House managers lobbied for acceptance of the Senate language without amendment. While admitting ‘little affection for the Senate’s bill’, Henry Hubbard (J-NH) stated ‘I am nevertheless disposed to take [it]. I consider the question to be – will you take the Senate’s bill, or will you take nothing?’ (*Register*, 22-1, p. 3098). Hubbard and his allies were able to stave off a few amendments, one of which sought to reduce the minimum service requirement from six months to three months and thus increase the generosity of the measure, before successfully cutting off debate. The bill was ordered to a third reading by more than a 2–1 margin, and was soon thereafter passed and signed by the president. Thus, in the closing days of an election-season session, the House acceded to the Senate’s take-it-or-leave-it offer. Presumably, campaigning on some new benefits was a more attractive option than returning home empty-handed, particularly in a policy area that lent itself to the regular extension and expansion of benefits. Not surprisingly, the impact of the 1832 legislation was quite similar to its 1818 predecessor. As Glasson (1918: 83–85) notes, its ‘provisions were extremely liable

to abuse' and in the judgment of one member, based on the census of 1830, 'the number of pensioners and unsuccessful applicants was greater than the number of white male citizens in the country old enough...to have served in the Revolution'. He goes on to point out that in 1834, John Quincy Adams recalled Senator Uriah Tracy of Connecticut saying 'that the soldiers of the Revolution claimants never died—that they were immortal. Had he lived to this time, he would have seen that they multiply with the lapse of time...[and] are more numerous at every session of Congress than ever before'.

8. Discussion

In the years following enactment of the Pension Act of 1832, the federal pension system and its administration were modified and expanded on a number of occasions. For instance, in 1836, Congress made provision for widows of revolutionary soldiers, and this was followed by enactments favoring veterans of the War of 1812, the Indian wars, and the War with Mexico. In 1833, a distinct pension office headed by a Commissioner of Pensions was created within the War Department. The Bureau of Pensions was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1849, and would grow to become one of the largest agencies of the federal government during the post-Civil War era, serving as it did the vast number of Union Army veterans on the rolls. It is this same Union Army pension system that previous scholarship has tied directly to distributive politics arising out of partisan and sectional interests related to the tariff (Skocpol, 1992). Our results reveal the remarkably similar linkage between income from the tariff and the distributional mechanism of military pensions, suggesting that this prominent account of the postbellum period actually had significant antebellum roots. The massive redistribution of federal revenue to Civil War veterans, which amounted to nearly 40 percent of federal spending in the late-1890s, was in many ways foreshadowed by similar distributive politics arising earlier in the nineteenth century Congress.

As our analysis has shown, the particularistic nature of antebellum pensions was not coincidental. Rather, pension legislation offered MCs a meaningful way to demonstrate their responsiveness as they built coalitions and cultivated their own support within the electoral and party apparatus as well as in the eyes of constituents. The mechanisms through which the electoral connection functioned at this time differ in important respects from the 'modern' congressional context that emerged in the Gilded Age and matured in the Progressive Era. Despite the lack of careerism in Congress in the early nineteenth century, many MCs did desire, and in fact pursued, a more general political career. And such a political career, as Aldrich (1995: 267) notes, was 'a party-centered one rather than an individual, office-centered career as in today's incumbency-oriented Congress'. Thus, while most MCs were not single-minded seekers of reelection to Congress, they *still* possessed an interest in keeping their constituents and party leaders happy. And once elected, members advanced (or worked to block) legislation based on its distributive implications for the electorate they served. Benefits were timed (and often paid

retroactively in lump sums) with a keen eye to the electoral calendar. Further, members were likely attentive to the opportunity this legislation provided to claim credit not just with veterans, but with professionals and businesses as well. Consequently, there is good reason to believe that the electoral connection was alive and well even very early in American history.

While beyond the scope of this paper, future analysis should also consider the extent of direct electoral effects arising from positions on pension legislation. Here we have sought to demonstrate the electoral and career-centered logic underlying the construction of pension legislation, but it would be consistent with our expectations to observe members' actions on pensions translate directly into benefits (or costs) on Election Day. As Carson and Sievert (2014) have demonstrated, the variable timing of elections in the early- to mid-nineteenth century as well as ballot placement of congressional candidates had the potential to foster a significant degree of electoral accountability in an era when party ballots dominated. Thus, we might expect to see the second side of Mayhew's argument – credit-claiming activities translating directly into effects at the ballot box – alive and well in this period. A full-scale systematic analysis sensitive to causality and accounting for the usual control variables is warranted, and could explore incumbent and quality challenger decisions with respect to running as well as changes in vote share.³⁷ A descriptive look at the aftermath of the House vote on passage of the 1828 Pension Act is instructive, though. In this case, there was a reasonable degree of variation within states to allow us to distinguish MCs who voted 'in step' with the predominant orientation of their state on the legislation from those who did not. Moreover, the subsequent election saw relative stability in district boundaries. What we find is suggestive of the sort of pattern one might expect if electoral accountability is at work. In the seven states with House members who cast an 'out of step' vote, the relative share of MCs whose electoral performance worsened (whether by defeat or a decrease in vote share) was fully 50 percent among those who voted on the wrong side of the issue compared to just under one-third of those who cast a consistent vote. The vicissitudes of early-nineteenth century elections being what they were, with high levels of turnover and strict party control over the ballot, makes this pattern, we believe, rather remarkable.

Recognizing the role of ambitious politicians in the antebellum Congress, who sought out and capitalized on credit-claiming opportunities on issues that resonated with constituents and provided geographically-targeted distributive benefits, allows us to explain an important dynamic that has gone unrecognized in previous scholarship on American political development. The quest for electorally-timed credit-claiming opportunities fueled demand for particularistic policies – perhaps the most obvious behavioral characteristic of the modern Congress – and led to the creation and expansion of a broad-based pension system for veterans of the Revolutionary War. As such, this chapter of American history holds important implications for our understanding of Congress and the development of policy in the antebellum period more generally.

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Notes

1. As Bianco et al. (1996: 147) state: 'It is one thing to argue that a congressional career was less attractive or less feasible in an earlier time than it is today, but another to conclude that members of the early Congress were unconcerned about the electoral consequences of their behavior'. See also Carson and Jenkins (2011).
2. Cooper and Young (1989: 99) make a similar point in explaining why nineteenth-century MCs worked to please their constituents, despite the fact that they did not often pursue congressional careers: 'It is arguable that before 1880 the political careers of members were focused broadly on state politics rather than narrowly confined to their House constituencies. Hence, members could well be interested in service to their states and localities, even if they were not as concerned about reelection to the House as they became in the twentieth century'.
3. As this was the era of indirect nominations for political office, party leaders possessed a strong (almost iron-clad) ability to determine who received party nominations. For more details, see Reynolds (2005).
4. We thank Rob Franzese for a helpful exchange on the preceding points – particularly 'Tufte's 5-ables'. Arnold's (1990: 47–48) incumbent performance rule follows a similar logic, and is based on the presence of three conditions for 'traceability': 'a perceptible effect, an identifiable governmental action, and a legislator's visible contribution'– with 'roll-call votes [being] the most common, visible, and unambiguous type of contribution'.
5. Adler (2002: 22) advances a similarly broad conceptualization of "distributive" propositions...to include all policies that benefit or have the potential to benefit constituencies with particular characteristics'.
6. For example, an MC today has little reason to claim credit for a retiree's receipt of a Social Security check. Yet the rollout of a new or expanded program likely does carry with it electoral benefits for legislative supporters – as in the case of the creation of Social Security program during the New Deal, for instance (see Fleck, 2008 for a recent review). We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us to clarify our treatment of this point.

7. Examples of works that use regional indicators and geographically-based economic measures as proxies of constituency interests to predict MCs' roll-call votes include Gilligan et al. (1989) and Krehbiel and Rivers (1988).
8. In doing so, we follow the style and presentation of analysis in Poole and Rosenthal (2007, Chapter 6). For ease of exposition and conciseness, many of the NOMINATE-based models described in the text appear in the Supporting Information described later. Additionally, as recommended by an anonymous reviewer, we examined the impact of MCs' veteran status. However, this provided no additional analytical leverage on vote choice in any of the models we present.
9. This section relies heavily upon Glasson (1900, 1918), Teipe (2002), and Clark et al. (2003).
10. Hereafter, we refer to this source simply as *Annals*. Monroe's message to Congress appears in full on pp. 12–19.
11. This level of turnover represented a significant increase over the typical range of 40 to 50 percent at the time (see Fiorina et al. 1975). Also, Bianco et al. (1996) show that constituents did not penalize members of the 14th Congress indiscriminately, but rather *specifically* based on their position (yea or nay) on the congressional pay raise.
12. 'DR' indicates that an individual was a member of the Democratic-Republican Party, whereas an 'F' indicates membership in the Federalist Party. Party codes (here and throughout the paper) come from Martis (1989).
13. The lack of a recorded vote on final passage in this case, unlike later House legislation, is curious. On the one hand, credit claiming is arguably easier when a legislator can point to a specific vote. Nonetheless, our account does not hinge on the position taken as much as the opportunity to point constituents to benefits provided. Moreover, in this Congress, coming on the heels of the explosive votes on a congressional pay raise in the previous Congress, members may have been less inclined to go on the record.
14. As national two-party competition broke down after the War of 1812, members were increasingly attentive to local needs and sought opportunities to develop a 'personal' brand name so as to build strong electoral ties (Jenkins and Weidenmier, 1999; see also Nielsen, 1968; White, 1951).
15. The Supporting Information file is available for download at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27759>.
16. Results not reported. In the remaining models for 1818 and 1820, we do not include a party variable because these votes occurred during the Era of Good Feelings, a time when most legislators were not overtly partisan. As such, it is not clear what a party indicator would signify. This presumption is confirmed by robustness checks, which show that the inclusion of party in the models has no statistical or substantive impact on the results reported.
17. Restricting the analysis to those senators from states that were part of the nation during the Revolutionary War reduces the model's sample size from 31 to 19. The reduction affects the power of the statistical test, and consequently, the likelihood of a Type II error (uncovering no effect when in reality such an effect exists). To improve power, and assess the robustness of our results, we are limited to (1) attempting to minimize 'noise', which might arise from collinearity among the covariates, and (2) increasing the significance level (α), which represents the likelihood of finding no effect when in fact one exists (Trochim, 2001). The results of the small-sample models in Table 1 are consistent when run independently for each variable as well as in light of the p -values, since in nearly every case of an insignificant coefficient the alpha exceeds 0.20 by a wide

- margin (and is therefore more than four times the conventional level of statistical significance of 0.05).
18. Note that the baseline for all PRE calculations is a minority-vote model, that is, where all members are predicted to vote on the winning (majority) side. Votes on the losing (minority) side would thus be considered 'errors' for prediction purposes. For more on the use of minority votes as a suitable naïve benchmark in PRE calculations, see Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
 19. A handful of states – mostly southern and thereby largely excluded from the distributive benefits of pensions – held their elections in 1819, after the shorter 2nd session that ran from November 16, 1818 to March 3, 1819.
 20. See, e.g., the advertisement of Romulus Riggs, *National Messenger*, November 6, 1818, p. 1. The involvement of clerks was highlighted in an investigation in early 1818 ('The National Clerks', *City of Washington Gazette*, April 10, 1818, p. 3), and Ohio Congressman Samuel Herrick's pension services received national attention in the fall of that year ('From the Zanesville (Ohio) Express', *Salem Gazette*, October 20, 1818, p. 2).
 21. Data are drawn from the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions*, various years. We operationalize the variable in a fairly crude fashion since district-level data are not available. As such, per capita here represents *state population*. While we would expect an even stronger relationship to district-level variation (with a more nuanced measure), the results are informative despite the coarseness of the data.
 22. In fact, Canon and Stewart (2009) note that a seat on Revolutionary Pensions was among the top five most valuable committee posts in the early House.
 23. See Williamson (2009).
 24. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Andrew Jackson rescinded this ruling on the basis that it was legislative in nature and thus the Department had exceeded its authority (Message to Congress, December 8, 1829, H.doc.2/1, 21-1).
 25. Hereafter, we refer to this source simply as *Register*. For the full text of Adams' message, see pp. 2775–86.
 26. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Richard Rush, to the House Speaker, January 12, 1829, H.doc.68, 20-2.
 27. Subsequent expansion of the pension system did not affect those who were included under the 1828 law. Rather, benefits were extended to others who were not encompassed by its provisions.
 28. On the sectional and generally pro-northern nature of the tariff, and the interplay between it and pensions, see Forsythe (1977), Jensen (2003), and Taussig (1923). Pincus (1975) describes the geographic concentration of interests.
 29. 'J' denotes affiliation with the Jackson faction, while 'A' indicates affiliation with the Adams faction.
 30. As was so often the case with pension legislation in the nineteenth century, the estimates were (in hindsight) exceedingly low. William Smith (J-SC) made just such a case in his remarks on January 29 (*Register*, 20-1, p. 187). As it happens, his predictions were much closer to the mark than those of the committee.
 31. In logit results not presented, none of the variables demonstrated a statistically discernible effect on the vote.
 32. In the intervening period, votes were also taken on whether to define qualified service as that of three years as opposed to service rendered until the end of the war, as well as proposals to reduce the benefit from full pay to half pay and to extend four years' pay to the legal representatives of deceased officers and soldiers (*Register*, 20-1, pp. 712-

- 14). Each vote evidenced sectional dynamics, which were picked up in either the second NOMINATE dimension, the regional indicators, or a mixture of the two.
33. See *Register*, 22-1, pp. 1918–43, 2277–82, 2287–2300, 2359–74, 2386–96, 2428–35, 2446–63, 2490–2504, 2553–56, 2672–79.
34. The parties in the 22nd Congress were Jackson (J), Anti-Jackson (AJ), Nullifier (N), and Anti-Masonic (AM).
35. See *Register*, 22-1, pp. 706–09, 737–40, 761–66, 862–64, 874–75, 919–33.
36. The baseline for this measure is 1834, since by then most of the new pensioners had been added to the rolls. The data are drawn from the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Pensions*, 1834, Table B.
37. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting we consider these corollaries of the electoral connection argument.

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