



ONE USC: A VISION OF COMMUNITY SAFETY FOR ALL

Recommendations from the USC Department of Public Safety Community Advisory Board

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Care, Accountability, Transparency

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We would like to thank President Carol L. Folt for giving us the honor and privilege of leading the Department of Public Safety (DPS) Community Advisory Board (CAB). As CAB co-chairs, we are honored to have been selected to steer this important effort for the university.

The CAB was created to become a crucial factor in ensuring an environment where everyone feels safe and respected. We set out to strengthen the trust between the university, DPS and the broader community, particularly in light of recent and ongoing events across the country that have underscored the need for transforming the relationship between law enforcement and the communities they serve. President Folt’s decision that we would report directly to her and the assurance that “nothing was off the table” illustrated her level of commitment regarding our role, as well as our autonomy.

Due in large part to the national urgency of these issues, President Folt tasked the CAB with undertaking an evidence-based examination of our public safety practices, including departmental accountability, transparency, bias training and hiring. During the past 10 months the CAB conducted **8** Pilot Conversations, **11** Co-Design Public Safety Sessions and **5** Kitchen Cabinet meetings attended by **more than 700** people from across our university community — students, staff and faculty, as well as current and former law enforcement — to ensure our recommendations would be informed by a diverse collection of voices. We especially thank the hundreds of community members, students, staff, faculty, law enforcement, community and university organizations who gave us their time, experiences, expertise and valuable input to support the charge of the CAB during the development and deliberations for the recommendations in this report. Whether you met with us individually, sent a message to us through our website, or attended a conversation, co-design session or kitchen cabinet meeting, we are so grateful for your engagement. Your collective commitment and passion provided constant reinforcement of our critical role in facilitating a positive relationship between the university and the community. We hope this process will serve as an example of the type of conversations that would prove useful in future efforts to address this important issue.

Due in large part to the national urgency of these issues, President Folt tasked the CAB with undertaking an evidence-based examination of our public safety practices, including departmental accountability, transparency, bias training and hiring.

The community’s ongoing engagement during a lingering pandemic and the many effects it has generated have been an inspiration, as many returned in phase three of our work to learn about our preliminary recommendations. We thank those who participated in the Academic Senate, Community Feedback Session, Graduate Student Government, Kitchen Cabinet, President’s Senior Leadership Team, Provost Council,

Staff Assembly and the Undergraduate Student Government feedback sessions just as classes were ending for the academic year. Your thoughts and comments, as you will read, are integrated throughout our report. We have deliberately paraphrased or used quotations that were repeated in similar fashions in a variety of contexts to preserve people's confidentiality, but we heard you loud and clear: the need for there to be

ONE USC experience of community safety equitably distributed to all is something we all need to embrace in the months and years to come.

The need for there to be ONE USC experience of community safety equitably distributed to all is something we all need to embrace in the months and years to come.

We certainly could not have accomplished this scope of engagement without the assistance and support provided by Senior Vice President for University Relations Sam Garrison and Executive Assistant Alejandro Maldonado. Their extraordinary administrative, logistical and technical assistance cannot be overstated. We also want to extend our gratitude to Senior


Vice President for Administration David Wright and DPS Chief John Thomas for their response to a voluminous data request resulting in more than 600 pages of documents, which helped facilitate the CAB's deliberations on recommendations for the president. We are also appreciative of Executive Director for Public Relations Projects Eric Abelev and former Communications Coordinator Shannon Ward for their innovative creation of our website and timely development and dissemination of communications. Our consultants, 21CP Solutions, were a small but mighty team of folks from around the country with deep expertise in this area, and we are grateful to them, particularly but not exclusively for their strong work with each of our subcommittees.

Finally, words will never express our thanks to our fellow CAB members for their time and commitment to the process of arriving at consensus around these recommendations. CAB members brought diverse experiences, expertise and opinions that were extremely useful for the dialogue we had on several sensitive issues in a respectful and effective manner. They did not complain when we asked for another two-hour meeting, then another the very next Friday, signaling how seriously we all took our role. All of us remain committed to this area of community transformation and hope this process will have a meaningful impact on the enhancement of community safety for all members of the Trojan community: students, faculty, staff and our neighbors.

Fight On!



Ange-Marie Hancock Alfaro
Co-Chair, USC DPS CAB
Dean's Professor
Chair, Political Science and
International Relations
USC Dornsife College of Letters,
Arts and Sciences



Erroll G. Southers
Co-Chair, USC DPS CAB
Professor of the Practice
Director, USC Safe Communities
Institute
USC Price School of Public Policy

The ONE USC Safety Vision is an environment where:

Everyone feels safe, respected and protected from being a crime victim.

The diverse experiences and needs of all USC students, faculty, staff and neighbors throughout USC's spheres of influence are addressed.

2 / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What does safety mean? Who feels safe and who doesn't? What are the conditions that produce physical and psychological safety in and around the public spaces of USC?

The University of Southern California Department of Public Safety (DPS) Community Advisory Board (CAB) has spent the last academic year focusing its attention on two complementary definitions of safety:

- A safe *life* that is free from experiencing crime
- A safe *experience* navigating the campus and its surrounding locations free of being falsely targeted as suspicious, threatening or not belonging to our community.

Our work has revealed that we need to have what we have named a **ONE USC community safety vision**. This university and community-wide safety vision has two interlocking features. First, the **ONE USC safety vision has a universal goal of ensuring an environment where everyone feels safe, respected and protected from becoming a crime victim**. Second, this vision recognizes that USC can only achieve that goal by addressing the diverse experiences and needs of *all* USC students, faculty, staff and neighbors throughout USC's spheres of influence.^[1]

To implement this safety vision, we engaged in an evidence-based, community-wide research process, which produced two general recommendations: to **re-envision public safety** and to **create an independent DPS oversight body**. Our recommendations for how to achieve these two broad goals are grouped into **four thematic pillars: Accountability, Alternatives to Armed Response, Community Care and Transparency**. Within the pillars, 45 action items serve as concrete ways we can move forward as **ONE USC**.

One influential analysis came from a staff participant in one of our co-design sessions. She suggested that based on the diverse experiences of those in attendance with DPS and public safety at USC, there are really "two USCs." While she intended to focus on the part of USC that feels safer with DPS around and the part of USC that feels less safe with DPS around, her description also helped us see additional examples of "two USCs."

The University of Southern California is comprised of two main campuses that sit in the heart of Los Angeles. Like any university in a metropolitan area, those who are part of the USC community are simultaneously part of a broader metropolitan community as neighbors to longtime residents who stay far longer than any individual degree term.

We heard from a USC leader that USC has transitioned from being a commuter school composed mainly of local California residents to a residential institution with students, staff and faculty from almost every country on earth who live, work and/or shop within a two-mile radius of our campuses. Students and parents shared that their perceptions of the communities surrounding USC during orientation were different from the realities of what members of the community were telling us about their interactions with DPS and USC more broadly. **These additional comments reinforce our conviction that all of the "two USCs" need to be reconciled under a single community safety vision.**

The CAB Mandate from President Folt

The CAB mandate from President Folt focused on four broad and complex tasks:

- Help ensure an environment where everyone feels safe and respected
- Conduct a thorough examination of USC's public safety practices, including hiring, finances, accountability and bias training

- Play a crucial role in USC’s renewed efforts to remedy broader social inequalities within our community
- Strengthen the trust between the university, DPS and the broader community

These tasks required us to talk with people representing all sectors of USC’s extended community; to analyze data (crime rates, DPS stops, memoranda of understanding and budget); and to participate in a community co-design process that ensured a broad contribution in the deliberations surrounding how to make USC an extended community that is both free from crime and empowers all members of the community to feel included.

Over the past 10 months we’ve engaged these complex questions of public safety as a multi-site university community. We engaged faculty, students, staff, parents, our neighbors in South Los Angeles and East Los Angeles, and safety professionals themselves in deliberations about what the future of safety at USC should look like. We’ve reflected on the “two USC’s” analogy, examined USC’s public safety practices and discussed how to strengthen the trust between the university, DPS and the entire USC community. We’ve analyzed copious amounts of [data](#)^[2] and conducted an

Over the past 10 months we’ve engaged these complex questions of public safety as a multi-site community.

[independent legal analysis](#), which confirmed that USC is a private educational institution that lacks the legal authority to ban law enforcement from its campuses at the federal, state or local levels. We state this up front to address an ongoing notion that removing DPS from USC would render our campuses closer to a position that would eventually prohibit LAPD from university properties as well. We note this not to be dismissive of what has become an emergent perspective over the past decade but quite the opposite: as a reflection of the seriousness with which we considered this position.

We also considered the opposite position with equal seriousness — should we invest more money and hire more DPS officers to see if USC could get to a “functional zero” level of crime? Our review of the last five years of budget numbers indicates that this has in some way been USC’s default position: the costs of contracts with LAPD and with CSC (the “yellow jackets”) have increased 350 percent and 66 percent respectively between 2015–2020. Over the same period, DPS leadership ranks have expanded by 39 percent, creating a 54 percent increase in senior leadership salaries. Yet even a global pandemic and increased spending cannot prevent all crime. Our approach intends to work smarter at a more cost-effective level. We recognize USC is well-positioned to attract new resources in federal, state and local spending to both make the community safer and be better neighbors at the same time.

This overall mandate leads us to note the vast capacity provided by the diversity of CAB members’ roles, personal and professional experience, expertise, race/ethnicity, gender and politics. We didn’t always agree, but throughout a deliberative process we ended up in far greater agreement than one would typically expect in our polarized nation. We are also grateful to the more than 700 people who took the time during a pandemic to be a part of how we walked out this journey in our [four-phase process](#).

We fully recognize that it was impossible to fulfill this entire mandate in under 10 months. What we present here is our best thinking to date, recognizing that there can and should be many more opportunities to advance the ball following this report. We stand united in the belief that the mandate is sound and should continue beyond this initial effort, using the tools of community co-design that we have introduced.

1. Re-Envision Public Safety

We propose a top-to-bottom re-envisioning of safety that allows the university and its neighbors to follow successful models like that of [Camden, New Jersey](#), to identify and recruit the best candidates to serve as officers and to re-design DPS to focus on protecting us from the most violent crimes, [which continue to be very rare in and around our campuses](#). We also envision a broader definition of safety that would leverage the talents and

resources of the entire university community to properly address cases involving mental health and homelessness, like the city of [Denver, Colorado](#), has.^[3] That said, our co-design conversations with all members of the community — including DPS officers themselves — confirmed that campus safety is not the same as municipal policing.

Our analysis of DPS’s mandate clearly suggests that over the years, adding to DPS’s plate has been based more on its standing as the only 24-hour campus agency rather than a deliberative process about whether it is the right resource to respond to tasks like lockouts, wellness checks, routine parking violations and lost and found. *It is true that simply expanding DPS’s scope is a more expeditious path; however it is also a fact that DPS is currently responding to matters that would be better served by persons and resources far better suited to address the issue.* We contend that USC should better value the members of our faculty, staff and student community with meaningful expertise in these areas and entrust them with resources and mandates to address these inequalities.

Our analysis revealed three principles for re-envisioning public safety that need to be prioritized:

- spend wisely
- reallocate where warranted
- no solutions chasing problems

It is time for USC as a community to develop a robust, comprehensive safety vision that is appropriately positioned for the 21st century and properly allocates resources where our students, staff, neighbors and faculty would benefit the most from them.

2. Create an Independent DPS Oversight Body

Most would agree: any agency that investigates itself won’t typically find a lot that is wrong. Our analysis identified meaningful deficits in [Accountability](#) and [Transparency](#) that can and should be greatly resolved through the continuous efforts of an independent oversight body. It was evident through our co-design sessions and our deliberations as a CAB that a permanent independent oversight body vested with a mandate from and reporting to the president and Board of Trustees is an essential component of ensuring that both the more detailed recommendations are implemented and that public trust in the CAB process is preserved.

We contend that *ex officio* collaboration with members of the president’s senior leadership team is the proper role for this new body rather than reporting to them. First, this role has worked very well thus far as part of our current structure to offer context, expedite data requests and, wherever applicable, participate in meetings and subcommittees.^[4] Moreover, while it is tempting to suggest that the permanent body report to a member of the president’s senior leadership team (whether the vice president of administration, general counsel or chief diversity officer) we argue that the scope of work this new body will undertake requires a reporting structure that preserves unfiltered annual reporting to the president and Board of Trustees, and a related but distinct annual report available to the general public, consistent with several of our similarly situated [peer institutions](#).^[5]

At a minimum, we strongly recommend that this new board’s scope of work include:

- Advice regarding the annual budget for community safety and protection
- Independent review of complaints lodged against DPS
- Analysis and review of annual stops and other relevant safety data
- Use and oversight policy development for inevitable advances in community safety technology

To sum up: we strongly urge President Folt and the USC Board of Trustees to implement a process for developing a **ONE USC** community safety vision. Without implementation of the many recommendations we discuss in this report, we are not convinced that USC will successfully improve trust or ensure an environment where everyone

feels safe. Nor will it be able to contribute to renewed efforts to remedy broader social inequalities. We repeat that this report is the beginning, not the end, of the conversation and/or action. We look forward to this process continuing in the way that it began — with a broad and diverse group of stakeholders committed to a community-engaged path forward to the **ONE USC** vision of community safety, policing and care.

[1] This approach is grounded in the scholarship of [targeted universalism](#) and [intersectionality](#).

[2] We conducted an independent document analysis of hiring, recruitment, job descriptions and training policies; we also analyzed budgets, data on DPS stops, complaints and overall crime rates across a multi-year (generally three to five years) period.

[3] We note that the Los Angeles City Council approved a similar [effort in October 2020](#). Implementation began in 2021, and is based on a widely known model from Eugene, Oregon, [CAHOOTS](#). Eugene is the home of the University of Oregon, a fellow PAC-12 institution.

[4] That said, when deliberating on our recommendations, we met in closed session and *ex officio* members were not permitted to vote or otherwise “weigh in” on the outcomes of our deliberations. The conclusions reported here are those of the full members of the CAB only, not *ex officio* members.

[5] We acknowledge and respect the conventional practice of keeping certain aspects of safety confidential in order to preserve a tactical advantage over those who might intend us harm. However, we also find that USC is overly cautious in this area; similarly situated institutions like the University of Chicago, [Northwestern University](#), Georgetown University and George Washington University all provide publicly available reporting beyond federally mandated Clery Act reports. We discuss this in greater depth in Appendix 4.

3 / INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Across the country and throughout our history, who is considered “worthy” of protection from crime and who has been framed as a “security threat” has followed disturbingly consistent patterns. The tensions wrought from this fraught history have periodically boiled over — in 1965 (Watts) and 1992 (Los Angeles), to the point where we no longer track by city or neighborhood, we now track by name. In 2020, the spotlight turned to Minneapolis following the murder of George Floyd. Many in and around USC’s community wondered: would nine minutes and 29 seconds of horrifying viral video ignite unrest or would it finally provide the opportunity to have the serious, inclusive conversation about safety that is long overdue?

In July 2020, USC President Carol Folt decided that USC would take the latter path. She announced the formation of the [USC Department of Public Safety Community Advisory Board \(CAB\)](#) and empowered it with a broad mandate:

- Help ensure an environment where everyone feels safe and respected
- Conduct a thorough examination of USC’s public safety practices, including hiring, finances, accountability and bias training
- Play a crucial role in USC’s renewed efforts to remedy broader social inequalities within our community
- Increase the trust between the university, DPS and the broader community

Co-chaired by Professors Ange-Marie Hancock Alfaro (USC Dornsife) and Erroll Southers (USC Price), the **19 members of the CAB** came from a diverse set of perspectives on policing, race and community.

As anyone would expect in 2020 amidst a global pandemic, an international movement for racial justice and a contentious national election, the opinions we heard related to policing in general and DPS specifically, spanned the gamut of possibilities. Our CAB’s shared agreements included the confidentiality of our processes for individuals who sought it, the availability of the co-chairs to speak on behalf of the CAB and the commitment to executing this long overdue process *right* instead of *fast*. This prioritization of quality over speed was sometimes hard for people to accept — they did not trust that we would encourage or produce action, nor did they have faith that if they repeated their stories for the umpteenth time over many years, this time to a willing CAB, that anything would change. We acknowledge that well-founded skepticism, and note that we also experienced fear-based responses from others who worried that DPS needed protection from the CAB’s inquiring eyes, that perhaps we were a “solution searching for a problem,” or we did not have all of the “context” to understand some of the difficult truths we will share in this report. It is impossible to craft a report that will say things that every person will agree with in this polarized context, and we humbly submit that no quality report could or should please everyone in every way.

Recognizing and leveraging the diverse strengths of CAB members, we organized into subcommittees and began developing areas of focus in what is a vast domain of applied and academic research. We also acknowledged where several of us had major gaps and were able to rely on both USC and CAB experts to help us participate fully in our co-design process. We are grateful for the trauma-informed meeting facilitation training, legal confidentiality and community violence intervention presentations that developed our ability to effectively navigate this process in an efficient and respectful manner. We believe that any member of this CAB now possesses many of the requisite skills to serve on a civilian public safety review board wherever they may live, an unintended civic benefit of this process.

Finally, we also agreed on a consensus decision-making model, which is to say that we established we would not issue recommendations that a bare majority supported. In order to

avoid undue influence from USC administration, we met in closed session (without *ex officio* members present) as a board over the three meetings necessary to deliberate about and confirm all of our recommendations. We wrote this report in a similar manner. We agreed to acknowledge and analyze the information and data seriously — both that which was provided by the broader USC community and our neighbors, as well as that provided by DPS — and we would search for areas of consensus to build trust and legitimacy that **action could and should be taken**. Many members of the CAB were surprised to learn of the issues where we disagreed and where we agreed. But every single one of us had the opportunity to review and edit this final report, and we stand behind it.

What follows is therefore our best evaluation given the deliberative process and the data available to us at this time. We freely acknowledge that given a different set of data, we might have made different or additional recommendations. We often disagreed — civilly — and still concluded our deliberations in a place of having **45** consensus recommendations, which are organized into two overarching recommendations and four thematic pillars.


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- A safe *life* that is free from experiencing crime
- A safe *experience* navigating the campus and its surrounding locations free of being falsely targeted as suspicious, threatening or not belonging to our community.

PROCESS

What was originally promised to be a biweekly meeting schedule over a single academic year quickly evolved into a more **time-consuming schedule** grounded in our four-phase community co-design process, which is presented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1.
CAB 2020-2021 Community Co-Design Process



We intentionally titled this a “co-design process” because it is a far more robust method of community engagement than listening sessions.^[1] Typically, listening sessions are the start and finish of a communications-driven engagement process. We respect that approach, but we engaged with all sectors of the USC community following the principles of participatory community-engaged research,^[2] which includes stages for sharing preliminary results to genuinely solicit additional directions for the research rather than to gauge audience reaction.

That is exactly what happened in our case. During our Phase 3 conversations with undergraduate/graduate student abolitionists, we were sent back to examine the budget, which reinforced our two general recommendations, and provided a micro-simulation for future oversight. From the Provost Council we were reminded of the value that a **peer institution analysis** can provide and the power of transformative justice for healing, which enhanced our case for multiple recommendations among the pillars.

The President’s Senior Leadership Team confirmed (also during Phase 3) that our independent legal analysis was accurate: USC as a private institution cannot ban all police from its campuses, and abolishing DPS would only usher LAPD onto our campuses, an outcome that, given LAPD’s checkered history, might worsen rather than improve the safety of all people in and around our campuses. Based on our reading of California Penal Code 830.7 and the Los Angeles City Charter, the fight for abolition belongs in Sacramento and the City of Los Angeles, which have the power to make such changes. USC does not.

Most of all the community feedback was helpful, allowing us to reconnect with parents who’d already given us incredibly helpful feedback, encouraging us to create “Know Your Rights” workshops for students that complement the typical orientation workshops. We later found that several of our peer institutions already provide this service via workshop or online brochure. Last but certainly not least, our neighbors^[3] pushed us to analyze both **Clery Report Data** and **DPS Call Data** to determine whether off-campus students are being properly disciplined with code violations regarding alcohol and drug use, which spark many neighbor disputes. Spoiler alert: they are not.

We therefore want to reiterate our thanks to everyone who participated in any or all of the phases of our co-design process. We acknowledge that there were many opposing views, even if they did not come to the same Zoom meeting or show up in a particular breakout room. The CAB exercised our principles of consensus frequently to produce a report that was evidence-driven, community-engaged and committed to a path forward that will bring us together into **ONE USC**.

ONE USC


Our work has revealed that we need to have what we have named a **ONE USC community safety vision**. This *university-wide* safety vision has two complementary features. First, the **ONE USC** vision has a universal goal of ensuring an environment where *everyone* feels safe, respected and protected from becoming a crime victim. Second, this vision recognizes that USC can only achieve that goal by addressing the diverse experiences and needs of all USC students, faculty, staff and neighbors throughout USC’s spheres of influence.^[4]

To implement this safety vision, our community-engaged and evidence-based research process produced *two* general recommendations: **to re-envision public safety** and **to create an independent DPS oversight body**. Our recommendations for how to achieve these two broad goals are grouped into **four thematic pillars: Accountability, Alternatives to Armed Response, Community Care** and **Transparency**. Within the pillars a total of **43** action items serve as concrete ways we can advance as **ONE USC**. Figure 2 illustrates both the relationships between the vision, overarching recommendations and thematic pillars. It also illustrates in yellow the primary role we envision the entire USC community (including its neighbors) should continue to play in building out the **ONE USC** community safety vision.

We fully recognize that 10 months is insufficient to have addressed every facet of what the **ONE USC** community safety vision should entail. We are pleased to report that this exhaustive process collected the thoughts of **over 700 people** who took the time to share them with us via Zoom, email or **submissions to our website**. We thank them for their valuable contribution and hope they will continue to be part of the **ONE USC** community safety vision process going forward. We contend that the community-engaged research process that served as the heart of how the CAB developed its recommendations should continue as the work transitions to an implementation phase.

Notably, three of the four thematic pillars are directly consonant with the **2019 USC Values Survey**. In October 2019, over 20,000 faculty, staff and students completed a poll inquiring about the values, behaviors and actions they wanted USC to embody. Of the six identified values, our pillars of **Accountability, Community Care** and **Transparency** directly reflect the Culture Journey’s embrace of *Accountability, Well-Being* and *Open Communication*.

FIGURE 2.
The ONE USC Community Safety Vision
and its Relationship to
the CAB’s Recommendations



Moreover we would contend that the remaining aspects of our **ONE USC** vision embrace integrity and diversity, equity and inclusion, two of the three remaining values. Continuing to engage the entire community in the development of the vision will ensure that the work is both implemented and assessed in a way that embraces the broader community expectation of the university for its role going forward.

The **ONE USC** community safety vision was influenced by a staff participant in one of our co-design sessions. She suggested that based on the diverse experiences of those in attendance with DPS and public safety at USC, there are really “two USCs.” While she intended to focus on the part of USC that feels safer with DPS around and the part of USC that feels less safe with DPS around, her description also helped us see additional examples of “two USCs.”

The University of Southern California consists of two main campuses that sit in the heart of Los Angeles. Like any university in a metropolitan area, those who are part of the USC community are simultaneously part of a broader metropolitan community as neighbors to longtime residents who stay far longer than any individual student might.

We also heard from a USC leader who reminded us that USC has transitioned from being a commuter school composed mainly of local California residents to a residential institution with students, staff and faculty from almost every country on earth who live, work, and/or shop within a two-mile radius of our campuses. Students and parents also shared their perceptions of the communities surrounding USC during orientation, which were different from the realities of what members of the community were telling us about their interactions with DPS and USC more broadly. **These additional comments reinforce our conviction that all of the “two USCs” need to be reconciled under a single community safety vision.**

As we will note in the next section, many people we spoke with feel safer in DPS’s presence. We repeatedly heard, for example, that individual officers have provided incredible professional service, up to and including Chief Thomas. We also noted that those who are aware of **DPS’s successful community engagement** programs like the Cadets program are fans of this work, just like many officers we spoke with in a dedicated session. The DPS officers we spoke with often feel most supported by USC when USC empowers them to engage with the community under non-exigent circumstances.

That said, we found some difficult truths that as James Baldwin would remind us, cannot be fixed until they are faced. Our focus on those truths and the road ahead should not be interpreted as one-sided or anti-DPS. We in fact stress wherever applicable how much DPS officers concur with our findings or offered helpful suggestions we recommend for implementation. Specifically, we want to flag that officer wellness, compensation, qualifications and retention are critical components of the **ONE USC** community safety vision.

We have organized the report to focus on recommendations first, then the data and legal analyses that support the findings overall. While we are proud to have engaged the full spectrum of views — from parents concerned about greater safety, to student and staff advocates pushing to abolish DPS, we did so with people who self-selected into our process. Thus, it is very possible that some views were missed. That said, we remain encouraged and indeed struck by both the diversity of participants and the common themes that emerged. We urge everyone to read the full report and to stay involved in the next steps of the process.

[1] See, for example, Rosen, J. and Painter, G. 2019. “From Citizen Control to Co-Production: Moving Beyond a Linear Conception of Citizen Participation.” *American Journal of Planning Research*

[2] Greenwood, D. J., W.F. Whyte, and I. Harkavy. 1993. “Participatory Action Research as a Process and as a Goal.” *Human Relations* 46:175–92. See Also: Hankivsky et al. 2014. “An Intersectionality-Based Policy Analysis Framework: Critical Reflections on a Methodology for Advancing Equity.” *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 13: 119 and Sacha, J., J. Sanchez, AM Hancock, M Pastor. 2013. “A Foot in Both Worlds,” pp. 11-13.

[3] We want to note that throughout our report, when we refer to the “community,” we mean the entire USC community of students, faculty, staff and neighbors. When we refer to our “neighbors,” we are speaking about people who are not affiliated with USC but live in and around either of our two campuses.

[4] This approach is grounded in the scholarship of [targeted universalism](#) and [intersectionality](#).

4 / GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS




TWO GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

A New Path Forward

Introduction

The idea of “public” or “community” safety has evolved over the last few decades to include the many things that law enforcement or quasi-law enforcement agencies are asked to do. More recently however, public safety has emerged as a way to describe “how law enforcement can serve as one tool in a comprehensive toolkit that helps to solve community problems.”^[1]

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL



General Recommendation: Defining Public Safety

The idea of “public” or “community” safety has evolved over the last few decades to include the many things that law enforcement or quasi-law enforcement agencies are asked to do. More recently however, public safety has emerged as a way to describe “how law enforcement can serve as one tool in a comprehensive toolkit that helps to solve community problems.”^[1] The Chancellor’s Independent Advisory Board of the University of California, Berkeley contends that its definition of community safety^[2] “resists trade-offs between the well-being of some for the false promise of safety for others.”^[3]

We took a slightly different approach. Rather than impose an external definition of safety, we asked people to collectively define public safety through their lenses of personal experience and how they envision it working in the future. The diverse large and small print quotations you will read throughout our recommendations section illustrate some of what we heard in our discussions that guide our findings. Our pilot conversations and co-design sessions helped us understand what makes people feel safe and what makes people feel less safe. We did not encounter anyone who was fully satisfied with the status quo; even those who acknowledged they felt safe frequently mentioned they had to trade on those relationships to get others quality service. One participant articulated two views: one involving herself — she has numerous strong relationships with people who work at DPS through her own occasional personal and professional situations — and her role as a mediator involving students. In such contexts, she feels obligated to mitigate what happens between DPS and the students, most frequently Black male students.

“The assumption in my group was that DPS would call on necessary entities when the call is needed based upon the call that is received.”

Our recommendation of a community driven, top-to-bottom re-envisioning of community safety articulates how we framed the 43 pillar recommendations. We adopt the term from DPS officers themselves, who are convinced that it is time to re-envision how the job is done and to get out of their comfort zones. Our co-design conversations with all members of the community — including DPS officers — also confirmed that campus safety is not the same as municipal policing. It was DPS officers who recommended changing the current job description, increasing the qualifications for entry-level positions, and making DPS a destination rather than a transitional department, with improved attention to officer wellness, training, retention and compensation.

We believe this recommendation is the most important tool available to preserve and indeed further lower the low rates of violent crime in and around USC, which we examined as part of a **recommended peer institution analysis**^[4] we conducted during phase three of the co-design process. The CAB concurs with the majority of participants in our co-design sessions: we need to take the “seed corn” that already works — including but not limited to DPS’s strong community engagement — and craft an infrastructure around it that better meets the needs of our entire community. This would allow DPS to focus on violent crime prevention and community policing.

Our review of successful models suggests both a vision and a tested game plan for achieving these outcomes. First, we applaud and endorse the university’s investment in cultural transformation. We recognize that the through line of these shifts is to move away from race-to-the-bottom analyses that focus on “what’s the least we are obligated to do,” usually to protect against litigation and legal liability, to a default position of “what’s the best we can do for all involved?” The CAB contends that any USC cultural transformation is incomplete without a concomitant cultural transformation at DPS. Our **Alternatives to Armed Response** pillar contains additional information and documentation regarding this re-envisioning.

We acknowledge that achieving a re-envisioning goal is a longterm process that requires numerous administrative changes. Going forward, we recommend that the entire

USC community (students, staff, neighbors, faculty, parents) conduct a community-engaged re-envisioning process to rethink and reorganize how to achieve the two parts of community safety — problem solving to protect people from crime and making sure all people feel safe from being targeted or traumatized by profiling. Our analysis revealed three principles for re-envisioning public safety that need to be prioritized:

- spend wisely
- reallocate where warranted
- no solutions chasing problems

In tandem with a community-engaged re-envisioning process, we recommend that the future oversight body we propose below take some specific actions in the immediate term. We found successful sector-specific transformation can be achieved through a two-part strategy of an external accreditation process that includes revision of all relevant job descriptions to be consistent with the **ONE USC** community safety vision, followed by a requirement of re-application by all staff to the newly designed positions.

Campus security accreditation is a necessary but insufficient process that can assist in the re-envisioning process and build community trust. Four of the eight peer institutions we reviewed are accredited by CALEA, a national accreditation organization, including NYU, which, like USC, is a non-sworn agency. As well, one of the most studied cases of culture reset, the police department of Camden, New Jersey, has received wide attention in the last year of a successful cultural transformation that used a related strategy to ensure a smooth and comparatively rapid organizational culture shift.

Our broader **ONE USC** community safety vision would also account for the incredible investments and growth that USC has experienced as a research university with impressive faculty, staff and students. The action items we discuss in this report are based on our review of the DPS budget over the past five years; we conclude that the most cost-effective strategy involves a re-envisioning of safety that leverages the knowledge and resources of the entire university community to properly address cases involving mental health, homelessness and other social services. Specifically, our university has invested in student mental health and street medicine programs that can now offer critical infrastructure to support action items in our report that devolve directly from the re-envisioning of public safety completed to date.

These areas are also sites of increased attention and investment at the state and local levels, as government institutions look for experienced experts with programs that work.

Our analysis of DPS's mandate clearly suggests that over the years, adding to DPS's plate has been based more on its standing as the only 24-hour campus agency rather than a deliberative process about whether it is the *right* resource to respond to tasks like lockouts, wellness checks, routine parking violations and lost and found. *It is true that simply expanding DPS's scope is a more expeditious path; however it is also a fact that DPS is currently responding to matters that would be better served by persons*

and resources far better suited to address the issue. We contend that USC should better value the members of our faculty, staff and student community with meaningful expertise in these areas and entrust them with resources and mandates to address these inequalities.

It is time for USC as a community to develop a robust, comprehensive safety vision that is appropriately positioned for the 21st century and properly allocates resources where our students, staff, neighbors and faculty would benefit the most from them.

General Recommendation: Create an Independent DPS Oversight Body

Our overall analysis identified meaningful deficits in **accountability** and **transparency** we discuss elsewhere in this report that can and should be greatly resolved through the establishment of a permanent independent oversight body. In many of our conversations,

“It shouldn't just be chop the police department, it's divert some of these dollars that we have in other places to service these needs.”

“If DPS is not the right entity to respond, what is the better choice?”

we heard that reporting complaints directly to DPS was undesirable and even traumatizing. It was clear through our co-design sessions and our deliberations as a CAB that a permanent independent oversight body with a mandate from and reporting to the president and Board of Trustees is an essential part of ensuring that both the more detailed recommendations are implemented and that public trust in the CAB process is preserved.

While USC has done an extraordinary job in promoting resources and programs that are available to the community, many community members perceive USC to be an unwelcoming environment. As we transition to a world with minimal COVID-19 transmission and physical constraints, we would hope that the DPS foot patrols, which are seen as beneficial by officers, as well as many in the community, would work to reverse these perceptions. In that regard, foot patrols are a foundational process that has always served public safety agencies well over many years, as they pursue enhanced community engagement. Having officers who understand deeply the principles of community care that are at the heart of campus safety (as opposed to the command presence of municipal policing) will also help in this regard.

A future oversight body has a role in promoting the community voice in DPS policies and program decisions as well. Community safety must be equitable and just for all, not just those that live, study or work on USC's campuses. Ultimately USC needs to safeguard and be responsible for the accountability, community care and transparency of DPS, even as our neighbors do their part in meeting DPS halfway to build a strong relationship.

Our **analysis of peer institutions** found examples of oversight bodies at the [University of Chicago](#), [Georgetown](#) and [Northwestern](#) that can serve as relevant resources. We note also that many of our peer public institutions have oversight bodies ([UC Berkeley](#), [University of Michigan](#), [University of North Carolina](#)) and numerous private institutions excluded from our analysis for demographic reasons (*e.g.*, their non-urban location or size) also have such bodies, including [Cornell](#), [Harvard](#) and [Villanova](#) Universities.

We contend that *ex officio* collaboration with members of the president's senior leadership team is the proper role for this new body rather than reporting to them. First, this role has worked very well as part of our current structure to offer context, expedite data requests and wherever applicable participate in meetings and subcommittees.^[5] Moreover, while it is tempting to suggest that the permanent body report to a member of the president's senior leadership team (whether, for example, the vice president of administration, general counsel or chief diversity officer), we argue that the scope of work this new body will undertake requires a reporting structure that preserves organizational integrity, unfiltered annual reporting to the president and Board of Trustees and a related but distinct annual report available to the general public, consistent with the transparency displayed by several of our similarly situated **peer institutions**.^[6]

At a minimum we strongly recommend that this new board's scope of work include:

- Advice regarding the annual budget for community safety and protection
- Independent review and assessment of all complaints lodged against DPS
- Analysis and review of annual stops and other relevant safety data
- Creation and review of quality of service benchmarks with external contractors
- Oversight of policy development for use of inevitable advances in community safety technology
- Assist where warranted with practices of transformative justice^[7]

We acknowledge that the CAB could not grapple comprehensively with questions of the proposed body's governance structure and mandated authority at this time. While some of these topics will require legal attention in the future, we urge the creation of a wide berth for meaningful oversight in light of both the seriousness of the work and the value it can

“DPS acts with more power than they have given the MOU with the City, which highlights the need for [community] education about the MOU.”

“I was dealing with a mental health crisis — a suicidal student — when DPS arrived the officer yelled ‘What's wrong with you?’”

provide to ensuring that accountability, alternatives to armed force, community care and transparency become the center of the **ONE USC** community safety vision and move the university closer to the values and culture it purports to embrace.

“When this happened there is very little follow up and the complaint just gets lost in the system.”

“If they aren’t already doing so, DPS should interface with USC and LA City and County resources for social services.”

A future oversight body should also reflect the diversity of campus stakeholders and also consider how it can leverage campus systems and structures already ingrained in making change in the process. Inclusion of advisory board members from Undergraduate Student Government (USG), Graduate Student Government (GSG), Staff Assembly, Academic Senate or the Provost Council would build inclusivity in the process and allow for broader engagement. The oversight body should also consider how outspoken neighbors and those who are often complained about, such as Greek life members, can be included to bridge the divide between these entities through community-based problem solving.

In the future, we believe that the forthcoming oversight body must play a crucial role in ensuring that we have improved communication with all stakeholders about DPS and all of our campus safety operations by continuing to engage with the community in a variety of ways, including hosting listening sessions, holding “town halls” to discuss DPS operations, conducting “report card” surveys of stakeholders and maintaining an easy-to-navigate website with links to where community members can find information about DPS.

We also believe that this body will be essential in ensuring transparency concerning DPS’s campus safety operations. It can do that by monitoring the ways that DPS disseminates information to ensure its accuracy and that DPS fairly represents its operations and accurate crime statistics.

[1] 21CP Solutions (2020). “An Assessment of the Yale Police Department,” p. 6.

[2] “As it is written in our charge, community safety means: 1) that those who are public servants charged with serving and protecting do so in ways that are consistent with the University’s stated values and the highest standards of professional conduct and consistency; 2) that all students are safe from arbitrary, unwarranted, unrestrained and/or excessive acts of surveillance, bodily intrusion, psychological harm or violence at the hands of law enforcement on and near campus; and 3) that campus representatives center the holistic wellness and inclusion of vulnerable campus communities (e.g. Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Undocumented, formerly incarcerated, LGBTQ, etc.) in their interactions.” 2019-2020 Annual Report, p. 11.

[3] Ibid.

[4] We analyzed eight universities, primarily private institutions, in four large cities: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.

[5] That said, when deliberating on our recommendations, we met in closed session and *ex officio* members were not permitted to vote or otherwise “weigh in” on the outcomes of our deliberations. The conclusions reported here are those of the full members of the CAB only, not *ex officio* members.

[6] We acknowledge and respect the conventional practice of keeping certain aspects of safety confidential in order to preserve a tactical advantage over those who might intend us harm. However, we also find that USC is overly cautious in this area; similarly situated institutions like the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Georgetown University and George Washington University all provide publicly available reporting *beyond* federally mandated Clery Act reports. We discuss this need for transparency in greater depth in Appendix 4.

[7] Practices of transformative justice build upon the insights of restorative justice but provide additional layers of consideration to account for systemic inequalities and legacies of oppression. See: Nocella, Anthony J. (2011) [Overview of the History and Theory of Transformative Justice](#), *Peace and Conflict Studies* 6:1, 1-10.




Accountability

Introduction

According to the Department of Justice’s Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing, having a culture of accountability is a key component of building trust and legitimacy.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY



Defining Accountability

The call for accountability has been a prominent issue in the national conversation on policing, and it was no different in our community co-design sessions, as the excerpts in this section illustrate. As expected, the issue of accountability appeared in all of our co-design sessions and all of our kitchen cabinet sessions. According to the Department of Justice’s Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing, having a culture of accountability is a key component of building trust and legitimacy.^[1] This notion of legitimacy cannot be overstated, inasmuch as the public confers legitimacy only on those they believe are acting in procedurally just ways. In that regard, agency accountability is critical infrastructure for public confidence.

The CAB’s definition of accountability mirrors that of peer institutions like the University of California, Berkeley, which defined police accountability as “a formal process of holding law enforcement accountable for harm (e.g., internal disciplinary processes, civil or criminal trials, etc.). We can also think of accountability as a practice in which law enforcement acknowledges the concerns and complaints of community members and responds in a meaningful way. In each case, accountability is based on the concerns and expectations

The diverse large and small print quotations you will read throughout our recommendations section illustrate some of what we heard in our discussions that guide our findings.

“One community member told a story about a bank in the area being robbed and it took LAPD 50 minutes to respond. That business now doesn’t call LAPD, they call DPS for a faster response.”

of the public and holds law enforcement accountable to these concerns and expectations. Instead of privileging the paradigm of law enforcement (*e.g.*, in evaluating whether or not an action was “justified”), police accountability elevates and requires law enforcement, as public servants, to meet a set of community expectations and standards for police behavior.^{4[2]}

Recommendations Summary

Consistent with the importance of accountability to enhanced trust and legitimacy, the CAB strongly recommends that the majority of recommendations in this pillar be addressed in the immediate term by design. The policy updates discussed in the immediate term section of the recommendations table are designed to create optimal conditions for a full reset of the relationships between DPS and multiple sectors of the USC community through the **ONE USC** community safety vision process.

First, we are pleased to recommend five immediate policy updates that would bring DPS in line with sector-wide accountability practices, preparing DPS to vault over the field following the re-envisioning public safety process discussed **in the first general recommendation**. The university and DPS should immediately ensure that sustained complaints or sustained reports of bias, discrimination or profiling or sustained misconduct involving these kinds of complaints can result in the termination of employment. We understand that the transition to this kind of accountability is long overdue, and should no longer be delayed.

Next, DPS should develop and provide a Community Engagement Card or QR code to be furnished to everyone who has an interaction with DPS personnel, which will provide an opportunity to forward information (whether commendation, complaint or other quality of service feedback) to DPS. This data can be shared with the new oversight body in an effort to track DPS’s performance in key metrics of community-oriented policing.

Third, DPS should log sufficient information to analyze the percentages of each officer’s investigative stops where a detained individual was found to be engaging in criminal activity. As other pillars detail, the lack of robustly collected data is a serious limitation in rooting out practices that are harmful to many in our broad community. Collecting this data and sharing it with the new oversight body will allow the fair implementation of the first recommendation regarding possible termination of employment while ensuring that the data is properly collected and reviewed by an entity external to DPS.

The fourth and fifth recommendations in the immediate term focus on bringing data to bear upon assessments of DPS’s performance as an agency by the new oversight body. DPS does not currently meet standard procedures of recording all self-initiated field contacts with individuals into a computerized log. In fact, these contacts are not currently recorded at all, having a significant impact on how we assess data with regard to racial or other identity-based forms of impact. We note this in greater detail in the Alternatives to Armed

Response pillar, but having these records provides important data about reasons for contact, and outcomes of the interactions will best flag problematic practices for additional training and/or further accountability.

Similarly, the new oversight body should play a key role in the two medium term recommendations put forth in this pillar. The CAB’s **independent legal analysis** leads us to conclude that re-envisioning public safety must include a thorough review and reassessment of USC’s relationship with LAPD. At a minimum, this review should ensure that the MOU is subject to all current applicable federal and state laws, as

well as the Los Angeles City Charter. The review should specifically proceed immediately following the collective re-envisioning process at the broader university level to ensure that the MOU reflects the new goals and values of USC. We also recommend data enhancements to include DPS’s creation of a database to identify officers who have committed racial profiling stop offenses. The review of this database annually by the new oversight body should be part of the future body’s own accountability process. DPS has recently come

under criticism for hiring former LAPD officers with public records of misconduct. These loopholes should immediately be closed by creating a database that identifies officers who have committed racial profiling stop offenses, and/or those who have been released from duty elsewhere due to misconduct. In our DPS officer co-design session, it became clear that officers value what they do, and are troubled by having trust in their guardian roles tainted by officers whose records should not have permitted them to be hired in the first place. ***Resolving this problem should not be delayed.***

In sum, the CAB offers specific and practical recommendations to demonstrate the university’s commitment and prompt response to one of the most important elements of community trust — accountability. Several of the recommendations may be implemented with DPS policy and procedure amendments, which are easily implemented; doing so will also yield quantifiable results and data for the purposes of assessing the efficacy of the action(s). Needless to say, these activities must be embraced as part of the DPS mission, as these procedures will convey trustworthy motives critical to establishing legitimacy in policing. The values and ethics of DPS should guide officers in their discretionary decision process, and the recommendations in the Accountability pillar can provide the foundation for a change in the culture. The objective is to help facilitate respectful encounters with the communities being served.

“DPS does not support the surrounding community from loud and unruly student parties and the disruption to the neighborhood.”

[1] 2015, p. 25

[2] UC Berkeley Chancellor’s Independent Advisory Board on Police Accountability and Community Safety Annual Report, 2019-2020, p. 14

“DPS doesn’t respond to complaints from the public.”

“DPS participates in selective enforcement [when it comes to students].”




Alternatives to Armed Response

Introduction

One of the primary drivers of innovation regarding alternatives to armed response has been the disparate impact of racial profiling on the life chances of particular populations.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO ARMED RESPONSE



Defining Alternatives to Armed Response

One of the primary drivers of innovation with regard to alternatives to armed response has been the disparate impact of racial profiling on the life chances of particular populations. The alternatives that have emerged are grounded in a turn toward forms of procedural justice. Procedurally just treatment focuses on four pillars: (1) treating people with dignity and respect; (2) giving individuals "voice" during encounters; (3) being neutral and transparent in decision-making; and (4) conveying trustworthy motives. One of the participants in a session said that procedural fairness is just a basic way for police to interact with people.^[1] This focus on fairness was echoed in many of the co-design sessions. The lethal consequences of racial profiling have been glaringly evident across the country and was one of the primary motivations for the launch of the CAB in August 2020. Specifically, the CAB substantiated longstanding anecdotal reports of profiling perpetrated by USC DPS officers in multiple ways.^[2]

We define racial profiling in consonance with California state law. Passed in 2015, AB953 defines racial profiling as:

The consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, or mental or physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop, except that an officer may consider or rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description. The activities include, but are not limited to, traffic or pedestrian stops, or actions during a stop, such as asking questions, frisks, consensual and nonconsensual searches of a person or any property, seizing any property, removing vehicle occupants during a traffic stop, issuing a citation, and making an arrest.^[3]

The diverse large and small print quotations you will read throughout our recommendations section illustrate some of what we heard in our discussions that guide our findings.

17. Mental Health:

Have other services provide the mental health response. If some functions currently handled by DPS are reassigned to other campus entities, then USC administration and DPS should consider reallocating funding in support of those reassigned services and redirecting resources from DPS to those other campus entities.

17

18. Homelessness:

Implement the Street Medicine Pilot Program with Keck Medicine as the lead response.

18

"We [DPS] need to completely re-envision how this job can be done. We understand the tactical reasons why it's been done the way it has in the past but we can make changes and be the leaders."

The CAB conducted a deep review of university and DPS-provided data and reviewed transcripts of 10 community co-design sessions to confirm DPS stops target Black and Brown males in our community, primarily under vague categories of “suspicious behavior” and “suspicious person.” Table 1 lists the 2019-2020 data collected by DPS and shared with the CAB; the full data analysis can be found in [Appendix 3](#). Stops of Black people (333, or 31.7 percent overall) clearly outstrip the populations of Black people in and around the Health Sciences (1 percent) and University Park (12 percent) campuses. Since DPS does not currently require officers to log all officer-initiated stops, we consider this a conservative (meaning low) estimate of what young Black people experience in and around USC. Moreover, arrest data does not match up with stops data, indicating both a likelihood that these stops are not effectively preventing crime. Together the lack of arrests and low overall presence of Black people lead us to conclude it is likely that nontrivial numbers of Black people are being surveilled and stopped repeatedly. More concerning is the issue that all stops are not documented, thus underscoring the number of negative interactions that may actually be occurring and are likely not being reported in the form of a complaint.

TABLE 1
Officer’s Perception of Person’s Race and Stated Reason for Stop, 2019-2020

Perceived Race ^[4]	Consensual	Suspicious Activity	Suspicious Person	Total Number of Stops
Asian	6 (20%)	20 (55%)	11 (30.5%)	37 (3.4%)
Black	29 (8.7%)	187 (56%)	117 (35%)	333 (31.7%)
Middle Eastern	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	0 (0%)	4 (.4%)
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander	1 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0%)
Unknown	21 (8.2%)	173 (67%)	63 (24.5%)	257 (24.5%)
White	46 (11.1%)	248 (60%)	119 (28.8%)	413 (39.3%)
Missing Data	*	*	*	5
TOTAL	104	631	310	1050

Within our co-design sessions many individuals bore witness to the consequences of acts of racial profiling and unsubstantiated officer stops. Throughout the co-design sessions, the call for a change in the response methods of officers prevailed. Interestingly, this call rose across the body of attendees regardless of whether they had personally experienced racial profiling, including faculty, staff, students and broader community members, or if the incidents were shared with others by the persons directly involved in the encounter. During the co-design sessions, community members repeatedly suggested that having armed officers respond to situations involving mental health and non-criminal calls could often be a trigger and escalate the situation. We also heard that response to noise calls by armed officers often was seen as an overreaction and resulted in increased tensions, especially when the armed response seemed to be triggered by the particular disturbance involving persons of color.

The CAB considered longstanding work in the area of procedural justice and best practices of de-escalation that also emerged out of our co-design sessions. The recommendations within this pillar are more specific enumerations of the principles of [re-envisioning public safety](#) that were presented in the first general recommendation.

Recommendations Summary

The first two recommendations for immediate implementation are grounded in the principles of re-envisioning public safety, as we noted. This is based upon the rationale that DPS’s

purpose and mission should align with the duties it performs on behalf of the broader USC community, whose experiences are vital in the actual accomplishment of DPS’s mission. Thus, we recommend that DPS should explore and address the duties currently performed by its officers and officials in order to effectively transition some of its duties to appropriate entities with the requisite experience and expertise. These duties may include but are not limited to: non-violent mental health response, noise complaints, citizen check-ins and non-violent alcohol-related infractions. These scenarios may not necessarily require an armed response, and doing so may only escalate circumstances. And, as DPS “debundles” some of its duties to reflect a more centralized and equitable approach, funding directly related to these duties should be proportionately allocated to the necessary entities based on the amount and intricacy related to them.

The second immediate recommendation focuses on the principle of equity, which was repeatedly mentioned by neighbors. They pointedly mentioned that they saw community residents being treated differently than USC students by DPS, particularly when residents may have been engaged in the same activities, giving rise to the need for the call for service. Because DPS is meant as an entity that serves all members of the broader USC community, including faculty, staff, students and neighbors, its response to calls should not be approached in a manner reflecting a biased approach depending on who is involved. The aforementioned being true, DPS must address its policies regarding noise complaints, alcohol-related offenses and the like regarding students. The CAB views equitable treatment amongst these populations as both necessary and paramount in creating a university culture of equity, mutual respect and community care.

The CAB envisions the third and fourth immediate recommendations as tasks suitable to the new permanent DPS oversight body, which should partner with DPS and other university entities to develop appropriate oversight policies in a manner consistent with the **ONE USC** community safety vision. A new Training and Professional Development Strategy can address recommendations from staff, students, faculty and the community, as well as DPS officers themselves, several of whom noted that they feel safest at USC when DPS invests in them or gives them opportunities to be heard and grow. Moreover, revising the stop standard policy also gives all parties the opportunity to rethink the causes and consequences of stops in the first place. The CAB’s analysis of [calls made to DPS](#) allows us to see that many stops attributed to the initiative of the officer are in fact responses to calls made by the broader community. The CAB endorsed changes in the stop standard language to clearly communicate the sense that there is a further caution in determining the need to make a stop, since the variation in what someone considers “suspicious” varies widely and does not often result in an arrest, as the data showed.

The medium term and longterm recommendations are the results of the CAB’s deep engagement with evidence-based strategies accompanied by clear records of results. They are also developed to be consistent with a) the status of USC as a world-class research university, with a faculty of unparalleled expertise in a variety of relevant topics, and b) the analysis of DPS-provided data regarding calls, community co-design session comments and a brief review of innovative measures taken by peer institutions.

Community violence reduction specialists bring their own community experience and knowledge to the heart of the intervention within violence reduction efforts. Almost all of the Community violence reduction specialists have life experience involving community violence and encounters with law enforcement. They are a group of individuals who have turned their lives around and have dedicated themselves to helping the community reduce violence.^[5] Several faculty at USC are experts in this form of intervention, and this program also brings the opportunity to collaborate more closely with community partners.

The two longterm recommendations urge that primary responsibility for handling

“DPS policing is the complete antithesis to providing security in a place of higher learning.”

“DPS services need to be more aligned with what it means to be embedded within a campus community.”

issues of mental health crises facing our students, staff and faculty (as well as individuals experiencing homelessness) transition to other university units better equipped to intervene with immediate and medium term assistance rather than the short-term assistance DPS is designed to provide. To be clear, we recognize that on any given day an armed DPS officer may in fact be the first individual to engage with a person experiencing either a mental health crisis or homelessness. However, the longterm strategy we advocate here is to engage all of USC's collective intellect and expertise to partner with city and county associates to address these issues as both first responders and as longterm experts in structural issues.

[1] Meares, T. 2017. "The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies." 119 *Columbia Law Journal* 5

[2] The analysis we were able to complete would have been greatly enhanced by improved data quality and quantity. For an example of the impact of quality data, see: Hetey, R. et al. 2016. "[Data for Change: a Statistical Analysis of Police Stops, Searches, Handcuffings, and Arrests in Oakland, California 2013-2014](#)" and Eberhardt, J. 2016. "[Strategies for Change: Research Initiatives and Recommendations to Improve Police-Community Relations in Oakland, California.](#)"

[3] Revised version of Sec.4 of Sec. 13519.4 (5e) of the California Penal Code.

[4] By "perceived race," we mean from the officer's perspective; what race did they attribute to the individual they stopped?

[5] Reductions in community violence due to community violence intervention workers have been documented to include a variety of practices that focus on restorative and transformative justice practices, in addition to trauma-informed intervention. See: Brantingham, J., N. Sundback, B. Yan, & K. Chan. 2017. [GRYD Intervention Incident Response and Gang Crime 2017 Evaluation Report.](#)




Community Care

Introduction

The concept of community care was prevalent in multiple CAB subcommittees and throughout our co-design sessions.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: **COMMUNITY CARE**



Defining Community Care

The CAB ultimately defined community care as a foundational premise that prioritizes the health, well-being and safety of USC faculty, staff, students, community stakeholders and those living on and around USC's campuses. This theme is consistent with USC's long held value that "community relationships provide a safe and creative environment for our employees, students and neighbors to live, learn, play and grow."^[1]

This theme is also deeply grounded in what it means to be a DPS officer and serve the overlapping and intersecting communities surrounding HSC and UPC campuses. Several officers grew up in and around the communities of South and East Los Angeles, and are proud to serve as "guardians" through DPS. Both community members who participated in the co-design sessions and DPS officers themselves agree that too often there has been an "us vs. them" mentality that is corrosive to the concept of community care and, ultimately, a **ONE USC** community safety vision. The community often feels the gates of USC are closed to them and that the campus, its resources and thought leaders are not their own. Equally, those on campus have struggled with safety concerns, particularly at night. DPS officers recognize that the trust is not there in the community and have worked with DPS community programs or taken the initiative themselves to get out of their vehicles and introduce themselves, but it is a tall order to achieve individually.

"DPS really doesn't know the community. They see themselves as a police force and not in service to the community. I am not sure how much they are ingrained in the community."

It is necessary but not sufficient for both groups to better understand each other. Fears of "the community" are created by uninformed perceptions of the challenges they face that

The diverse large and small print quotations you will read throughout our recommendations section illustrate some of what we heard in our discussions that guide our findings.

often contribute to crime, like food deserts, gang violence, rising gentrification and access to health care. The creation of a sustained community that is safe, where everyone is welcome and empowered to build shared understanding, trust and empathy is a crucial component

of the **ONE USC** community safety vision. It is not solely the responsibility of DPS. Although it can sometimes be difficult to understand how USC's broader community relations directly relate to DPS, the investments made in the community for the community represent the servant leadership USC publicly subscribes to through multiple academic, student affairs and administrative units.

Recommendations Summary

As we have noted throughout the report, USC is a Los Angeles institution — and one of the largest universities and private employers in Los Angeles. It cannot and should not exist in a vacuum, isolated from the communities and cultures surrounding its buildings and infrastructure. The recommendations we listed above are designed to reset community relations in a direction

that builds upon the **ONE USC** community safety vision and the shared understanding, trust and empathy we outlined above.

In July 2020, 382 USC faculty members signed a letter urging USC to redirect resources to initiatives to make underrepresented students and members of the community feel safer on campus. The four immediate term community care recommendations are consistent with that request. The first two recommendations are framed as commitments in direct pursuit of shared understanding and trust. They may seem relatively straightforward, but we envision these immediate term recommendations as a gateway to the medium term roadmap we have provided above, which should empower USC to “walk the walk” after “talking the talk.”

One of the community members of our CAB impressed us when she shared her encyclopedic knowledge of the many wonderful engagement efforts DPS spearheads in the community, something many DPS officers are also rightly proud of. DPS should continue to create opportunities for positive nonenforcement interactions with its personnel. Not all community members were of the same opinion.

USC's commitment to creating inclusive and inviting campuses should build on comments from multiple perspectives of DPS by improving community members' experiences of security protocols and their awareness of what DPS and other university units offer to the community. For example: USC can specifically assess how the guest passes for Trojan Check can help create a visual authorization for community on campus to limit negative interactions with DPS. As well, a diverse and broad marketing campaign can remedy existing

awareness gaps once programs have been revamped with the **ONE USC** community safety vision and opened to the community.

Campus stakeholders and the community alike celebrated USC and its facilities, faculty and resources repeatedly. Teachers shared stories of students from marginalized communities becoming first-generation graduates of USC thanks to USC's

Family of Schools, JEP, or the McMorrow Neighborhood Academic Initiative. Some community members who struggle with neighborhood violence saw the accessibility of DPS compared to LAPD as a benefit during times of crisis. The officers and the CSC Security staff, affectionately known as the “Yellow Jackets,” made people feel safe and comfortable. People who appreciated these kinds of resources were open to expansions of DPS into the community based on these experiences.

“We had a barbeque with the international students and DPS to get to know one another, as many students from foreign countries have a vastly different experience with law enforcement. We feel it's important they know DPS early and in a positive way. It was a lovely event and everyone enjoyed themselves, maybe expand that type of get-together.”

“I know little about what DPS does, I wish there was more opportunity to hear from them about their outreach, programs and services.”

That said, others would prefer LAPD respond to calls for service because they see its officers as subject to greater accountability structures than DPS. They also repeatedly perceived DPS to treat USC students preferentially, and as unresponsive to resident calls, despite DPS's surveillance cameras located throughout USC's designated [patrol zone](#). There was not nearly as much consensus on the future of DPS with regard to the subject of neighborhood or community relations as there was on other topics like accountability and alternatives to armed response.

As was common in the other pillars, the “two USCs” analogy emerged regarding community care. Throughout the last year it became clear that many who interface with the USC campus and people associated with USC feel watched rather than seen by DPS. Neighbors and residents near both campuses shared stories of an “us *vs.* them” feeling when it came to how USC prioritizes its engagements, development and public safety practices.

While students shared that USC programs that engage them to work alongside the community in outreach events, trash clean-up days or the medical clinic brought great value to their college experience, members of the community shared that they felt separate from the campus, unwelcome and unappreciated. We thus recommend that under the **ONE USC** community safety vision, the university follows through on its commitment to create egalitarian student/community opportunities for engagement that go beyond the extremely valuable but limited model of service learning to produce greater opportunities for building shared empathy and trust, two habits of deep solidarity.^[2]

To be completely candid, how and under what circumstances greater openness of USC's campuses to the community was possible or prudent was also a matter of significant debate within the CAB. USC has a wealth of resources that could be expanded to reach greater numbers of our neighbors than they already do, including supportive services through the Dworak-Peck School of Social Work, access to classes and certification courses through various USC colleges, FAFSA counseling and college application support, health care efforts to reduce disparities and expanded student support programs.

We concluded that we could stand fully together on the six medium term and two longterm recommendations once the immediate term commitments were implemented. All of the community care recommendations are the foundation of any future oversight body, particularly as it relates to its perceived legitimacy in the community.

“USC has cameras everywhere but when I call them for help as a resident they often do not respond or when they do, if my problem is with a student next door, they do not seem to want to address the challenges.”

[1] <https://communities.usc.edu/civic-engagement/>

[2] Hancock, *Solidarity Politics for Millennials*, 2011.



Transparency

Introduction

During the co-design sessions, we consistently heard the general sentiment that the community wants DPS to be more transparent about its operations.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: TRANSPARENCY

Goal Terms	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45
IMMEDIATE	<p>31. DPS: Should review, re-imagine and clearly publicize its mission, which should include providing a safe and secure campus environment that allows students, faculty, staff and campus visitors to realize their academic and social pursuits.</p>	<p>32. DPS: Should clearly communicate how DPS is different from the LAPD; what DPS does and what the LAPD does; and the relationship between DPS and LAPD.</p>	<p>33. DPS: If possible, DPS should look at ways to immediately change its uniforms so that they can easily be distinguished from LAPD officers in a way that could quickly be implemented.</p>	<p>34. DPS: Should clarify its mission and its policies with regard to students whose problematic behavior would normally justify receiving a citation by an LAPD officer if committed by a non-student. DPS should ensure that its officers are responsive to complaints from the local community and not inappropriately protecting students for activity that would otherwise merit a citation.</p>	<p>35. DPS: Should be more transparent about the data concerning its operations, including stop data, arrest data and basic budget information.</p>	<p>36. DPS: Should clearly publicize the revised mission statement on its website.</p>	<p>37. DPS: Must better communicate the services its officers provide and the scope of their respective enforcement.</p>	<p>38. DPS: Should change the color of its uniforms and/or create a more approachable look in its uniform design with colors not reminiscent of LAPD or other local municipal police forces so that students and the community around USC can easily identify DPS officers and distinguish them from LAPD and other agencies' officers.</p>	<p>39. DPS: Should form a working group, consisting of students, staff, faculty and DPS personnel, to determine uniform options and associated costs and present its findings with recommendations to the future oversight body.</p>	<p>40. DPS: Should develop educational materials to teach all community members about: 1. The services it provides and its enforcement authority and 2. The different roles of each classification of DPS officers.</p>	<p>41. DPS: Should maintain an activity log dashboard on the DPS website, which lists statistical information about its operations and activities, and which will serve as a building block to repair community trust. The information on the dashboard should be updated at least once a month to ensure its timeliness and accuracy.</p>	<p>42. DPS: Should continually reassess its mission statement and operations, and ensure that its website and educational materials are continually amended to provide proactive, accurate and timely information to the USC community.</p>	<p>43. DPS: Should work with an on-campus data analysis partner to collect and make available relevant and timely information regarding policing practices and outcomes on and near USC's campuses. This data should be used to inform and direct non-law enforcement resources, not as a tool to increase surveillance and enforcement.</p>	<p>44. The new permanent oversight body and DPS should present a proposal and budget to the university administration for a full uniform change.</p>	<p>45. DPS: Should review statewide policies and procedures to ensure that its data reporting practices are in alignment with the applicable state laws. These laws include Senate Bill 1421, enacted as an amendment to the California Penal Code Section 832.7, and Assembly Bill 953, enacted as an amendment to the California Government Code Section 12525.5.</p>
MEDIUM															
LONG															

Defining Transparency

During the co-design listening sessions, we consistently heard the general sentiment that the community wants DPS to improve its communication strategies, to share more information and to be more transparent about its operations. In this report, when we talk about improving communication, we mean that DPS should engage in consistent, timely, honest and open problem-solving discussions with all stakeholders concerning matters of campus safety and well-being. Likewise, improved information-sharing means sharing the information that will facilitate the community's awareness and understanding of matters that affect campus safety and community well-being. Finally, having more transparency means providing stakeholder groups with access to accurate and timely information about DPS's operations, outputs and outcomes. It was clear during the co-design listening sessions that doing all of these things will be crucial to gaining the community's trust and to reforming campus safety at USC. Therefore, in addition to the more specific recommendations listed below, our overarching general recommendation is that DPS must be better at communicating, must share more information and must be more transparent.

In addition to the Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing's recommendation to establish a culture of transparency, the 2019 Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights found an essential relationship between transparency, public trust and legitimacy.

The diverse large and small print quotations you will read throughout our recommendations section illustrate some of what we heard in our discussions that guide our findings.

“Why are there no reports when DPS traumatizes a student or a member of the community? This needs to be reported and be public to the community and students (transparency)”

The CAB’s co-design sessions made it crystal clear that the USC community wants DPS to improve its communication strategies and to be more transparent. The community needs to trust DPS and that will not happen unless DPS becomes better at communicating openly and honestly with the community, and is more transparent about its policies, its operations and its role in the community.

Recommendations Summary

Based on the co-design sessions, combined with the CAB’s discussions and our research about best practices in campus policing, our overall recommendation in response to these concerns is that DPS needs to communicate better about all aspects of what it does. If DPS wants to increase trust within the community, it must get better at communicating with the community. Too many members of the community do not know what DPS does, or how DPS can help them.

We have five additional specific recommendations to improve how DPS communicates with the community, shares information and provides transparency — beginning with a clear mission statement that reflects the **ONE USC** community safety vision of accountability, alternatives to armed force, community care and transparency.

The immediate term transparency recommendations empower USC’s neighbors, students, staff and faculty to better understand the mission, functions and operational effectiveness of DPS. Three of the five recommendations emerge both from our review of best practices and the co-design sessions, where lack of clarity regarding precisely what DPS does and how it is distinct from LAPD were frequent topics of discussion. These immediate term recommendations involve making sure the current record is clear and consistent across multiple platforms – print, internet, social media – and later, in the medium term, publicizing a revised mission and explaining topics like enforcement jurisdiction in plain language once those subjects themselves have been harmonized with the **ONE USC** community safety vision.

During the co-design sessions, we consistently heard participants say that they were unclear about the role and mission of DPS on campus and within the local communities. In particular, many faculty, staff, students and local community members do not understand the difference between the different types of DPS officers, including the unarmed Community Service Officers (CSOs) and armed Public Safety Officers (PSOs).

The two remaining immediate term recommendations – regarding uniforms and data transparency – emerged from a holistic review of the co-design session data. We were somewhat surprised to find a lot of attention given by our session participants to DPS’s uniforms. This topic was not on the CAB’s radar screen prior to these sessions. But the importance placed upon it and its connection to clarity about the distinctions between DPS and LAPD could not be ignored. There is no doubt the relationship between a university public safety department and neighboring city police departments is complicated. A key issue is clarifying the respective jurisdictional authority, roles and responsibilities of DPS officers as compared with LAPD officers. DPS has a formal written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with LAPD, which sets the conditions and relationship between the two police agencies, but as shown by the comments during the co-design sessions, many USC stakeholders are uncertain about the content and effect of that agreement.

In a similar vein, having more data transparency will be a crucial step in helping the community understand what DPS does and in helping to earn the community’s trust. California laws have changed in the past five years with regard to law enforcement agencies’ mandated data transparency practices. While DPS is not a municipal law enforcement agency, Table 2 presents the results of our review of similarly situated

“Need for more transparency and communication between all parties because USC isn’t going away and neither is the community so there needs to be camaraderie.”

“DPS offers a good degree of communication – text and email alerts.”

“There is a lack of transparency and USC and DPS does not allow for scrutiny when it comes to their activities, so they need to allow for scrutiny and be transparent and honest about their activities.”

peer institutions and indicates that multiple private universities in both Chicago and Washington, D.C. provide greater data transparency than USC. Private universities in New York provide greater clarity about their mission, and several institutions elect to provide greater transparency about hot topic policies like budget and body-worn cameras (Northwestern); use of force and staffing demographics (Columbia); or field interviews data and taser usage (University of Chicago). The full **peer institution** analysis we conducted is also available.

In summary, the issue of communication is the most essential building block in the Transparency pillar and cannot be overstated. Consistent references to this critical deficiency were mentioned throughout the CAB’s engagement process, regardless of the intended focus of discussion. The desired outcome of community trust will only occur when the broadest range of community members come to believe it shares a common set of values and

TABLE 2
Similarly Situated Private Universities’ Data and Policy Transparency

Institution	Stops Data Available Online	Policy Transparency
Columbia University	No	Yes
Georgetown University	Yes (first data expected Fall 2021)	Yes
George Washington University	Yes	Yes
Northwestern University	Yes	Yes
New York University (NYU)	No	No
University of Chicago	Yes	Yes
USC	No	No

interests with DPS. The best chance for that to happen emerges when the department is seen as an open book. Re-envisioning public safety is a dynamic process, allowing communities to identify problems and pinpoint areas in need of additional policy reform when data regarding officers’ activities are made available. Publicly available information regarding department policies and data on stops and calls for service are critical. This information is necessary for assessing the effectiveness of policing practices and priorities, and for community involvement and accountability. Informed community members are better positioned to make positive and productive contributions to co-designing public safety.

5 / CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND NEXT STEPS

Over the last 10 months we have listened to and spoken with anyone who would meet with us to understand their perspective in order to prepare this report. We are confident that the findings we share here are the right balance of data-driven analysis, empathic and trauma-informed listening and uncompromising commitment to a vision of community safety that unites us all — staff, students, neighbors and faculty — into **ONE USC**.

We look forward to the thoughts of the Board of Trustees and President Folt, who will be responsible for implementing the process of re-envisioning community safety and creating a permanent oversight body for DPS in a manner that facilitates accountability, alternatives to armed response, community care and transparency.

We invite all of you to stand with President Folt, the Board of Trustees and the members of the CAB as we embark on the more difficult conversations and actions that undoubtedly follow regarding implementation. Please let them know they won't be alone. Do not hesitate to speak up and make sure your voice is heard. Stay engaged, ask questions and track progress on the 45 recommendations through our forthcoming **ONE USC** community safety vision dashboard. These issues are too important and our lives are too valuable to leave this report on the proverbial shelf. Let's continue the journey of cultural transformation by transforming the culture of public safety at USC.

Fight On!

APPENDICES

6 / APPENDIX 1: COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE

The following summary list contains the recommendations agreed upon by the USC DPS CAB. They are intended to move USC closer to achieving the **ONE USC** community safety vision we outlined in this report.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL




TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY




TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO ARMED RESPONSE




TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: COMMUNITY CARE





TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS: TRANSPARENCY



7 / APPENDIX 2: LEGAL ANALYSIS

Summary Outline:

Analysis prepared by Robert M. Saltzman, JD, professor of lawyering skills, emeritus, at the USC Gould School of Law. Professor Saltzman also served on the Los Angeles Police Commission from 2007–2016.

- I. Issues related to the sources of authority for DPS
 - A. Two sources
 1. California Penal Code Section 830.7(b)
 2. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USC and the City of Los Angeles
 - B. Penal code authority
 - C. MOU
 - D. Regular review of the MOU with proposed recommendations
 - E. Fundamentals that should be included in the MOU
 - F. Publication of short and clear policies
 - G. Proposed recommendations
- II. Co-design session issue: It is difficult to distinguish DPS officers from LAPD officers.
 - A. Comments from the co-design sessions
 - B. Question: Should it be easy to identify who is DPS and who is LAPD?
 - C. Proposed recommendations
- III. Co-design session issue: It is difficult to know what DPS does and what LAPD does, how they differ and what their relationship is.
 - A. Comments from the co-design sessions
 - B. Community policing
 - C. Proposed recommendations
- IV. Co-design session issue: DPS should be abolished and the LAPD should be defunded.
 - A. Comments from the co-design sessions
 - B. Other sources of support for abolition and defunding
 - C. Possible responses to the arguments for abolition and defunding
 - D. Proposed recommendations
- V. Issue raised in the U.C. report: USC and DPS should have a good working relationship with the City of L.A. and the LAPD.
 - A. U.C. Report recommendation
 - B. Proposed recommendation

The Relationship Between DPS and the LAPD

- I. Issues related to the sources of authority for DPS: California Penal Code Section 830.7(b) and the Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”) between USC and the City of Los Angeles
 - A. DPS derives its authority from two related sources:
 1. California Penal Code Section 830.7(b)
 2. The Memorandum of Understanding between USC and the City of Los Angeles (for DPS and the LAPD, respectively)
 - B. Penal Code Authority: Under California Penal Code Section 830.7(b), persons regularly employed as *security officers for certain qualifying independent institutions of higher education* are not peace officers but *may exercise the powers of arrest of a peace officer* during the course and within the scope of their employment *if the institution has concluded a memorandum of understanding, permitting the exercise of that authority, with the sheriff or the chief of police within whose jurisdiction the institution lies.* (Emphasis added.)
 1. Section 66010(b) of the California Education Code determines whether a college or university qualifies as an “independent institution of higher education” for purposes of Penal Code Section 830.7(b) with respect to allowing university security officers to exercise the powers of arrest of peace officers.
 - a) USC qualifies under Education Code Section 66010(b) because USC satisfies the stated criteria for qualification:
 - (1) USC is a nonpublic higher education institution that grants undergraduate and graduate degrees.
 - (2) USC is formed as a nonprofit corporation in California.
 - (3) USC is accredited by an agency recognized by the U.S. Department of Education.
 - (a) USC is accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges’ Senior College and University Commission, recognized by the U.S. Department of Education.
 - C. The Memorandum of Understanding: In compliance with Penal Code Section 830.7(b), USC and the City of Los Angeles have executed an MOU, permitting USC DPS officers to exercise the powers of arrest of peace officers, with the Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, within whose jurisdiction USC lies.
 1. See MOU Article 3(A), which states in part, “It is the intent of the Chief of Police, by entering into this MOU, to allow employees of the USC Department of Public Safety (DPS) to exercise the arrest powers described in Penal Code Section 830.7(b).”
 2. The original MOU was executed in October of 2009 with a one-year term but with automatic extensions for one-year terms thereafter, unless either party terminates the MOU.
 - a) The MOU was formally amended in April of 2014. The MOU was further clarified by written agreements in February of 2015 and again in October of 2015.
 - b) The MOU continues today with automatic one-year extensions until such time as either party terminates the MOU.
 - c) According to information provided by DPS Chief John Thomas, the MOU was reviewed in 2016 in response to state legislation that would allow certain private institutions’ security officers to have peace officer authority throughout the state (while on duty) and again in 2018 when the MOU was reviewed by California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (CA POST) with respect to the same state legislation.
 - d) The October 6, 2015, letter agreement obligates DPS to review the maps which define DPS patrol and response areas to determine if any updates or changes to the maps are necessary or advisable. According to the letter, if DPS concludes that such changes should be made, DPS should contact the LAPD to discuss such proposed updates or changes. If there have been changes in the maps, these changes should be made clear as indicated in Section I(E)(1)(b)(1) below.
 - e) There has been no other comprehensive review of the MOU.
 - f) There have been no amendments or clarifications of the MOU since 2015.

3. Separate from the MOU, by letter agreement, beginning in 2018 (and continuing), USC pays the City of Los Angeles annually for additional crime suppression services provided by the LAPD.
 - a) The contracted services consist of two parts: (1) a Southwest Division crime suppression detail utilizing foot beats, bike patrols and high visibility crime suppression units in specific areas adjacent to the University Park Campus; and (2) a Metro Division SWAT detail co-located at the USC DPS University Park office.
 - b) During the first year of the contract for additional crime suppression, USC paid the City of Los Angeles \$1,125,000 for these additional LAPD crime suppression services. In subsequent years, USC paid the City of Los Angeles \$1,960,000 (in fiscal year 2019), \$1,650,000 (in fiscal year 2020) and is projected to pay \$2,080,000 in fiscal year 2021 for these additional LAPD crime suppression services.
- D. Regular review of the MOU: Best practices for MOUs between campus departments of public safety and local law enforcement call for regular review and evaluation of the MOU.
 1. See p. 14 of the National Center for Campus Public Safety's "Campus Policing in an Urban Environment" (July 2018): MOUs between campus departments of public safety and local law enforcement should be reviewed and tested regularly.
 2. See also Recommendation 5.13 and Recommendation 5.20 in 21CP Solutions, *An Assessment of the Yale Police Department* (March 2020): Recommendation that the Yale PD and the City of New Haven Police Department (NHPD) ensure that their relationships are clear and that they sufficiently reflect new practices, technology and changes in the law, and that the Yale PD agreement with the NHPD be reviewed to determine if changes are required given experience and the passage of time.
 3. See also Recommendation 2.1.2 in 21CP Solutions, *Re-Imagining Public Safety: Recommendations for the Harvard University Community & Police Department* (2020): that Harvard should update its mutual aid agreements with local police agencies to ensure that the agreements reflect the goals and values of the university.
 4. Proposed recommendations for consideration: USC should now engage in a thorough review of the MOU and should regularly conduct such reviews at least every three years to ensure that the relationships are clear, that the terms of the MOU sufficiently incorporate new practices, technology, experience and changes in the law, and that the MOU reflects the goals and values of USC.
 - a) As part of this comprehensive review, for purposes of clarity, USC should consider incorporating into the MOU the 2014 amendment, the 2015 letter clarifications and the contracts for added crime suppression services.
 - b) The terms of the revised MOU should include the schedule for periodic regular comprehensive reviews of the MOU and whether the terms are functioning effectively over time as laws, practices and policies changed.
- E. Fundamentals that should be included in the MOU: As indicated in the preamble to the MOU, the California Education Code requires the MOU to include designation of which agency shall have operational responsibility for the investigation of certain crimes and to delineate the specific geographical boundaries of each agency's operational responsibility.
 1. Best practices for MOUs between campus departments of public safety and local law enforcement indicate that, at a minimum, the following substantive matters should be covered adequately in the MOU:
 - a) Clear and comprehensive explanation of what each agency is required or authorized to do with regard to policing and investigation of certain crimes, including notification protocols; this is particularly important for officers working across shared jurisdictions.
 - (1) Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the MOU provide details regarding each agency's authorities and obligations regarding policing, investigations and notification protocols.
 - b) Clear jurisdictional boundaries.
 - (1) The USC/LAPD jurisdictional boundaries are clearly delineated in the MOU, its subsequent amendment and the February 20, 2015, clarification letter. (If there have been changes to the boundaries, these should be made clear to the USC community.)
 - c) Clear information about the nature of and requirements for training.

- (1) Training is covered in Article 9 of the MOU.
 - (a) Article 9 of the MOU does not refer to inclusion of community concerns in training.
- F. Publication of short and clear policies: Because MOUs tend to focus on specific legal obligations and requirements (to the detriment of clear and easy-to-understand policies)—and because MOUs are typically hard to locate and understand—best practices for campus departments of public safety and local law enforcement indicate that the terms of the MOU should be distilled into short and clear policies for each agency in order to ensure that officers patrolling and responding in shared jurisdictional areas fully understand their roles and responsibilities. Such policies should also be made available to the public.
- G. Proposed recommendations for consideration:
 1. As part of the thorough review of the MOU recommended in section I.D.4 above, USC should include community concerns, needs and desires in training of officers.
 - a) DPS may wish to have the CAB assist in this process of incorporating community concerns into training in the revised MOU.
 2. This review should consider broadening the training beyond the minimum required by law.
 3. This review should consider including a section on community policing and engagement.
 4. This review should determine if the system and protocols for investigation and reporting of crimes need to be updated.
 5. DPS should make the MOU readily available to members of the USC community.
 6. DPS should produce short and clear policies that reflect the terms of the MOU but are stated plainly and simply. DPS should make those policies readily available to all DPS officers and members of the USC community.
 7. This review should incorporate the review of DPS patrol and response areas to determine if any changes or updates are necessary or advisable (as called for in the October 6, 2015, letter clarifying the MOU). See I.C.2.d above.
- II. Issue raised in the co-design sessions: It is difficult to distinguish between DPS officers and LAPD officers.
 - A. From the co-design sessions:
 1. Because their uniforms are similar, it is difficult to distinguish between DPS and LAPD officers.
 - a) The old uniforms were different colors which helped distinguish DPS officers from LAPD officers.
 2. There needs to be more clarity and transparency regarding who is DPS and who is LAPD.
 3. There needs to be a clear distinction between LAPD and DPS officers; the similar uniforms confuse things.
 4. Over the years, DPS has postured more and more like the LAPD: uniforms, cameras, weapons and patrolling in unmarked cars.
 - B. Open question: Is it a good policy goal for it to be easy to identify whether an officer is DPS or LAPD?
 1. Affirmative answer: Yes, it should be easy to identify who is DPS and who is LAPD.
 - a) Article 7 of the MOU states that the public should be able to easily distinguish between security services personnel and local law enforcement personnel.
 - b) In the event of an incident that requires follow-up and review (and perhaps a complaint), it is important that members of the public be able to determine the identities of the police officers involved in the incident. In addition to having each officer's name legible on the uniform, in such situations it would be likely to be helpful for the public to know easily whether the officer is from DPS or the LAPD.
 2. Negative answer: No, there is benefit to having DPS uniforms that are similar to LAPD uniforms.
 - a) Given that DPS officers may exercise the powers of arrest of peace officers, it is desirable that the DPS uniform be similar to the LAPD uniform as a method of sending a clear signal to the public that DPS officers—unlike most private security officers—have the powers of arrest as peace officers.
 - b) In the event of an incident that requires follow-up and review, as long as each officer's name is legible on the uniform, that name should be adequate to assist in follow-up and determination of the identities of the officers involved in the incident.

C. Proposed recommendations for consideration:

1. DPS should review the following factors regarding DPS and LAPD uniforms:
 - a) The actual similarities and differences between the two uniforms.
 - b) The reasons why the DPS uniforms were changed to make the DPS uniforms more similar to the LAPD uniforms.
 - c) The experience of DPS officers with the current uniforms as compared with the experience of DPS officers with the prior uniforms.
 - d) Policies requiring each officer to have his or her name legible on the uniform for identification of officers involved in particular incidents.
 - e) A review to determine if state law still requires easy distinction between the uniforms.
 - f) Alternative uniform styles that might satisfy both the state requirements and the desire of DPS officers to have their uniforms signify their ability to exercise the powers of arrest of a peace officer.
2. DPS may wish to use the CAB as a resource in this evaluation of DPS uniforms.
3. Based on the information gathered in the review of DPS and LAPD uniforms (in II.C.1 above), DPS should determine whether the current uniforms are appropriate or if the uniforms should be replaced.

III. Issue raised in the co-design sessions: It is difficult to know what DPS does as distinct from what the LAPD does; there is a lack of clarity regarding how DPS and the LAPD differ, and there is a lack of understanding of the relationship between DPS and the LAPD.

A. From the co-design sessions:

1. It is difficult to know where DPS ends and the LAPD begins.
2. It is difficult to know whether to call DPS or LAPD in specific situations, and difficult to know what response to expect.
3. The MOU is neither readily available nor transparent.
4. Campus tours often describe DPS as “an extension of the LAPD.” It is problematic for some in the USC community to hear that DPS is an extension of the LAPD.
5. DPS should be known for having better community relationships than the LAPD.
6. DPS is a good liaison for students interacting with the LAPD and the LAFD.
7. DPS knows about related campus resources that are helpful; LAPD does not.
8. DPS is and should be more service-oriented than the municipal police force.
9. DPS is available for providing a broader range of help than the LAPD can provide.
10. DPS should be about “public safety,” not policing.
11. DPS should be protecting vulnerable students both from criminals and from being harmed by the LAPD, for example, by profiling.
12. DPS should handle breaking up student parties, not the LAPD.
13. LAPD responds and then leaves; DPS is in the community.
14. DPS has more discretion than the LAPD in how to respond to problems, although some LAPD officers use more discretion if they are around campus a lot.
15. The L.A. Police Commission should oversee DPS when it acts off campus.
16. It seems like DPS often protects students whose problematic behavior would be cited by the LAPD but for intervention by DPS (*e.g.*, for drunk and disorderly conduct or repeated excessive noise violations). Does DPS also have a responsibility to protect the community from the negative effects of the students’ problematic behaviors?

B. The success of community policing is in part the result of reducing specialized units, thus making more officers available as generalists who can address a wide variety of problems in the community in flexible and customized ways that better suit the varied and fluid nature of campus community needs. Compared with many officers in numerous specialized units in the LAPD, most DPS officers are generalists.

1. See K. Hancock, *Police Practice and Research* (2016), *Community Policing within Campus Law Enforcement Agencies*.

C. Proposed recommendations for consideration:

1. DPS should clearly communicate the following:
 - a) How DPS is different from the LAPD.
 - b) What DPS does and what the LAPD does.
 - c) The relationship between DPS and the LAPD.
2. DPS should emphasize and clearly publicize the following:
 - a) Its mission to provide a safe and secure campus environment that allows students, faculty, staff and campus visitors to realize their academic and social pursuits. This is distinct from the mission of the LAPD which is to safeguard lives and property, to reduce the incidence and the fear of crime and to enhance public safety and improve quality of life.
 - b) That the DPS focus is on safety and security compared to the LAPD focus which is on crime control.
 - c) That it is the goal of DPS to provide community care rather than to police in the manner of a municipal police force.
 - d) Its lack of specialized units, resulting in more officers who are generalists who can address a wide variety of problems in the community in flexible and customized ways which better suit the varied and fluid nature of campus community needs.
3. DPS should clarify its mission with regard to students whose problematic behavior would be cited by the LAPD (*e.g.*, for drunk and disorderly conduct or repeated excessive noise violations).
 - a) DPS should clarify its role in these situations:
 - (1) Does DPS protect students from being cited by the LAPD for activity that otherwise would be cited but for intervention by DPS?
 - (2) Does DPS have a responsibility to protect the community from the negative effects of the students’ problematic behavior?
 4. As recommended in I(F)(1)(e) above, DPS should make the MOU readily available to the USC community.
 5. As recommended in I(F)(1)(f) above, DPS should produce short and clear policies that reflect the terms of the MOU but are stated plainly and simply. DPS should make those policies readily available to all DPS officers and members of the USC community.

IV. Issue raised in the co-design sessions and more generally: DPS should be abolished and the LAPD should be defunded.

A. From the co-design sessions:

1. USC resources spent on DPS would be better spent promoting social justice and equity.
2. City of Los Angeles resources spent on the LAPD would be better spent promoting social justice, equity and new opportunities and programs in minority and disadvantaged communities.
3. Campus tours often describe DPS as “an extension of the LAPD.” It is problematic for some in the USC community to hear that DPS is an extension of the LAPD.

B. Other sources of support for abolishing DPS and defunding the LAPD include:

1. 382 USC faculty submitted a letter urging “USC to redirect 25 percent of the DPS budget to initiatives that will make underrepresented students and community members feel safer on campus.”
 - a) See Daily Trojan (July 9, 2020), *382 Faculty Draft Letter Demanding USC’s Commitment to Concrete Plans Addressing Racial Inequality*.
2. “A critical part of the national dialogue around policing is whether communities actually want ongoing, sustained interaction with police.”
 - a) See 21CP Solutions, *Re-Imagining Public Safety: Recommendations for the Harvard Community & Police Department* (2020).

- b) See Terrell Jermaine Starr, “Community Policing is Not the Solution to Police Brutality. It Makes It Worse”, *Washington Post* (November 3, 2015).
- 3. Indeed, at Harvard, some students are clear that, as one put it, “safety is not the presence of police.”
 - a) See 21CP Solutions, *Re-Imagining Public Safety: Recommendations for the Harvard Community & Police Department* (2020).
- 4. A UCLA faculty coalition called for administrators to defund and abolish UCLA campus policing and instead invest in reparative public goods.
 - a) One of the group’s demands is to defund the U.C. Police Department and replace it with anti-incarceration forms of accountability, including restorative and transformative justice and community-led public safety.
 - b) An op-ed written by the faculty coalition and published in the *Daily Bruin* stated, “By continuing to invest in policing, UCLA chooses to ignore the community that is its students.”
 - c) See *The College Fix* (January 2021), “UCLA Faculty Collective Demands Campus Policing Be Defunded, Abolished”.
- C. Possible responses to the proposals to abolish DPS and defund the LAPD:
 - 1. USC is located in the City of Los Angeles within the jurisdiction of the LAPD.
 - 2. DPS provides first-response police functions on and around the USC campuses based on authority granted to it under state law and on the terms of the MOU between USC and the City of Los Angeles. (See Section I above.)
 - 3. Based on IV.C.1 and IV.C.2 immediately above, if DPS did not exist—or if DPS is reduced significantly—then policing on campus currently provided by DPS would instead be handled by the LAPD.
 - a) USC does not have the legal authority to declare its campuses “police-free” zones where the LAPD cannot function.
 - 4. With DPS in existence, DPS controls the “dispatch” of calls and can determine the nature of the response to specific calls.
 - a) For example, if alternative responses such as crisis-intervention teams are available, DPS dispatch can assign a mental-health related call to a crisis-intervention team rather than to armed DPS officers with less training in mental health problems.
 - b) If DPS did not exist, then the 911 system and the LAPD would handle the dispatch of calls from the USC campuses as the system otherwise handles all calls. The 911 system and the LAPD would likely be less able and less willing than DPS to tailor the specific nature of the responses to individual calls not requiring a law enforcement armed response.
 - 5. Those in the community who are opposed to DPS policing on campus are likely to be even more opposed to having USC policed by the LAPD (because the LAPD focus is on crime control and prevention rather than community safety and security or a “community care” approach).
 - a) Those in the community who welcome DPS policing on campus and in the surrounding community are likely to be less satisfied with the LAPD’s standard law enforcement response to calls, as contrasted with DPS’s flexibility regarding the nature of the response to different types of calls.
 - b) Anyone needing assistance is also likely to be less satisfied with the LAPD’s average slower response times as compared with traditionally quicker DPS response times.
 - 6. Decisions regarding funding for the LAPD are made by the Los Angeles City Council and the mayor.
 - a) LAPD policies and program budgets are determined by the police commission and the chief of the LAPD.
 - (1) In the past year, the L.A. City Council reallocated some LAPD funding to alternative programs designed to promote social justice, equity and new opportunities in minority and disadvantaged communities.
 - (2) These L.A. City budgeting and policy decisions are beyond the reach of USC, DPS or the CAB.

- D. Possible recommendations for consideration:
 - 1. The senior USC administration, the DPS and the CAB should endeavor to communicate clearly to the USC community that if DPS is abolished—or if DPS is reduced significantly—then policing on and around both campuses currently provided by DPS would instead be handled by the LAPD.
 - a) These communications should make clear that USC does not have the legal authority to declare its campuses “police-free” zones where the LAPD cannot function.
 - b) These communications should make clear that, notwithstanding problems and issues with the performance of DPS, because DPS is more responsive than the LAPD to the needs and concerns of the USC community, it is on balance better for the USC community to be protected by DPS rather than relying solely on the LAPD for police protection.
 - c) As appropriate, these communications should make clear that DPS will be implementing significant changes to its policies and practices as a result of recommendations made by the CAB in other sections of this report.
 - 2. Based on other recommendations of the CAB, senior USC administration and DPS should review whether some current functions handled by DPS would be better handled by non-DPS campus entities. Examples of such functions include, among others, wellness checks, responses to mental health issues and lost and found.
 - a) If some functions currently handled by DPS are reassigned to other campus entities, then USC administration and DPS should consider reallocating funding for those reassigned services from DPS to those other campus entities.
- V. Issue raised in the U.C. report: USC and DPS should have a good working relationship with the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD.
 - A. Recommendation #19 of the University of California Presidential Task Force on University-wide Policing, *Implementation Report* (2020): The campuses and their police departments should strengthen relationships with local government and their police departments to ensure that campus concerns are appropriately communicated.
 - 1. Anecdotal evidence suggests that USC and DPS do have strong, positive and productive institutional working relationships with the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD.
 - a) According to DPS Chief John Thomas, LAPD recognizes DPS as a force multiplier in efforts to control crime in the USC communities, both for LAPD Southwest Division (University Park Campus) and the LAPD Hollenbeck Division (Health Sciences Campus).
 - (1) Communication is both formal and informal and at all levels within both organizations.
 - (2) LAPD assigns a senior lead (community services) officer to the University Park Campus. That officer is an effective liaison between the two departments, fostering communication and collaboration.
 - (3) The beneficial relationship is in part the result of shared training at the LAPD Academy and also the LAPD backgrounds of several DPS command officers.
 - (4) Another factor is that the community appreciates the DPS quick response time to calls and the DPS community-policing approach.
 - B. Proposed recommendation for consideration: USC and DPS should continue their efforts to maintain good working relationships with the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD.

Other Miscellaneous Comments from the Co-Design Sessions Regarding the Relationship between DPS and the LAPD:

Below are comments from the co-design sessions that refer to the relationship between DPS and the LAPD but did not seem to connect directly to a particular issue or recommendation:

- *DPS has an incestuous relationship with LAPD.*
- *I went to the police commission to revise the LAPD/DPS protocols. The LAPD SW Division Chief revised the protocols in a positive way. Then the SW Division Chief was replaced and the old protocols were put back in place.*
- *DPS set up a mobile response unit in front of my house even though the incident was down the block. I complained to DPS and they threatened me. I called LAPD to complain about DPS threatening me.*
- *The civilian review board should not be a bunch of “yes people.”*
- *DPS should not be hiring officers fired by the LAPD.*
- *DPS needs a positive relationship with the LAPD.*
- *There needs to be training of DPS officers for how to respond and hand-off calls to LAPD.*
- *DPS is not as autonomous as the LAPD. DPS is accountable to the senior USC administration.*
- *DPS needs conflict-resolution or a civilian complaint board like the LAPD.*
- *DPS needs transparency regarding how complaints are handled; there needs to be a civilian oversight board for DPS.*

1. Racial & Ethnic Analysis of DPS Stops 2019-2020
2. Analysis of USC-Specific Crime (2015-2018) and Service Calls Data (2015-2020)
3. Co-Design Session Attendance Data
4. CAB Website Commentary Summary

1. Racial & Ethnic Analysis of DPS Stops 2019-2020

Prepared by: Ange-Marie Hancock Alfaro, PhD, and Jarred Cuellar, MA, for the USC DPS Community Advisory Board

Brief Legislative Background: AB 953 (Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015)

AB 953 requires California law enforcement agencies to begin collecting and reporting data on complaints that allege racial or identity profiling. AB 953 also expanded the definition of racial and identity profiling to clarify that it is “the consideration of, or reliance on, to any degree, actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation or mental or physical disability in deciding which persons to subject to a stop or in deciding upon the scope or substance of law enforcement activities following a stop, except that an officer may consider or rely on characteristics listed in a specific suspect description.”

Under the Racial and Identity Profiling Act, by 2022, nearly all law enforcement agencies in California will be required to collect detailed information regarding stops and searches, including data on perceived demographics. The CAB watched a [video](#) that outlines steps law enforcement is taking to ensure the data best reflect reality, as well as the impact community organizations and academics hope the data will have on efforts to tackle racial profiling throughout the state.

As a non-sworn law enforcement agency, DPS has informed the CAB that it is not obligated to collect this data but began to do so voluntarily in 2019. Data for 2020-2021 is not yet available, according to DPS.

Description: The below tables are “raw data” tables that are offered in summarized format elsewhere in this report.

APPENDIX TABLE 3.1. NUMBER OF STOPS IN 2019-2020 BY RACE

Officer Assigned Race	Number of Stops	%
Asian	30	2.9
Black	333	31.7
Indian	3	0.3
Korean	1	0.1
Middle Eastern	4	0.4
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	1	0.1
Pakistani	1	0.1
Unknown	257	24.5
Vietnamese	2	0.2
White	413	39.3
Missing Data	5	0.5
Total	1050	100.0

Limitations:

- 1) This data is a single year snapshot so trends cannot be established.
- 2) This data is combined and not disaggregated by either affiliation (community/students/faculty/staff) nor is it disaggregated by campus (UPC/HSC)

APPENDIX TABLE 3.2: Number of Stops by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Number of Stops	%
Hispanic	479	45.6
Non-Hispanic	515	49.0
Unknown	54	5.1
Valid	2	0.2
Total	1050	100.0

APPENDIX TABLE 3.3: Racial Demographics of USC's Campuses (Combined)

Race	Students	Staff	Faculty
Asian	18.6%	32.5%*	14%
Black	5.5%	8.8%	3%
Indigenous/Native American	Missing	.7%**	0%***
Latinx/Hispanic	15.0%	30.2%	5%
White	29.4%	27.4%	66%
International	22.6%	Missing****	Missing****
Other	8.9%	Missing	
Unknown	Missing	3.2%	6%

Brief Summary:

We pulled this data from publicly available USC websites. As you can see in comparing the three tables, the number of stops of Black and Hispanic people far outstrip their prevalence among USC faculty, staff and students. We therefore turned to the neighborhood to determine whether the same would hold true based on neighborhood demographics. When we compare the above record of stops with the maps and demographic data provided below, we see that while the disparity for Latinos washes out when the broader community is included (that is, the percentage of Latinos/as/x profiled is not significantly higher).

* Staff count of "Asian" includes a combined figure that represents Asian, Filipino, Malaysian, Southeast Asian, Indian, Pakistani and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander categories in institutional data. We recognize and regret that this combination is often an untenable collapse of meaningfully distinct groups but were unable to duplicate the complexity across the other two population categories and made the difficult decision to combine.

** Staff count of Indigenous/Native American includes U.S. based indigenous as well as indigenous individuals from anywhere in North, Central and/or South America according to institutional data.

*** There are five Indigenous/Native American faculty total on both campuses of USC.

**** USC's Office of Institutional Research does not break this category out from other racial categories on its main page.

Neighborhood Demographics

Maps 3.1 and 3.2 were created based on census data to provide additional details regarding who resides in the neighborhoods surrounding both USC campuses. We explicitly focused on data from the [DPS patrol areas](#), which are publicly available.

MAP 3.1: University Park Campus Patrol Zone



APPENDIX TABLE 3.4: UPC area racial/ethnic makeup^[1]

Latino	48%
Black/African American	12%
Asian American	20%
White	19%
Other	<1%
Total population	43,775

MAP 3.2: Health Sciences Campus Patrol Zone



APPENDIX TABLE 3.5: HSC area racial/ethnic makeup^[2]

Latino	74%
Black/African American	1%
Asian American	22%
White	3%
Other	0%
Total population	4,377

What is the Listed Reason Why People are Stopped?

TABLE 3.6: Reasons for Stop by Racial Group Membership Identified by Officer

Race	Reasons for Stop			Total#
	Consensual	Suspicious Activity	Suspicious Person	
Asian	6 (20%)	16 (53%)	8 (27%)	30 (2.8%)
Black	29 (8.7%)	187 (56%)	117 (35%)	333 (31%)
Indian	0	2 (67%)	1 (33%)	3 (.3%)
Korean	0	1 (100%)	0	1 (.00%)
Middle Eastern	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	0	4 (.4%)
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander	1 (100%)	0	0	1 (.00%)
Pakistani	0	0	1 (100%)	1 (.00%)
Unknown	21 (8.2%)	173 (67%)	63 (24%)	257 (24.5%)
Vietnamese	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2 (.00%)
White	46 (11.1%)	248 (60%)	119 (28.8%)	413 (39.3%)
Unknown	0	5 (100%)	0	5 (.5%)
Total	104	636	310	1050

TABLE 3.7: Reasons for Stop by Ethnic Group Membership Identified by Officer

Ethnicity	Reasons for Stop			Total#
	Consensual	Suspicious Activity	Suspicious Person	
Hispanic	33 (6.8%)	320 (66.8%)	126 (26.3%)	479 (45.6%)
Non-Hispanic	63 (12.2%)	294 (57%)	158 (30.7%)	515 (49%)
Unknown	8 (14.8%)	21 (38.9%)	25 (46.2%)	54 (5.1%)
Missing	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2 (.00%)
Total	104	636	310	1050

Brief Summary:

Tables 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate the reasons for stops marked down by DPS officers and recorded in the organizational data set, first by race, then by ethnicity. These are basic cross tabulations (akin to qualitative overlaps in coding).

Gender Analysis

Appendix Table 3.8 presents the frequency table for stops by sex, which is again assigned by the officer at the stop. It suggests that these stops are deeply gendered as well as raced.

APPENDIX TABLE 3.8: Frequency of Stops Reported by Sex

Sex	Frequency	%
Female	130	12.4
Male	913	87.0
Non-Binary	5	0.5
Unknown	2	0.2
Total	1050	100.0

Together with the race and ethnicity data analysis, these data suggest that there is an intersectional disparity of experience among men of color, specifically but not exclusively Black men, having one experience on and around USC’s campuses and another experience for others. This data analysis corresponds to what we heard in the co-design sessions in a more anecdotal way. For these reasons, we believe that it is important to have a **ONE USC** community safety vision that is equitable.

2. Analysis of USC-Specific Crime Data

The purpose of this analysis was to explore what DPS does and how it jibes with public perceptions of its role. We analyzed two specific questions.

1) Does DPS treat students in off-campus locations with “deference,” to use the words of some of our USC neighbors?

Appendix Table 3.9 was created from publicly available Clery data to empirically examine the repeated qualitative assertion made by our USC neighbors that students were not disciplined for alcohol or drug violations off campus. We regret that we do not have noise violations data to analyze, but Clery data is publicly available and based on reports made by DPS to the U.S. government. Federal law defines the violations contained in this table as “the number of persons referred for disciplinary action for violations of the law.”

APPENDIX TABLE 3.9. Violations of the Law Referred for Disciplinary Action

On Campus	2016	2017	2018
Weapons	3	0	0
Drug Abuse Violations	31	88	206
Liquor Law Violations	485	689	735
Non Campus	2016	2017	2018
Weapons	3	0	0
Drug Abuse Violations	6	20	2
Liquor Law Violations	135	139	28

Brief Summary:

Our analysis shows that criminal drug and alcohol violations *on* campus far outstrip those off campus by USC DPS and/or LAPD. For both drug and alcohol violations, the number of on-campus referrals far outstrip those in the broader patrol zone of DPS. Whether this is formal or informal policy, the data here suggests that while enforcement has increased on campus (specifically in student housing, where most of these violations were located) over the three-year period (based on relevant data), both drug and alcohol enforcement has declined off campus from 2015-2018.

2) What percentage of calls to DPS involve welfare checks or other health-oriented matters?

In our assessment of DPS's scope of work, we explored the amount of work that DPS does in this area. **Appendix Table 3.10** shows the past five years of service calls in this area, and **Appendix Table 3.11** shows the most frequent overall service calls that DPS receives. We note 2020 with an asterisk as the global pandemic likely had a significant impact on the figures for this year, since quarantine and the closure of campus lasted for approximately nine of 12 months.

APPENDIX TABLE 3.10: DPS Health-Related Service Calls

Type of Service Call	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020*
Medical Escort	426	312	253	838	1,190	1,009
Illness Response	867	824	871	853	1,149	603
Injury Response	556	422	439	495	562	235
Welfare Check	559	583	583	865	1,022	689
Commitment to Mental Health for 72 hrs	56	70	64	57	98	51
Liquor Law Violations	0	0	0	1	1	0

APPENDIX TABLE 3.11: DPS Service Calls

Service Call	# of Calls	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020*
Open/Close Door/gate	Count	16,237	19,021	20,374	21,977	20,641	18,889
	%	49%	57%	60%	61%	59%	70%
Emergency Phone Activation	Count	1,147	973	1,312	1,747	1,945	1,341
	%	4%	3%	4%	5%	6%	5%
Maintenance Request (Non-Lighting)	Count	773	769	722	764	876	666
	%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%
Person Stuck in Elevator	Count	165	261	207	231	212	124
	%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%
Animal Control Problem	Count	147	90	105	126	159	119
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Emergency Phone Maintenance Request	Count	117	70	45	39	107	97
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Lights Out	Count	65	74	76	57	74	55
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Translator Service	Count	*	*	5	6	5	7
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Party/Event Shut Down	Count	*	*	*	*	23	86
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Brief Summary:

We combined the above data with what was provided to us by DPS about budget and personnel allocations. We noted that major increases in budget expenditures to LAPD and leadership team expansion did not correspond to the data with regard to the kinds of calls that DPS is currently fielding. The kinds of questions we were able to ask with this level of data

transparency are similar to those an independent oversight body would ideally ask, as well to ensure that wise spending decisions are getting USC the greatest return on its investment.

3. Community Co-Design Session Attendance

As we've noted throughout our report, attendance at our co-design sessions was a very important piece of our co-design process. Our co-design sessions were held via Zoom over a two-week period in February 2021. Although some DPS officers and former law enforcement attended these sessions, we also offered a co-design session in early April exclusively for DPS officers. Each 90-minute session featured three sections of questions, including a specific time slot for questions specific to each of the topics listed below, which corresponded to our subcommittee assignments. Although we announced specific themes, we explicitly let people join any of the sessions to talk about any topic important to them with regard to DPS and public safety more generally. We then conducted an analysis using Dedoose qualitative software to ensure that every subcommittee got the data relevant to their subcommittee assignment regardless of which session that data emanated from. **Appendix Table 3.12** reveals the different sessions and the attendance for each session.

While the most frequent category of participant was USC staff, we had a strong turnout from students and neighbors who are unaffiliated with USC. Six staff participants^[3] identified as having grown up in the community, and 143 of our participants were neighbors, a rate of 22 percent participation in our conversations by people who care deeply about their neighborhood.

APPENDIX TABLE 3.12 Attendance for February 2021 Community Co-Design Sessions

Subcommittee Topic	Session 1	Session 2	Total
Scope of Work	119	44	163
Race and Identity Profiling	54	55	109
Interactions with the Public	57	39	96
Best Practices	44	45	89
Neighborhood/Community Engagement	75	31	106
DPS Officer Session	10	*	10

4. Summary of CAB Website Comments

We received a number of comments posted anonymously to our website by students and staff. These comments were folded into our overall analysis and skewed away from the comments shared in the community co-design sessions. There are a variety of reasons for this possibility, but we accepted the comments as equally valuable to our process, as they represented views we did not necessarily hear elsewhere.

Several students (both anonymous and identified by their first name) were concerned that the CAB had been set up to be "politically correct" or to "defund DPS." They were generally supportive of DPS and worried that the CAB would somehow seek to abolish DPS. We placed the legal analysis that we did of the possibility of abolition prominently in the early parts of the report to clarify both the legal facts and to be clear that the abolition/defund side of the spectrum was one of several perspectives we heard.

We also received a suggestion from an alumnus that DPS officers should, in essence, convert into sworn peace officers to lessen reliance on LAPD, which has slower response times. That was the only suggestion of its kind among the data we gathered, though we want to report it here in the interest of full transparency. We also had a staff person suggest that we ensure we keep an international perspective, given the increased international status of our students. This was one of two occasions where international students were specifically mentioned, so again while we did not develop recommendations that directly speak to their experience, we did not receive clear, generalizable data that would have empowered us to do so.

Last but not least, we did receive some feedback from our neighbors, who were able to rely on DPS for support when LAPD refused to respond to a threatening individual. They, along with others discussed here, were more likely to favor increased spending for DPS than other participants.

[1] Collected from the California Census website. Frequencies come from pooled census tract data.

<https://cacensus2020.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=48be59de0ba94a3dacf1c9116df8b37>
<https://census.ca.gov/hhc-map/>

[2] Also collected from the California Census website. Frequencies come from pooled census tract data.

<https://cacensus2020.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=48be59de0ba94a3dacf1c9116df8b37>
<https://census.ca.gov/hhc-map/>

[3] This figure comes from all of our sessions, including those with DPS officers. All offered their multiple affiliations without prompting from the facilitators.

9 / APPENDIX 4: PEER INSTITUTION ANALYSIS ¹

On the advice of members of the Provost Council, we conducted an analysis of publicly available information about **eight** peer institutions. Peer institutions were selected for their similarity in size, their institutional status (7 of 8 are private comprehensive universities) and their medical facilities as well as university infrastructure (8 of 8 have medical schools serving at least partially urban populations).

The peer institutions were selected from among the largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the country, including New York, Los Angeles and Chicago. The fourth MSA includes Washington, D.C., another racially diverse urban area. **Appendix Table 4.1** shows the institutions, their locations and enrollments as of 2018, the latest year for which comparative Clery Act data are available.

APPENDIX TABLE 4.1. Peer Institutions Selected for Analysis

Institution (Accreditation)	Location	Sworn Officers?	Enrollment	Public/Private?
Columbia University	New York City (New York-Newark-Jersey City MSA)	No	31,077	Private
Georgetown University (CALEA)	Washington, D.C. (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, VA MSA)	Yes	19,204	Private
George Washington University (CALEA)	Washington, D.C. (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, VA MSA)	Yes	28,172	Private
Northwestern University	Evanston, Illinois (Chicago- Naperville-Elgin, Ill. MSA)	Yes	22,127	Private
NYU (CALEA)	New York, NY (New York-Newark-Jersey City MSA)	No	51,847	Private
UCLA	Los Angeles (Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim MSA)	Yes	44,537	Private
University of Chicago (CALEA)	Chicago (Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, Ill. MSA)	Yes	17,002	Private
USC	Los Angeles (Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim MSA)	No	47,310	Private


With regard to rates of crimes, peer institutions have similar rates of violent crimes like murder and assault, though it is essential to note that 2018 is also the year USC reported many previous sexual assaults due to the George Tyndall case. The Department of Education's [comparisons website](#) makes institutional comparisons available across a single year, so the Clery Act data presented below provides a snapshot of a particular year and is not illustrative of a trend.

We analyzed this data to confirm that these institutions are dealing with similar issues of crime, and the next three charts provide some detail in this regard.

¹ Prepared by Ange-Marie Hancock Alfaro, PhD, with the assistance of Lauren Brown, PhD, Jarred Cuellar, MA, and Nancy Hernandez, BA


Appendix Chart 4.1 shows only one murder or manslaughter crime throughout 2018 for any of the eight institutions (University of Chicago). This chart also reveals some location-based effects: Los Angeles has greater aggravated assault reports than either Chicago, New York or Washington, D.C. This is the first foundation of our claim that violent crime rates are generally low in and around these campuses; on the order of 3 percent, we were quoted, for USC.

APPENDIX CHART 4.1




Appendix Chart 4.2 shows the same analysis for violent sexual and relational crimes. As a reminder, for 2018 USC's numbers reflect the outsize impact of gynecologist George Tyndall. Without that spike in reporting (but also in full recognition of the harm it represents), USC is similar to its peer institutions with regard to sexual and relational violent crimes.

APPENDIX CHART 4.2



Appendix Chart 4.3 shows the comparison among peer institutions for property and other crimes. To be sure, robbery, motor vehicle theft and arson are all crimes that can be prosecuted. It is clear here that USC has higher incidences of theft than its peer institutions.

APPENDIX CHART 4.3



Given the comparatively low incidences of crime across all but two categories, we are confident that these institutions are reasonable comparator institutions for our analysis. We proceed now to the two main questions we analyzed, which focused on data and policy transparency.

1. Stops Data Transparency

As we noted in the main body of the report, several peer institutions publicly report their stop data annually. We elected not to choose whether they are mandated by the state to do so as the foundation for making our recommendation. That is a question of the "old" USC of doing the least we are obligated to do. Instead, we focused on simply attending to whether the institutions report. Appendix Table 4.2 reveals the results of our analysis to date.

APPENDIX TABLE 4.2. Peer Institutions Data Transparency Table

Institution	Stops Data Available Online?	Permanent Oversight Committee?
Columbia University	No	No
Georgetown University	Yes	Yes
George Washington University	Yes	Yes
Northwestern University	Yes	Yes
NYU	No	No
UCLA	Yes	No
University of Chicago	Yes	Yes
USC	No	Not yet

Brief summary:

Four of eight campus safety agencies report their stops data publicly. We note that some may be mandated by law to do so; there is some variation in how detailed the provided data is.

2. Policy Transparency

We also explored whether these peer institutions had transparency about their policies — whether it was a “use of force” policy, a “know your rights” policy or information about how and who they hire as officers. We acknowledge and respect the conventional practice of keeping certain aspects of safety confidential in order to preserve a tactical advantage over those who might intend us harm. However, we also find that USC is overly cautious in this area; similarly situated institutions like the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Georgetown University and George Washington University *all* provide publicly available reporting *beyond* federally mandated Clery Act reports. We note especially Northwestern, which in the past month has taken the step of publishing an annual report that reveals 10 years of budget and staffing information. **Appendix Table 4.3** shows a variety of additional information our peer institutions share.

APPENDIX TABLE 4.3 Policy Transparency Comparison Among Peer Institutions

Institution	Transparency Beyond Clery	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3
Columbia University	Yes	Use of force policy	Officer training	DPS staff demographics
Georgetown University	Yes	Stops data	List of officers who've completed anti-bias training	*
George Washington University	Yes	Stops data	Annual statistics review (calls, officer complaints)	*
Northwestern University	Yes	Stops data	Budget and staffing	*
NYU	No	*	*	*
UCLA	Yes	U.C. system-wide crime report	*	*
University of Chicago	Yes	Stops data	Field interviews	Hiring questionnaires (sworn/non-sworn)
USC	No	*	*	*

CAB MEETINGS (18)

- September 18
- September 25
- October 9
- October 23
- November 6
- December 4
- January 8
- January 22
- February 5
- February 26
- March 5
- March 19
- March 26
- April 2
- April 9
- April 16
- April 30
- May 14

STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK SESSIONS (8)*

- April 19 – Graduate Student Government
- April 20 – Undergraduate Student Government
- April 21 – Academic Senate
- April 22 – Provost Council
- April 23 – President’s Senior Leadership Team
- April 27 – Community/Neighborhood
- April 30 – Staff Assembly

KITCHEN CABINET

- December 9
- January 14
- February 25
- March 25
- April 29*

PILOT CONVERSATIONS (8)

- November 10 – Staff and Faculty
- November 11 – Students and Neighbors
- November 17 – Staff and Faculty
- November 18 – Neighbors and Students

CO-DESIGN PUBLIC SAFETY SESSIONS (11)

- February 8 – Scope of DPS
- February 9 – Race and Identity Profiling
- February 10 – DPS Interactions with the Public
- February 11 – Best Practices for Campus Public Safety
- February 12 – Community Engagement
- February 16 – Scope of DPS
- February 17 – Race and Identity Profiling
- February 18 – DPS Interactions with the Public
- February 19 – Best Practices for Campus Public Safety
- February 20 – Community Engagement
- April 7 – DPS Officers

*The April 29th meeting of the Kitchen Cabinet was the eighth feedback session we hosted.

Our approach in this process has been one that is consistent with participatory action research.^[1] We have specifically decentered institutional and organizational narratives about how DPS functions and works in order to understand the informal ways that different parts of our community experience DPS on a day-to-day basis.

Together with participatory action research, intersectionality helped us design an independent approach to understanding what we were learning and, as importantly, to respecting the time and effort of those who participated enough to allow them opportunities to clarify their thoughts or push us further by ground truthing what we heard and learned prior to finalizing our thoughts in this report. Over the past 30 years, intersectionality has emerged as a key analytical framework for understanding how power dynamics affect people’s interactions with institutional systems like law enforcement.^[2] Long misunderstood, intersectionality is an approach to understanding complex situations in ways that are nonreductive and avoid re-traumatization.

Our research design followed most of the key questions asked in intersectionality-based policy analysis.^[3] The two sets of questions, descriptive and transformative, allow us to simultaneously embrace a universal goal without erasing the specificity of various groups’ experiences within the broader USC ecosystem.

The descriptive questions allowed us to view the data we were provided, the data we collected and the publicly available data with an eye towards balancing the universal and the specific:

DESCRIPTIVE:

1. What knowledge, values and experiences do you bring to this area of policy analysis?
2. What is the policy “problem” under consideration?
3. How have representations of the “problem” come about?
4. How are groups differentially affected by this representation of the “problem”?
5. What are the current policy responses to the “problem”?

We next moved to the transformative questions, which allowed us to create a horizon of opportunities to transform how we envision community safety:

TRANSFORMATIVE:

6. What inequities actually exist in relation to the problem?
7. Where and how can interventions be made to improve the problem?
8. What are feasible short, medium, and longterm solutions?
9. How will proposed policy responses reduce inequities?

We are hopeful that these remaining transformative questions will get taken up by a future independent oversight body as we recommend in the report:

10. How will implementation and uptake be assured?
11. How will you know if inequities have been reduced?
12. How has the process of engaging in intersectionality-based policy analysis transformed:
 - a. Your thinking about relations and structures of power and inequity?
 - b. The ways in which you and others engage in the work of policy development, implementation and evaluation?
 - c. Broader conceptualizations, relations and effects of power asymmetry in the everyday world?

[1] Greenwood, D. J., W.F. Whyte, and I. Harkavy. 1993. “Participatory Action Research as a Process and as a goal.” *Human Relations* 46:175–92.

[2] Richie, Beth. 2012. *Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence, and America’s Prison Nation*. New York: New York University Press.

[3] See Hankivsky *et al.* 2014. “An Intersectionality-Based Policy Analysis Framework: Critical Reflections on a Methodology for Advancing Equity.” *International Journal for Equity in Health*, 13:119.

DPS Provided Data:

- DPS Annual Security Review (2020)
- DPS Budget Data (2015-2020)
- DPS Call Data (2015-2020)
- DPS Community Engagement Efforts
- DPS EEO-TIX Complaints (*those received by DPS and referred*)
- DPS Mission Statement
- DPS Organizational Chart
- DPS Patrol Areas
- DPS Policy Manual
- USC Crisis Intervention Team Mission

Independently Gathered Data:

- 5 Individual Conversations (*5 hours of notes data*)
- 8 Pilot Conversation Transcripts (*12 hours of notes data*)
- 11 Co-Design Session Transcripts (*990 hours of notes data*)
- 8 Co-Design Feedback Sessions (*6.25 hours of notes data*)
- 63 Website Comments

Publicly Available Data:

- Clery Act Data (*8 institutions*) - 2018
- Clery Act Data (USC) - 2015-2018



Representatives: (First row from left): **Academic:** Ange-Marie Hancock Alfaro (Co-Chair), Erroll Southers (Co-Chair), Jody Armour, Rebecca Lonergan; (Second row from left): **Staff:** Tiffany G. Andalon, Erika H. Chesley, Krisiti Dawn Culpepper, Beth Shuster, Michèle G. Turner; (Third row from left): **Neighborhood:** Dr. Ben Garcia, Glendy Ramirez-De La Cruz, Skipp Townsend; **Students:** Chris Perez, Nehar Ketkar; (Fourth row from left): Brandon McFarlin, Lennon Wesley III; **At-Large:** Danny J. Bakewell, Jr., Robert A. Hernandez, Robert M. Saltzman, *not pictured, Julie Burg*; (Fifth row from left): **Ex Officio:** Samuel Garrison, Beong-Soo Kim, Catherine Spear, John L. Thomas, David W. Wright

14 / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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We also want to thank the following people who made our process and report better. We cannot repay the favor but hope that our shared work will move us forward toward a brighter future for all of us.

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