

**‘A Man of Courage and Activity’: Thomas Tew, Anglo-American Piracy, and the
Manhattan to Madagascar Trade Network, 1690-1720**

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*“The sea is everything it is said to be: it provides unity, transport, the means of exchange
and intercourse, if man is prepared to make an effort and pay a price.”*

—Fernand Braudel

Sailing into New York Harbor in 1708, approaching the lower tip of Manhattan, an observer remarked that its one thousand houses were, “handsomely built by the Dutch, of Brick and stone, cover’d with red and black Tile; and the Land being high...an agreeable Prospect to the Spectator at a Distance.”¹ Decades earlier, especially during the tumultuous term of Colonel Governor Benjamin Fletcher (1692-1698), Anglo-American pirates had discovered New York an agreeable prospect up close. One such pirate, Thomas Tew, was observed in the summer of 1694 riding comfortably with Fletcher in the open coach of the governor’s six-horse carriage, presumably trading tales that now can only be imagined.²

Perhaps they spoke of the depressed economy of the North American colonies, of New York’s “auncient buildings...very meane...theyr streets Nasty & unregarded...Theyr shops very irregular, & few or none open.”³ Possibly Fletcher complained to Tew of the decline in trade with the Caribbean colonies brought on by King William’s War (The War of the League of Augsburg) and the generally heavy yoke of London’s mercantile trading policies; perchance it was the incessant rumors of a French invasion fleet, or more specific information recently garnered from the French pirate, John Reaux, discovered hiding out in Long Island Sound and said to be “well acquainted with this coast and...that 700 Recruits were sent to Canada this last Sumer, and that he was in Company of the Fleet;”⁴ or the recent ransacking of nearby Block Island by the French pirate, Montauban. Perhaps these events reminded Fletcher of the 1690 razing of the upstate village of Schenectady by French and Iroquois raiders, a mere twenty miles from the major Dutch and English fur trading entrepot at Albany. Maybe Fletcher complained to Tew of the lack of imperial naval support for his fledgling colony, that only one patrol boat, *Richmond*, which was stuck in dry-dock from October through March, had been granted by the Lords of Trade and Plantation, who administered the colony of New York from their comfortable English estates, thousands of miles away.

The words that passed from Tew’s mouth to the gracious governor, who courted Tew and treated him with the respect afforded only to renowned guests of the colony, will never be known. Whatever these words were, they left a strong impression on the governor, for some time later Fletcher remarked that Tew was, “a man of courage and activity, but of the greatest sence and remembrance of what he had seen, of any seaman I had mett. He was also what they call a very pleasant man, soe that at some times when the labours of my day were over it was some divertisement as well as information to me, to heare him talke.”⁵ If the information passed on to Fletcher included Tew’s early life

and career, he would have told the governor that he was born in Rhode Island, probably in the early to mid-1660s, and was unsurprisingly the son of a seaman, a profession which predominated in the early American colonies, since the central function of them, at least from London's perspective, was as mercantile satellites, important dumping grounds for goods manufactured in the metropole. In the eyes of the Lords of Plantation and Trade, the colonies existed solely for the economic profit of her metropolitan overseers, and trade networks were established early on, linking London with the North American and Caribbean colonies, and increasingly with West Africa and the ever-growing trade in African slave labor.

While riding in the carriage, Tew may have further told Fletcher that in the early to mid-1680s, he had lived and worked as a privateer in Jamaica, where he most likely would have been based in Port Royale, a well-established haven for Caribbean buccaneers. In the seventeenth century, as earlier, European nations and their colonial administrators utilized privateers during wartime, issuing official commissions, or letters of marque, to individual mariners and ships in support of marauding missions. In times of peace, the commissions were called letters of reprisal, which allowed an aggrieved subject to steal from the subjects of the prince whose subjects stole from him on prior occasions. Since there were not yet any formal methods of insurance in place, this was a crude way of compensating for losses at sea, and illustrates the weak institutional structure of international relations at the time, allowing many opportunities for abuse.

The governors of Jamaica, in particular, actively encouraged buccaneers to utilize Port Royale as a base and liberally commissioned them as privateers in the hope that the presence of the heavily armed pirate ships would discourage the Spanish and French from attempting to recapture the island. English crown finances could not have funded such a fleet, and in addition to protection, the citizens of Jamaica profited from supplies and services sold to the pirates, and Jamaican merchants acquired highly desirable cargoes at very little cost. This policy proved remarkably successful--there were no serious attempts to attack Jamaica once the English seized it from Spain in 1655, and the merchants of Port Royale grew rich on the plunder extracted from raids on Spanish towns and ships. Given its success, this policy must have seemed an intriguing antidote to Fletcher for some of the problems he was facing in his own colony.

Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the Spanish American empire was facing a period of decline. The silver galleon runs were becoming less and less frequent, and Anglo-American privateers like Tew now shifted their primary targets to French, and to a lesser extent, Dutch prizes, as dictated by the metropolitan imperial interests. Circum-Caribbean campaigns began extending outward to include the North American seaboard and the open Atlantic, at times ranging as far as the Atlantic islands of the Azores, Madeiras and Canaries, which served as maritime way stations, as well as to the West African coast where Europeans had established a number of slave factories. It was during one such commissioned voyage, granted in December 1692 by Lieutenant Governor Isaac Richier of Bermuda during King William's War (The War of the League of Augsburg), to raid the French factory at Goree in the Gambia River, that Tew bought a partial owner's share, took command of the 70-ton sloop *Amity*, which had previously been serving at Barbados under the command of Captain Richard Gilbert, and set off with a crew of roughly sixty men into the Atlantic with another ship captained by George Dew.

At the start of this voyage, this voyage out of the dozens and dozens taken prior, was it possible that Tew knew he would forgo his mission, round the Cape of Good Hope and enter the strange Indian Ocean where he had never before been, and openly turn pirate by making a spectacular if brutal raid on a Mughal prize? If so, the script could not have been written more perfectly. Soon after embarking, a sudden and violent Atlantic storm would appear that sprung the mast of Dew's ship, and the consorts quickly became separated in the oceanic tempest. It was at this opportune moment, suddenly alone on the open sea with his weather-beaten men, that Tew decided to double the Cape and try his luck in the rich trading grounds of the Indian Ocean seas. First, however, he had to convince his men.

Tew's history, as written by Captain Charles Johnson in 1724, includes an incredible speech allegedly given by the Rhode Island captain at this critical juncture of the voyage. It is worth citing at length, for it reveals very believable motivating factors in Tew's decision to turn pirate:

That they were not ignorant of the design with which the governor fitted them out; the taking and destroying of the French factory; that he, indeed, readily agreed to take a commission to this end, though contrary to his judgment, because it was for the sake of being employed; but that he thought it a very injudicious expedition, which, did they succeed in, would be of no use to the public, and only be of advantage to a private company of men, from whom they could expect to reward for their bravery; that he could see nothing but danger in the undertaking, without the least prospect of booty; that he could not suppose any man fond of fighting for fighting's sake; and few ventured their lives, but with some view either of particular interest or public good; but here was not the least appearance of either. Wherefore, he was of opinion, that they should turn their thoughts on what might better their circumstances; and if they were so inclined, he would undertake to shape a course which should lead them to ease and plenty, in which they might pass the rest of their days. That one bold push would do their business and they might return home, not only without danger, but even with reputation.⁶

At which point, Tew's men are alleged to have dramatically cried out in unison, "A gold chain, or a wooden leg, we'll stand by you!" While the literary attributes of such an exchange are undeniable, they still fit within the accepted knowledge of pirates and their society and culture.

While privateers and pirates plied the seas plundering other ships, they undoubtedly practiced a rough form of democracy aboard their own vessels, electing captains, distributing wealth equally, and even establishing a form of insurance for members who became injured or otherwise incapacitated during their excursions.⁷ According to Johnson's account, the first thing the crew of the *Amity* did upon turning pirate was elect a quartermaster, basically a second-in-command, whose opinion, according to Johnson, was "like the Mufti's among the Turks: the captain can undertake nothing which the quarter-master does not approve. We may say the quarter-master is an humble imitation of the Roman tribune of the people; he speaks for, and looks after the interest of the crew."

If these rough forms of pirate democracy were revealed by Tew to the governor, Fletcher must have noticed how much they contrasted with the land-based politics he had

become accustomed to since his arrival in the turbulent colony. Reaching his post in 1692, he discovered New York to be in a state of turmoil, a “divided, contentious impoverished people,” and further observed “neither Party will be satisfied with less than the necks of their Adversaries.”⁸ The parties to which he referred were the Leislerians and anti-Leislerians, named for Jacob Leisler, the recently deposed and executed Dutch leader who had seized power during the disorder in the colonies caused by the Glorious Revolution. Though the politics involved were imperial, local, religious, and otherwise complex, they left a lasting turbulent legacy from which Fletcher was never able to extricate himself, not least of which because he deepened the internal political rift by refusing to allow any prominent Leislerians to sit in the provincial assembly until they had received a full pardon from London.⁹ Once these pardons arrived, however, and two leading Leislerians, Samuel Staats and Peter Delanoy, were subsequently elected, Fletcher dissolved the assembly, citing its inability to put the province in a proper state of defense.¹⁰ He then turned to significantly more thuggish methods, allegedly admitting that he had threatened, “to pistoll any man that should chuse Peter De la Noy to serve for that place.” There was also testimony by another infamous pirate, William Kidd, that Fletcher, a royally appointed governor, had allied himself with a motley crew of soldiers and sailors, made them freemen of the city and enabled them to vote, which offers a tantalizing glimpse into the social and cultural politics of New York at this colonial juncture. The fact that the governor also had them patrol the streets to threaten impressment on anyone voting “incorrectly” suggests a methodology of political violence that very much runs counter to the alluring semblance of democracy found aboard the pirate ships.¹¹

It was not just aboard the ships, however, that pirates practiced their egalitarian ways, as Tew and his men discovered after they rounded the Cape and made a line for the Bab al Mandeb Straits, the narrow choke point of the Red Sea, where they intercepted a vessel belonging to the Great Indian Mughal, Aurangzeb. Ironically enough, the Mughal’s vessel had been sent ahead of the rest of the pilgrim fleet from India, on its way toward the port of Jiddah near Mecca, to clear the coast for rovers, an assignment which they failed most spectacularly. After a one-sided fusillade, the men of the *Amity* boarded the Muslim vessel, despite the hundreds of Indian troops on board, and the pirates took the vessel without suffering a single loss (the record is silent as to Indian losses). Afterwards, Tew and his men sailed to the nearby tiny island of St. Maries, off the eastern coast of Madagascar, where they encountered a thriving colony of pirates and a trading post that somewhat amazingly had its roots back in Manhattan.

Though this was Tew’s first personal experience in the region, Madagascar, the fourth largest island in the world, had a long history with foreign interlopers, beginning with Indo-Javanese merchants from the twelfth century. In 1500, the first Europeans arrived when Portuguese explorers stumbled upon “The Island of the Moon”, as it was known in Arabic, on their way to the Spice Islands. Unwilling to recognize the infidels, the Portuguese re-christened it *Sao Lourenco*, and European sailors continued to refer to it as St. Lawrence Island until the seventeenth century when the name Madagascar came into general use. Anthropologists and ethnographers have tended to divide into two camps--those emphasizing the Indonesian or Asian-Indonesian origin of the Malagasy, and those emphasizing the African or at least the creole aspect of Madagascar’s first inhabitants. The majority, however, suggest that the first inhabitants of Madagascar were

groups of Indonesian origin who had gradually migrated around the Indian Ocean rim, touching the East African coast before settling in Madagascar, a process which probably took place over a considerable period of time, beginning in the earliest centuries of the Christian era.

According to later European reports, no large or powerful state was reported on the island before the 1660s, and although the European visitors used the terms “chief” and “king” indiscriminately in their accounts, they leave little doubt that the entire island was fragmented into small and usually riverain sovereignties. The French established a small colony at Fort Dauphin on the southern tip of the island in 1643, but it was abandoned after three decades. A very limited number of firearms were passed from Fort Dauphin and the Portuguese caravels to the indigenous groups, and though slave raiding had always been fostered by the Muslim traders in the northern part of the island, it did not loom large in the picture until the end of the seventeenth century when colonial interlopers, including Anglo-American pirates like Tew, fueled by New York City merchants, began establishing a more brisk trade.

When *Amity* set anchor in the well-protected harbor of the tiny island of St. Maries (alternately called Nossi Ibraim and Nossi Boroha by Muslim traders) off the northeast coast of Madagascar in the wake of their successful raid in the Red Sea, Tew and his crew were greeted by Adam Baldrige, a factor sent from New York in 1691. When Baldrige had arrived at Madagascar, he immediately became embroiled in an inter-clan war on the main island, and his participation earned the working capital of seventy cattle and a number of slaves. He settled on “Pirate’s Island” in the lagoon at St. Maries and began the construction of a wooden fort, which was eventually bolstered by half a dozen guns obtained from passing pirate ships. Baldrige’s trading post was financed by an enterprising merchant in New York named Frederick Philipse, who had emigrated to New Amsterdam in the 1650’s as Frederick Flypsen, one of Peter Stuyvestant’s carpenters. Under the generous surrender terms offered by the English, the Dutch-born Flypsen anglicized his name and swore a simple oath of allegiance to the crown, thereby qualifying as a loyal subject with all the rights and privileges of an English citizen. He married a wealthy widow who had been left a fortune in ships and building lots in Manhattan, and once the English annexation of New Netherland was consummated, the entire English empire was open for trade. Philipse built his early fortune not only by supplying English manufactured goods for the upriver Indian trade and carrying the valuable furs back downriver for shipment to England, but he was also involved in the reshipment of Virginia tobacco to England, in addition to the shipment of logwood, which came from the Yucatan.¹² It is tempting to speculate on a pirate connection made from doing business with the logwood cutters of the Yucatan, most of whom were on-again/off-again pirates themselves.

English and colonial vessels had begun importing Malagasay slaves into the West Indies, Massachusetts and New York in the 1670s as a cheaper alternative to the Royal Africa Company (“RAC”) monopoly on the West African coast. Extremely profitable, it cost only ten shillings in goods to purchase a Malagasay slave whereas a sum of £3 to £4 was required on the west coast of Africa, where the RAC’s slave factories tightly controlled the trade in human chattel. In the 1680s and 1690s, vessels from New York, controlled by prominent merchants like Stephan Delancey and Philipse, engaged heavily in this trade. In a remarkable display of entrepreneurship in the depressed 1690s, the New

York merchants, aware (because of the Yucatan connection?) that pirates utilized Madagascar as a base, decided to supply them there. In return for liquor (rum, wine and beer), salt, guns, gunpowder, limejuice and clothing, the pirates would trade expensive textiles, drugs, spices, jewels, gold, and hard currency.¹³

Until the appearance of Vasco da Gama in 1497, sea-going trade within the vast Indian Ocean had generally been conducted on a peaceful basis. The Portuguese, however, altered the commercial and political landscape when they forced their way into this lucrative market with cannons blazing. Nonetheless, the interloping Europeans barely controlled a dent of the total East Indian trade. It was not until 1696, when a local rebellion against the foreigners forced the powerful Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb, to grant a crucial concession allowing the Europeans to construct fortifications in Mughal-controlled lands, that the English began to establish a greater foothold in the region.¹⁴ The presence of a pirate's lair on Madagascar was due more to its geographically strategic location near these lucrative trade routes, and the naval and jurisdictional power vacuum that existed in the region, than to any utopian desire on the part of the pirates to form a separate community—though a number of them did exist on the island, and even flourished for a short time. In addition to its proximity to the riches of the Red Sea trade, the pirates needed a safe place to rest, careen their ships, and re-supply, all of which Madagascar and its surrounding islands and islets provided.

It was in the 1690's when the pirate lairs established in the region were reaching their peak. In his contemporary account, Capt. Charles Johnson explains how the Madagascar pirates, cognizant of native tribal enmities, overcame inferior numbers with superior firepower and forged alliances with certain local princes in order to obtain island "fiefdoms" for themselves. The pirates took native prisoners of war and utilized them as slaves or sold them to Baldrige, the "Pirate-King." Baldrige was the first of a number of factors sent by Philipse to St. Maries in order to stimulate colonial trade in the depressed 1690s. In Philipse's own words, slaving was the key, "For negroes in these times will fetch thirty pounds and upwards in the head...It is by negroes that I finde my cheivest Proffitt. All other trade I look upon as by the by."¹⁵

The trade with pirates, however, was likewise extremely profitable, and offered unique opportunities for the entrepreneurial adventuresome. Madagascar, and St. Maries in particular, was a favored spot for the marauders, providing an ample supply of fruit (pineapples, bananas, coconuts, yams, oranges and lemons), rice, taro, honey, chicken, turtle, fish and beef (in the form of cattle, a pirate culinary lineage that can be traced to the Caribbean *boucaniers* of the early part of the century); bays and inlets for concealment from hostile shipping, and long sloping beaches to careen their wooden ships, where the mariners cleared them of weeds and barnacles, repaired leaks and replaced timbers riddled by the Toredoworm.

Though endowed with the natural bounty of the land and sea, the pirates who utilized St. Maries as a base lacked other vital necessities, most notably rum and beer, as well as manufactured goods. Philipse sent a random assortment of original cargo with Baldrige,¹⁶ and continued to regularly send supplies which were sold at premium prices, in return for Malagasy slaves, gold, diamonds, jewels, spices, silks, ivory and "pieces of eight", the Spanish coins ubiquitous in pirate lore that were regularly circulating in the Indian Ocean trade networks. Baldrige was later deposed by the English Admiralty Courts and revealed that the indigenous rulers also traded with the pirates, providing a

glimpse of a fascinating multicultural society. In one of Johnson's more widely quoted lines, he asserted that the pirates of Madagascar married "the most beautiful of the Negro women, not one or two, but as many as they liked, so that every one of them had as great a Seraglio as the Grand Seignor at Constantinople."¹⁷ This oft-cited line is more than likely an example of exaggerated and scintillating poetic license taken by the best-selling eighteenth-century author, although it is certain that at least some of these renegades miscegenated with the Malagasy women, freely or otherwise. In 1712, for example, an English pirate named "Tom" brought his mixed-blood son to London to be educated, but the boy, aged seventeen, became homesick and was sent back to Madagascar after three months. For a long time, the identity of "Tom" was thought to have been Thomas Tew, but this is an unlikely scenario.

Tew left St. Maries, though some of his men stayed behind in the pirate paradise. Some would die of tropical disease while fourteen others, unhappy with their share of £1200 each, decided to divide themselves into two groups of seven to fight to the death on the beach. The remaining two survivors then divided the booty among themselves while the dark red blood of their felled comrades soaked the white sands beneath them as it flowed into the crystal blue tropical sea.¹⁸ Tew, however, could not have known this, for he sailed back to Rhode Island with his captain's share of the loot and was greeted with great fanfare by the local residents. When the Rhode Island governor, "Honest" John Easton, failed to grant Tew a new privateering commission, Tew made the short journey down to New York, and now found himself traveling its streets in a very private meeting with the governor. Undoubtedly, he must have told Fletcher that upon his return, he had reimbursed *Amity*'s majority owners in Bermuda at fourteen times their original investment, a detail that surely would have interested the financially troubled governor.

Though the conversations between Tew and Fletcher can never be known, the historical record reveals that more than mere words were exchanged. Perhaps it was then, after these incredible tales were revealed, that Fletcher, as was later reported, gave Tew a gold watch "to engage him to make New York his port at his return."¹⁹ In return for the gold watch, Fletcher later admitted to the Plantation Lords that he received "a present which was a curiosity and in value not much."²⁰ Given the intense political and economic problems that were wracking his colonial administration, the thought of fostering the pirate trade no doubt appealed greatly to Governor Fletcher. When the six-horse carriage ride ended, and the warm New York summer day slipped into evening, the sound of music and laughter could be heard drifting softly from the windows of the governor's hall at Fort James. Inside, Mrs. Tew and her two daughters could be seen dancing away the night, dressed in rich Oriental silks and glittering diamonds for the gala function hosted by the Governor and Mrs. Fletcher for Tew and all of New York's finest, among which no doubt included its wealthiest merchant, Frederick Philipse. As Tew watched his wife and daughters glide across the hall, splendidly dressed in their pilfered diamonds and silks, we wonder if he contemplated the possibility that he might never see them again, that the winds of imperial change were in the air and that soon after his departure for a second voyage, an amazing commission would be granted to William Kidd to hunt Tew down. This commission, however, would not be needed. After paying Fletcher the tidy sum of £300 for his own "privateering" commission, he easily rounded up another North American crew and sailed to the Red Sea, where he suffered a death so horrible that his men, once so proud and brave, immediately surrendered to the Mughal ship they had

been attempting to board. Their captain, a man of courage and activity, had dropped to the deck in agony and slowly died holding his own guts in his hands, his mid-section having been torn open by a well-placed Mughal shot.

This was neither the last, nor most significant shot that came from the Mughal's direction. Anglo-American pirates, often flying English colors, continued to harass Mughal trade in the hopes of imitating Thomas Tew's now infamous first successful expedition. Kidd's commission to capture Tew, in fact, had originated in Parliament, included the direct participation of King William III, and was pushed along by East India Company backers who had a major financial stake in the Indian Ocean trade. As the Mughal rulers applied more and more pressure and threatened to dismiss the English from the lucrative East Indian trade, the English state, in turn, began a concerted campaign to eliminate the pirates by establishing admiralty courts in the colonies, unifying the disparate piracy laws, and generally monopolizing the violence at sea through expanding naval expenditures. The pirate colonies at Madagascar, now threatened by increasing English naval excursions, nonetheless disintegrated on their own over brutal treatment of the natives, who rose up and slaughtered many of the interloping pirates. Governor Fletcher, for his part, was eventually recalled from the turbulent colony after his Leislerian political opponents used the piracy issue as leverage against him. The trade in Malagasy slaves was likewise suppressed by the RAC, though Philipse's son circumvented the monopoly again from 1716-1721 before the New York to Madagascar trade was permanently dismantled by stronger legislation and enforcement from Parliament. It would take five decades longer, and revolutionary actions by other Anglo-American men of courage and activity, before London's strangulating mercantilist policies were permanently ruptured. The seas, however, would always provide unity, transport and the means of exchange and intercourse to men of all nations who made the effort, and paid the price.

Endnotes

¹ William Hallam Bonner, *Pirate Laureate: The Life and Legends of Captain Kidd*, p. 19, citing eighteenth-century historian, John Oldmixon, *The British Empire in America*, 119, 129. New York Town became a city under the Dongan Charter of 1686.

² Letter from Peter de La Noy relative to Governor Fletcher's Conduct, 13 June, 1695, *NYCD IV*, 223.

³ Andrews, Wayne (ed.), "A Glance at New York in 1697: The Travel Diary of Dr. Benjamin Bullivant, *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, 60 (1956), p. 65.

⁴ Gov. Fletcher to the Committee of Trade, 10 Oct., 1693, *NYCD IV*, 68.

⁵ *NYCD IV*, p. 447.

⁶ For a long time, the true identity of Capt. Johnson was believed to have been Daniel Defoe, author of *Robinson Crusoe* and *Captain Singleton*, among others (*General History of the Pirates* is still indexed under "Defoe" by most libraries). Given the strong stylistic similarities and literary content, this is unsurprising, though inaccurate. Johnson's account is now generally accepted as historical, though there is no way of verifying the veracity of the dialogue.

⁷ In separate contemporary accounts, Woodes Rogers, Alexander Exquemelin and Capt. Johnson have all described such democratic practices. Furthermore, the recent excavation of the *Whydah* wreck off the coast of New England has uncovered Spanish coins, or "pieces of eight", which bear the marks of being equally cut or divided by a sharp blade. For more on Anglo-American pirate culture, see Marcus Rediker's article, "Under the Banner of King Death': The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716 to 1726."

⁸ Fletcher to Mr. Blathwayt, 10 Sept., 1692, *NYCD III*, 848.

⁹ See Fletcher to Sir William Phips, 7 Jan. 1693, *NYCD IV*, p. 3; Abraham Gouverneur to his Parents, 12 Oct. 1692, *ibid*, p. 4; and Thomas Clarke's Account of an Interview with Phips, Jan. 1693, *ibid*, p. 8-9.

¹⁰ Fletcher to the Lords of Trade, 19 Nov., 1694, *ibid*, p. 113.

¹¹ Proceedings of the Lords of Trade, 28 Aug., 1695 (Whitehall), *ibid*, p. 128. Regarding Fletcher's admission: "The Deponent (French) went to dine with Coll. Fletcher with the intent to know the truth of such Report and having spoke of it there in Coll. Fletcher's presence he the said Coll. Fletcher did not deny but rather owned that he had said so."

¹² Biographical background taken from Jacob Judd, "Frederick Philipse and the Madagascar Trade," *NYHS Quarterly*, Vol. LV, No. 4 (October 1971).

¹³ See Virginia Platt, "The East India Company and the Madagascar Slave Trade", *William and Mary Quarterly*, Oct. 1969, p. 550-551; Ritchie, p. 37-38; Jameson, p. 153-257; and Judd, p. 363.

¹⁴ See K.N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760*, p. 53.

¹⁵ Philipse to Baldrige, 25 February, 1695, cited in Judd, p. 358.

¹⁶ 44 pairs of shoes and pumps, "6 dozen of worsted and threed stockens", carpenter tools, 5 barrels of rum, four ¼ casks of Madeira wine, 10 cases of spirits, 2 old stills full of holes, 1 worme, 2 grindstones, 2 cross saws, 1 whip saw, 3 jars of oil, 2 iron pots, 3 barrels of cannon powder, books, catechisms, bibles, garden seeds, and 3 doz. hoes.

Deposition of Adam Baldrige, *Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents*.

¹⁷ *A General History*, p. 35.

¹⁸ See "Deposition of Samuel Perkins," Jameson, p. 177.

¹⁹ Letter from Peter de La Noy relative to Governor Fletcher's Conduct, 13 June, 1695, NYCD IV, 223

²⁰ NYCD IV, p. 447.

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