Abstract:
In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180-1). While most commentators treat this as Kant’s metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant’s clue and treat schematism literally as *Kunst*. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant’s theoretically exact ways of using the term ‘*Kunst*’ in the *Critique of Judgment* we gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant’s concerns in the third *Critique*.

§1. Introduction: Schematism as a ‘hidden art’

In the Schematism chapter of the first *Critique*, Kant notoriously claims,

> the schematism of our understanding is a hidden art [*Kunst*] in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty. (A141/B180-1)

According to most commentators, this description of schematism is simply Kant’s metaphorical way of saying that schematism is something too obscure to explain. As P.F. Strawson puts it,

> How the mechanism [of the imagination] is supposed exactly to work is not very clear… But the obscurity of this point is something which [Kant emphasizes himself] … Thus Kant says of schematism that it is ‘an art concealed in the depths of the human soul …’. [Imagination] is a concealed art of the soul, a magical faculty, something we shall never fully understand.

Strawson is not alone in this reading; indeed, many commentators, such as Bennett, Pippin, and Guyer, offer what we could call the ‘obscurity interpretation’ of Kant’s description of schematism.

What I aim to explore in this paper is a possibility that this line of interpretation passes quickly over: namely that Kant’s description of schematism as *Kunst* gives us an invaluable resource for understanding it. To be sure, Kant describes schematism as a form of *Kunst* that is hidden and much of the sense of mystery might arise from this aspect of his
description. Nevertheless, it is still a form of Kunst and given that he makes clear elsewhere, especially in the Critique of Judgment, that he has theoretically precise ways of using the term ‘Kunst’, we should take seriously the possibility that its purpose in the above passage is to make a positive contribution to our understanding of schematism. Moreover, since the activity of schematism is a topic Kant is lamentably terse about, it seems no resource should be neglected.

Now, not everyone has overlooked the possibility of Kant’s account of schematism relating more generally to the aesthetic concerns of the third Critique. For example, both Eva Schaper (1964) and David Bell (1987) have offered what we could call an ‘aesthetic interpretation’ of the Schematism, which takes into account the link between Kant’s accounts of the productive imagination and the power of judgment in both texts. Yet, although I am broadly sympathetic with this aesthetic interpretation, what neither Bell nor Schaper pursue is one of the most concrete links between the Schematism and third Critique, viz., Kant’s use of the term ‘Kunst’ itself.

In what follows, I shall pursue this link directly. What we will find is that Kant’s theoretically exact uses of Kunst shed considerable light on his theory of schematism. We shall take our point of departure from Kant’s most sustained discussion of Kunst in his mature work: §§43 and 49 of the third Critique (§2). And once we have a basic sketch of Kant’s general theory of schematism on offer (§3), we shall consider to what extent schematism relates to the senses of Kunst laid out in the third Critique (§§4-6). Along the way, these considerations will not just illuminate what Kant means when he says schematism is Kunst, but also why he calls schematism a hidden Kunst in first place. Ultimately, by following up Kant’s clue to think of schematism as Kunst, we shall deepen the aesthetic interpretation, and, at the same time, deepen our understanding of the nature of schematism itself.
§2. Kunst in §§43 and 49 of the Critique of Judgment

Let’s begin by getting a clearer picture of Kant’s theoretically exact ways of using the term ‘Kunst’. His most precise presentation of the notion of Kunst can be found in §43 (‘Von der Kunst Überhaupt’) of the Critique of Judgment. In this section, Kant offers his definition of Kunst understood not as a product, e.g., the Mona Lisa, but as an activity an agent engages in, e.g., the art of painting. As Henry Allison has noted, in §43 Kant proceeds “in scholastic fashion by attempting a definition by genus and species.” 7 Hence Kant begins by describing two jointly sufficient and necessary conditions an activity must meet in order to fall under the genus Kunst and then delineates two species of this genus.

Kant lays out the two conditions required for the genus Kunst in his discussion of the difference between artistic activity and the activities involved in nature [Natur] and science [Wissenschaft]. First, with regard to the distinction between Kunst and nature, Kant argues that while nature may be able to bring about products, e.g., a beehive, this mode of production does not count as Kunst because it is not the result of a choice the agent has made. Thus, Kant says, ‘only production through freedom, i.e., through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason, should be called Kunst’ (KU 5: 303). 8 The production through freedom he has in mind here involves an agent ‘conceiving of an end’ and Kunst is the activity through which she brings this end about (KU 5: 303). Kant suggest that although we may be able to think of a beehive as if it were the effect of such a conception, we should not, strictly speaking, think of the bees themselves as the agents responsible for conceiving of this end. From this emerges the first condition an activity must meet in order to fall under the genus Kunst: it must be an activity the agent engages in as the result of an end she has adopted. 9 Call this the ‘end-adoption condition’.
The second condition emerges in Kant’s discussion of the difference between the activities involved in *Kunst* and those involved in science:

*Kunst* as a skill [Geschicklichkeit] of human beings is also distinguished from science [Wissenschaft] (to be able from to know [Können vom Wissen]), as a practical faculty from a theoretical one, as technique [Technik] from theory. (KU 5: 303)

Unlike science, which requires theoretical knowledge [Wissen], Kant argues that *Kunst* requires practical abilities, or what we might call ‘know-how’. Illustrating his point with examples, Kant claims that just as mastering a geometrical proof does not guarantee one’s ability to survey land, knowing about shoes does not make one able to cobble one. As Kant describes this latter example, Pieter Camper, the author of *Treatise on the Best Form of Shoes*, could ‘describe quite precisely how the best shoe must be made, but he certainly was not able to make one’ (KU 5: 304). As these examples suggest, in order to put our theoretical knowledge to use in a practical situation, we need the *Kunst* associated with know-how. In which case, in addition to meeting the end-adoption condition, in order for an activity to fall under the genus *Kunst* it must also meet what we could call the ‘know-how’ condition: it must involve skills or know-how.

Having laid out the conditions of the genus *Kunst*, Kant goes on to consider two species of *Kunst*: the *Kunst* of genius and of handicraft. Kant’s way of introducing the distinction between genius and handicraft is somewhat misleading for his claim that ‘*Kunst* is also distinguished from handicraft’ may give one the impression that handicraft does not count as *Kunst* (KU 5: 304). However, insofar as both handicraft and genius meet the end-adoption and know-how condition they fall under the genus *Kunst*, hence his description of the former as ‘renumerative’ or ‘mechanical’ and the latter as ‘liberal’ or ‘free’ *Kunst* (KU 5: 304). Where they differ is with respect to what species of *Kunst* they belong to and Kant wants to emphasize that handicraft does not fall under the particular species of free *Kunst*,

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i.e., of genius, that is of special interest in the third *Critique*. In handicraft, Kant claims the artist regards her activity as ‘labour’ and is motivated only by the remuneration she will receive, whereas the ‘free’ artist regards her activity as ‘play’ and is motivated by the activity itself:

[Free *Kunst*] is regarded as if it could turn out purposively (be successful) only as play, i.e., an occupation that is agreeable in itself; [handicraft] is regarded as labour [*Arbeit*], i.e., an occupation that is disagreeable (burdensome) in itself and is attractive only because of its effect [*Wirkung*] (e.g., the remuneration [*Lohn*]) (KU 5: 304).14

This, however, is only the first pass at how the activity involved in handicraft differs from what is involved in the *Kunst* of genius.15 Indeed, as Kant develops his analysis of genius in the ensuing sections (§§46-49), further discrepancies become apparent. Taking Kant’s summary of genius at the end of §49 as our guide, we find that genius has four features that distinguish it from handicraft.16 First, on Kant’s view, genius is an *original talent*. Unlike the activities involved in both science and handicraft where the agent is guided by antecedently given rules and procedures,17 artistic production is guided by the inborn talent of the artist: ‘genius … is a *talent* for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule’ (KU 5: 307).18 And, since the artist’s own talent must give the rule to art, Kant maintains, ‘*originality* must be [genius’s] primary characteristic’ (KU 5: 308).19

Second, Kant claims genius must involve ‘a relation of the imagination to the understanding’ (KU 5: 317). More specifically, he claims in the production process, an artist must decide on what she wants to present through her work of art, or, in Kant’s terms, she, through her understanding, must select a ‘determinate concept of the product, as an end’ to pursue (KU 5: 317). And she must, in turn, rely on her imagination to develop a sensible way of presenting that concept, i.e., ‘a representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept’ (KU 5: 317).20 If the artist’s activity
does not involve this cooperation between the imagination and understanding, Kant claims
she will produce ‘nonsense’, rather than a work of art that is ‘exemplary’, i.e., can serve as a
model for other artists (KU 5: 308).  

To be sure, handicraft too will involve a relationship between the imagination and
understanding; however, as Kant makes clear with the third feature of genius, these cognitive
capacities are apportioned to one another in a free way in the production of fine art, a
freedom not shared by handicraft. This emerges in Kant’s discussion of ‘aesthetic ideas’.  
According to Kant, an aesthetic idea is the imagination presentation of the concept the artist
wants to present through her work. However, unlike in ordinary cognition, where the
imagination is constrained to present the logical content of the concept at stake (KU 5: 317),
in genius the imagination is free from this constraint and is able to add various ‘aesthetic
attributes’, i.e., attributes the artist subjectively connects to the concept (KU 5: 315). These
aesthetic attributes coalesce together into an aesthetic idea and it is through this freely
created idea that the relevant concept is presented.

But as Kant asserts with the fourth feature of genius, this special proportion holding
between the imagination and understanding in genius is the result of a ‘natural endowment’
or a ‘natural gift,’ something Kant says is ‘unsought’ and ‘unintentional’ (KU 5: 307, 317-8).
The artist cannot follow a step-by-step guide in her productive activities; rather, she must
rely, in part, on some unsought natural endowment. To be sure, the artist can control some
aspects of the production process, e.g., she can pick what colours to restrict herself to or
whether to use sonnet form; however, Kant thinks there is some further contribution from
genius that the artist cannot seek or control. For these reasons, Kant claims genial talent is
something the artist is not fully able to explain to herself,

the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the
ideas for it come to him, and also does not have it in his power to think up such
In light of this passage, we could say that the inner workings of this natural endowment, of genius, are *hidden* from the artist.

By way of summary, genius is a species of *Kunst* that differs from handicraft insofar as it is, one, an original talent. Two, it must involve the artist’s understanding setting an end and her imagination presenting that end. Three, it involves the expression of an aesthetic idea, hence, a free cooperation between the imagination and the understanding. And four, this proportion is achieved thanks to a natural endowment of the artist, which is, in some sense, hidden from her.  

3. Schematism: Basic Features

Kant introduces the notion of schematism in a very brief chapter titled ‘On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ (A137-147/B176-187). This is the first chapter of the ‘Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment’, and Kant’s main concern is explaining how it is possible for us to make judgments in which we apply concepts to intuitions. On his view, in order for us to make such a judgment, the concept involved must be ‘homogeneous’ with the intuition it is to be applied to (A137/B176). This, he thinks, poses a particular problem in the case of judgments where we apply the categories to empirical intuition for it seems that the categories, qua *pure* concepts, are so heterogeneous with respect to intuitions, qua *empirical* representations, that the former could not be applied to the latter (A137-8/B176-7). Kant, in turn, offers his theory of schematism as a way to explain how these judgments are possible.

However, although transcendental schematism is his main focus, Kant alludes to two other forms of schematism: the schematism of pure sensible concepts, e.g., mathematical
concepts, and that of ordinary empirical concepts, e.g., the concept of a dog (A140-1/B179-180). By my lights, Kant addresses these other forms of schematism because even if the problem of heterogeneity is most extreme in the transcendental case, nevertheless, he regards all concepts as heterogeneous with all intuitions. As he says in the third Critique, understanding, with its concepts, and sensibility, with its intuitions, are ‘two heterogeneous elements’ (KU 5: 401). Indeed, Kant describes the sorts of representations involved in concepts and intuitions in heterogeneous terms: whereas concepts are mediate, universal representations, intuitions are immediate, singular representations (A320/B376-7). In which case, the problem of heterogeneity will arise in any judgment, including pure sensible and empirical ones, in which we apply a concept to an intuition.27

Kant’s solution to the problem of heterogeneity takes shape in his theory of schematism. He argues that in order for us to be able to apply a concept to an intuition, there must be a ‘third thing’ [ein Drittes] homogeneous with both the concept and the intuition, and this ‘third thing’ is what Kant labels a schema. As he says in his discussion of transcendental schemata,

there must be some third thing [ein Drittes], which must stand in homogeneity [Gleichartigkeit] with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be … intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema. (A138/B177)

Although this passage references transcendental schemata, I take it to point towards the dual nature of all schemata: they are mediating representations, possessing both sensible and intellectual aspects.28 We can, in turn, reconstruct what these sensible and intellectual features of schemata are on the basis of two sets of claims Kant makes about them.

On the one hand, Kant claims that a schema is a sensible ‘presentation’ [Darstellung] of a concept, or, as he puts it, a representation of a concept ‘made sensible’ [Versinnlichung]
More specifically, he describes a schematic representation as a ‘monogram of pure a priori imagination’ (A142/B181). And elsewhere he defines a monogram as an ‘outline’ [Umriß], ‘sketch’ [Zeichnung], or ‘silhouette’ [Shattenbild] of an object (A833/B862 and A570/B598). Given that outlines, sketches, and silhouettes represent objects as a whole, I take a monogram to be a holistic representation of a concept made sensible, i.e., a representation of how the various marks of that concept manifest in a unified sensible way. In which case, we could think of the sensible aspect of a schema as involving a gestalt, i.e., a sensible, holistic presentation of a concept.

Consider, for example, the schema for a dog. While the concept ‘dog’ indicates that dogs have various properties, e.g., being furry, four-legged, an animal, etc., the schema represents how those various properties appear together as a whole in perception. Similarly, the schema for a pure sensible concept like ‘triangle’ will be a gestalt that reflects how the various properties of a triangle, e.g., having three sides, three angles, etc, manifest in a single figure. Finally, with respect to transcendental schemata, Kant describes them as ‘time-determinations’ and, on my interpretation, this means they represent what we could call temporal gestalts, i.e., temporal patterns that reflect the category at stake (A142/B181). For example, the schema for the category of cause would be the temporal pattern: if A at time₁, then B at time₂ (A144/B183). As we see in each case, then, a schema is a sensible gestalt that represents how the concept with its various marks will manifest in a spatial or temporal whole.

On the other hand, Kant does not think a schema is entirely sensible; rather, he maintains a schema must have intellectual features as well if it is to be able to mediate between concepts and intuitions in judgment. This brings us to the second set of claims Kant makes about the nature of a schema: he describes it as a ‘rule’ or ‘general procedure’ for
determining ‘our intuition in accordance with a general concept’ (A140-1/B180). A schema, then, is something like a pattern that we can follow for synthesizing an intuition in such a way that it represents a particular concept. My schema for the concept ‘dog’, for example, guides me in synthesizing intuitions of poodles, German Shepherds, and Chihuahuas in accordance with the concept ‘dog’, just as my schema for triangles guides me in synthesizing intuitions of isosceles, equilateral, and right triangles in accordance with the concept ‘triangle’. Meanwhile, Kant claims, transcendental schemata enable us to synthesize the a priori manifold of the pure intuition of time in accordance with the categories (A138/B177).

Now, in order for a schema to be able to serve as a rule or indicate a general procedure for us to follow in synthesizing intuition, the gestalt represented by the schema must be suitably generic, i.e., it must reflect a sensible pattern that is flexible or, perhaps, vague enough to apply to different intuitions. For example, the schema of a dog cannot just represent my pet poodle for, to use Kant’s word, the ‘image’ of my pet poodle is not generic enough to apply to visually dissimilar dogs, like Chihuahuas. As Kant makes this point in his discussion of triangles:

No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere. (A141/B180)

The schema of a triangle, by contrast, would have the right generality to apply to different types of triangles. So too do transcendental schemata need to be generic: they, as Kant suggests must be able to apply to any representation: ‘[they] concern the determination of the inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations’ (A142/B181, my emphasis).

Ultimately, then, a schema, on Kant’s account, is a generic gestalt, i.e., a sensible, holistic presentation of a concept, that serves as a rule for us to follow when synthesizing.
intuition in accordance with that concept. However, in addition to discussing the nature of schemata, Kant also discusses the activity through which schemata are produced, an activity I shall refer to as ‘schematism’. Unfortunately, Kant does not say much about this activity. He does attribute this activity to the productive imagination (A142/B181). And he asserts the claim we have been puzzling over, viz., that it is a form of hidden Kunst. This brings us back to our main question: by calling schematism hidden Kunst does Kant simply mean to say it is something too obscure to explain? Or, does he intend for us to take him at his word, and treat schematism literally as Kunst?

§4. Schematism and Agency

An initial worry may arise at this point: in his discussion of Kunst in the third Critique, Kant is clearly thinking of it as an activity performed by a particular agent, e.g., a cobbler or painter; however, who, if anyone, could be the agent of schematism? Is there any sense in which I schematize? Or is it rather something that just happens within me?

Though my full response to these questions will only take shape in the ensuing discussion, I take it to be the case that, for Kant, we are, indeed, the agents of schematism; however, we are agents in a somewhat attenuated sense. On the one hand, the activity of schematism is not like other activities we are aware of or that we control. The cobbler, for example, is the agent of his cobbling in a robust sense: he is aware of working with the leather, he can directly manipulate it, etc. Schematism, by contrast, is something hidden, presumably falling under the category of imaginative activities that are ‘indispensable’, but ‘of which we are seldom ever conscious’ (A78/B103). So we do not appear to be the agent of schematism in any robust sense.
On the other hand, Kant does not reserve agential language for the activities we are aware of or directly control; he also uses it when describing the faculties of imagination and understanding. To pick a prominent example, synthesis, which both the understanding and imagination engage in, is defined by Kant as ‘the action of putting different representations together with each other’ (A77/B103, my emphasis). Moreover, he describes the understanding and imagination as having aims: the understanding ‘is always busy poring through appearances with the aim [in der Absicht] of finding some sort of rule in them,’ and that the imagination has ‘as its aim [Absicht] … the necessary unity in [the synthesis of the manifold of appearances]’ (A123). But who is the agent responsible for acting and aiming in these ways?

While Kant’s language sometimes invites us to regard the faculties themselves, The Understanding or The Imagination, as the agents in question, this leads to a rather unsatisfactory homuncular view of the mind. A more promising alternative is to regard the various faculties as capacities [Vermögen] that belong to us and to regard their activities as exercises of our capacities. In which case, we are the agent of the activities of the imagination and understanding; their ends are our ends. This, in fact, appears to be the view that Kant endorses at the end of the B Deduction: in order to perceive a house, he claims, ‘I make the empirical intuition of a house into a perception through apprehension of its manifold … and I as it were draw its shape,’ so too when I perceive water freezing, ‘I apprehend two states … I ground the appearance as inner intuition, I represent necessary synthetic unity of the manifold (B162-3, my italics). Here we find Kant ascribing various actions, which he had previously attributed to either the imagination or the understanding, to us as their agent. To be sure, we are not necessarily aware of or in control of these activity, in which case our agency in these cases is more attenuated; however, acknowledging that
Kant makes room for this weaker sense of agency both does justice to Kant’s agential language, while avoiding the homuncular view of the mind.

Applying this weaker sense of agency to schematism, we find that although Kant will describe the imagination as the faculty that does the schematizing, his considered view should be that I, in virtue of my imaginative capacities, engage in schematism. With this preliminary hurdle removed, we should now pursue the parallels between schematism and *Kunst* more directly.

§5. Schematism as a Species of *Kunst* in General

Let us consider first whether schematism falls under the genus of *Kunst*. If so, it must meet the two conditions: it must involve practical abilities and know-how (the know-how condition) and it must be an activity that results from the agent adopting an end (the end-adoption condition).\(^{34}\)

*a. The Know-How Condition*

As I noted above, in the third *Critique*, Kant suggests that a schema is a representation of a concept ‘made sensible’ (KU 5: 351). However, in order to sensibly present a concept, it is clear the imagination cannot rely on theoretical knowledge alone. Indeed, Kant introduces his doctrine of schematism precisely because he thinks our theoretical grasp of something through the understanding does not guarantee any practical competence with it, i.e., it does not give us a sense of how that thing ought to manifest itself in experience. To this end, Kant offers the example of a physician who has theoretical knowledge about a disease, but cannot tell whether a particular patient actually has the disease (A134/B173).\(^{35}\)
Indeed, there seems to a transcendental analogue in the B Deduction, where Kant argues that possessing the categories, qua ‘purely intellectual’ ‘forms of thought’ does not yet guarantee their applicability to intuition (B150).

In order to make a concept sensible, then, the imagination must rely on resources outside of theoretical knowledge. But what is the alternative? Taking our cue from §43 of the third _Critique_, we are led to suspect that the imagination’s ability to make a concept sensible is just that, an ability (Kennen): it involves skills that outstrip our theoretical knowledge (Wissen). And, indeed, when we consider what the imagination must do in order to make a concept sensible, we find that it relies on several skills. It must be able to _project_ and _anticipate_ how the various marks of the concept in sensible, holistic terms and, at least in the empirical case, to _adjust_ and _readjust_ our schematic representation of a concept on the basis of further sensible experience or increased knowledge. These projections, anticipations, and adjustments are the skills that contribute to the know-how of the imagination in its schematizing activities. In which case, schematism does meet the know-how condition of _Kunst_.

**b. The End-Adoption Condition**

Turning to the end-adoption condition, _prima facie_, schematism seems to be very different from the sort of ‘artistic’ activities that result from more explicit, self-conscious end-adoption, e.g., baking a cake. As noted above, schematism does not appear to be something we are aware of at all, let alone something we engage in because of an end we have consciously adopted.36

Despite these appearances, a closer look at schematism reveals that it can meet the end-adoption condition after all. To begin, it seems plausible that we develop at least some
empirical schemata as a result of ends, either theoretical or practical, we have chosen. We often set ends for ourselves and engage in various activities in our pursuit of those ends. If, for example, I decide I want to learn to distinguish different herbs, I will engage in various activities, like tasting herbs, cooking with herbs, etc., which help me bring that end about. However, at least on a Kantian picture, I will also engage in various mental activities that aid me in pursuit of this end, one of which will presumably be schematism. My imagination will develop schemata for basil, chervil, rosemary, etc. and these schemata will put me in the position to recognize and differentiate these herbs.

To be sure, this does not mean that I choose to schematize in any robust sense, as I might choose to read the *Joy of Cooking*. But the ends-adoption condition does not require us to choose the activity in this robust sense; as long as the activity is entailed by the end we have chosen, then it will meet this condition. Indeed, even in paradigmatically practical examples, e.g., trying to hit a baseball, we do not robustly choose every activity that aids us in pursuit of our ends. The batter often does not deliberately choose to raise his elbow, turn his hips, or follow through; indeed, if he did deliberately choose these activities at each moment, he would most likely never hit the ball. Nevertheless, these are activities that result from ends-adoption, just as, I am suggesting, schematism does.

Yet, this response only goes so far: although it shows that some of our schematizing activity can meet the end-adoption condition, this by no means shows that all empirical, let alone transcendental, schematizing activity meets this condition. After all, transcendental schematism happens *a priori*. And much, if not the majority, of our empirical schematizing results from simply ‘bumping up’ against things in the world, and this, it would seem, is not entirely up to us. So what sense could be made of talk of adoption of ends in these cases?
In order to answer this question, we need first to recognize that, for Kant, not all of the ends we adopt are up to us. Most prominently happiness, Kant argues, is not an end that is up to us; instead, as he puts it in the *Groundwork*, it is an end ‘that can be presupposed surely and a priori in the case of every human being, because it belongs to his essence’ (G 4: 415-6). Nevertheless, in the First Introduction to the third *Critique* he argues that there are technical imperatives of *Kunst*, albeit of a special kind, which arise from this necessary end.\(^{37}\) This means that, for Kant, there are at least two kinds of imperatives of *Kunst*: imperatives relating to ends that are up to us and imperatives relating to necessary ends. This, in turn, opens up the possibility that not all *Kunst* is the result of an arbitrarily chosen end; some *Kunst* can be the result of ends we must adopt, ends necessitated by the kinds of beings we are.

This raises the question: is schematism guided by any necessary end? I think the answer is yes. For, as I will now show, all of our schematizing activities do involve the adoption of what I shall call the ‘constitutive end’ of the productive imagination.\(^{38}\) By a constitutive end, I have in mind an end we must adopt in order to be able to engage in the activity at all. For example, engaging in the activity of playing Scrabble to win involves the constitutive end of scoring more points than your opponents. I take Kant to commit himself to the productive imagination having a constitutive end insofar as he offers a functional account of this capacity, i.e., insofar as he maintains that the productive imagination has a function that is teleologically aimed at a particular end. This end is what I take to be a constitutive end we must adopt in order to exercise the productive imagination at all. In which case, all exercises of the productive imagination, including schematism, must adopt its constitutive end.
Evidence for this functional account of the productive imagination can be found in Kant’s discussion of the ‘transcendental function’ of the productive imagination in the A Deduction. Here, Kant argues that the transcendental function of the imagination is associated with the aim of bringing about ‘necessary unity in the synthesis of appearances’:

insofar as [the productive imagination’s] aim [Absicht] in regard to the manifold of appearances is nothing further than the necessary unity in their synthesis, this can be called the transcendental function of the imagination. (A123, my emphasis)

The ‘necessary unity’ Kant has in mind is the unity that is involved in experience, so he thinks that the transcendental function of the imagination plays a crucial role in making experience possible:

it is only by means of [vermittelt dieser] this transcendental function of the imagination that even the affinity of appearances, and with it the association and through the latter finally reproduction in accordance with laws, and consequently experience itself, become possible; for without them no concepts of objects at all would converge [zusammenfließen] into an experience [eine Erfahrung]. (A123)

What I want to emphasize is Kant’s rather striking claim that the imagination enables experience by getting our concepts to ‘converge into an experience’. This, I believe, gives us an important insight into the function of the productive imagination: it has the aim of bringing about experience by getting our concepts to ‘converge into an experience’. To put the point in a different way, the productive imagination is functionally aimed at bringing our concepts to bear on what we intuit.

Although this is the ‘transcendental function’ of the imagination, there is reason to think the same aim underwrites both transcendental and empirical schematism. For, in the case of transcendental schematism, the imagination aims at making experience in general possible, i.e., making it possible for concepts in general to converge on intuition in general. And it guarantees this possibility by bringing the categories to bear on the temporal manifold of inner sense, a pre-condition of experience at all. Meanwhile, in pure sensible and
empirical schematism, the imagination aims at making particular experiences possible, e.g., enabling the concepts ‘triangle’ or ‘dog’ to converge on a particular intuition. Schematism, in whatever form, then aims at getting concepts to converge into experience, hence, involves adopting the constitutive end of the productive imagination.

In the end, then, all schematism involves some form of end-adoption: insofar as we are engaged in some activity, say becoming a better home-cook or exercising our productive imagination, we are thereby committed to the adoption of certain ends. Furthermore, if we couple this analysis of end-adoption with my earlier argument about why schematism meets the know-how condition, then we have reason to think schematism is an activity that falls under the genus Kunst. This is, indeed, a happy result, as it gives us at least one helpful way of cashing out what the concealed Kunst of schematism involves.

§6. Schematism and the Kunst of Genius

We now need to consider whether schematism also falls under one of the species of Kunst Kant discusses in the third Critique: does it at all resemble handicraft or genius? As I argue below, although there are some disanalogies between schematism and genius, by paying attention to often overlooked features of Kant’s account of genius, we will find that schematism is, in fact, more continuous with genius than with handicraft.

a. Schematism and genius: apparent contrasts

The activities involved in genius and schematism come apart most sharply with regard to the third feature of genius, viz., that it involves the expression of aesthetic ideas and a free proportion between the imagination and understanding. This emerges in §49, where Kant claims,
in the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the constraint [Zwange] of the understanding and is subject to the limitation of being adequate to its concepts; in an aesthetic respect, however, the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of which the latter took no regard in its concept. (KU 5: 316-7)

Here, Kant contrasts two ways in which the imagination can present a concept. In the first case, the imagination is constrained by the understanding, insofar as it has to offer a ‘logical presentation’ of the concept that reflects its ‘logical attributes’ (KU 5: 315). This type of ‘direct’ presentation of a concept is what Kant in §59 identifies with a schema (KU 5: 352). By contrast, in the second aesthetic case, the imagination is free from this constraint and creatively adds an aesthetic idea and aesthetic attributes to that concept. This results in an ‘indirect’ or ‘symbolic’ presentation of a concept (KU 5: 352). In which case, the relationship holding between the imagination and understanding in schematism seems to be precisely what Kant wants to contrast with the free relation between these two capacities in genius’s expression of aesthetic ideas.39

b. Schematism and genius: deeper parallels

However, even if we were to concede that schematism and genius come apart with regard to the third feature of genius, this does not yet drive a wedge between schematism and the other three features of genius. In the first place, it is clear that insofar as both schematism and genius involve the imagination presenting a concept offered to it by the understanding, it will involve the second feature of genius. This, however, does not seem to be distinctive since it seems to be a feature shared by handicraft as well.

What aligns schematism with genius more decidedly is the way in which it involves the first and fourth features of genius: originality and being the result of a natural endowment. To appreciate this, however, we must pay careful attention to how exactly
Kant is conceiving of originality and natural endowments. Turning, first, to his discussion of genius as an original talent, while it may be tempting to think of artistic production as original insofar as it is free from all constraint by rules and concepts, something like creation *ex nihilo*, this does not reflect Kant’s view of originality. For Kant, the originality of genius necessarily involves constraint. This, in part, follows from the fact that genius counts as *Kunst*, something Kant thinks must involve normative constraint: ‘For every *Kunst* presupposes rules which first lay the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is first represented as possible’ (KU 5: 307, my emphasis).

Furthermore, Kant thinks that being constrained by formal, mechanical rules is also an ‘essential condition’ of genius (KU 5: 310). Kant claims that while an artist is free to come up with the aesthetic idea she wants to execute, the way in which she executes this must be constrained by mechanical, formal rules. In Kant’s words,

there is no beautiful *Kunst* in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something **academically correct**, does not constitute the essential condition of the *Kunst* ...Genius can only provide rich **material** [*Stoff*] for products of *Kunst*; its elaboration [*Verarbeitung*] and **form** require a talent that has been academically trained. (KU 5: 310)

If, for example, a poet wants to write a sonnet, she is constrained by the formal rules for sonnets, rules that do not originate in her, but rules she must nevertheless follow in order to produce a sonnet. To be sure, this feature of genius does not account for its originality (the other ‘essential condition’); nevertheless, it does reveal that, for Kant, an activity can still be original even if it is constrained by mechanical rules.

But even if we turn our attention to the original features of genius, displayed most vividly in the expression of an aesthetic idea through a work of art, we find that here too genius is constrained. In fact, what we find is that an artist’s activities are original *because* they are governed by norms of a particular sort, viz., **self-given** norms. This contrasts genius with
handicraft: whereas in the *Kunst* of handicraft, one is guided by rules extrinsic to her, in the *Kunst* of genius, ‘nature in the subject [i.e., in the artist] must give the rule to art’ (KU 5: 307).

We can distinguish two sorts of self-given norms that guide artistic production on Kant’s view. In the first place, Kant suggests there are self-given norms that govern the artist’s production of an aesthetic idea. Insofar as the aesthetic idea must be a presentation of the concept at stake, it must, in some sense, ‘belong to’ that concept, i.e., it cannot be so divorced from the concept that it would no longer count as its presentation (KU 5: 315).

However, the artist’s imaginative process for developing such an aesthetic idea cannot be guided by an external standard: insofar as the process is original, neither the logical content of the concept nor some other artist’s rendering of it can guide her. Instead, Kant suggests, the artist is guided by an internal standard, her own sense for what aesthetic idea will do justice to the concept: as Kant puts it, the artist has ‘no other standard than the feeling of unity in the presentation’ (KU 5: 319). In the second place, when we consider the artist’s execution of an aesthetic idea in a particular medium, say, on a canvas or on the page, her creation and revision process must be guided by internal standards, i.e., her own sense of what counts as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ way of presenting that idea concretely. If she, instead, emulates external standards, she is once again failing to be original. In the end, then, the artist’s activities are original insofar as she is guided not by norms imposed on her ‘from without’, but by norms she develops internally and imposes upon herself.

If we now consider whether schematism is original in this sense, as involving self-given norms, several important similarities come to the fore. In both genius and schematism, the way in which, one, the imagination presents a concept (through an aesthetic idea or a schema) and, two, the ‘material’ (the artist’s medium or the manifold of intuition) is manipulated must be guided by self-given norms. On the first count, as we have already
seen, in order for the imagination to develop a schema in the first place it must rely on know-how. These skills, however, appear to be norm-guided: there are right and wrong ways to anticipate, project, and adjust expectations for how a concept manifests in sensible terms. My schema of chervil, for example, should not accommodate every green herb I come across. But these norms are not external rules that we somehow internalize; they are norms that are self-given. To be sure, in the empirical case, the imagination develops schemata as a result of ‘bumping against’ the world; however, the world does not offer us step-by-step recipes for how to imaginatively develop a schema. This is a skill our imaginations must develop internally. Even more so in the transcendental case, since transcendental schematism is a condition of having any experience at all, the norms that guide it cannot be given from the outside, but must rather have an internal source. In both cases, then, the production of a schema is guided, at least in part, by norms I, through my imagination, develop for right and wrong ways to imaginatively project, anticipate, and adjust. Secondly, when we synthesize an intuition in accordance with a schema, this activity too involves self-given norms: given that a schema is a representation our imaginations develop internally that can serve as a rule or procedure for us to follow in synthesizing intuition, when we actually perform this synthesis, our activity will be guided by a self-given norm. Ultimately, insofar as self-given norms guide our schematizing activities in these ways, it mirrors the originality involved in genius.

We are now in the position to consider the final way in which schematism parallels genius: it shares in the fourth feature of genius, viz., it is a natural endowment. This parallel is particularly important because it promises to shed light on what has seemed like obscurity to so many, viz., Kant’s claim that schematism is a hidden Kunst. Recall that, according to Kant, the free use of the imagination and understanding in genius is something that is
brought about through a natural endowment of the artist (KU 5: 318). And, since this natural gift is just that, a gift, something given to her and not intentionally brought about, the artist cannot fully describe, explain, or even 'know' how exactly the production process takes place (KU 5: 308). It is in this sense that the inner workings of the artistic process are hidden from the artist.

What I would like to suggest is that by calling schematism a hidden Kunst Kant is alerting us to the fact that it, like genius, is a natural endowment we cannot fully understand. Schematism, in whatever form, involves a process that we are not fully conscious of, let alone have much insight into. Although I might, for example, be able to explain to someone how to play a C Major scale on the piano, I cannot explain to someone how to make her imagination schematize a concept. Unlike many skills that we can articulate to ourselves, our ability to schematize is, then, more like a ‘natural endowment’ or a ‘gift’. And, it is in this sense, that schematism is a hidden Kunst.

In general, then, although there are some dissimilarities between schematism and genius, we have more reason to align it with this aesthetic form of Kunst than with the Kunst of handicraft. Indeed, when we take a closer look at Kant’s conception of constrained originality and his discussion of natural endowments, we gain insight not only into the artistic aspects of schematism, but into its more mysterious aspects as well.

§7. Conclusion

When Kant calls schematism hidden Kunst, he is not just being obscure. To the contrary, a literal reading of this claim reveals that not only does schematism fall under the genus Kunst, but also it in many, though not in all, regards falls under the species of Kunst associated with genius. Indeed, we realize that schematism not only involves know-how and ends-adoptions,
but also that it, like genius, involves constrained originality and a hidden natural endowment. By following out the clue from Kant’s choice of terms, then, we can acquire considerable insight into the schematism process.

This, in turn, points towards yet another way in which the ‘aesthetic interpretation’ of schematism is productive for our understanding of it. As commentators like Schaper and Bell have already shown, reading Kant’s theory of schematism in light of the third *Critique* can elucidate this notoriously difficult portion of the first *Critique*. While they focus primarily on the connection between schematism and Kant’s discussion of judgment in the third *Critique*, in this paper I have shown we should also direct our attention to the connection between schematism and the notion of *Kunst* so prominent in this latter text. However, in addition to augmenting the aesthetic interpretation of schematism, these considerations promise to contribute to the growing body of literature that explores the value of the aesthetic for Kant’s philosophy more generally. Whether we consider earlier work by Rudolph Makkreel and Hannah Ginsborg, or more recent work by Fiona Hughes, Henry Allison, Béatrice Longuenesse, among others, there is mounting evidence that suggests we ought to read the third *Critique* not just as an analysis of aesthetic experience *per se*, but as an invaluable resource for understanding Kant’s theoretical philosophy.42 As Rebecca Kukla nicely summarizes this conviction,

we cannot properly understand Kant’s critical epistemological program or his account of empirical cognition without also understanding his account of aesthetic judgment, imagination, and sensibility.43

Our present discussion is intended as but one moment of this larger movement, the movement that seeks to elucidate the glimmer of insight Kant had in the Schematism: the art of everyday experience.44
Bibliography


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2 Strawson (1974): 47

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Kunst that constitute genius' (title of §49). This, I take it, is why he aligns genius with the distinction between fine art and handicraft.

Though Kant says that Kunst in this sense involves only ‘production through freedom,’ I do not take this to mean that Kunst must involve only autonomous action in the moral sense. Rather, as long as the agent is engaging in the activity in light of some reason or other, i.e., as the result of ‘rational consideration’, then she is producing through freedom, which stands in sharp contrast to the purely instinctive production that the bees engage in.

To be sure, in the Third Moment of Taste, Kant suggests that a beautiful object, hence a beautiful work of art, involves ‘purposiveness without a purpose’; however, in those earlier sections, Kant is describing how we experience an already produced work of art, not the end-guided activity through which a work of art is produced.

That Kunst requires both conditions is also evident in the ‘First Introduction’ to the third Critique, where Kant argues that imperatives of Kunst are relevant, on the one hand, to ends-adoptions and ‘the Kunst of bringing about that which one wishes should exist’ and, on the other hand, to know-how insofar as these imperatives are imperatives of skill (‘technical imperatives’) (EE 20: 200, see also Gr 4: 415-7).

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See also R1866 (16: 142-3):

‘Kunst’

LehrKunst mechanisch (Handwerk)
Kommt darauf an, wie und wodurch man etwas kan [sic], des genie [sic]


That genius meets the two conditions of the genus Kunst is evident in §49 where Kant says genius involves the adoption of a ‘determinate concept of the product, as an end’ (KU 5: 317) (hence, meets the end-adoption condition) and is a talent for Kunst, not for science (hence, meets the know-how condition). To be sure, he does claim that genius is ‘not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule’; however, this does not mean genius is skill-free, but rather does not involve a skill for following pre-given rules (KU 5: 307). That handicraft also meets the two conditions of generic Kunst follows from the fact that it, one, adopts an end, viz., remuneration; and, two, involves the know-how and skill for following pre-given rules (KU 5: 310).

Though we often use genius substantively as a synonym for an artist, Kant more often uses genius to describe the mental disposition of an artist (KU 5: 307). Hence his analysis of genius in terms of the ‘faculties of the mind that constitute genius’ (title of §49). This, I take it, is why he aligns genius with the activity of free Kunst.

See also R812 (15: 361), R963 (15: 424), R1806 (16: 142), R2026 (16: 201), R2705 (16: 477) for the distinction between fine art and handicraft.

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See also Tonelli (1966) for a discussion of the development of Kant’s notion of genius from the pre-critical period to the third Critique.

For handicraft in this regard, see KU 5: 310 and R941 (15: 417).

For the contrast between genius and science, see KU §§46-7, R621 (15: 268), R812 (15: 361), R829 (15: 370).
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19 See below for a more thorough discussion of originality. See also R812 (15: 361), R933 (15: 414), and R949 (15: 420-1).
20 For example, Ernest Hemingway, in a letter to Gertrude Stein, suggests that his aim in his short story ‘Big Two-Hearted River’ is to ‘do the country like Cézanne’ (Hemingway (1981): 122). This, then, would be the concept he pursues and presents through the imaginative representation of the character Nick Adams, the experience of fishing, etc.
21 See Gammon (1997) for a discussion of Kant’s theory of exemplary originality.
22 I take the point he is making here to be similar to his earlier claim in §21 about the judgment of taste: although all cognition involves a basic relationship between the understanding and the imagination, in a judgment of taste these capacities are apportioned to each other in a unique way, i.e., in a way that is ‘optimal for the animation of both powers’ (KU 5: 238-9).
23 To be sure, both genius and handicraft are free in the sense that they involve choices grounded in reason, i.e., the sort of freedom Kant discusses in relation to ends-adoptions in §43. However, there is another kind of freedom that they do not share, the freedom Kant associates with ‘play’ and ‘spirit’, i.e., the freedom of genius.
24 For a more thorough discussion of aesthetic ideas, see my (2013).
25 See also KU 5: 309
26 Kant summarizes these features as follows, ‘According to these presuppositions, genius is the exemplary originality of the natural endowment of a subject for the free use of his cognitive faculties’ (KU 5: 318).
27 I, therefore, do not take the problem of homogeneity to be one that applies only in the case of transcendental schematism (in disagreement with Walsh (1957/8), Chipman (1972) and Pippin (1976)).
28 Although I cannot discuss the following issue at length, insofar as I take empirical schemata to mediate between a concept and an intuition, my interpretation contrasts with a popular interpretation of empirical schemata as identical to empirical concepts, put forward most notably by Chipman (1972): 42, and can be found in Bennett (1966): 151 and Guyer (2006): 97. I do not think that Kant makes this identification. For one, the way Kant sets up schemata as mediating between concepts and intuitions, something he does even in his discussion of empirical schemata, seems to preclude this. Moreover, given that a schema is not just an intellectual representation, but is a sensible representation as well, this too should set it apart from a concept. For an argument why Kant should make this distinction, see Pippin (1976): 166-7. For an alternative argument that schemata cannot be identical to concepts on the grounds that they are pre-discursive representations that play a role in concept-formation, see Lonergan (1998): 116-7, Allison (2001): 25-6, Allison (2004): 209-210.
29 This supports Heidegger’s claim in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that “The formation of the schema is the making-sensible of concepts” (68).
30 Kant, in fact, connects monograms to Kunst, when he suggests that these are the sketches or silhouettes painters have in their heads (A57/B598).
31 I shall leave it open as to whether transcendental schemata are exclusively temporal, as Allison (2004): 217-8 suggests, or whether they can involve spatial determinations as well, see Guyer (1987): 174 and (2006): 98-9.
32 This is somewhat obscured by the fact that Kant also says that ‘the procedure of the understanding with these schemata [is what we will call] the schematism of the pure understanding’ (A140/B179). But, in the following sentence, Kant clarifies his view by saying that ‘The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination’ (A140/B179).
33 I return to the ‘aim’ of the imagination in more detail in §5b.
34 This possibility seems threatened by Kant’s discussion of determining and reflecting judgment in Section V of the First Introduction of the third Critique, where he aligns the schematic use of judgment with determining or mechanical judgment, and the technical or künstlich use of judgment with reflecting judgment (EE 20: 212-4). But it is crucial to note that in this passage, Kant is contrasting determining and reflecting forms of judgment; he is not addressing the imagination’s schematizing activities. To put the point another way, what Kant is concerned with in this passage is the way in which judgment can either proceed schematically or technically; he is not taking up how the imagination schematizes. Moreover, the imagination’s schematizing activities are, in fact, pre-conditions of proceeding schematically in judgment. For, in a determining judgment, we mechanically apply a concept to an intuition; however, in order for us to be able to apply that concept to intuitions at all, we first need a schema, which mediates between concepts and intuitions.
35 As Kant puts it, although the physician ‘understands the universal in abstracto [he] cannot distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs under it.’
36 For other instances of Kunst that involves the end-adoption condition in the first Critique, see Kant’s discussion of the argument from design (A626-7/B254-5), architectonic as the Kunst of systems (A832/B860-A835/B863), and dialectical Kunst (A61-3/B86-8, B141fn, A502/B530, A606/B634).
In claiming that there are technical imperatives that are associated with happiness, Kant, in the *First Introduction*, takes himself to be correcting his earlier position in the *Groundwork*, where he did not treat imperatives of happiness as imperatives of *Kunst*. That being said, Kant acknowledges that there is a difference between the imperatives associated with happiness and those associated with contingent ends.

This notion of constitutive ends is shaped by the account of ‘internal standards’ in Korsgaard ([1999]: Section IV); formal features of judgment and the ‘strong notion’ of form as an internal standard in Engstrom ([2009]: 98-118, 131-3); and formal principles and formal ends in Reath ([2010]: Section III and [2013]: Section I, B and III).

This is not to say that the free exercise of our capacities in an aesthetic context cannot relate to cognition at all; indeed, Kant continues in this passage by claiming that aesthetic ideas can be applied ‘subjectively, for the animation of the cognitive powers, and thus also indirectly to cognitions’ (KU 5: 317). This, I take it, leaves room on Kant’s view for aesthetic ideas to perform an, at least, indirect cognitive function, a topic I cannot pursue further here.

We find a nice example of this type of self-given norm in Ernest Hemingway’s early career. As was noted above, in his short story ‘Big Two-Hearted River’, Hemingway claims he wants to ‘do the country like Cézanne’ and his own understanding of what this amounts to constrains him in the creation and revision process. As we see in a letter to Bob McAlmon regarding the revision process, Hemingway, who had originally included a long monologue by Nick Adams, eliminates this because it does not accord with this guiding concept: ‘decided that all that mental conversation in the long fishing story is the shit and have cut it all out. I got a hell of a shock when I realized how bad it was and that shocked me back into the river again and I’ve finished it off the way it ought to have been all along’ (Hemingway (1981): 133).

To make the analogy complete, this process in genius leads ultimately to the production of a work of art, whereas this process in schematism leads ultimately to the production of either an image (in the empirical case) or a determining of time (in the transcendental case).

In *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (1990), Makkreel argues that the third *Critique* reveals the imagination plays not just a constitutive role in experience, but an interpretative one as well. Meanwhile Ginsborg in her dissertation *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition* (1990), as well as in subsequent articles (e.g., 1997) examines the contribution the third *Critique* makes to our understanding of the intersubjective nature of judgment. More recently, she (1997), along with Longuenesse (1998: Chs 6-7) and Allison (2001: Ch 1), has emphasized the role reflective judgment plays in empirical concept formation. Hughes (2007) in *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology* argues that aesthetic judgment reveals to us the subjective, synthetic activities at work in ordinary cognition. Finally, Kukla’s (2006) important volume *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy* includes a number of essays by Ginsborg, Longuenesse, Allison, Guyer, and others who examine the relationship between Kant’s aesthetic and cognitive theories in general.

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