Kunst (Art), Riß (Rift, Design), and Anschauung (Intuition) Entries
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1. Kunst, Art
According to Heidegger, in order to understand art, we cannot take our cue from the aesthetic tradition; rather, we must analyze art in terms of its relation to truth and ontology. To this end, he defines art as the historical happening of truth in which beings are unconcealed to us by means of a work of art. On his view, it is only within this framework that one can hope to give a proper account of three important aspects of art, viz., its essence, creation, and appreciation.

In addition to defending a positive account of art, Heidegger devotes much of his discussion on this topic to a critique of aesthetics. As Heidegger presents it, aesthetics is driven by the idea that subjective experience is the key to understanding what the essence, appreciation, and creation of a work of art involves:

The way in which man experiences art is supposed to inform us about its essential nature. Experience is the standard-giving source not only for the appreciation and enjoyment of art but also for its creation. Everything is experience (GA5: 67/50).

Teasing this claim out, he suggests that aesthetics takes the essence of a work of art to depend on it being an object of subjective experience: “Aesthetics treated the artwork as an object, as indeed an object of aesthetes, of sensory apprehension… [which] [t]hese days… is called an “experience”” (GA5: 67/50). Meanwhile, he maintains that aesthetics analyzes the appreciation of a work of art in terms of the feelings and experiences the object gives rise to in a subject, e.g., the feeling of pleasure, which defines beautiful art in the classic 18th century aesthetic tradition. Finally, concerning the creation of a work of art, Heidegger claims that aesthetics takes it to involve something akin to handicraft, i.e., the skilled activity through which a craftsperson takes some matter and gives it form in light of an end or purpose. Indeed, he argues that this conception of artistic creativity becomes so influential that “the conceptual pair “matter and form” came to be the really principal schema for all inquiry into art” (GA43: 99/N1 82, see also GA5: 12/9).

Heidegger raises several objections to this aesthetic approach to art. To begin, he argues that aesthetics is misguided in applying the form-matter distinction to art because this distinction is not one that “belongs, originally, to the sphere of art and the artwork,” but rather to the sphere of equipment (GA5: 12/9). Unlike equipment, which depends on our ends and purposes, he asserts that there is something about a work of art that is “self-sufficient… which has taken shape by itself and is never forced into being” and in this regard is more like another type of being, viz., a mere thing (GA5: 14/10).

Moreover, Heidegger argues that any analysis of a work of art solely in terms of its relation to subjective experience is problematic because it feeds into two worrisome tendencies that dominate the modern era, viz., subjectivism and enframing [Gestell]. Subjectivism, for Heidegger, involves the disposition to carve up the world into subjects and objects and to take the former to be the measure of the latter. Meanwhile, enframing is the more extreme form subjectivism takes in the technological era in which beings come to be defined not just in relation to the subject, but to the subject’s will. Accordingly, in enframing all beings come to be regarded as resources, the value of which we can calculate in relation to our will.

According to Heidegger, aesthetics falls under the sway of both of these tendencies. In the first place, its commitment to subjectivism is evident in the fact that it places art within the framework of subjects and objects:
[in aesthetics] [t]he artwork is posited as the “object” for a “subject”; definitive for aesthetic consideration is the subject-object relation… The work becomes an object in terms of that surface which is accessible to “lived experience” (GA43: 91/N1 78).

Furthermore, he indicates that the influence of technology and enframing is manifest in rise of the “art business” [Kunstbetriebes] and the fact that works of art come to be defined in relation to that business, e.g., as objects to be enjoyed by the connoisseur, preserved by the curator, criticized by the critic, etc. (GA5: 26/19).

Heidegger raises a number of objections against aesthetics on the basis of the tendencies towards subjectivism and enframing in it. To begin, aesthetics falls prey to Heidegger's more general objection to these tendencies, viz., that they encourage an overly anthropocentric understanding of beings. Rather than understanding beings on their own terms, according to their own essences, he objects that subjectivism and enframing erroneously lead us to define beings solely in terms of their relation to human beings. For Heidegger, then, aesthetics goes wrong insofar as it overlooks the ways in which works of art manifest something that is not entirely of human making.

Furthermore, he objects that by treating a work of art as an object of subjective experience or as a resource, aesthetics overlooks the true value of a work of art. “For us today,” he says, “the beautiful is the relaxing, what is restful, and thus intended for enjoyment. Art then belongs in the domain of the pastry chef” (GA40: 140/IM 146). However, on Heidegger's view, this misestimates the value of what a work of art as 'great art' could be:

Great art and its works are great in their historical emergence and Being because in man’s historical existence they accomplish a decisive task: they make manifest, in the way appropriate to works, what beings as a whole are…. Art and its works are necessary only as an itinerary and sojourn for man in which the truth of beings as a whole… opens itself up to him…. [A]rt is great because it is an “absolute need” (GA43: 100/84).

As this passage indicates, he thinks great art accomplishes a decisive task in history because it answers an absolute need, viz., to understand the truth of beings as a whole. However, echoing Hegel's claims about the end of art, Heidegger maintains that although there used to be great art, e.g., in Greece, “when aesthetics achieves its greatest possible height, breadth, and rigor of form, great art comes to an end” (GA43: 100/N1 84, see also GA5: 67-60/50-2). By Heidegger's lights, by approaching art from within the subjectivist and enframing perspectives, aesthetics mistakenly limits the potential of a work of art to the realm of pastry when it, in fact, once did and perhaps could once again play a decisive historical role in our understanding of the truth of beings.

On this point, Heidegger does not appear to share Hegel's conviction that great art must remain a thing of the past. Rather, he leaves open the possibility that art might one day again be great; indeed, he even indicates that art might be what saves us from the grip of technology:

Could it be that [poetic] revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power…? Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell (GA7:36/QCT 35).

At the very least, he acknowledges that art has a possibility higher than that which aesthetics accords it and leaves it open whether it can once again play a decisive role in history, revealing to us the truth of beings as they are in their own essence.

Contrary to the aesthetic tradition, Heidegger thus thinks that a proper analysis of the essence, creation, and appreciation of art is one that relies neither on the framework of subjects and objects, nor on the enframing perspective of technology and that, instead, restores the possibility that art can be great insofar as it historically reveals to us the truth of beings. Defending such an account is something that Heidegger undertakes with his first major essay on art, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (1935-6) and that he refines over the years, especially in his lectures and writing on
poetry, e.g., his lectures on Hölderlin’s ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’ (GA39, 1934-5), *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry* (GA4, 1936-68), ‘Why Poets?’ (1946), and ‘…Poetically Man Dwells…’ (1951).1

In order to develop the details of Heidegger’s account, it makes sense to start, as he does in the ‘Origin’ essay, with a discussion of the essence of art. Heidegger begins this essay by drawing a distinction between a *work of art* and *art*. Whereas a work of art is a particular type of being that we can come across in experience, e.g., a painting, he claims that art is what serves as the ‘origin’ of a work of art, i.e., the “source of its nature [*Wesen*]” (GA5: 1/1). He, in turn, defines art as “a happening of truth,” which involves “the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings” [*das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Warheit des Seienden*] (GA5: 21/16). By ‘truth’ in this context, Heidegger has in mind the Greek conception of truth as *aletheia*, which involves the “unconcealment of beings”; in which case, when truth happens in art, he thinks the truth of beings is unconcealed (GA5: 21/16).

However, as the definition of art indicates, this unconcealment is something that occurs when truth sets itself ‘*ins-Werk*’, i.e., it both actively sets itself to work and sets itself up in a work of art. Accordingly, he defines a work of art as a being in which truth happens, as beings are unconcealed to us.

In order to illustrate this definition of a work of art, in the ‘Origin’ essay Heidegger uses several examples, the two most famous of which are a painting of peasant shoes by van Gogh and a Greek temple at Paestum.2 In the case of the van Gogh shoes, Heidegger claims that the painting involves a happening of truth because it discloses to us what pertains to the essence of the shoes insofar as they are equipment, viz., ‘reliability’ (GA5: 19/14).3 Meanwhile with regards to the temple, Heidegger suggests that truth happens in it insofar as it “opens up a world while, at the same time, setting this world back onto the earth” (GA5: 28/21). ‘World’ and ‘earth’ are technical terms for Heidegger and since they play a pivotal role in his analysis of how truth happens not just in the temple, but in any work of art, they warrant closer analysis.4

In the ‘Origin’ essay, he characterizes a world as “the world of [a] historical people,” e.g., the world of ancient Greece or the Middle Ages, and he claims that it is shaped by the complex web of relations that give meaning to everything in that world (GA5: 28/21). For example, he suggests that the world of ancient Greece is determined by the “paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its destiny” (GA5: 28/21). By contrast, he describes the earth as something that arises out of itself, independently from us. Indeed, he suggests it is ‘self-closing’ and ‘self-secluding’, something that shuts itself off from human attempts to understand it (GA5: 35/26, 34/25).

Nevertheless, he also maintains that the earth serves as the secure basis out of which everything else arises; hence, the earth serves as that in which everything, including a historical human world, is grounded.

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1 For a discussion of Heidegger’s later reflections on non-poetic arts, including the abstract painting of Klee and Cézanne and east Asian art, see Young (2001): Chapter 4. See also Sharr (2007) for a discussion of Heidegger and architecture and Torsen (2014) for a discussion of Heidegger and abstract art.

2 Another important example that he mentions, but develops to a lesser extent is C.F. Meyer’s poem “The Roman Fountain.” For criticism of Heidegger’s use of examples in art merely as a means to explore his own philosophical ideas about truth and being, see Pöggler.

3 Heidegger’s analysis of the van Gogh painting was sharply criticized by the art historian Meyer Schapiro (1968, 1994) for amalgamating together several of van Gogh’s paintings of shoes together and for identifying the shoes as peasant shoes, when they are, in fact, van Gogh’s own shoes. For responses to this criticism, see Derrida (1987) who objects to both Heidegger’s anti-modern privileging of the rural and Schapiro’s privileging of the individual and Thomson (2011) who defends Heidegger’s use of the painting on phenomenological grounds.

4 There is a debate about the relative value of each of these examples for Heidegger: while Dreyfus (2005) and Young (2001) argue that the Greek temple is the most important example, Thomson (2011) claims van Gogh’s painting is the most important.
Heidegger, in turn, connects the idea of world and earth to a work of art, claiming that it is of the essence of a work of art to, one, set up a world, and, two, set forth the earth. On his view, a work sets up a world when it “opens up a world and keeps it abidingly in force” (GA5: 30/22). That is to say, the work is something that discloses and illuminates a particular historical world, e.g., van Gogh’s painting opens up the world of the peasant woman to us. Meanwhile, he claims that a work sets forth the earth because it allows it to emerge as what it is, i.e., as something self-secluding, self-closing, and not of human making. Whether we consider the earthly materials a work of art is made of, e.g., “stone, wood, metal, color, language, tone,” or the earthly setting in which a work is situated, e.g., the Greek temple standing on a rocky hillside, Heidegger claims that works of art make the earth visible to us (GA5: 31/23).

Although a work thus brings world and earth into relationship with one another, Heidegger argues that this relationship is one that involves conflict and strife. This is due to the fact that world and earth, on his view, are “essentially different”:

The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people. The earth is the unforced coming forth of the continually self-closing (GA5: 35/26).

Insofar as the world demands openness and the earth demands concealment, when they come together in a work of art, Heidegger argues that they will be in conflict with one another. Yet in spite of this conflict, he maintains that the ‘rift’ \([R/\beta]\) between the two should not be understood as a ‘cleft’ between them, but rather as a ‘design’ that binds the two together and which is, in turn, fixed in place in the ‘figure’ \([Gestalt]\) of the work of art (GA5: 51/38).

For Heidegger, then, a work of art is something that sets up a world and sets forth an earth and in so doing makes the strife and rift between the two manifest in its figure. On Heidegger’s account, recognizing these features of a work of art is crucial for understanding how truth happens in it. For he claims that,

Truth establishes itself in the work. Truth is present only as the strife between clearing and concealing in the opposition between world and earth. As this strife of world and earth, truth wills its establishment in the work (GA5: 50/37).

Heidegger’s reasoning is as follows. Although truth is something that involves the unconcealment of beings, unconcealment is something that requires concealment. Beings do not just immediately disclose themselves to us; rather, they are initially concealed from us because they either ‘refuse’ or ‘obstruct’ themselves from us, and in order for truth, i.e., unconcealment to happen, there must be a ‘clearing’ or ‘opening’ among what is concealed, which illuminates those beings (GA5: 40-1/30).

For this reason, Heidegger asserts, “truth happens as the ur-strife between clearing and concealment” (GA5: 42/32). However, given that he connects earth to what is concealing and closing and world to what opens and clears, he takes the tension between concealment and unconcealment to involve the strife between earth and world. Thus, in order for truth to happen, the world and earth must be brought into strife with one another, which is precisely what takes place in a work of art. The Greek temple, for example, can disclose the nature of the Greek world and the earth upon which it rests because it brings them out of unconcealment and makes their strife manifest.

There is, however, one further aspect of Heidegger’s account of the essence of art in the ‘Origin’ essay, which sets the scene for much of his later thought about this topic, viz., the claim that “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is, in essence, poetry \([\text{Dichtung}]\) \(^5\)

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\(^5\) There is a question as to whether Heidegger’s claim that a work sets up a world should be understood in an ontological sense, i.e., it founds a world, and/or in an epistemological sense, i.e., it reveals a world to us. See Dreyfus (1993), Young (2001): 29-34, and Richardson (2012): 294-8.
In order to clarify this idea, Heidegger draws a distinction between a narrow and broad sense of poetry: poetry in a narrow sense refers to the particular kind of linguistic work referred to as ‘poesy’, whereas poetry in the broad sense refers to the “illuminating projection of truth” (GA5: 60). Although Heidegger is aware that the latter is an unusual way to gloss what poetry is, he argues that it makes sense as long as we have “the right concept of language” (GA5: 61). Though we tend to think of language as a means of communication, he insists that there is a more primordial sense of what language is as something that “brings beings as beings, for the first time into the open”; hence, he claims that language involves a kind of “[p]rojective saying” (GA5: 61). On his view, poetry in a broad sense just is this type of projective saying that brings beings into unconcealment. So when Heidegger claims that art is poetry, he means art is poetry in the broad sense, i.e., it is something that involves projecting the strife between world and earth in such a way that allows beings to be unconcealed, hence truth to happen.

What, thus, emerges in the ‘Origin’ essay is Heidegger’s view that it is of the essence of art to be something that involves the happening of truth, i.e., poetry in the broad sense, and it is of the essence of a work of art to be a being in which truth happens.

Turning to Heidegger’s account of the creation of a work of art, in the ‘Origin’ essay he argues that instead of analyzing creation as aesthetics does in terms of the relationship between the artist and a work of art, we should instead take our cue from the essence of the work of art itself: Though the work first becomes an actual thing through the completion of creative activity and is, therefore, dependent on such activity for its reality, the essence of creation is determined by the essence of the work (GA5: 47). Given that a work of art is essentially a being in which truth happens, he claims that, “we can characterize creation as the allowing of something to come forth in what has been brought forth” (GA5: 48-9). The createdness of a work of art, thus, depends on the way in which it allows for truth to happen in it.

Although his analysis of the creation of a work of art in the ‘Origin’ essay accordingly keeps some distance from an analysis of artistic activity, this is a topic that he devotes more attention to in his writings on poetry, emphasizing the idea that the creation of a poem involves, one, receptivity, and, two, the creation of a ‘building’ in which human beings can ‘dwell’.

While Heidegger discusses poets like Rilke and Trakl, there is no poet, indeed no artist, who looms larger in Heidegger’s corpus than Hölderlin: in addition to lecturing and writing about Hölderlin’s poetry, many of Heidegger’s key philosophical ideas, like the fourfold, the flight of the gods, remembrance, the festival, etc., owe a debt to Hölderlin. When pressed to explain why Hölderlin occupies such an important place for him, Heidegger claims that what singles Hölderlin out is that he is “the poet’s poet,” i.e., a poet who uses his poetry to explore what the poetic vocation amounts to (GA4: 34).

By Heidegger’s lights, Hölderlin helps us see that contrary to the aesthetic view that analyzes artistic creativity in terms of the activity of the artist, poetic creativity is, in fact, a process in which the poet is initially receptive to beings and the work she produces is the means by which she gives what she has received. Making this point in ‘Why Poets?’, he says,

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6 Whether we can extend Heidegger’s analysis of poetic creativity to artistic creativity more generally depends upon whether one lays emphasis on his claim that all art is essentially poetry or his claim that given its connection to language, poetry is a privileged form of art: “poesy happens in language because the latter preserves the primordial essence of poetry. Building and plastic creation, on the other hand, happen, always and only, in the open of saying and naming” (GA5: 62/46). If one emphasizes the former, then it seems viable to apply the model of creation in poetry to other art-forms; but if one emphasizes the latter, then it would seem creation in poetry is distinct from what occurs in other art-forms.
Fashion means: create or retrieve [Schaffen bedeutet schöpfen]. To retrieve from a source means to take in what rises up and to bring away what has been received…. [It] manufactures nothing. It receives and gives what it has received (GA5: 298/224).

As he tends to make this point in his later philosophy, the poet should let herself be appropriated [vereignet] by an appropriative event [Ereignis]. At times, he identifies this appropriative event as the summons of language that itself speaks and of the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. However, a significant strain in his thought indicates that poets can also be receptive to issues that pertain to the modern technological era. This is the topic of 'Why Poets?', an essay that takes its cue from Hölderlin’s question, “and why poets in a desolate [dürftiger] time?” (GA5: 269/200).

Following Hölderlin, Heidegger suggests that what characterizes the modern ‘desolate time’ is the “default of God”: “a God no longer gathers men and things to himself visibly and unmistakably and from this gathering ordains world-history and man’s stay within it” (GA5: 270/200). Instead of having a God or gods to give things value, Heidegger claims that under the sway of technology, we take everything to be under the rule of the human will. Though we are desolate, Heidegger indicates that most of us are no longer able even to experience this: we tend to be so enveloped in technology that we no longer recognize that there is something lacking in the modern world. By contrast, he argues that some modern poets are sensitive to the ‘abyss’ of the modern era, as well as to the “track of the fugitive gods” (GA5: 270/200, 272/202). For this reason, he says that, “To be a poet in a desolate time means: singing, to attend to the track of the fugitive gods” (GA5: 272/202). By being responsive to and then singing about the fugitive gods, Heidegger thinks that poets can illuminate the danger of living in the era of technology.

In addition to receptivity being an important component of poetic creativity, Heidegger argues that the poet creates a space, a ‘building’, in which she allows beings to exist in accordance with their own essence. This is an idea that emerges in his discussion of the concepts ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ in his essays ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (1951) and ‘…Poetically Man Dwells…’. Heidegger draws the idea of dwelling from Hölderlin’s line, “poetically man dwells upon the earth” and he claims that dwelling constitutes the “basic character of human existence” and the “manner in which mortals are on the earth” (GA7: 191/PLT 211, GA7: 193/PLT 213, GA7: 150/PLT 146). More specifically, he says that dwelling involves ‘schenen’, which is translated as ‘to spare’ and ‘to preserve’ (GA7: 151/PLT 147). His idea is that dwelling is something that ‘leaves’ things to exist in their own nature, indeed, ‘safeguards’ and ‘protects’ them from any tendency to dominate them (GA7: 151/PLT 147). He identifies these things as the fourfold and asserts that dwelling involves the way in which we, as mortals, “preserve [schenen] the fourfold in its essential being” (GA7: 152/PLT 148). That is to say, unlike in technology when human beings assert their command over everything, in dwelling human beings allow earth, sky, divinities, and mortals to be as they are.

Though dwelling is the basic character of human existence, Heidegger maintains that, “poetry is what really lets us dwell” because it provides us with a ‘building’ in which we can dwell (GA7: 193/PLT 213). By ‘building’ in this context he does not mean a physical structure like a house, but rather a ‘location’ that both “admits the fourfold and… installs the fourfold” (GA7: 156/PLT 155). It is in this building that, he thinks, human beings can dwell because it is a space that encourages us to let beings exist in accordance with their own essence.

In sum, Heidegger views the creation of a work of art as something that involves allowing truth to happen and the poet’s (and perhaps other artist’s) contribution to this depends on her responsiveness to beings and her ability to give what she has received in the ‘building’ that is her poetry.

The final area to discuss is Heidegger’s view of the appreciation of a work of art. According to Heidegger, there are two key characteristics of our appreciation of a work of art: preservation and displacement. Although we tend to associate preservation with what a curator does, Heidegger
conceives of preservation as something that involves “allowing the work to be a work”, i.e., allowing the work to disclose beings to us in accordance with their own essence (GA5: 54/40). He claims that this sort of preservation requires a distinctive kind of willing and knowing:

Willing [in this context] is the sober resoluteness [Ent-schlossenheit] of that existential self-transcendence which exposes itself to the openness of beings as it is set into the work…. As knowing, preservation of the work is the sober standing-within the awesomeness of the truth that happens in the work (GA5: 55/41).

Thus, in order to preserve a work of art, we must both will to remain open to beings that transcend us and engage in the kind of knowing that involves standing within the truth that happens.

Moreover, when we preserve or dwell in a work in this way, Heidegger claims that the work will have a powerful effect on us, displacing us from our ordinary way of looking and things and disclosing things to us in a new light:

[the work will] carry us into the openness [of beings] and, at the same time, out of the realm of the usual. To submit to this displacement means: to transform all familiar relations to world and to earth, and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to dwell within the truth that is happening in the work (GA5: 54/40).

Far from our response to art, then, being a matter of aesthetic experience of pleasure, Heidegger suggests that when we are appropriately responsive to a work of art, we break away from what is familiar and come to dwell in the ‘extraordinary’, i.e., in the way in which truth happens in a work of art (GA5: 54/40). This, in turn, is something Heidegger thinks can be of decisive historical significance, as it answers our absolute need to understand the truth of beings.

References in Heidegger:
GA4
GA5: 1-74/1-56, 75/57, 269-320/200-241
GA12: 31-78/159-198, 79-146/1-54
GA39
GA40:140/IM 136
GA43/N1
GA52
GA53
GA75

Further Reading:


2. Riß, Rift, Design
Heidegger defines ‘Riß’ as the ‘rift’ or ‘design’ that unifies the strife between world and earth and is manifest through the figure [Gestalt] of a work of art. His analysis of Riß, in turn, plays an important role in his account of what is required in order for truth to happen in art and for a work to be created.

Heidegger discusses the notion of ‘Riß’ in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in the context of discussing the strife between world and earth. In this essay, he characterizes a world as what belongs to a historical people, e.g., the world of ancient Greece or the Middle Ages, and he claims that it is what ‘opens’ or ‘clears’ the “relations and paths” for that people, which give their lives meaning and shape their destiny (GA5: 28/21). As he makes this point, “The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people” (GA5: 35/26). By contrast, Heidegger maintains that the earth is not dependent upon us, but rather is something that arises out of itself. Indeed, he claims that it is something that is closed off to human understanding: “It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it” (GA5: 34/25). For this reason, he describes earth as something that is ‘self-closing’ and ‘self-secluding’ (GA5: 35/26, 34/25).

Given that world is what opens up a space of human meaning and earth is what closes itself off from us, Heidegger claims that the two are “essentially different”; however, he also insists that world and earth are “never separated from one another” because “[w]orld is grounded on earth, and earth rises up through world” (GA5: 35/26). In cashing out the relationship between the two, he argues that they do not relate to one another in the “empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another”; instead, they relate to one another as two opponents in a fight (GA5: 35/26). Insofar as world and earth are thus locked in a struggle, he designates the relationship between the two as one of ‘strife’ (GA5: 35/26).

Heidegger introduces the term ‘Riß’ in order to clarify what this strife involves. Riß carries the connotation of a ‘rift’ between two things; however, Heidegger claims that the rift between world and earth cannot be understood as a ‘tear’ or ‘rupture’ between the two. Instead, drawing on related terms like ‘Grundriß’, ‘Aufriß’, ‘Umriß’ (which are translated as ‘fundamental design’, ‘sketch’,
and ‘outline’, respectively), he maintains that the rift between world and earth is a ‘design’ that binds
the two together (GA5: 51/38). In his words,

The rift [Riß] carries the contestants into the source of their unity, their common ground. It
is the fundamental design [Grundriß]. It is the outline sketch [Auf-riß]. This design [Riß] does not allow the contestants to break apart. It brings the contest… into a shared outline

The Riß between world and earth is thus both a rift and a design that unifies them in their strife.

Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that the Riß is something that is “fixed in place” by means of
the ‘figure’ [Gestalt] of a work of art (GA5: 51/38). As he says in the context of discussing Dürer’s
famous remark that “art is found in nature; whoever can wrest [reißen] her has it,” “[w]rest [reißen]
means here, to bring forth the rift and to seize [reißen] it with drawing pen and drawing board” (or
presumably whatever one’s preferred media is) (GA5: 58/43). According to Heidegger, the Riß is
something that has to be brought forth in a work of art because this is what world and earth
demand: whereas world requires that the Riß is something that has to be “set forth into the open”
through some existing being, earth requires that it be “set itself back into the pull of the weight
of the stone, into the dumb hardness of the wood, into the dark glow of colors” (GA5: 51/38). On his
account, it is the figure of the work of art that accomplishes both of these things: it allows the Riß to
be set into the earth, while at the same time opening it up to us.

One of the reasons Heidegger emphasizes the idea that the Riß between world and earth is
fixed in place in the figure of a work of art is because he sees it as playing a pivotal role in the
happening of truth, which is essential for art. According to Heidegger, truth happens “as the ur-
strife between clearing and concealment” and “as the contesting of the strife between world and
earth” (GA5: 42/32, 45/33). However, he claims that in order for this happening to take place,
truth must ‘establish’ itself in the ‘open’, i.e., there must be a particular being in which truth happens:
The openness of this open, i.e., truth, can only be what it is, namely this open, when and as
long as it establishes itself in its open. In this open, therefore there must be a being in which
the openness takes its stand and achieves constancy (GA5: 48/36).

Given that the Riß between world and earth is fixed into place in the figure of a work of art,
Heidegger identifies the work of art as a being in which truth establishes itself. Hence his claim that,
“The structured rift [Riß] is the jointure of the shining of truth” (GA5: 51/38).

Heidegger, in turn, uses this analysis of the relationship between Riß, truth, and figure to
eclucidate the ‘created’ nature of a work of art. Though the createdness of a work of art is usually
analyzed just in the terms of the relationship between an artist and her work, Heidegger says that, “The
createdness of the work means: the fixing in place of truth in the figure. Figure is the structure
[Gefüge] of the rift in its self-establishment” (GA5: 51/38). For Heidegger, creation is thus a process
that involves the ‘self-establishment’ of the Riß in the figure of the work. For this reason, although
he acknowledges that the artist is required for a work to become actual, he claims that, “the essence
of creation is determined by the essence of the work” (GA5: 47/35).

References in Heidegger:
GA5: 51-3/38-40, 58/43, 60/45, 54/72
GA12: 24-9/PLT 201-6, GA12:60/183, 69/190, 185/90, 240/121

3. Anschauung, Intuition
Heidegger defines intuition in general as the seeing or apprehending of something that shows itself.
He, in turn, delineates several species of intuition: sensory intuition, which is the apprehension of a
something sensory; categorial intuition, which is the apprehension of something non-sensory; and

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Hermeneutical intuition, which is the intuition a phenomenologist should use to apprehend and interpret phenomena.

Heidegger’s analysis of intuition takes its cue from what he identifies as a dominant tradition in philosophy that privileges intuition as opposed to the intellect as the most original form of access to and knowledge we have of beings. As he characterizes this tradition in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,

from antiquity to Kant and Hegel, intuition is the ideal of knowledge, the ideal of the apprehending of beings in general, and the concept of truth in knowledge is oriented to intuition (GA24:157-8/118, see also SZ 57, 96).

He takes this commitment to the primacy of intuition to be evident, for example, in the fact that the Greeks “define the mode of access to the extant [Vorhandenen] primarily as an intuitive finding present [das anschaulende Vorfinden]” and in Kant’s claim that, “intuition is that… upon which all thought as a means is directed” (GA24: 154/109, GA3: 21/15).

However, Heidegger claims that Husserl is to be credited with refining the notion of intuition in important ways by introducing a distinction between sensory and categorial intuition. As Heidegger presents Husserl’s view in *History of the Concept of Time*, unlike most other thinkers in the tradition, Husserl recognizes that intuition is not an exclusively sensory act, but rather that intuition should be defined in a broad sense to encompass any act in which we apprehend an object, whether sensory or non-sensory. Thus, Husserl distinguishes between two different kinds of intuition: sensory intuition in which we apprehend sensory objects that are “bodily given” to us, e.g., a yellow chair, and categorial intuition in which we apprehend non-sensory or ideal objects, e.g., “allness’, ‘number’, ‘subject’, ‘predicate’, ‘state of affairs’, ‘something’” (GA20: 64/47, 80/60). Although categorial intuitions are directed towards non-sensory objects, Heidegger points out that they are nevertheless ‘founded’ in sensory intuitions, e.g., they can make a state of affairs implicit in the sensory intuition explicit or they can use the sensory intuition as a basis upon which they can see something else categorial, like an idea or species (GA20: 81/60, 84/63). Furthermore, he emphasizes that categorial intuition is not an abstract act we occasionally engage in; rather, it “is invested in the most everyday of perceptions and in every experience,” e.g., when we perceive something ‘as’ something (GA20: 64/48, 91/67).

Heidegger’s assessment of these historical approaches to intuition is two-fold. On the one hand, in *Being and Time* he is critical of the idea that intuition (or as it is sometimes translated ‘beholding’) represents our most primary and original way of accessing beings:

‘Intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological ‘intuitions of essence’ is grounded in existential understanding (SZ 147).

For Heidegger, existential understanding is the sort of ‘sight’ [Sicht] that Dasein has which “lets entities which are accessible be encountered unconcealedly by themselves” and it is what grounds our original way of accessing beings, e.g., through the circumspection [Umsicht] that gives us access to ready-to-hand beings, sollicitude [Rücksicht] that gives us access to other Dasein, and the sight that gives us access to Being as such (SZ 147, 146). By contrast, he claims that insofar as intuition involves merely “[l]ooking at something… of setting our sights towards what is present-at-hand” it is a derivative way of accessing beings (SZ 88).

On the other hand, Heidegger is more sympathetic to the idea that intuition is the foundation of the phenomenological method. To begin, he suggests that Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition is significant for three reasons. First, it reveals that there are acts in which we grasp ideal objects, which are not “constructs of… the subject” (GA20: 97/71). Second, it “paves

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7 See GA3 and GA24 for Heidegger’s extended interpretation of Kant’s theory of intuition
the way for a genuine form of research,” viz., phenomenological research in which we elucidate the ‘structures’ of these ideal (‘apriori’) objects (GA20: 98/72). Third, insofar as it encourages us to “broaden the idea of objectivity,” it helps us recognize that phenomenology is a form of ontology (GA20: 98/72). For Heidegger, then, Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition serves as an important precursor for his own conception of phenomenology as a form of research in which we investigate ontological structures that show themselves to us.

However, Heidegger rejects Husserl’s claim that phenomenology involves categorial intuition defined as the “analytic description of intentionality in its apriori” (GA20: 108/79). On Heidegger’s view, phenomenological research should not be concerned primarily with intentionality, but rather with the question of the meaning of being. For this reason, he argues that the sort of description phenomenology involves should be hermeneutical, i.e., it should involve “interpretation… through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein possess, are made known to Dasein’s understanding of being” (SZ 37, see also GA20: 190/140). Thus, for Heidegger, the sort of seeing that the phenomenological method rests upon is hermeneutical in nature. Though he does not use the phrase in Being and Time, this sort of seeing is what he calls ‘hermeneutical intuition’ in his early lectures:

The empowering experience of experience that takes itself along is the understanding [verstehende], the hermeneutical intuition, the originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of concepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed all transcendental positing falls out (GA 56/57: 117).

Hermeneutical intuition is, thus, something that apprehends experience in meaningful ways prior to theoretical objectification. On Heidegger’s view, this can be of value to phenomenology insofar as it allows one both to see phenomena as they show themselves and to interpret those phenomena according to what they mean.

References in Heidegger
GA3, GA 25
GA 5: 305/228
GA20: 63-103/47-75, 107/78, 109/80, 130/95
GA56/55: 117