Built in Obsolescence: The Coming End to the Abortion Debate

Vernellia R. Randall and Tshaka C. Randall

Abstract

The current legal and political dispute is grounded in the misconception that the decision to have an abortion is one decision, a decision to terminate a fetus. In fact, in choosing an abortion, a woman is actually making two distinct choices: first, she is choosing to terminate her pregnancy, that is, remove the fetus from her body; and, second, she is choosing to terminate the fetus. Currently, a woman's decision to remove the fetus from her body (the "autonomy decision") is necessarily a medical decision to terminate the fetus (the "reproductive decision"). The current argument in favor of legalized abortion assumes that the woman's autonomy interest is inseparable from the reproductive decision. Over time, medicine will develop to the point where the decisions can be made separately with a live birth of a fetus creating no more risk to the woman than an ordinary abortion. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence offers no legal reason for a woman's interests to be given primacy in the reproductive choice over the reproductive interest of a man or the state. For more than thirty years, one side of the abortion debate has argued about a right to life while the other side has argued about right to autonomy. The changing medical technology will allow the law to satisfy both sides. In the future, the law will be able to allow a woman to choose early in the pregnancy not to carry to term while making it illegal to terminate the life of a fetus; a change that will have significant consequences for all parties involved: women, men and the state.

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2 Professor of Law, University of Dayton; BSN University of Texas, Austin, TX (1972); MSN University of Washington, Seattle, WA (1978); JD Northwestern School of Law Lewis and Clark College, Portland, OR (1987).
3 Assistant Professor of Law, Florida A&M University; BS University of Dayton, Dayton, OH (1994); MA University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (1996); JD University of Pennsylvania School of Law, Philadelphia, PA (2002).
Introduction

Opponents of unfettered access to abortion argue that the fetus enjoys, from the moment of its conception, the same inalienable "right to life" that any other human enjoys. Advocates of unfettered access to abortion argue that the right to an abortion is protected by the Constitution and based on a woman's right to privacy. This argument has played out repeatedly in the courts since Roe v. Wade and was repeated most recently when the Supreme Court considered a state ban on "partial birth" abortions. Amazingly, advocates on both sides have missed the true significance of "partial birth" abortion; that is, partial-birth abortion is an example of the built-in obsolescence of the controversy over abortion, and foreshadows the end of the abortion debate. Both sides of the debate have all but ignored the impact of changing medical technology on the debate as it is currently framed, and, by extension, on reproductive rights.

The current legal and political dispute is grounded in the misconception that the decision to have an abortion is one decision, a decision to terminate a fetus. In fact, in choosing an abortion, a woman is actually making two distinct choices: first, she is choosing to terminate her pregnancy, that is, remove the fetus from her body; and, second, she is choosing to terminate the fetus. Currently, a woman's decision to remove the fetus from her body (the "autonomy decision") is necessarily a medical decision to terminate the fetus (the "reproductive decision"). The current argument in favor of legalized abortion assumes that the woman's autonomy interest is inseparable from the reproductive decision. However, as Laurence Tribe noted in 1973:

Once the fetus can be severed from the [womb] by a process which enables it to survive, leaving the abortion decision to private choice would confer not only a right to remove an unwanted fetus from one's body but also an entirely separate right to ensure its death.7

4 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding Texas criminal abortion statutes prohibiting abortions are unconstitutional).
6 While the establishment of personhood for the fetus has been argued among portions of the public and constitutional law scholars (see e.g., Abortion Rights and Fetal 'Personhood' 112 (Edd Doerr & James W. Prescott eds., 2d ed. 1990)), it has not been a part of the Court's jurisprudence on the issue of abortion (see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1972) (holding that a fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment)). We have therefore chosen not to enter this contentious debate as any discussion of it on our part would merely distract from our thesis.
7 Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1973) (discussing the effect of using the extrinsic
Currently, the first decision inevitably leads to the second, however, changing medical technology ensures that this will not always be the case. Over time, medicine will develop to the point where the decisions can be made separately with a live birth of a fetus creating no more risk to the woman than an ordinary abortion. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence offers no legal reason for a woman’s interests to be given primacy in the reproductive choice. For more than thirty years, one side of the abortion debate has argued about a right to life while the other side has argued about right to autonomy. Changing medical technology will allow the law to satisfy both sides. In the future, the law will be able to allow a woman to choose not to carry to term while making it illegal to terminate the life of a fetus.

Legal Framework of the Abortion Debate

In the nineteen sixties, Texas law criminalized all abortions except those undertaken on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. In the early part of 1970 a single pregnant woman, who at the time wished to remain anonymous, challenged the constitutionality of the Texas criminal laws. A three judge District Court panel declared the Texas laws violated the woman’s Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court, in 1973, affirmed, in relevant part, the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade had three central parts. The Court affirmed: (1) a woman’s right to choose an abortion without undue influence from the state in the first two trimesters; (2) the state’s power to restrict abortions in the third trimester; and, (3) the state’s interest in the woman’s health and the potential life of the fetus (criterion of viability instead of intertwining religion with politics as argument in favor of legalized abortions).

8 See infra notes 29 through 44 and accompanying text. For more than thirty years, one side of the abortion debate has argued about a right to life while the other side has argued about right to autonomy. See generally Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971), reprinted in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 69-80 (Ronald Munson ed., Wadsworth 5th ed. 1996); Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183 (1989).

9 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-118.

10 Id. at 120. Roe argued that the Texas statutes violated her privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments and were unconstitutionally vague. Id.

11 Id. at 121-22. (specifically, “the 'fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose where to have children.””) The District Court also declared the Texas statutes void because they were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 122.

12 Id. at 164-67. The Supreme Court concluded that because the statutes were overly broad by not distinguishing abortions in different trimesters it did not need to address the issue of vagueness. Id. at 164.
fetus.13 The Court’s decision was grounded in a right to privacy implicit in the Constitution.14 Roe was not the final word on abortion, and since that decision the Court has been asked to address the issue on several occasions. Shortly after Roe, the Court reaffirmed and refined its decision.

In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,15 the Supreme Court struck down a spousal notification provision that required a woman seeking an abortion to notify her spouse before an abortion could be performed in the first twelve weeks of a pregnancy.16 In its holding, the Court reasoned that a state could not “delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.”17 Since the state could not regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, it could not delegate authority to any particular person to prevent abortion during that same period.18 Danforth is as informative for what it does not say, as for what it does. The Court’s analysis in Danforth focused on a question of timing as much as anything else. The Danforth decision struck down a state law that regulated abortion pre-viability, and did so because the state had no authority to regulate abortion during that period.19 Implicit in Danforth is the understanding that the state may delegate its authority post-viability and may consider the father’s reproductive interests.20

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,21 the Supreme Court

13 Id. at 164-65. The Court’s holding is based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The Court also noted that while the right to privacy covers abortions, it is not absolute and the state interests prevail at some point. Id.
16 Id. at 52.
17 Id. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)) (holding Missouri abortion statute valid in all respects except a provision prescribing method of care for protection of fetus).
18 Id. The Court recognized the impact of the decision to have an abortion on a marriage, but clarified that the right to privacy is an individual right. Id. at 70.
19 Id. at 69. At issue was a provision that required a spouse’s consent before an abortion could be performed during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. The Court said that “[c]learly, since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period.” Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 at 69.
20 In Danforth, the Court did not hold that the state could not delegate its authority in the manner it had, nor consider the interests of the prospective father; rather, the Court grounded its authority in the fact that, pre-viability, the state had no authority to delegate. Id.
again reaffirmed its decisions in *Roe* and *Danforth*. The Court additionally refined its jurisprudence regarding abortion. In *Roe* and *Danforth*, the Court discussed fetal viability without clearly defining it, instead discussing a trimester framework that relied on what was the then state of medicine which acknowledged that a fetus was viable after two trimesters of gestation. The Court departed from that definition, defining viability generally as, that time when the fetus was “potentially able to live outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid.” By defining viability in this way, *Casey* allows for the use of technology in radically shrinking pre-viability.

The Court's jurisprudence on abortion makes at least one concept clear, that while a woman's interest in terminating an unwanted pregnancy is given primacy pre-viability, the state’s interest is paramount post-viability. This concept was never clearer than in the Court's 2007 ruling in *Gonzales v. Carhart*. In *Carhart*, the Court upheld a state's ban on a late-term abortion procedure, reiterating the pre- and post-viability distinction. This distinction raises serious concerns regarding the future of reproductive rights.

The Impact of Medical Technology

Each day brings medical advances that blur the bright line third trimester rule of *Roe v. Wade* and turns back the viability clock established in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*. To start, there is a significant difference in the survival rate of premature infants now compared to the early nineteen seventies when *Roe* was decided. At the time of *Roe v. Wade*, fetuses/infants born before twenty-four weeks had very little chance of survival. By 1989, the age at which a fetus could be expected to have a reasonable chance of survival had moved below twenty-four weeks. Today, over fifty percent of those

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22 *Id.* at 833 (affirming woman’s right to choose abortion before fetal viability).
23 *Id.* at 872. (discussing *Roe*); see also, *Danforth*, 428 U.S. at 61 (referencing *Roe’s* discussion of “viability” as occurring sometime in the third trimester).
25 *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 860. The court notices that medical advancements may alter time of fetal viability, but recognizes that viability remains a critical fact. *Id.*
27 *Id.* at 1626-27. The Court noted that while the statute was constitutional as applied in most situations, specific challenges might be entertained. *Id.* at 1639.
28 *Roe*, 410 U.S. at 160 (stating viability is usually placed at seven months, but can be as early as twenty-four weeks).
29 *See generally* DONALD D. MCINTIRE & KENNETH J. LEVENO, NEONATAL MORTALITY AND
Medical technology has always had a significant impact on the survival rates of preterm infants. For instance, the development of antibiotics and blood transfusions, advances in the prenatal and neonatal technology, increased understanding of the physiology and pathology of the newborns, and the development of the subspecialty in pediatrics of neonatologist significantly increased the survival rates of preterm infants.

Perhaps the most significant development in the survival of preterm infants has been the medical specialty neonatologist and neonatal intensive care unit. Neonatal intensive care units developed in the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties provide specialized care of ill or premature infants. They provide better temperature support, isolation from infection risk, specialized feeding, respiratory support and access to specialized...

MORBIDITY RATES IN LATE PRETERM BIRTHS COMPARED WITH BIRTHS AT TERM. DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER, DALLAS, TEXAS 75235-9032, USA.; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 490-91 (1989). Plaintiffs brought class action challenging the constitutionality of a Missouri statute which set forth in part: (1) that the life of each human being begins at conception, (2) that a physician, prior to performing an abortion on any woman whom he has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks pregnant, must ascertain whether the fetus is viable by performing medical tests to determine the fetus' gestational age, weight and lung maturity. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205(1), (2) (1986).


physicians, equipment and resources. Over the next ten to twenty years, premature infants will survive at increasingly younger development and at an increasingly higher rate.

In addition, during the next twenty years it is predicted that an artificial womb capable of sustaining a fetus to term will become reality. There are many potential uses for an artificial womb including providing a drug/alcohol free environment during gestation; turning multiple pregnancies from fertility treatment to a single pregnancy; as an alternative to human surrogacy and, of course, as an alternative to fetal termination.

Professor Hung-Ching Liu, the director of the Reproductive Endocrine Laboratory at Cornell University’s Center for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility in Manhattan, has already developed an artificial womb and brought rodents to term in the artificial womb. This is significant because rodents’ reproductive processes are very similar to those of humans. Similarly, Dr. Yoshinori Kuwabara, a Japanese Professor of Obstetrics at Juntendo University, delivered goats from an artificial womb after just three weeks of gestation. In fact, researchers believe that they will have a functional

33 Id. at 7-8.
34 See generally, J. Bion, Rationing Intensive Care: Preventing Critical Illness is Better, & Cheaper, Than Cure, 310 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 682, 682-83 (1995). Neonatal intensive care is a scarce and expensive resource which is often successful in the short term in that it prevents immediate death, only for the infant to die some months or years later. Id.
37 Reynolds, supra note 26 (discussing Professor Liu’s experiment growing a rodent fetus); See generally Hyun Jee Son, Student Scholarship, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling Viability’s Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 213 (2005).
38 See generally Reynolds, supra note 26 (discussing Professor Liu’s experiment growing a rodent fetus).
Scientists are now developing the artificial womb for use in cases where the woman is ill and can no longer carry the fetus, or where the fetus is ill and needs to be removed from the woman’s womb and cared for where it can be easily monitored. While the development of the artificial womb has focused on the health of mother and child, there is no reason an artificial womb could not be used to bring a child to term in cases where a woman wants to terminate her pregnancy and the father (or the state) wants the infant born alive. Artificial wombs may make it possible that viability will occur near the moment of conception. If a safe transfer technique is developed then even an “embryo [could] gestate to full term outside the mother’s womb and inside a separate and discrete man-made womb.” Finally, an artificial womb might not be required if scientists can develop a technique for transplanting a fetus from a birth mother to a surrogate.

Regardless of the final form it will take, developing neonatal technology including artificial wombs makes it inevitable that the fetal termination decision will be separated from the fetal extraction decision; late-term abortion is an example of this coming dilemma.

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40 Reynolds, supra note 26, (discussing Professor Liu’s experiment growing a rodent fetus).
41 Reynolds, supra note 26, (discussing Professor Liu’s experiment growing a rodent fetus); Son, supra note 28.
42 Son, supra note 28, at 214.
43 See generally, LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF THE ABSOLUTES 220 (W. W. Norton & Company 1992) (noting the types of technology that were pondered included a wide array of possibilities such as the “artificial womb or placenta” or even the technology to allow men to become “pregnant”); Ken Martyn, Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1194 (1982) (arguing that artificial womb technology shows a need to refocus viability away from technological advancements to the more fruitful question of when human life begins); Michael Buckley, Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (1982) (discussing the need for the Court to clarify between the right to terminate a pregnancy with the right to destroy an embryo); Mark A. Goldstein, Note, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 882 (1978) (arguing the artificial womb technology shows that a “state may proscribe first trimester feticide abortions as long as none of the woman’s fundamental rights are infringed”).
Late-Term Abortions as a Current Example

The debate over late-term abortions provides a current context demonstrating the coming dilemma. Late-term abortions are generally defined as abortions that occur at a state of fetal development that would give the fetus a high probability of survival if born alive. Using that definition, late-term abortions exclude all first-trimester abortions; include all third-trimester abortions; and include some second-trimester abortions and exclude others. Late-term abortions are seen as necessary when fetuses are discovered to have congenital defects or to save the life of the mother. Only a fraction of late-term abortions performed, however, are done for fetal anomalies or to save the life of the mother; many are done for non-medical, elective reasons.


See Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Fetal development: What happens during the second trimester? (July 25, 2007), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/prenatal-care/PR00112/METHOD=print (noting first trimester is generally considered between conception through twelve weeks).

See Mayo Foundation, supra note 45 (noting third trimester is generally considered pregnancy from twenty-eight weeks to birth).

See Mayo Foundation, supra note 45 (noting second trimester is generally considered pregnancy from thirteen weeks to twenty-seven weeks).


Byron C. Calhoun, James S. Reitman & Nathan J. Hoeldtke, Perinatal Hospice: A Response to Partial Birth Abortion for Infants with Congenital Defects, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 125, 126 (1997) (noting that late-term abortions should not be performed if there is realization of a future for the child); Diane M. Gianelli, Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to 'Half Truths', 40 AM. MED. NEWS 3, 3, Mar. 3, 1997 (abortion rights activist calling for more truthful debate regarding late-term abortions).

See Center for Disease Control, Birth Defects, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/bd/default.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). Congenital defects severe enough to cause death still affect approximately twenty percent of all live births. Id; Joan Callahan, Ensuring a Stillborn: The Ethics of Fetal Lethal Injection in Late Abortion, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 254, 258-60 (1995). Late-term abortions are intended to ensure that fetuses with severe congenital defects will not be born alive, to avoid prolonged suffering at birth when law and society recognize and protect the infant as a person. Id.

Curtis R. Cook, Testimony of Dr. Curtis R. Cook, M.D. Specialist in Maternal-Fetal Medicine (Perinatologist) Butterworth Hospital, Grand Rapids, Michigan Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology Associate Director, Maternal-Fetal Medicine Assistant Residency Program Director at a Joint Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and the Constitution Subcommittee of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee March 11, 1997, 14 ISS. L. & MED. 65, 66 (1998) (offering testimony in support of the ban on partial-birth abortion).
Of the estimated 30,000 late-term abortions performed each year, as many as eighty percent of these may be 'elective,' that is, the vast majority of these late-term abortions are performed in the twenty-plus week range on healthy fetuses and physically healthy mothers. Even where the pregnancy poses a threat to the woman's life at gestational stages when late-term abortions are typically performed, immediate delivery of the fetus with vigorous supportive care would result in survival of many fetuses. Whatever the reasons that prompt them, late-term abortions are intended to ensure that an unwanted fetus/infant is not born alive. Because of the size of the fetus, more common abortion techniques such as "suction curettage" are unsuitable in late-term procedures. More common late-term procedures include amino infusion and "dilation and extraction." However, some of these procedures have resulted in

53 Id. In their writings Dr. Haskell and Dr. McMahon discussed the numbers of partial-birth abortions attributed to infants with defects or maternal health. Id. at 17-18.
57 With amino infusion (or induction), the physician injects a solution of either saline or urea into the amniotic cavity of the uterus. After the fetus dies from the solution, labor is induced and the fetus is delivered dead. See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 516-17 (D. Neb. 1997); Michael F. Greene & Jeffrey L. Ecker, Abortion, Health, and the Law, 350 NEW ENG J. MED. 184 (Jan. 2004); Massie, supra note 47; Tomoko I. Hooper, Roy G. Smith & Ronald J. Pion, Saline Abortion: A Review of the Experience at Kapiolani Hospital, 32 HAW. MED. J. 222, 222 (Jul.-Aug. 1973) (examining the risks of mid trimester abortion using intraamniotic instillation of hypertonic saline).
58 Dilation and extraction involves dilation of the cervix and extraction of the uterine contents,
some undesired live births or serious complications. All "late-term" methods have the following in common: they require that a doctor induce labor to dilate the cervix, and terminate the fetus before delivery. Another procedure, "Dilation and Extraction" (D&X) or partial-birth abortion was specifically developed in response to the live birth problem. D&X involves inducing labor, rotating the fetus so that the feet and legs deliver first and causing the death of the fetus before its head can be born. Thus, because labor is induced and the fetus is "born," a D&X or "partial-birth abortion" involves no more physical risk to the woman than if she decided to have the fetus born alive. This technique is used when the fetus/infant is too large for an abortion by dilation and evacuation and to assure that there is not a failed abortion and the fetus/infant is born alive.

the fetus, by surgical means. See generally Philip D. Darney, Elizabeth Atkinson & Kimi Hirabayashi, Uterine Perforation During Second-Trimester Abortion by Cervical Dilation and Instrumental Extraction: A Review of 15 Cases, 75 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 441 (1990) (reviewing the frequency and cause of uterine perforation during second trimester abortion by dilation and extraction).

59 See e.g., Michele Kurs Frishman, Wisconsin Act 110: When an Infant Survives an Abortion, 20 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 101, 101 (2005) (noting that the use of urea, inducing labor, or performing a hysterotomy or hysterectomy during late-term abortions may result in live birth); George Stroh & Alan R. Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL 83, 83 (1976).


61 The use of the term "Dilation and extraction" appeared as a response to the description of the procedure as a "partial-birth" abortion.

62 However, the term "partial-birth abortion" is a political term and not a medical term; medical professionals have referred to partial-birth abortion as: dilation and extraction, ("intact D&X"); intact dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E"); or modified dilation and evacuation, ("modified D&E"). Massie, supra note 47, at 313; American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Statement of Policy, Statement of Intact Dilatation and Extraction (January 12, 1997) (noting that "partial-birth abortion" is not a medical term and electing to use the term "Intact Dilation & Extraction" (Intact D&X)). Nancy Romer, The Medical Facts of Partial Birth Abortion, 3 NEXUS 57, 58 (1998) (describing intact D&X in lay terms).

63 MASSIE, supra note 47, at 311. Jill Stanek, a registered nurse, testified to her experience of following a failed abortion procedure. She described holding the child in her arms and waiting forty-five minutes for it to die. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act: Hearing on the Born Alive Infants Protection Act, H.R. 4292 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 41 (2000) (Testimony of Jill Stanek, R.N.); Kathleen M. Casagrande, Children Not Meant to Be: Protecting the Interests of the Child When Abortion Results in Live Birth, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 19, 33 (2002) (describing process of physician's inserting chemical poison to ensure that the fetus is not born alive); Cf. Roger Byron, Children of a Lesser Law: The Failure of The Born-alive Infants Protection Act and a Plan for its Redemption, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 275, 285 (2006-2007) (noting that a child marked for abortion that emerges from the womb alive may still be treated as if they did not exist and thus have no rights under the law); Hilary White, Baby Girl Born Alive and Killed After
In *Gonzalez v. Carhart*, the Court focused on which procedure a state might legally ban, however, in line with the Court’s previous rulings, a state might legally ban all late-term abortions that resulted in a dead fetus. The American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG) found no circumstances where D&X would be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of the woman. Because labor is induced and the fetus/infant is “born,” a D&X or “partial-birth abortion” involves no more physical risk to the woman than if she decided to have the fetus/infant born alive. There is, of course, some danger to the fetus/infant of a pre-term delivery. At less than twenty-four weeks, fetal/infant survival is about thirty percent, between twenty-four and twenty-six weeks gestation fetal/infant survival is between fifty and seventy-five percent.


64 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).

65 See 127 S.Ct. at 1627 (examining the Partial Birth Abortion Act’s purpose and scope).

66 American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, *Statement of Policy, Abortion* (1997); Cf., MASSIE, supra note 47, at 305.


“Before performing the actual delivery, there is a two day period of cervical dilation that involves forcing up to twenty-five dilators into the cervix at one time. This can cause great cramping and nausea for the women, who are then sent to their home or to a hotel room overnight while their cervix dilates. After returning to the clinic, their bag of water is broken, the baby is forced into a feet first position by grasping the legs and pulling it down through the cervix and into the vagina. This form of internal rotation, or version, is a technique largely abandoned in modern obstetrics because of the unacceptable risk associated with it. These techniques place the women at greater risk for both immediate (bleeding) and delayed (infection) complications. In fact, there may also be longer repercussions of cervical manipulation leading to an inherent weakness of the cervix and the inability to carry pregnancies to term.”

Id.

68 ROMER, supra note 52 at 60.
The problem with the intact D&E/partial-birth abortion debate specifically, and the abortion debate in general, is that it is based on the false presumption that the full authority on whether to reproduce is housed solely in the woman. Thus, partial-birth abortion allows the woman to make both the decision to remove the fetus/infant from her body and the decision to kill the fetus/infant. While commentators argue that intact D&E/partial-birth abortion are the lesser of several evils because they are substantially safer for the mother than the other leading methods of late-term abortion, they make no assertion about the comparative safety between intact D&E/partial-birth abortion and giving birth to a live fetus/infant. In fact, they cannot make that assertion; intact D&E/partial-birth abortion carries inherent health risks more significant than childbirth. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, the state law banned a particular procedure, when the state might have just as easily, and more successfully, chosen to ban all post-viability procedures that result in a terminated fetus.

The Future of Reproductive Rights

There are more interests at stake in the abortion decision than those of the pregnant woman. The government has a legitimate interest in protecting both the unborn child and the health of the mother, and the father of the child has a personal interest in the pregnant woman’s decision. Thus, unlike the condition of being pregnant, the “right” to have an abortion is not a fact that is specific to one gender. Instead, it is a legal right as to which the law can properly assign different interests to various parties.

Over the last thirty years, the abortion debate has focused on the tension between a woman’s right to choose an abortion without undue interference from the

69 Cf. Calhoun et al., supra note 40 at 138 (arguing that the “real problem with partial-birth abortion is that it is based on the false presumption that parents have the capacity and full authority to determine which infants shall live, how long, and with what ‘quality of life.’”).

70 Better Late Than Never, 214 The New Republic 8, 8 (1996); Cook, supra note 56 at 67 (asserting there are and always have been safer techniques for partial-birth abortion).

71 Cf. Cook, supra note 56.

72 Romer, supra note 57 at 61. The artificial dilation of the cervix may result in cervical incompetence and complications during future pregnancy. Id. Women can have problems in future pregnancies if the cervix opens spontaneously and the fetus/infant is delivered prematurely. Id. Furthermore, turning the fetus/infant into the feet first position requires use of instruments inside the woman’s uterus and can result in injury to the uterus, maternal hemorrhaging, and infection. Id.


state and the state’s interest in the life of the fetus and the health of the mother, however, the reproductive decision, in truth, involves three parties with sometimes competing interests: the woman’s interest, the man’s interest and the state’s interest. A woman’s right to abortion has been anchored in her right to privacy and her interests in individual autonomy. Specifically, a woman has the right to control what happens to her body (autonomy) which leads to the right to decide whether or not to reproduce. That is, under the current law, once pregnant, a woman can decide to terminate the fetus or give birth.

Theoretically, a man’s interests in the abortion decision are similar to the woman’s—a right to privacy, autonomy and reproductive rights. Because men have no autonomy interest in the abortion decision, their reproductive interest has been limited because of the primacy given to the woman’s autonomy interest. Even though a man may not want to reproduce he cannot force a woman to have an abortion; by the same token, a man who wants to reproduce cannot stop a woman from having an abortion.

The state has an interest in protecting potential life throughout the pregnancy. However, the current balancing of the state’s interest versus the woman’s interest is centered on viability. The state has little ability to protect the life of fetus if it is not viable. Essentially, pre-viability, the woman’s interest in autonomy and right to control her body trumps the state interest in the potential life of the fetus. However, once the fetus is viable, the state can protect the potential life by outlawing abortion in all cases except for when the health of the woman is at stake. As has been discussed, changing medical technology will have a significant impact on how the courts view the primacy of the state and the woman’s interest. In addition, the same changes in technology will impact the balance between the woman and the man’s interests.

Currently, the constitutional basis for the right to choose an abortion is grounded in the woman’s autonomy interest, an interest that does not necessarily implicate reproductive rights. As Tribe observed, the abortion decision involves two separate medical decisions: the decision to remove the fetus from the woman’s body (Fetal Extraction) and the decision to kill the fetus (Fetal Termination). While, historically, and currently during most stages of pregnancy, the first decision inevitably

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76 TRIBE, supra note 6.
leads to the second, changing medical technology ensures that this will not always be the case. Over time, medicine will develop to the point where, the decisions can be made separately with a live birth of a fetus creating no more risk to the woman than an ordinary abortion. Under those circumstances, there is no legal reason that a woman’s interests should be given primacy in the reproductive choice. Taking into consideration the changing technology, the reproductive interest could be balanced as a private decision between a man and woman based on their potential responses to the pregnancy. It is also possible that the state’s interest in the potential life of the fetus might be exercised in a way that makes all abortions illegal and provides recognition of men’s reproductive interest.

Up until this point, a woman’s reproductive interest has consistently prevailed over the man’s, not because the law gave greater protection to the woman’s reproductive interest, but because the woman’s autonomy interest gave her decisions regarding reproduction primacy. In fact, it is a fair statement to assert that courts and legislatures have generally not recognized any reproductive interest of men and only indirectly recognized the reproductive interest of women. In the future, the courts and legislatures will have to address directly reproductive rights. Whose reproductive interest will prevail may depend on whether there is reproductive conflict and whether there are viability concerns. Where there is reproductive conflict, the legislatures will most likely give priority to the person who wants life, however, that priority for the man will only occur if the conflict arises post-viability.

If both the woman and man want to reproduce (or do not care), there is no reproductive conflict. In this situation there are no viability concerns and no reason for the state to assert its interest, thus both parties’ reproductive interest prevails and the result will be pregnancy and live birth. If the woman wants to reproduce and the man does not, there is a reproductive conflict, and because the woman wants life there are no viability concerns. Thus, the woman’s reproductive interest prevails and the result will be pregnancy and live birth. If the woman does not want to reproduce and the man wants to reproduce, there is reproductive conflict and there are viability concerns. In this situation, a man’s reproductive interest will prevail, but only if the decision is post-viability. If the decision is post-viability, then the man’s reproductive interest prevails, and there will be fetal extraction and not fetal termination, however, if the decision is made pre-viability, then the woman’s reproductive interest prevails, and fetal termination will occur.77 If both the woman and man do not want to reproduce (or do not care),

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77 At least one commenter has asked whether requiring a woman to wait until viability to exercise her autonomy interest might be constitutionally permissible. Bruce Ching, Inverting the Viability
there is no reproductive conflict. In this situation, there are no viability concerns, thus both parties reproductive interest might prevail and the result would be fetal termination. However, it is possible that some states will exercise their interest in life and ban all fetal terminations. In this case a woman would be able to exercise her autonomy interest by having fetal extraction, but would not be allowed to choose fetal termination. In such a case, neither party's reproductive interest prevails. See Figure 1.

Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Woman's Desire</th>
<th>Man's Desire</th>
<th>Reproductive Conflict</th>
<th>Viability Concerns</th>
<th>Prevailing Reproductive Interest</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman wants to reproduce or does not care</td>
<td>Man wants to reproduce or does not care</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Both Parties Reproductive Interest prevails</td>
<td>Pregnancy and live birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman wants to reproduce</td>
<td>Man does not want to reproduce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Woman's Reproductive Interest prevails</td>
<td>Pregnancy and live birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman does not want to reproduce</td>
<td>Man wants to reproduce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, decision is pre-viability</td>
<td>Woman's Reproductive Interest prevails</td>
<td>Fetal Termination (fetal death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, decision is post-viability</td>
<td>Man's Reproductive Interest prevails</td>
<td>Fetal Extraction (live birth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman does not want to reproduce or does not care</td>
<td>Man does not want to reproduce or does not care</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Both parties Reproductive Interest prevails</td>
<td>Fetal Termination (death of fetus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, Must be post-viability</td>
<td>Neither parties Reproductive Interest prevails; State's interest prevails</td>
<td>Fetal Extraction (live birth)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test for Abortion Law, 22 Women's RTS. L. REP. 37, 44-45 (2000).
Regardless of the approach adopted by states, there will be collateral consequences which will need to be addressed in subsequent research. In this section, it is only our intention to point out some of the potential consequences. If changing medical technology results in the recognition of men's reproductive interest this would essentially be an equalization of reproductive rights and responsibilities. This equalization of gender rights does not necessarily mean this change would be entirely equitable in result.

The social impact of being able to extract the fetus from the woman's uterus will be significant. Both states and fathers could exercise their interest in having a live fetus. States could require all women to have fetal extraction. This would place a significant financial and emotional burden on men and women who do not want children. Men who did not want to reproduce have always borne this burden when a woman decided to carry the fetus to term, however, the number of men who will be required to reproduce will increase substantially. For women, the burden of having a child they did not want is one that many women have not had to bear since the legalization of abortion. If a state was to choose to require fetal extraction in all feasible cases, it could have a disproportionately negative impact on poor women and women of color. Poor women may be forced to have children they cannot afford. While this is no different from the situation for poor men, poor women are not in the same place as poor men. Women earn less and where children are involved, women are more likely to be the primary caregiver. As a result of women's financial status the new

78 Cf., Audrey Rowe, The Feminization of Poverty: An Issue for the 90's, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 73, 75-77 (1991); But cf., Athena Mutua, Why Retire the Feminization of Poverty Construct?, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2001) (arguing the construct that poor women are worse off than poor men should no longer be used).

79 See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Sex Discrimination in the Labor Market, 2(4) FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 1, 80 (2006). "Women earn less than men, and no matter how extensively regressions control for market characteristics, working conditions, individual characteristics, children, housework time, and observed productivity, an unexplained gender pay gap remains for all but the most inexperienced of workers." Id. "If the unexplained pay disparity sometimes favored women and sometimes favored men there would be no reason for concern. . . But systematically and without exception finding that women earn less than men raises some questions. . . [I]t is hard to continue to attribute the remaining disparity to unmeasurables and intangibles like effort and motivation and to ignore the possibility that discrimination remains a factor in the gender pay disparity." Id.

reproductive reality may cause more illegal terminations, however, it may also increase interest in pregnancy prevention and early stage abortion before fetal extraction is a viable alternative, and advances in technology could eventually make extraction a viable alternative even for embryos.

If extraction is required by the state and neither the woman nor the man wants to exercise their reproductive rights, we may see the establishment of fetal adoptions. If the extracted fetuses are placed for fetal adoption there will be an increase in the already high number of unadoptable minority and disabled babies, particularly black babies. This may result in a significant portion of a generation being raised as wards of the state.

Finally, even though men and women may relinquish their parental rights to the state, because of the significant financial burden on the state resulting from such a decision, states may take physical custody of the extracted baby but require both parents to continue to provide financial support; again, placing an inequitable burden on those least able to afford it. Thus, while abortion as we understand it might be radically altered because of the new reproductive rights reality, gender, class and race issues will persist and in many instances may worsen.

Conclusion

Technology is changing in ways that will have a significant impact on the current abortion debate, and our understanding of reproductive rights. There are three potential state responses to this changing medical technology. First, states may outlaw abortion and force women to use an artificial womb and/or fetal adoption.

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82 See, MINN. STAT. § 145.415 (1974), amended by MINN. LAWS ch. 159, § 26 (1999) (making a child born alive after an attempted abortion a ward of the state unless either parent asserts parental rights within 30 days).

83 Cf. Jee Son, supra, note 26 at 213 (citing Sacha Zimmerman, Fetal Position - The Real Threat to Roe v. Wade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 18 & 25, 2003, at 14, 16) (quoting Dr. W. David Hager, the head of the George W. Bush’s administration’s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee as stating, “Roe v. Wade should be repealed anyway. But if we had the technology to
v. Wade states can restrict access to abortion in the third trimester and many states already outlaw abortion post-viability. Furthermore, many states have implemented unconstitutional and unenforceable bans which changing medical technology might make acceptable. However, some states may continue to see the abortion decision as a private decision giving the father more rights and the mother more responsibilities under the equal protection clause. Finally, a state could decide that the fetus is an extension of the woman’s body and that anything done to the fetus must be done with the mother’s consent to protect her privacy.

None of these options require the Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade and subsequent rulings. The Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence stands for the proposition that the woman’s autonomy interest outweighs the state’s interest in life until viability; after viability the state may exercise its interest so long as the health and welfare of the mother are provided for in any laws enacted. At the time Roe was decided, viability was the third trimester: twenty-four weeks. Over the next twenty years, viability will move back earlier and earlier in the pregnancy, until, conceivably, an embryo will be viable at conception. With changing medical technology, the state’s interest in potential life could take precedence over the woman’s reproductive interest. The woman’s reproductive interest would still exist, but the state could limit her right to exercise it by choosing a procedure that would not result in fetal termination if a living fetal extraction is available. Further, the father’s reproductive interest, which has received little support under the current law, would have to become part of any abortion discussion.

In offering this analysis, we are not taking a position on either “pro-choice” or “right to life.” It is clear that our prediction could have serious negative impact on women. The current abortion paradigm gives women power in a society where they have little. Further, the personal consequences of having a child exist in the world being raised by another may be different for women than for men. Even after decades of progress, we are still conditioned to believe that “a woman’s place is in the home,” and

be able to placentize or incubate in a placental environment, then I would say that would be an argument in favor of repeal.”).

84 See also, Sally Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?, 66 MODERN L. REV. 175, 176 (2003) (examining the basis of paternal obligation where women retain sole control over the abortion decision); Cf. Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos & The “Right not to be a Parent,” 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 131 (2003) (discussing the “right not to be a parent,” the controlling standard by which several courts have decided disputes over frozen preembryos); See generally Scott Altman, Note, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT’L J. L., POL’Y & FAM. 173 (2003) (reviewing arguments that can be offered for the support obligation).
that there is a special bond between mother and child. While the law may be shaped to allow men and women equal parts in any reproductive decision, those decisions may not have equal consequences. Giving women this choice—both reproductive and autonomy—is one of the few places in our society where women actually have more power than men, in a profound way. If changing medical technology takes that away, the other pulls society gives men may end up leading women to coercive choices. This is true not only in the United States, but around the world as other women look to our system as a model for empowerment. We are not suggesting this argument as a reason to continue to give the woman’s decision primacy over the man’s when the woman does not want to reproduce but the man does. However, notwithstanding this, changing medical technology will require a reassessment of the respective rights and responsibilities. One side of the abortion debate argues that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose an abortion; the other side argues that the fetus has a right to life that the law must recognize. New medical technology will allow the law to satisfy both. In the future, the law will be able to allow a woman to choose not to carry to term while making it illegal to terminate the life of a fetus.