Additional Tables for

“Learning to Consolidate Democracy”

Gretchen Casper and Kyle Joyce

Pennsylvania State University

Department of Political Science

Pennsylvania State University

September 2004

In our 2004 APSA conference paper, “Learning to Consolidate Democracy,” we discuss elite bargaining in twelve countries across forty-one national crises. In that paper, we present tables for one of the countries – Italy -- specifying the actors in the crises, their preferences, and their constraints. The tables for Italy were included there because we based our bargaining model on this country. However, we excluded tables for the remaining eleven countries due to considerations of space. Below, we include the tables for all twelve countries.

Table 1: Italy (Terrorism Series)

Crisis: Beginning in the 1970s, Italy experienced a wave of terrorist events directed against the state. The most shocking events were the kidnapping and murder of the president of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, Aldo Moro, and the bombing of the Bologna central railway station.

Terrorism (1977-1999)	Government	Terrorist Groups
Preferences	1. Status quo.	1. Overthrow the state.
	2. Terrorist groups overthrow the state.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. Until it changed the laws in 1975, the government was more restricted in its ability to act against terrorists.	1. Terrorism is illegal.
	2. Some of the anti-terrorist officials were actually sympathetic to the terrorist groups.

Table 2: Italy (Corruption Series)

Crisis: In 1992, the government launched the Clean Hands investigation to identify politicians who were awarding government contracts to businesses in exchange for bribes and kickbacks. The investigation expanded its scope of inquiry from local government officials to cabinet ministers, former prime ministers, and Prime Minister Berlusconi.

Corruption (1993-1999)	Supporters of the Clean Hands Investigation (Magistrates and Legislators)	Opponents of the Clean Hands Investigation (Legislators)
Preferences	1. Introduce transparency into the political system.	1. Corruption continues.
	2. Corruption continues.	2. Introduce transparency into the political system.
Constraints	1. Lack of information regarding the participants of corruption due to its secret nature.	1. Corruption is illegal.
	2. Development of the party system contributed to the emergence of clientelism.	2. New legislation in 1989 enhanced the criminal code and provided for stricter legal constraints against corrupt politicians.

Table 3: Italy (Northern League Series)

Crisis: The Northern League was created in 1982 to protect the northern region’s political and economic interests. The League complained that northern resources were being redistributed unfairly to the south. Eventually, it threatened to form an independent state in the north, the Republic of Padania.

Northern League (1982-1999)	Government	Northern League
Preferences	1. Status quo: retain legal authority over the entire territory.	1. Establish an independent state in the Northern region.
	2. Make some concessions to the Northern League (such as meeting economic demands).	2. Gain some concessions from the government (such as economic demands).
	3. Grant independence to the Northern region.	3. Accept the status quo.
Constraints	1. International systemic factors increased the importance of Northern Italy.	1. The Italian legal framework did not allow for the degree of autonomy sought by the Northern League.
		2. Organizational weakness.
		3. Negative public image.

Table 5: India (Separatist Activity Series)

Crisis: India experienced periods of violence as secessionist movements defended ethnic nationalism by declaring their independence. The state responded to these threats of territorial disintegration by further centralizing power.

Separatist Activity (1970-1990)	Government	Separatist Groups
Preferences	1. Status quo.	1. Secession.
	2. No secession, but the fulfillment of some economic, social, and political demands.	2. No secession, but the fulfillment of some economic, social, and political demands.
	3. Secession.	3. Status quo.
Constraints	1. Politicization of military from frequent use of the armed forces to maintain status quo.	1. The constitution was amended in the 1980s to increase the power of the state in fighting terrorist groups.
		2. The terrorist groups were not united in the efforts to overthrow the state.

Table 6: India (Indira Gandhi Series)

Crisis: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s election was declared null and void by a lower court for breaking campaign laws in her 1971 election and she was banned from running for office for six years. The Supreme Court overturned this ruling and legitimized her election. Opposition groups staged civil disobedience and demanded Indira Gandhi’s resignation.

Indira Gandhi (1975-1979)	Government (Indira Gandhi)	Opposition parties
Preferences	1. Remain in office.	1. Force Indira Gandhi out of office.
	2. Leave office.	2. Gandhi remains in office.
Constraints	1. Indira Gandhi’s election was declared null and void for breaking campaign laws.	1. Restrictive legal framework, which gave power to the government to arrest opposition members.

Table 7: India (Strikes Series)

Crisis: In the mid-1970s, India began a transition from a predominantly public-sector to a private-sector economy. This transition proceeded slowly until the election of Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister, in 1984. Public sector workers initiated a series of strikes to protest the effects of this privatization, including the increase in food prices, minimum wage, and job security.

Strikes (1984-1992)	Government	Public sector workers
Preferences	1. Privatize industry.	1. Protect the public sector.
	2. Protect the public sector.	2. Privatize industry.
Constraints	1. High level of foreign debt.	1. High level of foreign debt.

Table 8: Mali (Coup Attempt Series)

Crisis: Moussa Traore overthrew the Keita government and installed a military junta. Supporters of Modibo Keita tried to overthrow Traore and reinstall Keita.

Coup Attempt (1969-1982)	Government (Traore)	Opposition (Supporters of Keita)
Preferences	1. Status quo.	1. Remove Traore and install Keita as president.
	2. Traore overthrown and replaced with Keita.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. There existed significant support for Keita.	1. The Traore regime jailed Keita supporters and minimized the power of pro-Keita unions.
	2. The military was not united behind Traore.

Table 9: Mali (Rebels Series)

Crisis: In 1990, the Tuareg launched a rebellion against the Traore regime. When the regime’s aggressive counterinsurgency measures failed, it signed a peace agreement with the rebels. However, the rebels complained that the regime did not fully implement the agreement and fighting resumed.

Rebels (1990-1994)	Government (Traore)	Tuareg Rebels
Preferences	1. End fighting with Tuaregs.	1. Have government implement all of their demands for educational reform.
	2. Status quo – continue fighting.	2. Have government implement some of their demands.
		3. Have government implement none of their demands.
Constraints	1. Tuaregs did not honor cease-fire agreements.	1. Government did not honor cease-fire agreements.

Table 10: Mali (Traore Series)

Crisis: By the early 1990s, opposition to Moussa Traore’s regime mounted. Diverse groups (such as students, labor unions, and human rights organizations) united to oust Moussa Traore and reinstall democracy.

Traore (1991-1993)	Government (Traore)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo.	1. Traore removed from power and democracy installed.
	2. Traore removed from power and democracy installed.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. The military was not united behind Traore.	1. Demonstrations were illegal.
		2. Military used force to end opposition demonstrations.

Table 11: Mali (Student Violence Series)

Crisis: The student organization, AEEM, played a leading role in overthrowing the military regime in 1991. The transitional government accepted AEEM’s demands for educational reform; however, it did not implement all of their demands. In 1993, AEEM attempted to negotiate with the Konare government on the remaining educational reforms. When the talks failed, AEEM became militant and expanded their demands to include political reform.

Student Violence (1993)	Government (Konare)	AEEM (Assn. of Students and Pupils of Mali)
Preferences	1. End student strikes.	1. Have government implement all of their demands for educational reform.
	2. Continuation of student strikes	2. Have government implement some of their demands.
		3. Have government implement none of their demands.
Constraints	1. The new democratic government depended on student support to overthrow the military regime and install democracy.	1. Use of violence alienated the mass public and rank-and-file members of the student organization.
	2. Groups pressing demands on the new government to fund a wide range of reforms, including elementary education, health care, transportation, and economic development projects.

Table 12: Mali (Elections Series)

Crisis: Legislative and presidential elections were held in 1997. The Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of the legislative elections due to massive disorganization (such as a shortage of ballots). Opposition groups boycotted the presidential elections to protest the annulment of the legislative election results.

Elections (1997)	Government (Konare)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Win reelection to the presidency.	1. Defeat Konare in the elections.
	2. Lose the election.	2. Konare wins the election.
Constraints	1. Opposition boycott of the election would diminish Konare’s legitimacy if he were reelected.	1. Constitutional Court annulled first round of the legislative elections.
	2. The election suffered from significant logistical problems.	2. The election suffered from significant logistical problems.

Table 13: Portugal (Salazar Series)

Crisis: Antonio de Oliveira Salazar installed an authoritarian regime after the overthrow of the Republic in 1926. In 1958, elections were held in which General Humberto Delgado ran as the opposition candidate.

Salazar (1958-1968)	Government (Salazar)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo.	1. Removal of Salazar as prime minister.
	2. Removal of Salazar as prime minister.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. Growing pressure for Salazar to retire.	1. Opposition political parties were banned.
	2. Transformation of Portugal’s economy.	2. Salazar refused to retire.
	3. Situation of Portugal’s colonies in Africa.

Table 14: Portugal (Transition Series)

Crisis: Military officers organized the Movement of the Armed Forces with the goal of overthrowing Marcello Caetano’s regime and installing a pro-left junta.

Transition (1974-1976)	Government (Movement of the Armed Forces)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Installation of leftist regime.	1.Replace the MFA regime.
	2. Return to right-wing dictatorship.	2. Installation of leftist regime.
Constraints	1. Economic crisis.	1. Opposition groups were not united.

Table 15: Portugal (Strikes Series)

Crisis: In 1976, Portugal installed a democratic government and began to nationalize industries. Labor unions were able to gain favorable agreements from the government covering workers in these nationalized industries because of their ability to mobilize workers for political action. By 1983, Portugal was experiencing an economic crisis and was forced to implement austerity measures in exchange for a loan from the IMF. Labor unions responded to this policy change by initiating a series of strikes.

Strikes (1983-1989)	Government	CGTP (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers)
Preferences	1. Privatize the economy.	1. Government accepts their demands to protect the public sector.
	2. Accept all of the union’s demands.	2. Privatization of the economy.
Constraints	1. The IMF forced Portugal to implement austerity measures in exchange for a loan.	1. Laws existed (but had never been implemented) that allowed businesses to fire workers.
		2. Economic crisis.

Table 16: Ecuador (Political Unrest Series)

Crisis: President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra was reelected in 1960. However, opposition to his administration quickly emerged. As a result, Ecuador experienced a series of riots, strikes, and coup attempts.

Political Unrest (1961-1975)	Government (Velasco Ibarra)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo -- remain in power as president.	1. Remove Velasco from office.
	2. Be removed from office.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. Economic stagnation.	1. Military was not united behind opposition.
	2. Military was not united behind Velasco.
	3. United States’ support for Velasco was declining.

Table 17: Ecuador (United Workers’ Front Series)

Crisis: Ecuador experienced an economic crisis in the 1980s, characterized by spiraling foreign debt and inflation. To encourage economic growth, the government reduced government regulation and rescheduled its foreign debt. Labor unions demanded that government increase the minimum wage and freeze prices for basic commodities. When the government refused, labor unions joined to form the United Workers’ Front (FUT) and initiated strikes.

United Workers’ Front (1985-1999)	Government	FUT (United Workers’ Front)
Preferences	1. End strikes without making concessions to unions.	1. Government accepts their demands.
	2. Make concessions to unions.	2. Government refuses to accept their demands.
	3. Fail to take control over the situation.
Constraints	1. Economic crisis.	1. Economic crisis.

Table 18: Ecuador (Rebels Series)

Crisis: Alvaro Vive, Carajo (AVC) was a small rebel group organized to fight for social justice. Although the group maintained a relatively low profile, it engaged in kidnapping and attacks on the media. The government feared that the AVC received training or other support from foreign countries (such as Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya) and responded to the AVC with force.

Rebels (1985-1993)	Government	Opposition (Alvaro Vive, Carajo!)
Preferences	1. Defeat rebel groups.	1. Continue to destabilize government using terrorist acts.
	2. Status quo – terrorism continues.	2. Be defeated by government.
Constraints	1. Pressure from Amnesty International to respect human rights.	1. Creation of anti-terrorist police unit authorized to use aggressive force to defeat the AVC.

Table 19: Philippines (Election Series)

Crisis: President Marcos ran for reelection in 1969. He had implemented popular reforms during his first administration and became the first president to win reelection. However, opposition to Marcos significantly expanded immediately after his reelection as it became clear that he had used massive electoral fraud.

Election (1969-1970)	Government (Marcos)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Marcos remains in power past 1972.	1. Marcos is defeated in 1969 election -- he serves only one presidential term.
	2. Marcos wins reelection in 1969 – serves two presidential terms.	2. Marcos wins reelection – serves two presidential terms.
	3. Marcos loses the 1969 election – serves only one presidential term.	3. Marcos remains in power past 1972.
Constraints	1. Informal constraint – no president had even been re-elected in Philippine history.	1. Marcos had strong mass public support leading up to the 1969 election, because of policies under his first administration.
	2. No broad support for Marcos to remain in power after two terms as president.

Table 20: Philippines (New People’s Army Series)

Crisis: The New People’s Army (NPA) was the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Formed in the late 1960s, the NPA established small units in northern Philippines with the goal of training peasants to overthrow the government. President Marcos used the NPA as a justification for his declaration of martial law in 1972. Although the NPA was relatively small in 1972, it expanded significantly during the Marcos regime, both in terms of its size and its expansion across the country.

New People’s Army (1971-1998)	Government	New People’s Army (NPA)
Preferences	1. Defeat NPA.	1. Overthrow government.
	2. Cease-fire agreement with NPA – NPA makes concessions.	2. Cease-fire agreement with NPA – government makes concessions.
	3. Cease-fire agreement with NPA – government makes concessions.	3. Cease-fire agreement with NPA – NPA makes concessions.
	4. Overthrown by NPA.	4. Defeated by government.
Constraints	1. NPA received financial support from the People’s Republic of China during the 1970s.	1. Financial support from the PRC ended in the 1970s.
	2. NPA’s use of guerrilla tactics made it difficult to infiltrate and defeat.	2. The NPA did not have enough arms or soldiers to overthrow the government.

Table 21: Philippines (Muslim Insurgency Series)

Crisis: The Muslim insurgency arose in the southern Philippines as Christian settlers began to outnumber Muslim farmers on the island of Mindanao. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was created in 1968 to fight for independence for Mindanao.

Muslim Insurgency (1974-1999)	Government	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Preferences	1. Defeat the MNLF.	1. Creation of independent state of Mindanao.
	2. Cease-fire agreement with the MNLF – minor concessions.	2. Cease-fire agreement with the MNLF – agree to Mindanao autonomy.
	3. Cease-fire agreement with the MNLF – agree to Mindanao autonomy.	3. Cease-fire agreement with the MNLF – minor gains.
	4. Creation of independent state of Mindanao.	4. Defeated by the government.
Constraints	1. MNLF received significant international support.	1. Splinter groups broke off from MNLF.
	2. The military was already fighting a guerrilla war against the NPA.
	3. Christian farmers on Mindanao did not support autonomy.
	4. Economic crisis.

Table 22: Philippines (Transition Series)

Crisis: President Marcos had ruled the Philippines since 1972, when he had declared martial law and installed an authoritarian regime. By the mid-1980s, he recognized that his support was deteriorating and announced presidential elections for 1986. The Democratic Opposition, led by Corazon Aquino, quickly organized to try to defeat Marcos in the elections. The Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines (RAM) also organized, covertly, to overthrow Marcos and install a military junta.

Transition (1983-1986)	Government (Marcos)	Opposition	Military Rebels (Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement -- RAM)
Preferences	1. Status quo – continuation of Marcos’ regime.	1. Return to democracy.	1. Military junta led by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.
	2. Return to democracy.	2. Provisional government in exile.	2. Junta with Enrile and Aquino sharing power.
		3. Status quo – continuation of Marcos’ regime.	3. Return to democracy.
			4. Status quo – continuation of Marcos’ regime.
Constraints	1. Defection of key actors from Marcos’ support coalition.	1. Corazon Aquino was an untried political leader.	1. RAM was a small and secret group within the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
		2. Opposition in the Philippines was traditionally disunited.	2. It was unclear whether the mass public would support a junta.

Table 23: Philippines (Coup Attempts Series)

Crisis: President Marcos was forced to flee the Philippines in 1986. Corazon Aquino, his opponent in the presidential elections, was declared the rightful leader and she installed a democratic government. However, two groups emerged to oppose her: the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) and Marcos loyalists.

Coup Attempts (1986-1991)	Government (Aquino)	Military Rebels
Preferences	1. Defeat military rebels.	1. Overthrow Aquino’s government.
	2. Rebels overthrow government.	2. Government defeats rebels.
Constraints	1. Aquino was an untried political leader.	1. The military rebels were small in number.
	2. The rebels were well funded.	2. It was unclear how much support they would receive from the Marcos loyalists or the mass public if they rebelled.

Table 24: Bolivia (Military Takeover Series)

Crisis: The period from 1952-1964 is referred to as the “Bolivian national revolution.” The incumbent government refused to accept the results of the 1951 elections, which was won by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), and asked the military to take over power, instead.

Military Takeover (1951-1964)	Government (MNR)	Opposition (Military junta and FSB)
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Overthrow MNR government and gain power.
	2. Overthrown by opposition.	2. Remain out of power.
Constraints	1. Lack of unity within the MNR.	1. Lack of unity within the military.

Table 25: Bolivia (Transition to Banzar Series)

Crisis: The period from 1969-1971 was characterized by increasing polarization between the left and the right. President Alfredo Ovando and his successor, Juan Jose Torres, were generals who modeled their regimes after the military-populist government in Peru. However, other officers, such as Colonel Hugo Banzar Suarez, preferred the Brazilian model of a conservative military regime. These right-wing officers opposed the left’s reemergence and strengthening under Ovando and Torres.

Transition to Banzar (1969-1971)	Government (Ovando, Torres)	Opposition (Banzar)
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Overthrow the government and gain power.
	2. Overthrown by opposition.	2. Be defeated by the government.
Constraints	1 Ovando and Torres alienated their left-of-center supporters by taking a centrist position.	1. It was unclear how much support the opposition could muster to overthrow the government.
	2. Rumors of Ovando’s corruption weakened support for his government.

Table 26: Bolivia (Banzar Series)

Crisis: In 1971, Colonel Hugo Banzar Suarez overthrew the Torres regime. Banzar’s military regime lasted until 1978 when, in reaction to mounting domestic and international opposition, he announced elections.

Banzar (1973-1978)	Government (Banzar)	Opposition (Pereda)
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Gain power.
	2. Cede power to a trusted ally (Pereda).	2. Be barred from power.
	3. Lose power.
Constraints	1. Military was not united behind Banzar.	1. Pereda would lose legitimacy if he gained power via unfair elections.
	2. Popular unrest.

Table 27: Bolivia (Transition to Democracy Series)

Crisis: Initially, General Banzar planned to run in the 1978 election. However, strong opposition from within the military caused him to support the candidacy of his ally, General Juan Pereda Asbun. Although Pereda appeared to win the elections, the National Electoral Court annulled the results, based on widespread fraud, and called for new elections to be held.

Transition to Democracy (1978-1982)	Government (Military Junta)	Opposition (Congress)
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Install a civilian government.
	2. Cede power to civilian government.	2. Status quo – continuation of military junta.
Constraints	1. Military not united behind continuation of military junta.	1. Previous civilian governments were unstable.
	2. International pressure.
	3. Accusations of corruption against the junta.
	4. Civil unrest.

Table 28: Bolivia (Labor Unrest Series)

Crisis: Bolivia experienced an economic crisis in the early 1980s. President Hernan Siles Zuazo tried to push through austerity measures to stabilize the economy. Labor unions opposed these measures with a series of strikes, demonstrations, and roadblocks.

Labor Unrest(1983-1996)	Government	Opposition (COB)
Preferences	1. Status quo – austerity measures.	1. Reverse austerity measures.
	2. Make concessions to labor sector.	2. Status quo.
Constraints	1. Economic crisis.	1. Government’s use of executive decrees to pass new economic laws.
	2. Pressure from private sector to support austerity measures.

Table 29: Bolivia (Coca Growers Series)

Crisis: The Bolivian government implemented programs to eradicate coca production, to counter drug trafficking. While the United States supported these programs with financial aid and military training, coca growers opposed them.

Coca Growers (1994-1998)	Government	Opposition (Military junta and FSB)
Preferences	1. Elimination of coca production and trade.	1. Status quo – continuation of coca production and trade.
	2. Status quo – continuation of coca production and trade.	2. Elimination of coca production and trade.
Constraints	1. Lack of domestic support for the program.	1. Illegal activity.
	2. Lack of sufficient trained staff to implement eradication program.
	3. High demand for coca.

Table 30: Brazil (Transition Series)

Crisis: The military overthrew Brazil’s civilian government in 1964. The military leaders’ goals were to insure that the country did not become communist and to reestablish law and order. In 1974, President Geisel announced a slow liberalization process that would eventually end with a transition to democracy.

Transition (1977-1984)	Government (Military Regime)	Opposition (MDB)
Preferences	1. Retain conservative control of government with slow and controlled liberalization process with PDS majority and president.	1. Remove military from government, prevent old regime interests from gaining access to government, and install a democratically elected legislature and president.
	2. Military rule.	2. Remove military from government, install a democratically elected legislature and president with old interests represented as a minority opposition party.
	3. Retain conservative control of government with PDS majority and president but with an accelerated liberalization.	3. Allow the military to retain control of the government in a liberalized political system.
	4. Lose power, complete liberalization.	4. Revert to military control with no liberalization.
Constraints	1. Potential opposition from hardliners in the military.	1. Legal constraints on opposition’s activities.
	2. Rising strength of the opposition.

Table 31: Brazil (Labor Unrest Series)

Crisis: Brazil reinstalled a democratic government in 1985. The new democracy experienced economic crises, leading presidents to push for the implementation of austerity measures. However, labor unions opposed these measures and called for a series of strikes to force the government to rescind its policies.

Labor Unrest (1986-1999)	Government	Labor Unions
Preferences	1. Implement austerity measures to control inflation.	1. Receive major concessions from government to protect wage increases and job security.
	2. Offer major concessions to unions to protect wage increases and job security.	2. Offer minor concessions to government.
	3. Offer minor concessions to unions.	3. Government implements austerity measures.
	4. Try to break strikes.	4. Government breaks strikes.
Constraints	1. Mass public support for unions.	1. Strikes are illegal.
	2. Unions entered into alliance.	2. The mass public supported the unions but did not support strikes.
	3. Union controlled key industries.

Table 32: Indonesia (Rebellion Series)

Crisis: Indonesia became independent in 1950. The new government faced a series of religious, political, and regional crises. As a result, the government found itself fighting several separatist groups in an attempt to maintain the territorial integrity of the new country.

Rebellion (1950-1977)	Government	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo -- Republic of Indonesia remains intact.	1. Autonomy given to all regions.
	2. Autonomy given to some regions.	2. Autonomy given to some regions.
	3. Autonomy given to all regions.	3. Status quo -- Republic of Indonesia remains intact.
Constraints	1. The military is not united behind the government.	1. Rebel groups only had support at the local level.
	2. Indonesia lacks national unity.	2. Sukarno declared martial law in 1957.
	3. The Republic of Indonesia is young – the political institutions are weak.

Table 33: Indonesia (Communist Purge Series)

Crisis: General Suharto overthrew the Sukarno regime in 1965. As the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had been one of Sukarno’s largest supporters, Suharto was determined to purge the party from the political arena.

Communist Purge (1951-1970)	Government	PKI
Preferences	1. PKI thoroughly defeated, no longer an actor in national politics.	1. PKI remains a strong national actors that can challenge Suharto’s rule.
	2. PKI weakened but still an actor in national politics.	2. PKI weakened but still an actor in national politics.
	3. PKI remains a strong national actor that can challenge Suharto’s rule	3. PKI thoroughly defeated, no longer an actor in national politics.
Constraints	1. Delay in Suharto receiving full presidential power.	1. Pro-PKI military had been purged by Suharto.
		2. Muslims opposed PKI.
		3. Sukarno, the PKI’s most important supporter, was stripped of his presidential powers.

Table 34: Indonesia (Separatist Movements Series)

Crisis: Indonesia experienced rebellion in several regions of the country. The most severe crises emerged in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh. Suharto tried to defeat these separatist groups by using military force.

Separatist Movements (1976-1994)	Government (Suharto)	Separatist Movements
Preferences	1. Separatist movements are defeated.	1. Separatist regions become independent.
	2. Separatist regions become independent.	2. Separatist movements are defeated.
Constraints	1. There existed strong and long-standing opposition to the national government, based on cultural differences.	1. The separatist movements’ armed groups are small.
	2. International organizations sanctioned Indonesia for using force against the separatist movements.

Table 35: Indonesia (Transition Series)

Crisis: Opposition to Suharto’s regime began to emerge in the 1970s. However, Suharto was certain that he could hold onto power because he was supported by the military, his political party (Golkar), and by his business cronies.

Transition (1993-1999)	Government (Suharto)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo -- Suharto remains in power.	1. Suharto is forced to step down from the presidency.
	2. Suharto is forced to step down from the presidency.	2. Status quo -- Suharto remains in power.
Constraints	1. Muslim and military leaders sided with the opposition.	1. The opposition was not united.
	2. Economic crisis.	2. The main opposition party, PDI, was weakened by Suharto.

Table 36: Ivory Coast (Houphouet-Boigny Series)

Crisis: Felix Houphouet-Boigny became president of Ivory Coast in 1960, when the country gained independence. He ruled through his party, the Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire (PDCI). Opposition to his one-party rule escalated in the 1980s as the economic crisis depressed his ability to buy political support by distributing economic benefits.

Houphouet-Boigny (1963-1983)	Government (Houphouet-Boigny)	Opposition (Students)
Preferences	1. Status quo – Houphouet-Boigny remains in power.	1. Houphouet-Boigny is forced out of power.
	2. Houphouet-Boigny is forced out of power.	2. Status quo – Houphouet-Boigny remains in power.
Constraints	1. Harder to redistribute funds to regime’s supporters.	1. Regime trying to control independent student unions.
	2. Not all student unions were controlled by the regime.	2. Government’s use of aggressive tactics to put down oppositions with use of force.

Table 37: Ivory Coast (Elections Series)

Crisis: President Houphouet-Boigny died in 1993. Henri Konan Bedie, the former head of the National Assembly, was named as the head of a transitional government. Elections were held in 1995. However, opponents of Bedie demanded that the electoral code be revised, to insure that the elections would be free and fair.

Elections (1995-1999)	Government (Bedie)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Elections with restrictions.	1. Free elections.
	2. Free elections.	2. Elections with restrictions.
Constraints	1. The opposition’s boycotting of the elections weakened the government’s legitimacy.	1. New election laws.
		2. Government ban on demonstrations.
		3. Opposition groups not united.

Table 38: Myanmar (Civil War Series)

Crisis: Myanmar gained its independence in 1948. Almost immediately, rebel groups arose. Secessionist groups fought for the creation of independent states for minority groups, such as the Shans and Karens. Prime Minister U Nu declared martial law and used military force to try to defeat these groups. As a result, civil war broke out.

Civil War (1950-1960)	Government	Rebel Groups
Preferences	1. Defeat rebels.	1. Defeat government.
	2. Make minor concessions to rebels.	2. Make minor concessions to government.
	3. Be defeated by rebels.	3. Be defeated by government.
Constraints	1. Rebel groups controlled various regions of the country.	1. Rebel coalitions were not stable.
	2. Rebel groups formed coalitions against the government.	2. Some rebel groups surrendered to the government in exchange for amnesty.

Table 39: Myanmar (Rebels Series)

Crisis: General Ne Win overthrew U Nu’s government in 1962. The new military regime declared that the separatist groups were hindering Myanmar’s socioeconomic development. It abolished minority state administrations and tried to bring these minority groups under central control.

Rebels (1962-1995)	Government (Military Regime)	Rebels
Preferences	1. Defeat rebels.	1. Defeat government.
	2. Make minor concessions to rebels.	2. Make minor concessions to government.
	3. Be defeated by rebels.	3. Be defeated by government.
Constraints	1. Government had a freer hand than during the civil war series because it was now a military regime rather than a civilian government.	1. Rebel coalitions were not stable.
	2. Rebel groups controlled various regions of the country.	2. Some rebel groups surrendered to the government in exchange for amnesty.
	3. Rebel groups formed coalitions against the government.

Table 40: Myanmar (Transition Series)

Crisis: By the 1980s, opposition to the military government had increased. Demonstrations and protests were held demanding that the military leaders resign and return the country to democracy.

Transition (1987-1990)	Government (Military Regime)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo -- one-party rule under military control.	1. Free multiparty system.
	2. Military control of very limited pluralism with regime party lead.	2. Multi-party system under military control with regime party majority.
	3. Multi-party system under military control with regime party majority.	3. Military control of very limited pluralism with regime party lead.
	4. Free multi-party system.	4. Status quo -- one-party rule under military control.
Constraints	1. United opposition.	1. Regime’s excessive use of force to put down opposition.
	2. International pressure.

Table 41: Myanmar (Aung San Suu Kyi Series)

Crisis: Aung San Suu Kyi was the daughter of Aung San, one of the leaders of the fight for independence. She was married to a British academic and returned to Myanmar in 1988 to aid her ill mother. After demonstrations erupted, she began to give speeches calling for free elections and the return to democracy. She became one of the leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), an opposition party.

Ang San Suu Kyi (1994-1999)	Government (Military Regime)	Opposition (NLD)
Preferences	1. No concessions for opposition.	1. Restoration of democracy.
	2. Minor concessions to opposition.	2. Major concessions to opposition – allow them to hold a shadow parliament and draft a revised constitution.
	3. Major concessions to opposition – allow them to hold a shadow parliament and draft a revised constitution.	3. Minor concessions to opposition.
	4. Restoration of democracy.	4. No concessions for opposition.
Constraints	1. International pressure.	1. Most of the opposition’s leaders were jailed.
		2. The military regime refused to allow the opposition to hold meetings.

Table 42: Zaire (Mobutu Series)

Crisis: In 1965, Joseph Desire Mobutu implemented a military coup to overthrow President Kasavubu. He declared himself prime minister and created a one-party regime. From 1965 to 1987, Mobutu faced a series of coup attempts. He depended on the military to defeat opposition to his regime.

Mobutu (1965-1987)	Government (Mobutu)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Force Mobutu out of power.
	2. Be forced out of power.	2. Status quo – Mobutu remains in power.
Constraints	1. Overdependence on armed forces risked politicizing it.	1. Legal framework gave little power to opposition.
	2. International pressure.	2. Opposition weak.

Table 43: Zaire (Transition Series)

Crisis: In 1990, Mobutu announced a liberalization policy, with the goal of blunting opposition to his regime. He lifted the ban on opposition parties and promised that a new constitution would be drafted. However, opposition parties did not believe that he was sincere in his promise of a transition to democracy.

Transition (1990-1997)	Government (Mobutu)	Opposition
Preferences	1. Status quo – remain in power.	1. Installation of democracy.
	2. Be forced out of power.	2. Status quo – Mobutu remains in power.
Constraints	1. Strikes.	1. Mobutu reshuffled prime ministers.
	2. Division within the army.	2. Opposition was not united.
	3. Mobutu’s health.	3. Ethnic cleavages.
	4. International pressure.	4. Rebel movement opposed Mobutu but did not necessarily support the opposition.
	5. Rebel movements.