

Nicole Holz

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Fields Primary: Health Economics, Public Economics
Secondary: Urban Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Education Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2023 (Anticipated)
Dissertation: Essays in Public Economics
Committee: Matthew Notowidigdo (Chair), David Dranove, Dean Karlan, Molly Schnell
M.A., Economics, Northwestern University, 2020
B.S., Chemical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015

Fellowships & Awards Susan Schmidt Bies Prize for Doctoral Student Research on Economics and Public Policy, 2020
National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program, 2017-2020
Jeffrey L. Pressman Award, 2014

Teaching Experience Teaching Assistant:
ECON 307 - Economics of Medical Care, Fall 2021
MMSS 398 - Senior Thesis Seminar, Fall 2019 - Spring 2020
Grader:
STRT 431 - Business Strategy, Fall 2020
STRT 443 - Healthcare Strategy, Winter 2021 & 2022
HCAK 941 - Value Creation and Capture in Healthcare, Spring 2021

Research and Professional Experience Research Assistant, Matthew Notowidigdo, Northwestern University, 2019-2020, 2022
Research Assistant, Amanda Starc, 2021
Associate, TGG Group, 2015-2017

Conferences Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Austin 2022
American Society of Health Economics Annual Conference, 2021
Advances with Field Experiments, University of Chicago, 2019

Academic Service Empirical Methods in Economics Conference (EMCON) Organizer, Northwestern University, 2019
Applied Micro Lunch Seminar Organizer, Northwestern University, 2019-2020
Graduates Mentoring Undergraduates Student Group, Northwestern University, 2020-2021
Northwestern Graduate Mentorship Program Mentor, 2021-2022
Referee: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Development Economics, Economic Modeling, International Journal of Health Economics

Job Market Paper**“Information Disclosure and Patient Demand”**

Information disclosure programs may not function as intended if the consumers who have the least to gain from being paired with a top-rated seller respond more than those who have more to gain in settings where capacity is constrained. In this paper, I explore how a disclosure program used by a private insurer steered patients toward higher quality, more cost-efficient physicians. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that the top physician ranking of “Premium Care” leads to a 38% increase in the volume of new patients and that the effects are stronger for younger patients. These young patients, however, may not benefit by being matched to higher quality, more cost-efficient physicians. Using a two-way fixed effects design identified by “switchers,” patients who switch physicians, I find that switching to higher quality, more cost-efficient physicians led to larger declines in spending for middle-aged patients than for younger adult patients, with no impacts on health outcomes. I conclude that policies that nudge middle-aged patients toward more highly ranked physicians could lead to considerable cost savings.

Working papers**“Rational Eviction: How Landlords Use Eviction in Response to Rent Control” with Eilidh Geddes**

August 2022 - [Click here for draft](#)

“Rent control policies seek to ensure affordable and stable housing for current tenants; however, they also increase the incentive for landlords to evict tenants since rents re-set when tenants leave. We exploit variation across zip codes in policy exposure to the 1994 rent control referendum in San Francisco to study the effects of rent control on eviction behavior. We find that for every 1,000 newly rent-controlled units in a zip code, there were 12.05 additional eviction notices filed in that zip code and an additional 4.6 wrongful eviction claims. These effects were concentrated in low income zip codes.”

“Housing Affordability and Domestic Violence: The Case of San Francisco’s Rent Control Policies” with Eilidh Geddes

October 2022 - [Click here for draft](#)

Policy advocates claim that one benefit of rent control may be decreased intimate partner violence (IPV). However, the theoretical effects of rent control on IPV are ambiguous. Rent control may lessen financial stressors within a relationship and decrease strain that leads to violence. However, it may make leaving the relationship more costly, shifting the bargaining power in the relationship and leading to more violence. We leverage the 1994 expansion of rent control in San Francisco as a natural experiment to study this question. This expansion created variation across zip codes in the number of rental units that were newly rent controlled. We exploit this variation in a continuous difference-in-difference design. We estimate an elasticity of -0.08 between the number of newly rent controlled units and assaults on women resulting in hospitalization. This effect translates to a nearly 10% decrease in assaults on women for the average zip code. This relationship is not explained by changes in neighborhood composition or overall crime, consistent with the effects being driven by individual level changes in IPV.

“Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent-sharing in Modern College Sports” with Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew Notowidigdo

NBER Working Paper No. 27734

July 2021 - [Click here for draft](#)

Intercollegiate amateur athletics in the US largely bars student-athletes from sharing in any of the profits generated by their participation, which creates substantial economic rents for universities. These rents are primarily generated by men’s football and men’s basketball programs. We characterize these economic rents using comprehensive revenue and expenses data for college athletic departments between 2006 and 2019, and we estimate rent-sharing elasticities to measure how rents flow to women’s sports and other men’s sports and lead to increased spending on facilities, coaches’ salaries, and other athletic department personnel. We rule out skill-upgrading of coaches as an alternative explanation of our results by focusing on head coach “stayers” using panel data on the identity of each football head coach in our sample. Using complete roster data for every student-athlete playing sports at these colleges in 2018, we find that the rent-sharing effectively transfers resources away

from students who are more likely to be Black and more likely to come from poor neighborhoods towards students who are more likely to be White and come from higher-income neighborhoods. Having documented the existence of rent-sharing, we conclude with stylized calculations of a wage structure for college athletes using the collective bargaining agreements in professional sports leagues as a benchmark. We also discuss how our results help understand how universities have responded to recent threats to these rents arising from litigation, legislation, and the global coronavirus pandemic.

Work in progress

“Understanding the Career Consequence of Reporting Employer Crimes” with Justin Holz and Haruka Uchida

White-collar crimes, nonviolent offenses committed in commercial situations, cost the United States more than \$500 billion annually. Since white-collar crimes are difficult to detect, law enforcement agencies often rely on insiders, called whistleblowers, to report malfeasance. However, these whistleblowers may face retaliation for reporting, by either their current or prospective employers who are made aware of the applicant’s whistleblowing status. We propose a large-scale resume-correspondence study to understand the career consequences of whistleblowing for those who report two types of whistleblowing in the health industry: billing fraud and sexual harassment. Pilot results indicate that reporters of billing fraud are punished in the labor market, whereas reporters of sexual harassment are rewarded with more interview callbacks.

References

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