Cities on the Hill
City Delegations and Civil Rights Liberalism, 1933-1963

Tom Ogorzalek

Northwestern Political Science and Urban Studies
tko@northwestern.edu
The Cities on the Hill

Synthesize Urban Politics, Race, and APD

- Development of urban-rural, Red-Blue divide
- City institutions in national politics

Today

- City delegations and civil rights liberalism
- Local institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs): Support cohesion despite heterogeneity
- Mechanisms, big picture, paper framing
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Strange bedfellows, 1964

How do different kinds of places handle race differently?
Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights

Red-Blue
A City Interest?
Cities and race

ElectoralCollege1960.png


Tom Ogorzalek
Cities on the Hill
Motivation
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Civil Rights

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Cities and race

Source: Mark Newman

Tom Ogorzalek  Cities on the Hill
## North or South? Accounts of Racial Realignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Timing</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue Evolution</td>
<td>1960s</td>
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</tr>
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Motivation
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County1960.png

Motivation
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Cities and race

Source: 2004 NAES

Bushvote2004color3legend.png

Source: 2004 NAES
Urban-Rural Cleavage: Congress

Source: CSR data
Urbanicity: a challenge to unity

Figure: Chicago’s racial composition, 2010
“The Ungovernable City”

NYtimes.com, US Census

NYCCensus.png

YatesBook.jpg

Tom Ogorzalek Cities on the Hill
“Hyperpluralism”
Locally, northern cities were divided by race

“[On race], the only genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent.”

-Mike Royko
Nationally, urban representatives were a strong force for racial liberalism

Home to racially progressive forces

- Civil rights organizations, progressive unions, civil society
Motivating Questions

Given racial division at home, how do we characterize urban behavior on race at the national level?

City representation was marked by cohesive liberalism.

Through what mechanisms did locally divided cities embrace racially liberal positions cohesively at the national level?

Urban institutions fostered the development and defense of the Democratic Party's racially liberal platform.
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<td>petition</td>
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<td>Liberalism</td>
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<td>1930s</td>
<td>Urbanites</td>
<td>Urbanicity, local politics</td>
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Cities: Polities with urgent governance challenges

Urban conditions generate distinctive preferences and governance needs

- Density, Heterogeneity, Size
Cities: Polities with urgent governance challenges

Urban conditions generate distinctive preferences and governance needs

- Density, Heterogeneity, Size
- Economic management: redistribution, regulation, public goods
- Culture: change, heterogeneity, impersonality
Cities: Polities with urgent governance challenges

Urban conditions generate distinctive preferences and governance needs

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- Economic management: redistribution, regulation, public goods
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Cities face distinctive challenges

- City limits: Formal and informal constraints to policymaking
- “Diversity problems” related to heterogeneous constituencies
Cities on the Hill: City Delegations

- Pursue city-friendly policies in state and nation
- Urban reps act strategically as blocs (Weir et al)
- Cohesion a good strategy for success on “urban” issues (Burns et al)
- MCs represent *city as well as district*
- Transmit local solutions for political order to higher levels.
Cities on the Hill: City Delegations

- Pursue city-friendly policies in state and nation
- Urban reps act strategically as blocs (Weir et al)
- Cohesion a good strategy for success on “urban” issues (Burns et al)
- MCs represent *city as well as district*
- Transmit local solutions for political order to higher levels.
“Those of us who have served in the state legislature know of the power that is more than numerical that goes with the organization of the big cities.”

Rep. John Vorys (R-OH)\(^1\)

“Local experience has taught them that in unity there is power.”

Leo Snowiss,

“Congressional Recruitment and Representation”\(^2\)

\(^1\)“Apportionment of State Legislatures,” Subcom No. 5, House Committee on Judiciary. Aug. 6, 1964, HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 504-50
\(^2\)Snowiss (1966), p.630
Model of Representation: Electoral Connection
Model of Representation: City delegations

- Jurisdictional (Border) and Organizational (Party)
- IHIs vary over space and time
- H: Local IHIs will be related to representation
- H: Cities with strong IHIs will be more cohesive
Establishing political order

Cities develop institutions to overcome “diversity problems”

- Machines (Erie, etc)
- Monopolies (Trounstine)
- Urban regime (Stone)
- Pluralism (Dahl)

These are forms of horizontal integration across an uneven, heterogeneous space (IHIs).
Jurisdictional IHI: Municipal Boundary

NYCCDs1945Black15-eps-converted-to.pdf
Organizational IHI: Party
Do IHIs Enhance Cohesion? Hypotheses

Jurisdictional:

\[ H_{\text{Jurisdictional}} : C_{\text{City}} > C_{\text{Metro, Suburbs}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Organizational:

\[ H_{\text{Organizational}} : C_{\text{StrongIHI}} > C_{\text{WeakIHI}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)
Observable implications: Delegation level

City delegations will be more cohesive:

• Than sets of representatives not from single local political jurisdiction (eg. suburbs, metro area, national party) (Jurisdictional)

• If they have strong local partisan institutions (eg. Chicago v. LA) (Organizational)
Observable implications: Delegation level

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• Than sets of representatives not from single local political jurisdiction (eg. suburbs, metro area, national party) (Jurisdictional)

• If they have strong local partisan institutions (eg. Chicago v. LA) (Organizational)
Cities are more cohesive than other blocs
Stronger organizations, more cohesion
City delegations: Empirical summary

IHIs associated with cohesion

- City delegations more cohesive than non-city
- Cities with TPO more cohesive delegation
- Same-city dyads more likely to “agree” on party and vote, especially from strong-party cities
- Despite heterogeneity, and even when we account for other kinds of constituency similarities
Local Division, National Unity

MarquetteparkCHI1966.jpg  CR64sign.jpg
Urbanicity and race

Possible positions:

- Threat/Rivalry (Mass position)
- Contact-induced toleration (common but not modal)
- Reduced public coordination
- Pluralism ("City interest")
Antiracism without Antiracists

City IHIs associated with early support for civil rights in House

- Pursue urbanizing strategy, while GOP and non-urbanites silent
- Unanimous support for civil rights by those who share local party with Afam Rep
- 7 percent increase in likelihood of support for civil rights by those in strong IHI context

Local institutions driving national political change
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
- Articulate the city position
- Defend/represent that position cohesively
- Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
Who testifies? MCs at hearings on race, 1926-1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>FEP</th>
<th>Polltax</th>
<th>Lynching</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative position</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Dem</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal position</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Dem</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Number of MCs testifying in hearings about race from 1926-1949. Substance of testimonies typically along sectional lines. Nearly all non-congressional testimonies from urbanites.
Urban arguments for racial liberalism, 1926-1949

Early arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens
Aspatial Civil Rights

Although he [the African American] has been in possession of (political and civil rights) for relatively so short a time he has shown himself to be worthy of them. As a free man he has always been amenable to reason and persuasion; as a citizen he has uniformly been a patriot, and as a voter he has consistently aligned himself with the intelligence, the efficiency, the administrative ability, and the forces that stand for order and property. What can be said of any other group of our fellow citizens?

Sen William B. McKinley (R-IL), 1926

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3 “To Prevent and Punish the Crime of Lynching,” Hearing before Subcom on S. 121, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb.16, 1926. p.4
[HRG-1926-SJS-0003]
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Early arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens

New racial liberalism: urban framing

- American pluralism
- Danger of disorder
- Efficiency and production
- Federal legislation can help foster change, mitigate prejudice
Pluralism

Chicago is a melting pot city, as you know. Chicago was built by the people of many lands, of every race, creed, color, and ethnic origin... Negroes are not the only segment of our population that has benefited from the city's [fair employment] policy, for nationality and religious groups benefit when the employer adopts fair employment practices.

Richard J. Daley, 1961

---

Danger of disorder

We [in Detroit] get the jitters. We feel that we are sitting on a powder keg. Our race riot of last summer is still fresh in our memories. . . . Whatever measure of racial harmony we enjoy today in our industrial racial relationships in Detroit is largely attributable to the work of the present FEPC . . . more important than mere civil society and union cooperation.\(^5\)

Clarence Anderson,
Metropolitan Detroit FEP Council, 1944  \(^6\)

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\(^5\)ibid, p. 87

\(^6\)“Fair Employment Practices Act,” Hearing of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Aug 30, 1944. HRG-1944-EDS-0004, p. 87
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Previous arguments about American values/justice, or “worthiness” of African Americans as citizens

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- Danger of disorder
- Efficiency and production
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Despite racial division at home, urban representatives make racial liberalism an urban position at the national level.
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

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- Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
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Figure: Group means on DW-NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores, 1930-1970. In the chamber as a whole, and outside the South, city representatives were more liberal on average.
Table: Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE second-dimension scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (#categories)</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>(Robust Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity(7)</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>(0.029)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat(2)</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>(0.018)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South(2)</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>(0.021)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>(0.013)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE 2nd Dimension scores, 1930-1960. City representatives were on average more “liberal” than suburban or rural representatives on issues of race and region. (*p < .01, N=6313, $R^2 = .70$)
Multivariate Analysis, Civil Rights Liberalism 1933-1963

DV: Agreement with African American position

Predictors of interest

- Urbanicity (City-Suburban-Rural district indicator)
- City delegation descriptor (Indicator for white MCs from city delegation with black MC of the same party)
- Local party strength (TPO score, interacted with Democrat indicator)

Alternative explanations

- Congressional Party (Democrat indicator)
- Section (Non-south indicator)
- Constituency Pressures (Union Density, % Afam, %Far Left)

Sample: Civil Rights roll calls, 73rd-88th Congress
Logit, robust SEs clustered by legislator, vote and congress fixed effects
## Civil Rights Roll Calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year*</th>
<th># of votes</th>
<th>Subject(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Frederick Douglass Statue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anti-lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>School Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fair Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission, Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civil Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table:**  House roll calls about Civil Rights for African Americans by Congress, 1899-1963. *Year Congress began. **Unclear from AIP data what civil rights dimension of this appropriations roll call was. (Source: AIP data)
Logit regression: Agreement with African American position on civil rights

<table>
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<th>Variable (#categories)</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>(Robust SE)</th>
<th>Mfx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity (7)</td>
<td>0.173**</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackPartner</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO*Dem</td>
<td>0.519*</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(Fig.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO (5)</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-south Dem. Seat (2)</td>
<td>2.705**</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Seat (2)</td>
<td>-1.064*</td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-south(2)</td>
<td>1.311**</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackVEP (%)</td>
<td>1.728</td>
<td>(3.755)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union (%)</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Vic. (%)</td>
<td>-1.060**</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dem</td>
<td>-1.705**</td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% FarLeft</td>
<td>3.393</td>
<td>(8.862)</td>
<td>–</td>
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</table>

Table: Civil Rights Liberalism, 1933-1963. ***City representatives and those with a black partner in their city delegation were more likely to support civil rights. Local black partnership was perfect predictor of support, those observations are dropped from this model. Exclusion of the variable does not reduce the magnitude or significance of the other predictors of interest. Marginal effects estimated as expected change in likelihood of agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*p < .05, **p < .01 N=7620, Psuedo-$R^2 = .49$. Estimated with an intercept, vote-level fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered by legislator.)
Party Organization and Support for Civil Rights by Party, 1933-1963

Figure: Probability of support for racially liberal position by TPO (Interaction interpretation). While Republicans from strong-party places were no more likely to support the racially liberal position, Democrats from strong party organizations were about 37 percent more likely to take such a position than their copartisans from places with weak local parties.
City IHIs

City representatives supported civil rights liberalism

- Related to local institutions and “city interest”
- Racism present in streets and city hall, but not in national representation

Analyze IHIs and cohesion directly
Urbanizing Issues: A Model of City Representation

How do cities pursue a “city interest” in higher arenas? (Burns et al 2009)

• Identify an issue as distinctively “urban”
• Articulate the city position
• Defend/represent that position cohesively
• Encourage non-city co-partisans to defer to city position
City Delegation Cohesion, Civil Rights Votes (1940-1970)

**Figure:** Average City Delegation Cohesion on Civil Rights Votes. City delegations with strong IHIIs were more cohesive on civil rights issues. Dotted line indicates congressional party average on all RCs.
Pairwise cohesion

Delegation-level cohesion may be due to other factors

- Partisan composition
- Demographic similarity

Analyze dyads

- Pairs of representatives are building blocks of delegations
- Can account for some alternative hypotheses: PARTY
- Two steps to representation: selection and voting
Regression: Dyadic agreement on civil rights

Unit of analysis: Dyad of two voting legislators
Pool: Civil rights votes, 1933-1963
DV: Agreement on vote
Explanatory: Similarity on...
  • Shared city institutions
  • Shared National Party
  • Constituency similarities (geography, demography, politics)
## Probit regression: Dyad-level agreement on civil rights

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<td>2</td>
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<td>State</td>
<td>.081**</td>
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<td>Racesim</td>
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<td>Classsim</td>
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<td>2,288,558</td>
<td>177,655</td>
<td>6,430</td>
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</table>

### Table: Dyad-level agreement on Civil Rights, 1933-1963.

Key explanatory variables of interest highlighted in gray. Marginal effects for statistically significant coefficients estimated as expected change in likelihood of dyad agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$). Significance estimated with non-parametric shuffling procedure described in Rader et al 2014; significance at $p < .10$ means that observed test statistic (Z-score) lies outside 5-95 percentile range of test statistics for that coefficient in simulated models. Estimated with an intercept, congress-, and vote-level fixed effects not listed here.
Empirical Summary: Civil Rights

City representatives cohesively liberal

• Establish civil rights liberalism as urban position
• More likely to support it
• Traditional party cities particularly cohesive in support
Paradoxes of City Representation: Race

Local-National differences

- “Sharp racial edge” in cities
- Building local coalition with national positions
- Different “portfolios” across levels
- Not-that-cheap talk
Paradoxes of City Representation: Race

Undemocratic liberalism?

• Racial Threat and Ethnic Whites
• Perspective not voiced or voted by machine representatives
• Imperfect but certainly *better*
Big picture

- Local institutions influence character of higher-level representation
- Polarization, Ideology, and Urbanicity
- Democracy and Diversity
Thank you!
Figure: Share of Southern House seats held by Democrats, post-Civil War congresses. (Census Regional Definition)
Democrat v. Density in 1932
Democrat v. Density in 1964
The denser the county, the greater the support for Obama

Source: Mark S. Newman, U.S. Census
The denser the county, the greater the support for Obama

Source: USA Today/Mark Newman, US Census

Tom Ogorzalek Cities on the Hill
City Districts, 2013-

Chicago.pdf
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Table: Proportion of votes on which city delegations were unanimous, Congresses 70-100: Cities with strong IHI strengths are unanimous more often than cities with weaker IHI strengths. Source: USR Data, AIP
Forces for cohesion/Vertical integration

Municipal

- Common local political identity
- Intergovernmental transfers go downtown, not to district
- Norms of reciprocity within organization, repeated interaction

Organizational/Partisan

- Strong local organizations control access to nomination (Mayhew 1986)
- Strong local organizations can mobilize, win all elections, not just local
- Politicians “brung up” in local organizations remain “that way” (Wilson, Snowiss)
Figure: Chicago, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census. African Americans were heavily concentrated within cities like Chicago.

Figure: Chicago, Percent black in congressional districts, 1945. Residential segregation led to political segregation: few congressmen had many black constituents.
Heterogeneity, not just diversity: Eg, Philadelphia, 94th congress

Philly94.png
Heterogeneity, not just diversity

Figure: Cross-District Heterogeneity Among Congressional Delegations (1960-2000): City delegations are almost always more internally heterogeneous than suburban delegations. Source: USR data, Lublin (1997)
Do IHIs enhance cohesion?

Delegation-level cohesion may be due to other factors
  • Partisan composition
  • Demographic similarity

Analyze dyads
  • Pairs of representatives are building blocks of delegations
  • Can account for some alternative hypotheses: PARTY
  • Two steps to representation: selection and voting
Pairwise model

Figure: **City Delegation Theory**: Local city IHIs complicate the traditional model of Congressional representation (denoted by the relationships of $A_1$, $A_2$, and $C$). Factors external to both district and chamber will influence representation.
Representation: selection

Jurisdictional:

$$Pr(Party) = \text{City} + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Organizational:

$$Pr(Party) = \text{City*TPO} + \text{City} + TPO + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon$$ \hspace{1cm} (4)

- Measures are similarity on dimension in question.
- Vote- and Congress-level fixed effects
- Robust SEs and non-parametric estimation
## Tests of City IHI Association with Congressional Party Affinity

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### Table: Probit Regression Results:
City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Congress and vote fixed effects not listed here. *p < .05

**Motivation**
City Delegations
Civil Rights
Urbanizing Race
Liberalism
Cohesion
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**Table: Marginal Effects:** City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional dyads. *p < .05
Figure: Strength of Same-city effect on large-city dyads by organization-type. Congressional dyads, 1939-1999. Difference in slope significant at $p < .05$. Diff-in-diff: .09.
Motivation
City Delegations
Civil Rights
Urbanizing Race
Liberalism
Cohesion

Jursidictional:

\[ Pr(AgreeVote) = City + Party + Region + Section + State + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  

(5)

Organizational (Same City Only):

\[ Pr(AgreeVote) = TPO + Race + Class + Urbanicity + \epsilon \]  

(6)
Tests of City IHI Influence on Roll Call Voting

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Table: Probit Regression Results: DV: agreement on vote, independent variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Shaded rows are coefficients of interest. All models include (unlisted) congress- and vote-specific fixed effects, and model 7 also includes city fixed effects. *$p < .05$
**Probit regression: Dyad-level agreement on civil rights**

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**Table:** Dyad-level agreement on Civil Rights, 1933-1963. Dyads from strong-party cities were more likely to agree on civil rights roll calls. Key explanatory variables of interest highlighted in gray. Marginal effects for statistically significant coefficients estimated as expected change in likelihood of dyad agreement given one-category shift in the dependent variable, other variables held constant at appropriate values (*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$). Significance estimated with non-parametric shuffling procedure described in Rader et al 2014; significance at $p < .10$ means that observed test statistic (Z-score) lies outside 5-95 percentile range of test statistics for that coefficient in simulated models. Estimated with an intercept, congress-, and vote-level fixed effects not listed here.
Dyadic Estimation: Significance Test

Dyadic Agreement as DV

- Observations not independent (voters appear in many dyads)
- Higher change of Type 1 Error with Robust Standard Errors
- Non-Parametric Significance Test (Rader et al 2014)
- Shuffle explanatory variable of interest 1000x
- Save simulated test statistics, compare distribution to observed
Dyadic Estimation: Significance Test

Figure: Significance of SameCity, Model 5, Dyad Vote Analysis. Density plot of simulated Z-scores
Cohesion scores

Cohesion: To what extent is a bloc voting cohesively?

- 1 = Perfect Cohesion, 0 = Evenly split

- Cohesion = \[ \frac{|Yea - Nay|}{Total} \]

- Bias correction when comparing blocs of very different sizes (Desposato 2005)

- \[ E(C | Yea, Nay, Total) = \frac{Yea(Yea - 1) + Nay(Nay - 1)}{Total(Total - 1)} \]

Likeness: How alike are two blocs of voters?

- 1 = Identical in proportions, 0 = Completely in disagreement

- \[ \text{Likeness}_{AB} = 1 - \left| \frac{Yea_A}{Total_A} - \frac{Yea_B}{Total_B} \right| \]