CHICAGO → POLITICS
POLITICS → CHICAGO

GOVERNING THE GLOBAL METROPOLIS

THOMAS OGORZALEK, NU POLI SCI
TODAY

Chicago Politics

• History of “The Machine”
• Contemporary Chicago politics
• In broader context: Urbanicity and “Blue America”
• Some policies and Q & A

Urban political science
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

What is a city?

What characteristics make cities distinctive?
What is a city?

What characteristics make cities distinctive?

What makes *Chicago* distinctive?
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

What is a city?

- Density
- Heterogeneity
- Size
- Centrality

Cities are high-maintenance places, with a high demand for governance.
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

Cities are high-maintenance places, with a *high demand* for governance

- Redistribution
- Public goods
- Regulation
- Intergroup comity—getting along with difference
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

Cities are high-maintenance places, with a *high demand* for governance

- Redistribution
- Public goods
- Regulation
- Intergroup comity—getting along with difference

But they are also *constrained*

- Formal limits by state government
- Logical limits by federalism: interjurisdictional competition
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

• High demand, but constraints

• Solutions
  • Institutions to help govern
  • Political organization
IDEAL DEMOCRACY

Popular Will → Government
REAL DEMOCRACY

Institutions = “Rules of the Game” (Formal and Informal)
REAL DEMOCRACY

Popular Will → Political Party → Government
MACHINE POLITICS: 
FACTIONAL ORGANIZATION

(AKA Clientelism)

Political Support/Loyalty

Ward Boss

(Precinct Captains)

Ward Boss

(Precinct Captains)

Ward Boss

(Precinct Captains)

Particularistic Goods
POLITICAL MACHINE: UNIFIED HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION

Political Support/Loyalty →

Ward Boss

→

Ward Boss

→

(Precinct Captains)

(Precinct Captains)

(Precinct Captains)

Particularistic Goods →
1ST DEMOCRAT SLATE NAMING SESSION HELD: Subgroup to Get Job of Dumping 3 Judges

Tagge, George
Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963); Dec 21, 1955;
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1987)
p. 7

1ST DEMOCRAT SLATE NAMING SESSION HELD

Subgroup to Get Job of Dumping 3 Judges

BY GEORGE TAGGE

Mayor Daley yesterday attended the first meeting of the Democratic slatemaking committee, with prospects that selection of state candidates will be put off until after Jan. 3.

Chairman Joseph L. Gill of the slate committee said he will appoint a subcommittee of five on Municipal court candidates. It was reported that the small group will be assigned the unpleasant chore of dumping three judges.

Bar Group Raps Four

The Chicago Bar association recommended recently that the Democratic organization deny its endorsement to Judges John T. Zuris, Victor A. Kula, Mason S. Sullivan, and John R. McSweeney.

It is reported that party leaders have decided not to relist Zuris and McSweeney, although McSweeney topped the low foursome in the bar poll.
CHICAGO MACHINE

Distinctive features

• Consolidates later than other major cities (1930s)
• Closer ties to national Democrats
• Last longer into present

Character of decisionmaking

• Unanimity as a group
• Local autonomy
MACHINE POLITICS, CHICAGO-STYLE

- 1860s-1920s, factional machine politics
- “Big Bill” Thompson, Republican boss
  - Charismatic personal leader
- Democrats have 4 main factions:
  - Two led by “boss” types
  - Two led by “reform” types
MACHINE CONSOLIDATION, CHICAGO-STYLE

- Republican disintegration
- Cermak takes leadership in Dems
- Installs allies in top Dem leadership positions
- Immigrant appeals: “A House for all Peoples”
  - “Pushcart Tony”
- Ethnic hierarchy
  - Irish
  - Slavic
- Kelly forges strong link to FDR
  - Federal patronage via New Deal
CHICAGO’S ETHNIC ENCLAVES
Democratic consolidation: Cermak, Kelly, Nash (1920s-1940s)

City-wide dominance: Richard J. Daley (1950s-1970s)

Fracture and Insurgency: Byrne, Washington (1970s-1980s)

Retrenchment/Re-formation: Daley (1990s-2000s)

Today?
CHICAGO MACHINE: CORE AND PERIPHERY

Substantive
• Offices
• Patronage
• Services

Symbolic
• Recognition
• Holidays
• Parades
CHICAGO MACHINE: CORE AND PERIPHERY

Egs.

Kelly, Daley, Sabath

Pucinski, Rostenkowski, Marzullo

Washington, Chico
CHICAGO MACHINE AND RACIAL SUBORDINATION

- Growing black population
- 1900-1947: swing constituency
- 1947-1959: Strong Dems, provide margin of victory
- After 1959: Strong Dems, but superfluous bloc
VOTING, CHICAGO

(Keiser 1997)
CHICAGO MACHINE: BLACK POLITICAL SUBORDINATION

- Growing black population
- 1900-1947: swing constituency
- 1947-1959: Strong Dems, provide margin of victory

- Marginalized constituency
- Fewer Services and Jobs
- Peripheral place in machine
  - Dawson remains as sub-boss
- 1960s: Racial issues rise in prominence
  - Machine takes locally conservative stance
BLACK EMPOWERMENT, CHICAGO-STYLE

- By 1980, Chicago is 40% African American
- Several large cities have had black mayors
- Harold Washington, ex-machine Reform candidate, launches campaign
BLACK EMPOWERMENT, CHICAGO-STYLE

• By 1980, Chicago is 40% African American
• Several large cities have had black mayors
• Harold Washington, ex-machine Reform candidate, launches campaign
• Wins primary v incumbent mayor (Byrne) and Daley (son)
• Divisive racial politics in general election:
  • http://mediaburn.org/video/image-union-episode-608/#video
• Partisanship displaced by race
1983 MAYORAL ELECTION: DEM PRIMARY
ORDER-FRACTURE-REORDER

1975 Primary Election, Mayor, Chicago, IL
Election Map by Ward

1975 General Election, Mayor, Chicago, IL
Election Map by Ward

Scale=370000, Centered at 41.86 N,88.775 W, projection=Mercator

(Crystal Media)
ORDER-FRACTURE-REORDER

1991 Primary Election, Mayor, Chicago, Illinois (Democratic Party)
Election Map by Ward

1991 General Election, Mayor, Chicago, Illinois
Election Map by Ward

SCALE=370000, CENTERED AT 41.86 N, 88.775 W, PROJECTION=Mercator

(City of Chicago Democracy Project)
1999 General Election, Mayor, Chicago, Illinois
Election Map by Ward

Scale=370000, Centered at 41.86 N,88.775 W, projection=Mercator

(Richard M. Daley
Bobby L. Rush)
ORDER-FRACTURE REORDER

Daley Vote Share, 2007

- 48%
- 49% - 50%
- 51% - 60%
- 61% - 75%
- 76% - 93%
SUCCESSION, RETRENCHMENT

Richard J Daley (1953-1976)
SUCCESSION, RETRENCHMENT

Richard J Daley (1953-1976)


Rahm Emanuel (2011-)
SUCCESSION, RETRENCHMENT (NYC)

Ed Koch (1978-89)

David Dinkins (1989-93)

Rudy Giuliani (1993-2001)
SUCCESSION, RETRENCHMENT (LA)

CHICAGO, 2015

How should we understand the 2015 election and Chicago’s current political climate?

• Re-emergence of Machine?
• “One percent” against neighborhoods/”working families”?
• Intramural Democratic Party politics?
CHICAGO, 2015: CONTEXT

• Emanuel as first “post-machine” mayor (?)
• Never been a run-off (since shift to non-partisan, 1989)
  • Anti-incumbent mood heads down-ticket
• Progressive Caucus opposed to Emanuel
• Karen Lewis and CTU
  • Endorse Garcia
  • (Some) unions v. “Chicago Forward” (Emanuel SuperPAC)
Like city council, but for the county.

Formerly alderman and state senator

Represents area on SW side, including Little Village, heavily Latino area (esp. Mexican and Mexican-American)
EMANUEL, 2011 AND 2015 (WARDS)
DID ANYTHING “HAPPEN?”

Biggest *changes* might be

- Closer contestation: drops in support for Emanuel, runoff
- Added seats (but still not majority, or close) to City Council’s Progressive Caucus
CHICAGO, 2015

How should we understand the 2015 election and Chicago’s current political climate?

• Re-emergence of Machine?
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• Intramural Democratic Party politics?
RE-EMERGENCE OF MACHINE?

Some continuity with “old” hyperlocal machine organization
- Burke, Madigan
- Emanuel allies

But Richard M. Daley also reconstituted coalition
- Downtown “development” coalition
- Centralized investment, neoliberal service model
- Emanuel is continuity with this
CHICAGO, 2015

How should we understand the 2015 election and Chicago’s current political climate?

• Re-emergence of Machine?
• One percent against neighborhoods/”working families”?
• Intramural Democratic Party politics?
IDENTITIES IN CHICAGO

• How salient are group identities?
• Chicago demography changing
  • Lots of immigration, esp. Latinx
  • Increase in white pop
  • Slow decrease in black pop
  • Polarization → Fragmentation
• Candidates drew from bases in first round
ETHNORACIAL IDENTITIES IN 1983

• Turnout: 82% !
• In South Side wards, Washington got >95%
• In whiter Machine-dominated wards, Washington got <10%
• (Some in between)
ETHNORACIAL BLOCS IN CHICAGO 2015
POLARIZATION V FRACTIONALIZATION

Population
- Group 1
- Group 2

Population
- Group 1
- Group 2
- Group 3
- Group 4
EMANUEL’S SUPPORT ERODES ON SOUTH AND WEST

Emanuel Support by CA, 2011

Emanuel Support by CA, 2015

(Double-click to enter text)
EMANUEL SUPPORT ERODES MOST AMONG AFAM

![Graph showing Emanuel 2015 vs. Emanuel 2011 data with a fitted line. The x-axis represents % Afam, the y-axis represents Emanuel 2015-Emanuel 2011. The fitted line indicates a negative correlation.]
SCHOOLS AND EMANUEL SHIFT

Support for Elected School Board (2015)

School Closings and Change in Support

Legend
YESPSB
- Not on ballot
- 0.000001 - 0.696654
- 0.696655 - 0.850800
- 0.850801 - 0.910783
- 0.910784 - 0.988400
CHI LATINX VOTING
Support for Garcia vs. % White

CHICAGO: THE AFAM CLOUD
NYC: THE GENTRY-CLOUD
NYC vs CHI: Who are the “Working Families”?

Largely Latinx and working class neighborhoods; NOT majority white areas.

“Brownstone” gentrifying areas; majority white, upper-middle class.
CHICAGO, 2015

How should we understand the 2015 election and Chicago’s current political climate?

• Re-emergence of Machine?
• One percent against neighborhoods/“working families”?
• Intramural Democratic Party politics?
URBANICITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIG-CITY GOVERNANCE

- High demand, but constraints

- Solutions
  - Political organization
  - Efficiency (to meet demand despite constraints)
  - Institutional manipulation (to subvert some demand)
  - National-level alliance (to meet demand and ease constraints)**

**
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE: 2004
URBAN PARTISANSHIP

Proportion of City Representatives in Democratic Party

Proportion of Dem. Representatives from City Districts
## CHICAGO MAYORS, 1931-PRESENT: ALL DEMOCRATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anton Cermak</td>
<td>1931-1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Kelly</td>
<td>1933-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Kennelly</td>
<td>1947-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard J. Daley</td>
<td>1955-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Bilandic</td>
<td>1976-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Byrne</td>
<td>1979-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Washington</td>
<td>1983-1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eugene Sawyer</td>
<td>1987-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard M. Daley</td>
<td>1989-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahm Emanuel*</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRAMURALS

- Emanuel with strong links to “downtown” interests
  - Centrist Democrat
  - “Neoliberal governance”

- Garcia/CTU/United Working Families
  - Advocates more redistribution and inequality-mitigation

Closer to each other than to GOP
INTRAMURALS

- Emanuel with strong links to “downtown” interests
  - Centrist Democrat
  - Advocates mix of policies: “Neoliberal governance”

- Garcia/CTU/United Working Families
  - Progressive Democrat
  - Advocates more redistribution and inequality-mitigation

Differences ideological, but also due to institutional positions

- Some say redistributive politics should be reserved for higher levels
CHUY AND BERNIE

Garcia 2015 (1st Round)

Sanders 2016
PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS

"Progressive" Caucus, 2015
- Green: Not
- Orange: Signed on
- Light Yellow: Probably
EMANUEL AND CLINTON

% for Clinton, 2016 Dem Primary

eman15rop vs hrc16pdemp eman15rop
CHICAGO, 2015

How should we understand the 2015 election and Chicago’s current political climate?

• Re-emergence of Machine?
• One percent against neighborhoods/”working families”?
• Intramural Democratic Party politics?
CURRENT ISSUES

Police reform
Budget impasse
Sanctuary cities and immigration
CPS
POLICE REFORM

Pattern of excessive force

- Shootings
- Torture
- Black site
- Stop, Question, Frisk

Justice Dept consent decree in jeopardy
LAQUAN MCDONALD REACTION
BUDGET IMPASSE(S)

No state budget for 3 years

• Chicago-led Dems v Rauner-led GOP

• “Discretionary” programs languish
BUDGET IMPASSE(S)

Local, recurrent budget crises

• Privatization wave diminished revenues

• TIFs and special districts silo money

• Big cities ALWAYS have funding scarcity
Chicago: ~22% foreign-born, largely Latinx

Drumpf Threatens to Cut Off Funding From ‘Sanctuary Cities’

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (SADIE GURMAN)
April 22, 2017, 1:50 AM CDT
CPS (V CTU)

Recurrent conflict over:
- Charter schools
- Teacher contract
- Overall funding

Forrest Claypool, CPS
Karen Lewis, CTU
CURRENT ISSUES

Police reform
Budget impasse
Sanctuary cities and immigration
CPS
FURTHER READING

Chicago machine:

• Milton Rakove Don’t Make No Waves, Don’t Back No Losers
• Rakove We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent
• Richard Keiser Subordination or Empowerment?
• Mike Royko Boss
• Roger Biles Daley
• William Grimshaw Bitter Fruit
• Larry Bennett The Third City
• Simpson and Spiro Building the City of Spectacle
PLAY WITH THE DATA

Chicago Democracy Project @ NU Poli Sci
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE? NOT IN 1916
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE? NOT IN 1932
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE? NOT IN 1932

Graphs by stusab
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE! BY 1960

Graphs by stusab
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AL</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>FL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
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<td>NJ</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>WI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graphs by stusab

logpopdens

-5 0 5 10

-5 0 5 10
URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE, 2008
### MACHINE POLITICS V

#### POLITICAL MACHINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine politics</th>
<th>Political Machines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Style of politics</td>
<td>Particular organizations, successful at machine politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubiquitous in 19\textsuperscript{th}, early 20\textsuperscript{th} c.</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often factional</td>
<td>Highly organized/disciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on particularistic exchange</td>
<td>Based on particularistic exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bridges) (Erie)</td>
<td>(Shefter) (Ansell and Burris) (Trounstine in <em>Monopolies</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tammany Hall (always)</td>
<td>Tammany (under Croker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago (since ~1870s)</td>
<td>Chicago Democrats (since 1933)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Many cities experience machine politics, but not all experience the political machine”
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

- Interjurisdictional competition
- Mobility of capital, residents
- “City” has organic interest; like a firm
- Three kinds of policies:
  - Developmental (“Growth”, benefits above-median)
  - Allocational (Housekeeping, neutral)
  - Redistributive (Benefits below-median)
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

[Graph showing the relationship between income and the number of people.]
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

Pressure for redistribution

# of people

Median

Income/Wealth
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

Pressure for redistribution

# of people

$\rightarrow$

Median
Income/Wealth
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

“Logic of interjurisdictional competition”
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

“Logic of interjurisdictional competition”

Hi Tax, Hi Service

Low Tax, Low Service

Low Tax, Hi Service
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

• Sears: Chicago → Hoffman Estates → ?
• Cubs to leave Chicago?
• Texas: Open for business

• “Race to the bottom?”
MODEL 2: THE LIMITED CITY

- Interjurisdictional competition
- Mobility of capital, residents
- “City” has organic interest; like a firm
- Three kinds of policies (Peterson):
  - Developmental (“Growth”, benefits above-median)
  - Allocational (Housekeeping, neutral)
  - Redistributive (Benefits below-median)
    - (Let higher levels do this)
If a CA had a closed school, Emanuel’s drop was (on average) 10 pts larger
COMMUNITY AREAS AND WARDS

Wards, 2015

Community Areas

(Change)

(Don’t Change)
TURNOUT DROPPED ABOUT 10% OVERALL
RUNOFF TURNOUT: UP A LITTLE
BIG-CITY TURNOUT: DECLINING

Governing Magazine
IDENTITIES

• How salient are group identities?

• Chicago demography changing
  • Lots of immigration, esp. Latino
  • Increase in white pop
  • Slow decrease in black pop
  • Polarization → Fragmentation

• Candidates drew from bases in first round
CHI CLASS VOTING: PRIMARY
“In order for anything to be done under public auspices, the elaborate decentralization of authority. . . must be overcome or set aside.”

-Edward Banfield and James Wilson, City Politics
CITY DEMOCRACY
CITY DEMOCRACY

District

Intermediate City Institutions

Representation
Distinctive polities

- Often much more diverse than USA
  - Increasingly “Fractionalized”
  - Racial and ethnic appeals common
  - Coalitions of blocs often necessary for win: “power brokers”
POLARIZATION VS FRACTIONALIZATION

Population

- Group 1
- Group 2

Population

- Group 1
- Group 2
- Group 3
- Group 4
RACIALLY POLARIZED ELECTIONS

• Often very heated rhetoric, high level of mobilization
• Creates (by itself) high degree of group conflict
• Common when relative sizes/statuses are changing
  • Especially when majority fading
  • ”Group threat”
• Race displaces partisanship/ideology
• Turnout/mobilization more decisive than persuasion

• Eg Chicago 1983 (Washington-Epton), NYC 1993 (Giuliani-Dinkins)
RACE, PARTISANSHIP, AND VOTING

Political condition for "group threat" theory

Applies *mainly* to white voters in polarized electorates...minority blocs usually cohesive)

Kaufmann
POLARIZATION V FRACTIONALIZATION

USA
- White
- AfAm
- Latinx
- Asian
- Other

Chicago
- White
- AfAm
- Latinx
- Asian

New York
- White
- AfAm
- Latinx
- Asian
ETHNORACIAL FRACTIONALIZATION

• Makes cross-group coalitions necessary
  • Groups often vote as blocs—"power brokers"
  • Makes polarizing racial appeals less common

• Rainbow coalitions?
  • Not automatic (eg. AfAm and Afro-Caribbean in NYC)
  • Segregation—groups often in different constituencies, leading to ethnic appeals
  • Competition—scarce goods, offices
  • Coalitions require a lot of coordination and maintenance

• Mobilization often uneven across groups
CHICAGO: CRIME RATES DOWN BEFORE SQF

Figure 8.1. Trends in Recorded Crime, 1991–2003

(Skogan 2006)
CHICAGO — Chicago is like a "warn-torn" country, Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump said during the first presidential debate Monday night.

"It is terrible there," Trump said, reiterating his
SQF: CHICAGO

New York City 2011  685,700 / 8,230,000 = 83/1,000
Chicago       2014  718,000 / 2,700,000 = 266/1,000
The Survey
Conducted by UofI Survey Research Laboratory

1,450 respondents

Address-based sample
Rs randomly selected from household members 16+
up to ten recontact attempts
interviews evenings and weekends
English or Spanish
personal interviews in living-rooms and kitchens
$40 cash incentive for participating
follow-up validations of 10% of interviews

Response rate 28%
biggest issue addresses where contact never made
cooperation rate (among contacts) 52%
white households lowest response rate due to non-contacts

Questions about encounters with police cover calendar 2014-2015
Analytic Sample

clustered variety of data by census tract major race and lifestyle clusters

sampled from each cluster
better-off blacks (yellow)
poor blacks (green)
lakefront whites (red)
bungalow belt whites (orange)
hispanic port-of-entry (purple)
hispanic established (blue)
diverse non-hispanic immigrants

1,700,000 residents of the clusters

Can be weighted for household size and proportions in each cluster
Step 1: Screen for Encounters

Have you ever been stopped by Chicago police in a car or on a motorcycle; as driver or passenger; when out walking, or shopping, or just standing around?” for any other reason?

72% recalled a stop

For each category did this happen in the past 12 months?

30% stopped once/more in past 12 months

If more than one encounter in past 12 months identify the most recent

Follow-up questions regarding what happened during recent encounter

a lot happened
What is a “stop & frisk”?  

Operational definition: stopped, but no arrest and no ticket issued  
(note this is a metaphor – not everyone who is stopped is frisked)

This is the same definition as a Chicago recorded stop

By this definition, of the 30% stopped by police in past year:
  25% “enforcement” stops (arrested or ticketed)
  75% “investigative” stops, or “stop & frisk”

Stop & frisk involved 22% of the population surveyed – a Big Number
  (if a) Chicago pop estimate = 466,000 people 16+ stop/frisked

Hard to tell if 30% stopped or 22% stop/frisk is a high or low number
  - every survey study uses different measurement strategies
  - police records count stops, not people, and there are many repeat people

My most recent earlier Chicago survey (2003) found 20% stopped
• SQF the predominate recent experience people had with police
• young men and racial minorities the most frequent targets
• A lot happens during stop/frisks
• Use of force is very common
• Use of force is very racially disparate
Views of Police by Race and Language

Chicago 2003

stop without good reason

percent rating some or big problem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos-English</th>
<th>Latinos-Spanish</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos-English</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

use excessive force

percent rating some or big problem

<table>
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<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chocolate 2003

some problem  big problem
“Round Up The Usual Suspects”
Repeated stops impose their own, additional burden more than inconvenience; additional injustice loom large in people’s lives – when and where they go signal particular disrespect
SQF Effects: Trust

• Trust is among the most important components of procedural justice theory

• Related to
  • support for the police among taxpayers and voters
  • cooperating with police
  • involvement in community policing and prevention project
  • crime reporting and stepping forward as witnesses
  • self-reports of offending
Measure of Generalized Trust in Police

How often do police try to find the best solutions for people's problems in this neighborhood?

How likely is it that people's basic rights will be well protected by the Chicago police?

How likely is it that the leaders of the Chicago police will make decisions that are good for everyone in the city?

How sincere are police working in this neighborhood about trying to help people with their problems?

How honest are police working in this neighborhood?

How much of the time can the police be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in this neighborhood?

Cronbach’s Alpha .90; avg r=.59; single factor=67% of total variance
Figure 4  Trust in Police by Stop Experience and Race

percentages are declines from a "no contact" baseline

- black
  - no contact: 45%
  - SQF: 33%

- white
  - no contact: -18%
  - SQF: -7%

- hispanic
  - no contact: -21%
  - SQF: 15%

- other
  - no contact: -12%
  - SQF: -26%

- moderate trust
- high trust
Regression Analysis - Impact of Encounters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>trust in the police</th>
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<td>-0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>income</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>male</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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R=.38  \( R^2=.15 \)
N=1,450
### Regression Analysis - Impact of Procedural Justice

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R = .64  R² = .41
N = 339

### Sample Questions
When you talked to the police, how polite were they to you?
How satisfied were you with the time and opportunity they gave to you to tell your story?
To what extent do you believe the police made their decisions based on the facts?
Do you think you got what you deserved according to the law?
The Impact of Positive and Negative Contacts in Four Cities

"Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police." Police & Society, 206
The Impact of Positive and Negative Contacts in Four More Places

"Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police." Police & Society, 206