Civic Education and Democratic Backsliding in the Wake of Kenya’s Post- 2007 Election Violence

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Abstract

This paper examines two previously unexplored questions related to the impact of civic education programs in emerging democracies: 1) whether such programs have longer-terms effects, and 2) whether civic education can be effective in the context of democratic “backsliding.” We investigate these questions in the context of a large-scale civic education program implemented in Kenya between 2006 and 2007. The program ended just before the disputed 2007 election that sparked a wave of ethnic clashes that killed more than 1,000 people, displaced at least 350,000 from their homes, and brought the country to the brink of civil war. Data come from a survey of 3,600 respondents conducted in late-2008, about nine months after the violence. We test for program effects across a range of dependent variables, and find that the program did have longer-term effects, particularly on variables related to civic competence and engagement. It had less consistent effects, however, on core democratic values and orientations. These findings are consistent with previous studies of the short-term effects of civic education. Intriguingly, we also find that the program had positive effects related to Kenya’s post-election violence. Participants in the program who subsequently were affected by the violence were less likely (relative to non-participants who were later affected by the violence) to adopt negative beliefs about Kenya’s political system, less likely to support the use of ethnic or political violence, and more likely to forgive those responsible for the post-election violence.
1. Introduction

Democracy works better when citizens possess attitudes and values that are conducive to multiparty politics and where citizens participate actively in the political process. There is considerable debate about the particular configuration of dispositions and behaviors that are most conducive to democratic development, but the notion that democracy can be strengthened by encouraging ordinary citizens to adopt certain values and behaviors is a near-truism. Belief in this truism among international donors has inspired a wide range of policies and programs designed to further mass democratic culture around the world. Civic education programs, in particular, have emerged as a core component of efforts by the U.S. and other Western countries to aid the consolidation of democratic practices in emerging democracies. While little data is available on the extent of such efforts, one recent study estimated that the main U.S. donor, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), alone spent between 35 and 50 million dollars per year on civic education worldwide from 1990 to 2005 (Finkel and Smith 2008).

Can donor-sponsored civic education programs work in emerging democracies? Recent evaluations among both school-age children and adults in a variety of new democratic settings offer some evidence that such programs can be effective (Bratton et al. 1999; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Finkel 2002; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Slomcyznski and Shabad 1998). Yet important questions remain. In this paper, we present the findings of an evaluation of a national civic education program implemented in Kenya between 2006 and 2007. We seek to contribute to the literature in two specific ways. First, we ask whether civic education has long-term effects. Most prior research has relied on surveys that were conducted shortly after the programs ended, making it impossible to determine whether the observed effects
were transitory or more enduring. For reasons explained below, we were forced to delay our examination of Kenya’s civic education program until nearly a year after it had ended. While this created a number of logistical challenges, it also provided an opportunity to examine the longer-term effects of the program. Second, this study seeks to understand whether civic education programs can work in countries experiencing democratic reversals. Nearly all the studies cited above were conducted in countries that were on a positive trajectory, such as the Dominican Republic, Zambia, Poland and South Africa in the mid-to-late 1990s, or Kenya at the time of its democratic breakthrough election of 2002. It may be that civic education has greater effects in countries that are on the road to consolidation, where citizens may be particularly receptive to civic education interventions. Less is known about the potential contribution of civic education in settings like Kenya during the elections of 2007, where the consolidation of democracy was challenged by intense ethnic political mobilization, widespread violence, and electoral fraud.

We explore these questions through an examination of the Second Kenya National Civic Education Programme (NCEP II-Uraia), a large-scale civic education program carried out in Kenya during the run-up to the 2007 elections. Our data come from a 2008 survey of 1,800 individuals who attended at least one NCEP II-Uraia civic education event and 1,800 similar non-attendees. Because Kenyan citizens freely chose whether to participate in NCEP II-Uraia activities, we expected that the treatment group (participants) would differ in systematic ways from the control group (non-participants), making it difficult to determine whether any \textit{ex post} differences between the two groups could be attributed to the program rather than to other \textit{ex ante} disparities between the groups. To address concerns related to selection bias, we employ a three-fold approach. First, at the sampling stage we developed a matching protocol in which
each respondent who reported participating in the program was carefully matched with a similar respondent who had not participated. This ensured that the control and treatment groups were well balanced in terms of age, education, gender, and group membership. Second, we used matching at the estimation stage to further reduce the remaining disparities between the groups and to ensure that the two groups had a common support. Third, we collected data on a wide range of covariates to allow us to control for differences across the treatment and control groups that were not addressed by the first two steps. The strategy results in one of the more rigorous set of procedures for dealing with selection bias yet undertaken in observational research in the field.

Three main findings emerge from this study. First, in line with previous research, we find that the program had the most consistent long-term effects on a set of variables related to “civic competence and engagement” – e.g., political knowledge, efficacy, and participation. It was, however, significantly less effective on influencing most core democratic values and orientations. Second, the program nevertheless had positive effects on some variables related to ethnic tolerance and on support for the peaceful resolution of ethnic and political conflict, a key concern in Kenya’s multiethnic democracy and especially in the aftermath of the widespread and tragic violence following the 2007 elections. Third, we find that the program played some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the post-election violence itself. The direct experience of post-election violence did much to undermine individual’s faith in Kenyan democracy and their role in it, but these negative effects were attenuated among those who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. To this extent, the program was at least partially successful in preventing even more disillusionment and democratic backsliding as a result of the events that occurred in Kenya after the program had formally concluded.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the existing literature and unanswered questions regarding the effects of civic education. We then provide background on the NCEP II-Uraia program and the context of the study. We then describe our estimation strategy, focusing particularly on our efforts to address concerns about selection bias. We then present the results and conclude.

2. Civic Education in Emerging Democracies: Unanswered Questions

Donor-sponsored civic education programs in emerging democracies are typically designed to promote a bundle of norms, values, and behaviors thought to be conducive to democratic politics. While the goals and methods vary across countries, civic education programs generally seek to provide citizens with knowledge about how the political process works, encourage active participation, and attempt to instill values such as tolerance and support for individual liberties. Civic education programs typically work through some mix of school-based initiatives geared toward students, community-based activities (workshops, meetings, village theater, etc.) aimed at adults, and in some case, media campaigns as well.

While only a handful of quantitative studies have been conducted, the consensus within the existing literature is that civic education can be effective, especially on variables related to knowledge, participation, and civic engagement. On political knowledge, Finkel and Ernst (2005), for example, found that high-school students in South Africa who received civic instructions on a regular basis possessed greater knowledge of the country’s constitution and were better able to identify key national leaders than students who were exposed less frequently or not at all. On participation, a separate study found that programs implemented in three disparate settings – the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa – increased citizen
participation in local politics by a significant margin (Finkel 2002; Finkel 2003a). Existing
studies, however, have found that civic education programs generally have more limited effects
on citizen orientations, such as political tolerance or institutional trust, though some modest
effects have been documented (Bratton, Alderfer, Bowser, and Temba, 1999; Finkel 2003a;
Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis, 2000).

Recent experimental studies, both from mature and emerging democracies, lend credence
to the idea that programs implemented by civic groups can have important effects on attitudes
and behaviors. A large experimental literature on get-out-the-vote efforts in the U.S. has shown
that non-partisan voter mobilization programs can increase electoral participation (Gerber and
Green 2000; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003). Though research in emerging democracies is
less developed, two recent studies are noteworthy. Collier and Vicente (2010) found that an anti-
violece campaign implemented by a non-governmental organization in Nigeria was effective in
increasing turnout rates in the country’s 2007 election. Green and Paluck (2009) found that
exposure to a radio program in Rwanda increased citizens’ willingness to express dissent with
peers and reduced willingness to defer to local officials when dealing with community problems.

While the existing literature provides evidence that civic education programs of various
types can be effective, a number of questions remain. In this study we focus on two issues.
First, we ask whether civic education has long-term effects or whether its effects are more
ephemeral. There is good reason to suspect that civic education might have minimal longer-term
impact. Much of the existing literature on political culture suggests that attitudes and
dispositions ought to change very slowly and mainly in response to large-scale trends in
countries’ economic, political, and social structures (Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963;
Dalton 1994; Weil 1993) If these accounts are correct, we should expect that while civic
education might have positive short-term effects, such programs will be less likely to produce deeper effects that will be sustained over time. Moreover, nearly all existing studies of civic education look for effects relatively shortly after the programs have ended. Less is known about whether effects remain over time, or whether citizens return to their prior predispositions and orientations long after programs have ended.

A second question relates to the potential importance of contextual factors. While civic education programs have been implemented in many different types of settings, nearly all existing evaluation come from countries that were on a positive trajectory at the time of the research. It may be hypothesized that citizens are most willing to adopt new attitudes and behaviors in settings where opportunities for political engagement are expanding, and where the messages from civic education reinforce positive experiences with democratic change. On the other hand, the earliest studies of civic education found that greater effects among students were seen when civic education messages were “non-redundant” to the democratic messages that young adults may have heard in their family and friendship circles (Langton and Jennings 1968). To this extent, it may be the case that civic education is even more effective in less democratic contexts or in countries experiencing political violence or other kinds of democratic reversals. Without evidence to this point from civic education evaluations in more negative, authoritarian, or “backsliding” contexts, we simply do not know which of these processes is more prevalent.

3. The Second Kenya National Civic Education Program (NCEP II-Uraia)

We examine these issues through an evaluation of the second round of Kenya’s National Civic Education Program (NCEP II), which ran from April 2006 to September 2007. NCEP II, which was funded by a basket of European donors, sought to build on the lessons of a prior civic
education program (NCEP I), which was conducted in Kenya from 2001 to 2002 (Finkel 2003b, Finkel and Smith 2008). The program took the name “Uraia”, meaning “citizenship” in Kiswahili. The program was implemented by forty-three Kenyan civil society and religious institutions organized into four larger consortia.¹ These organizations conducted a wide variety of activities, including workshops, village theater performances, informal meetings in churches and mosques, cultural gatherings, and other public events. Records collected by the Program (which we later used for sampling purposes) show that approximately 79,000 unique events were held. The program also funded a media campaign that included television, radio, and newspaper. While it is not possible to determine the number of people reached by the program with certainty, we estimate that the program reached between 4.5 and 5.5 million individuals through its face-to-face components (roughly 21% to 26% of the adult population).²

The program was designed around five key themes: 1) nation-building, 2) democracy, 3) good governance, 4) constitutionalism, and 5) human rights. The activities conducted under the NCEP II rubric sought to increase individuals’ level of awareness and knowledge of these five thematic areas, as well as to cultivate the skills, values, and dispositions that would facilitate effective citizen participation, that would serve to hold political elites accountable, and that would enable individuals to assert and defend their political and human rights against possible encroachment by the state or other members of Kenyan society.³ Most of the orientations that

¹ The consortia were Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRE-CO), Consortium for Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities (CEDMAC), Ecumenical Civic Education Programme (ECEP), and National Muslim Civic Education Consortium (NAMCEC). The first three consortia listed had also participated in NCEP I.

² This estimate is based on the total figure of 10 million individuals trained, as reported in program documents, discounted by the level of multiple exposures to program events reported by participants in our survey. The United Nations estimated that in 2006 there were approximately 39 million Kenyans and that 54% of these were adults (16+). Source: World Bank Development Indicators.

³ These goals are explicitly laid out in the program documents that the Study Team consulted, including David Everatt (Strategy and Tactics), Kenya National Civic Education Program Phase II (NCEP II) Framework Report, Prepared for Danida (Kenya), July 2004; and Kenya’s National Civic Education Programme: The Uraia Manual,
NCEP II sought to influence – including awareness of politics, rights, and citizen responsibilities, skills, support for democratic values, tolerance and political participation – are well known to political scientists as precisely those aspects of public opinion that are most important for the development and consolidation of democratic political culture. At the same time, NCEP II also addressed many Kenya-specific issues, such as the on-going constitutional review process, ethnic and religious tension, and three “cross-cutting issues” – HIV/AIDS, gender, and environmental concerns.

NCEP II was implemented in the context of a highly polarized political system. The country’s president, Mwai Kibaki, had come to power in 2002 in an election that was widely viewed as a major step toward the consolidation of democracy (Ndegwa 2003). The election marked the first transfer of power from one party to another in the country’s history. Prior to the 2002 election, the country’s dominant party, KANU, had maintained its rule through a mix of heavy-handed tactics, electoral fraud, and ethnic mobilization. Kibaki came to power at the head of a highly diverse, multi-ethnic coalition, promising to bring an end to the corruption, incompetence, and ethnic favoritism that had become endemic to Kenyan politics. Yet, within a short time of taking office, Kibaki’s administration become embroiled in a series of major scandals that raised doubts about the president’s commitment to reform. Moreover, Kibaki’s reliance on a close circle of advisors drawn mainly from his home ethnic region led many to conclude that ethnic favoritism remained deeply entrenched in his administration (Barkan 2008). Tensions between different factions in the Kibaki government came to a head in a 2005 referendum on constitutional change (Lynch 2006). Many of Kibaki’s 2002 coalition allies openly campaigned against the referendum, which was supported by the president. The

campaigns devolved into a hostile contest in which ethnic communities lined up on opposing sides of the issue, and leaders employed divisive ethnic messages to rally their supporters. The referendum, which failed by a wide margin, left the country deeply polarized along partisan and ethnic lines. Given this context, one of the core goals of NCEP II-Uraia was to encourage ethnic tolerance during the 2007 election.

The 2007 election proved to be a highly contentious race that brought long-standing communal grievances over economic and political inequalities to the fore (Barkan 2008). As in the 2005 referendum, the 2007 election was filled with divisive ethnic appeals that played on and exacerbated resentments and hostilities between ethnic communities (Horowitz 2010). Disputes over the outcome of the election, which was widely believed to have been stolen by the incumbent party, sparked a wave of ethnic violence in which more than 1,000 people were killed and at least 300,000 more were displaced from their homes (Anderson and Lochery 2008). The initial wave of violence targeted ethnic groups aligned with the incumbent party, particularly members of Kibaki’s ethnic group, the Kikuyu (Chege 2008). In response, reprisal attacks were launched against ethnic communities thought to be allied to the opposition, particularly the Luo and the Kalenjin. The spiral of violence, which engulfed large sections of Kenya’s Rift Valley and the capital city Nairobi, lasted over two months until a power-sharing agreement was reached in late February 2008 by the main political parties. Our survey, as well as national survey data collected by the Afrobarometer in late-2008 showed that at least a quarter of the Kenyan population was directly affected in one way or another by the conflict.\(^4\) The post-election violence revealed both the tenuousness of Kenya’s progress toward democratic

\(^4\) The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey (n=1,104), which was conducted in October – November 2008, found that approximately 24% of respondents had been directly affected through loss of personal property, destruction of a home or business, personal injury, or the death of a family member.
consolidation and the depth of ethnic and partisan antipathies within Kenyan society (wa Githinji and Holmquist 2008; Chege 2008).

The post-election violence raised important questions regarding the effects of the pre-election civic education program. The first concern was that the violence might have erased whatever positive gains were produced by NCEP II-Uraia. As noted, the program sought to promote inter-communal tolerance and to encourage the use of democratic means – rather than violence – to resolve disputes. We speculated, therefore, that the divisive effects of the conflict could have undermined precisely the attitudes and behaviors targeted by the civic education initiative. Second, it may have been the case that those who had participated in NCEP might have reacted differently to the violence itself than those who did not. Although the program did not anticipate the conflict, one measure of the program’s success would be that participants who were directly affected by the violence would be less likely to “backslide” away from supportive-democratic attitudes and values than those affected by the violence in the control group. We speculated, in other words, that the program might have “inoculated” participants in important ways against the negative or anti-democratic effects of Kenya’s post-election political violence.

4. Data, Measurement, and Statistical Methods

We explore the impact of the NCEP II-Uraia program through an analysis of a survey of 3,600 individuals conducted across the country between December 2008 and January 2009. The survey was conducted as part of an overall evaluation of the NCEP II-Uraia program that was commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development in September 2008.\(^5\) 1,800 individuals who had been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities were

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\(^5\) The evaluation was implemented through the D.C.-based research and consulting firm Management Systems International, with a research team that also included Dr. Paul Mbatia, a University of Nairobi sociologist.
interviewed by survey teams from the Nairobi-based firm Research International as the “treatment group” sample, along with 1,800 “control group” individuals who were similar to the treatment group but who had no NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face exposure. Treatment group individuals were selected based on a two-stage random sampling process (that will be described more fully below): a random sample of 360 NCEP II-Uraia activities was first selected based on so-called “Form D” cover sheets that facilitators were required to complete after each activity and file with the NCEP-II-Uraia central offices; five specific treatment group respondents were then interviewed based on a random sampling of households in the areas where the selected activities took place. Finally, a detailed procedure was implemented to interview five control group individuals from those same areas, and who were matched to the treatment group on a series of demographic characteristics, including education, age, gender, and membership in civil society organizations. These procedures, along with additional statistical matching of the treatment and control groups that we introduce at the analysis phase, give us as much confidence as possible – given the inherent limitations of the data that we will discuss below – that the observed differences between the groups can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia exposure.

Several methodological issues should be noted at the outset. First, in contrast to the previous NCEP I assessment (Finkel 2003b; Finkel and Smith 2008), the current study does not contain a “pre-test” component. That is, we do not have baseline data on individuals’ democratic orientations before the NCEP II-Uraia activities took place. This means that, with only cross-sectional data at our disposal, we face even greater difficulties in ruling out the possibility that individuals in the treatment group were already different on democratic outcomes, or different on factors relevant to changes in democratic outcomes, before their exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. Second, the events following the 2007 election prevented the study from being
implemented until over a year after the end of the program itself. As noted above, the study was only formally commissioned in September 2008, some nine months after the election and the violence that took place in the election’s aftermath. This means that the study represents an assessment only of the long-term impact of the NCEP II-Uraia program on individuals, as we were unable to observe individuals at or around the time that the NCEP II-Uraia interventions took place. Third, the study by necessity relies on individuals’ recollection of activities that took place many months before they were interviewed. While the Form Ds contained information about the kind of activity and the numbers of individuals who participated in particular NCEP II-Uraia events, they did not contain the names nor contact information for specific individuals who had attended. This necessitated the institution of relatively elaborate procedures during the sampling stage to verify the status (treatment versus control) of individuals who were contacted by Research International. We believe the procedures were implemented successfully by the survey teams, but nevertheless there is likely to have been some degree of error in the respondent’s recall of participation in NCEP II-Uraia activities.

**Sampling and Respondent Selection Procedures**

We began the sampling by randomly selecting 90 activities conducted by each of the four NCEP-II consortia for inclusion in the study. We then conducted a detailed coding of a random sample of approximately 2000 Form D activity sheets for each Consortia. This coding contained information on where a given activity was conducted, what kind of activity it was, which civil society organization undertook the activity, how many people attended, and other aspects related to the nature of the particular Uraia civic education event. We used this data base

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6 It would have taken months to code all of the 79,040 activities available to us, and would have been prohibitively expensive as well)
to determine the mix of civic education activities, e.g., workshops, poetry/drama, or informal gatherings, that were undertaken by each Consortia, and we then allocated a proportional number of each Consortia’s 90 total activities to each kind of civic education event. So, for example, if 20% of CRECO (Constitution and Reform Education Consortium) activities were workshops, we allocated 20% of the 90 total CRECO activities (or 18 activities) for inclusion in the study to be workshops. In this way the 90 selected activities for each Consortia represent an accurate reflection of the kinds of civic education activities that each undertook as part of the Uraia program.

We next selected the specific Uraia activities for inclusion in the study, using the quota of 90 activities per Consortium discussed above. We decided to limit the sampled activities to those conducted during 2007, as activities from 2006 were judged to have taken place so long ago by the time of data collection (December 2008) that accurate respondent recall would be very difficult. 2007 activities, moreover, represented nearly 80% of all Uraia activities, so there was very little given up in terms of program representativeness in limiting our sampling points to activities from that year. Within each Consortium, we then calculated the appropriate number of workshops, poetry-drama, and informal meetings that, given a total sample of 90 activities per Consortium, would accurately reflect that Consortium’s overall mix of activities. We then drew the appropriate number of workshops, poetry-drama, and informal meetings at random from the activity data base. This procedure resulted in 111 targeted workshops, 51 targeted poetry-drama activities, and 198 targeted informal meetings, for a total of 360 targeted activities.7

Research International then sent survey teams to the exact venue (such as a school or marketplace) where each of the 360 sampled activities took place, and searched for respondents

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7 It was also necessary to oversample the number of poetry-drama events to yield enough sampling points for reliable analyses. The resultant sample was then re-weighted in the analysis phase to reflect the true proportion of each kind of activity conducted by each of the program’s four participating Consortia.
following the random route procedures outlined in the next sub-section. If, after one full day of interviewing, the survey team was unable to locate any respondents who had participated in any Uraia activities, the sampling site was abandoned and replaced with – whenever possible – another of the same type of activity for that Consortium drawn from the activities data base. This occurred in approximately 18 instances, half of which were associated with poetry-drama events. We show in Table 1 the targeted number of activities of each type for each Consortium, and the total number of each activity that is contained in the final sample. Given the lack of participant lists, and given the other uncertainties involved in these procedures, we consider the sampling for the study to have been extremely successful. Table 2 shows that the final sample of activities accurately reflects the regional distribution of Uraia activities as well.

(Tables 1 and 2 here)

Survey enumerators were given extensive training in the procedures required to select “treatment group” respondents (individuals exposed to Uraia civic education) and “control group” respondents (similar individuals not exposed to Uraia activities). Interview teams started at the exact venue where each of the 360 sampled Uraia activities took place. Interviewers then followed a random walk in a pre-determined direction (depending on the day of the week), proceeded at least 200 meters, and began screening either the first or second household that they encountered (again depending on the day of the week). A detailed set of screening questions was asked of all potential respondents, and if a given respondent reported attending at least one civic education activity before the 2007 election, the individual was selected for inclusion in the
“treatment group.” Given the random selection of the program’s activities from the activity database, and the random route respondent selection procedures implemented in the field, we consider the treatment group sample to be a relatively accurate representation of the population of Kenyan citizens who were “treated” or exposed to NCEP-II Uraia civic education activities.9

Once a treatment group respondent interview had been successfully completed, the interviewer recorded that person’s demographic information in terms of:

- Gender
- Age
- Education (highest level of schooling)
- Number of Secondary Group Memberships (number of groups to which the person belongs, including church or religious organization, youth or sports group, trade union, women’s group, cultural or school organization, burial society, tribal or clan association, business or professional association, political party, or other group).

Interviewers were then instructed to find control group individuals who had similar demographic characteristics as the given treatment group individual but who had not attended Uraia civic education activities before the 2007 election. Interviewers were told to skip at least four houses and then begin contacting households, looking for individuals with the same gender as the treatment group respondent, whose age was within 10 years of the treatment group respondent, who was in the same general category of education (Primary, Secondary, Post-Secondary), and who was in the same general category of group memberships (0, 1-2, 3 or

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8 The exact wording to define “civic education activities” for the respondent in the screening questions was: “As you may know, there are some programs going on in Kenya that try to engage people about democracy and human rights, and about how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are sponsored by community organizations or religious organizations, and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discussions in churches or mosques about citizens’ rights and responsibilities. We call these kinds of activities “civic education.”

9 As noted above, despite our efforts at implementing the random site and random route respondent and treatment selection procedures, there are still likely to be some unavoidable biases in the samples. Relying on respondent recall of their participation in Uraia activities to select the treatment and control groups introduces possible biases, in that individuals who were more affected by the activities may be more likely to remember them. It may also be the case that individuals could not distinguish completely between Uraia and non-Uraia civic education, or between pre- and post-election civic education. And it may also be the case that treatment group respondents attended some other Uraia activity aside from the specific activity that took place at the sampling point.
more). This set of procedures was repeated until five treatment group respondents and five matching control group respondents were interviewed from each of the 360 sampling points, resulting in 1,800 treatment group respondents and 1,800 matched control group respondents.

Fieldwork took approximately 38 days, beginning on 10th December 2008 and ending on 30th January 2009. A total of 72 interviewers were used on the project, with 15 team leaders and 3 overall supervisors. Before fieldwork commenced, all interviewers and team leaders underwent a three-day training session, of which there were seven spread throughout the country.

**Survey Instrument and Scales**

The survey instrument was constructed using a variety of sources, including the impact survey for the first National Civic Education Programme (Finkel 2003b), recent Afrobarometer surveys carried out in Kenya, and other surveys on human and political rights from other parts of the world. The questionnaire was tailored to the Kenyan context, taking into account the goals and objectives of NCEP II, as articulated in the *Uraia Resource File* and other official documents, as well as in conversations with donors and implementers at the start of the evaluation.

We included questions relating to the general themes of the Uraia program: good governance, human rights, democracy, constitutionalism, and nation-building. For some of these dimensions, the questions relate to individuals’ awareness, involvement, or perceived competence regarding an issue or theme, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Civic Competence and Engagement*. For other dimensions, the questions related to individuals’ preferences or values about politics, the rights of citizens, leaders, institutions, or the overall political system, and we categorize these items under the general rubric of *Democratic*
Values, Rights, and Responsibilities. Finally, the survey included a range of questions on ethnic social and political relations, taking into account the highly polarized conditions following the inter-communal violence that occurred after Kenya’s 2007 election. Nearly all of the questions represent either standard measures of the respective items in the political science literature or adaptations of recent surveys that were done in Kenya, in particular the NCEP I Impact Evaluation. The questionnaire was translated into Kiswahili by members of the Research International staff, and back-translated by a professional translator in Nairobi.10

Civic Competence and Engagement

Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their knowledge of how the Kenyan government works, ways to protect their basic rights, and their knowledge about the constitution and its reform. Respondents were also asked about their perceived political efficacy, or ability to influence government and politics. In addition, the survey asked respondents about the extent to which they participate in local and national-level politics.

Political Knowledge. Respondents were asked four questions about knowledge of political leaders and institutions in Kenya: whether they knew the title of the person who chairs the Kenyan parliament, who appoints members of the Kenyan High Court, how the constitution can be amended, and who is responsible for deciding how money from the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is used. We summed respondents’ correct answers to create a Political Knowledge scale ranging from 0 to 4. The reliability of the scale (coefficient alpha) was .69

10 67% of the interviews were conducted in Kiswahili, 26% were conducted in English, and 7% were carried out in one of Kenya’s other languages.
**Political Efficacy.** We measured the individual’s sense of perceived influence in politics, or political efficacy, by asking individuals whether they agreed with the statement: “I feel well prepared for participating in political life.” Responses were scored as “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.”

**Political Participation.** The survey instrument included questions on whether the respondent had done any of the following in the past year: 1) discussed political issues with friends, family, or coworkers; 2) worked for a political party or candidate; 3) participated in an organized effort to solve a neighborhood or community problem; 4) attended a meeting of the local town council or with other government officials; 5) contacted a local official, like a local councilor or an official who works for a government agency; 6) lodged a complaint with a government body or a civil society organization about unfair treatment or a violation of your rights; 7) contacted a national elected official; 8) taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue; and 9) contacted a local chief or traditional leader about a problem. For each item, responses were scored on a three-point continuum, with “1” for “not done,” “2” for “once,” and “3” for “several times.” A factor analysis showed that the items tended to “load” on two different dimensions, one corresponding to *Local Political Participation* (items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9) and one corresponding to *National Political Participation* (items 2, 6, 7, and 8). We created scales associated with each dimension by averaging the responses for the respective items. The reliability of the *Local Participation* scale was .66, and the reliability of the *National Participation* scale was .69.

**Informed about How to Protect Rights.** We asked whether individuals felt informed about what they could do to defend their rights if the police or some other group tried to stop them from
exercising basic political and social rights, with responses coded as “1” for “not very informed,” “2” for “somewhat informed,” and “3” for “very informed.”

**Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities**

We asked a series of questions concerning the respondent’s support for various democratic norms values, and institutions. These questions addressed five main topics: support for democracy as a form of government; support for the political values that are inherent in democratic governance; support for certain social values that tend to support democratic politics; support for current political institutions and the democratic political system; and the perceived rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

**Democracy is Best.** We asked respondents, “Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader that does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things do not work, democracy is always best. What do you think?” Responses were scored as “0” for those who say that the country needs a strong leader, and “1” for those who say that democracy is always best.

**Support for Rule of Law.** We asked respondents whether “it is sometimes necessary to ignore the rule of law and solve problems using other means”. The question was coded as “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

**Vote Buying.** We asked two questions about whether respondents thought it was wrong for “a candidate or party official to offer money in return for a vote” and for “a voter to accept money in return for his or her vote.” Responses were coded as “1” for “not wrong at all,” “2” for “wrong but understandable,” and “3” for “wrong and punishable.” The questions were correlated at .59, and we created a *Vote Buying Wrong* variable by averaging the two items.
Political Violence. We included a question that asked whether respondents thought the use of violence was morally justifiable “to achieve an important political goal.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

Rights Consciousness. We probed respondents about their support for eight basic political and human rights: 1) “the right of individuals to criticize the government,” 2) “the right to form groups that push for political changes,” 3) “the right to obtain information about how government funds are spent,” 4) “the right to be free from unlawful arrest of prosecution by the government,” 5) “the right of anyone to run for elected office, regardless of ethnicity or political viewpoint,” 6) “the right to travel and work anywhere in the country,” 7) “the right of all political parties to campaign for people’s votes in all parts of the country, regardless of which ethnic group is the majority,” and 8) “the right to own land anywhere in Kenya.” For each item, responses were scored as “3” if the respondent thought that the right “should always be maintained,” “2” for “it depends on the situation,” and “1” for “almost never be maintained.” Factor analysis showed that all eight items loaded on a single dimension, and therefore a Rights Consciousness scale was created by averaging the responses to the eight questions. The reliability of this scale was .73.

Women’s Rights. We asked individuals three questions about women’s role in Kenyan society, 1) whether “women and men should both be allowed to inherit land,” 2) whether “there should be a certain number of parliamentary seats and cabinet positions reserved for women,” and 3) whether “women should have the same right as men to serve as religious leaders, that is, as priests, pastors, or imams”. All three questions were coded from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree,” and the three scores were averaged to create a general Women’s Rights variable. The reliability of the scale was .58.
In light of the inter-ethnic violence that occurred after the 2007 election, we included several questions on the strength of ethnic and national identification, tolerance of other ethnic communities, and beliefs about ethnic group rights.

**National Versus Tribal Identity.** We asked individuals to provide an assessment of their identity as a Kenyan *versus* that of a particular tribe or ethnic group. We first asked individuals, “What is your tribe,” and then asked them: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a (INSERT TRIBE). Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings: “I feel only Kenyan,” “I feel more Kenyan than (TRIBE),” “I feel equally Kenyan and (TRIBE),” “I feel more (TRIBE) than Kenyan,” and “I feel only (TRIBE).”

**Ethnic Tolerance.** We included a battery of questions to test respondents’ willingness to extend basic political and social rights to members of other ethnic communities, particularly groups that the respondents disliked. For this, we used a multi-step procedure. First, we asked respondents about their feelings toward each of Kenya’s five largest ethnic communities (Kalenjins, Luos, Kikuyus, Kamba, and Luhyas). Respondents were asked whether they liked or disliked each group, and responses were recorded on a five-point continuum with “1” indicating “like the group very much” and “5” indicating “dislike the group very much.” Next, we asked respondents whether there was one group among the five that they liked the least. We considered this the respondent’s “Most Disliked Group” (MDG). Third, after having identified a Most Disliked Group, respondents were asked whether members of that group should be allowed to “form their own political party” and “speak in your community even if they say things

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11 In the event that a respondent refused to identify any group as her MDG, we used the group with the lowest score on the like/dislike questions as that respondent’s MDG. In the case of a tie, we randomly selected one of the five largest groups as the respondent’s MDG.
that you do not think are right.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly disagree” to “5” for “strongly agree.” These two items were moderately correlated at .24, and were averaged to create a Political Tolerance of Most Disliked Group variable. Next, we asked two questions about inter-ethnic social relations. Respondents were asked whether they would want their son or daughter to marry a member of the MDG, and whether they would support an organized effort to keep members of the MDG from living in their area. Again, responses were from “1” as “strongly disagree” to “5” as “strongly agree.” The two items were averaged to create a Social Tolerance of Most Disliked Group variable. The inter-item correlation between the two questions was .33.

Oppose Ethnic Violence. Respondents were asked, “If one ethnic or religious group feels threatened by other ethnic or religious groups, the use of violence to defend itself is morally justifiable.” Responses were scored from “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.”

Statistical Procedures

The main obstacle in estimating the casual effect of exposure to the NCEP II-Uraia program, as is the case in nearly all observational assessments of development programs, is the potential for selection bias. Because Kenyan citizens freely chose whether to participate in the program under study (as opposed to being randomly assigned to treatment conditions in experimental research), it is likely that many differences exist between the treatment group and the control group that may also be associated with differences on political knowledge, participation, and other dependent variables. To address these concerns, we employ a three-fold approach. First, as described in the previous section, we developed a matching protocol for the sampling stage in which each respondent who reported having participated in NCEP II-Uraia
was carefully matched on place of residence, age, gender, education, and group memberships with a respondent who had not participated. This ensured that the control and treatment groups were well balanced on several of the most critical variables relevant for predicting democratic orientations at the outset.

Second, we supplemented this sampling-based matching with additional balancing of the treatment and control groups at the estimation stage, using the CEM (Coarsened Exact Matching) methods developed by Ho et al. (2007), Iacus et. al (2008), and Blackwell et al. (2009). We matched on a range of factors (age, income, church attendance, group membership, and whether respondents had every served as a leader of any group or association to which they belonged) that might be related to both NCEP II-Uraia participation and democratic orientations. We further eliminated any respondent who reported attending any civic education activities after the 2007 elections. The CEM matching procedure produces different “bins” or strata consisting of the combinations of characteristics in the specified variables (e.g. leaders with high church attendance, medium income, no other civic education exposure), and then balances the treatment and control groups as completely as possible by eliminating treatment group cases that have no corresponding control group member in their “bins”, and eliminating control group cases that have no corresponding treatment group member in their “bins” as well. In our case, this procedure eliminated 611 individuals in the original treatment group, and 197 members of the original control group.

(Table 3 here)
Table 3 shows the degree of imbalance between the treatment and control groups on a number of covariates before and after the CEM matching procedures were implemented. The table shows that, despite the rough matching procedures used at the sampling stage, statistically significant differences remained on some variables, including age and income. And relatively large differences between the groups exist in the pre-CEM columns for group leadership, membership in parties or civic groups, and in the motivational and media exposure factors. Once the CEM balancing procedures were implemented, the groups were nearly perfectly balanced (i.e., had identical mean values) on all the demographic covariates, including many (such as marital and employment status) that were not explicitly entered into CEM. These procedures do much to ensure that observed differences between the treatment and control groups are not the result of pre-treatment differences between the groups on any demographic factor we measured in the study.

Nevertheless, it can be seen that even after implementing the CEM matching procedure significant differences still exist between the CEM-balanced treatment and control groups on motivational factors such as political interest and discussion, on general media exposure and exposure to specific NCEP II-Uraia media presentations, and on membership in political parties and civic organizations. This presented a difficult choice for assessing the causal impacts of face-to-face NCEP II-Uraia activities. To the extent that civic education exposure led individuals, for example, to become more interested in politics, or to attend to media (or NCEP II-Uraia media) messages more frequently, or to join a civic group, then controlling for, or balancing, these “post-treatment” variables will result in an attenuation of the estimated causal effects of interest. On the other hand, it is likely that at least part of the differences between treatment and control individuals on variables reflects pre-existing differences in motivation and
chronic exposure to political information between the two groups. Variables such as interest,
discussion and media exposure may further serve as partial proxies for unobserved factors such
as an intrinsic “taste” for politics or more “democratic” personality characteristics that may differ
between the treatment and control groups and thus confound the causal inference process as well.
On balance (no pun intended), we decided to include these motivational and media exposure
variables, as well as reported membership in civic organizations and political parties, as
additional controls in CEM-weighted regression models predicting each democratic orientation
along with treatment/control group status. As noted, this procedure may result in our
underestimating the impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure, to the extent that many of these
variables may in fact have been affected by the treatment itself. Nevertheless, we include these
variables in a more conservative attempt to capture some of the political and motivational
differences between the treatment and control groups that may produce spurious estimates of the
causal effect of the program.

To estimate treatment effects, we ran separate OLS regressions for each dependent
variable described in the previous section. All models use the post-CEM balance data and
included whether the respondent had attended an NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activity, along with
the following controls: age group, gender, education level, income level, frequency of church
attendance, a measure of group membership, whether the respondent belongs to a political party
or a civic organization, whether respondent has ever been a leader of any group to which he/she
belongs, media consumption, political interest, a measure of political participation, and exposure
to NCEP II-Uraia media campaign. We also include a dummy variable or fixed effect for each
of the 360 sampling points in the study.
5. Basic Results

Table 4 presents our core findings from regression models predicting each of the dependent variables described above. To facilitate comparison of the magnitude of effects across these variables, we also show standardized coefficients, which were calculated by dividing the regression coefficient for each dependent variable by the standard deviation of the variable.13

(Table 4 here)

The results show that NCEP II-Uraia had the most consistent effects on Civic Competence and Engagement variables, and more limited effects on democratic values and orientations or identity and ethnic group relations. Program participants scored higher both on objective measures of political knowledge (general knowledge) and perceived knowledge of Kenya’s political system (perceived knowledge of the constitution) and their basic rights as citizens (informed about protecting rights). Participants also expressed greater confidence in their ability to influence political outcomes (internal efficacy). These effects were moderate in substantive terms, with standardized effects in some cases in the .15-.20 range. Given the long time period that had elapsed since individuals experienced the NCEP II-Uraia activities, this is relatively impressive evidence regarding the durability of civic education’s impact, at least on this cluster of democratic orientations. The program had mixed effects on participation, leading to higher levels of participation at the local level but not at the national level. We suspect that the difference can be attributed to the program’s greater focus on local-level politics and perhaps

13 This coefficient is sometimes referred to as the “Y-standardized” coefficient. See Long 1997, chapter 3. In this context the Y-standardized coefficient is similar to Cohen’s D and other “effect coefficients” that are frequently used in experimental and quasi-experimental research.
also the nature of the Kenyan political system which offers few avenues for citizens to engage national-level institutions.

On the cluster of variables related to Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities, we observe only scattered effects. The program had no effect on basic orientations toward democracy or support for the rule of law (*democracy is best, support for rule of law*). Effects were seen, however, on two variables related to more quotidian aspects of electoral politics in the Kenyan context, *rejection of vote buying* and *opposition to the use of violence*. We suspect that in emerging democracies like Kenya, where citizens often have good reason to be skeptical about national-level political institutions, civic education programs face greater difficulty in influencing citizen orientations toward broad concepts like democracy or the rule of law, relative to the more immediate issues that have greater bearing on the citizens’ interaction with the political process. On human rights, we find that the program had a small positive effect on support for a bundle of basic human and political rights (*rights consciousness*), but was not effective in regard to women’s rights (*support for women’s rights*).

Similarly, we find mixed results on variables related to Identity and Ethnic Group Relations. The program led to significant increases in the amount of social tolerance that individuals are willing to extend to their “most disliked group”, and led to significant increases in the perception that violence is not an appropriate means for ethnic groups to defend themselves if they feel threatened. The program was less effective regarding questions of national belonging or ethnic political tolerance. Given the centrality of these outcomes to the program’s goals, we conclude that the modest observed effects are indicative of a mixed record – while some positive changes were observed, no movement was seen on other key variables targeted by NCEP II-Uraia.
It should be noted, however, that none of the observed effects for democratic values or ethnic orientations were all that large in terms of their substantive magnitude. The standardized effects for these variables were all below .10, well below the values registered for the variables in the civic competence and engagement cluster. All of this suggests that NCEP-II Uraia was a relatively effective long-term agent of political empowerment, but a much less effective long-term agent for value change.

6. The Impact of Post-Election Violence

In this section we explore the ways that the violence and dislocations that occurred in Kenya following the disputed 2007 elections may have influenced the effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education. The violence itself was the main reason that the evaluation of NCEP II-Uraia’s impact was unable to be undertaken immediately following the election, as the insecurity and political uncertainty in the country disrupted nearly all development and democracy assistance programming and made it impossible to conduct field research until mid-to-late 2008. But one benefit (if that word can be used in this unfortunate context) of the situation was that we could inquire about the individual’s personal experiences with the post-election violence and disruptions, and determine whether and how such experiences may have mitigated or otherwise influenced the impacts of pre-election civic education. Such an exploration, as discussed above, provides perhaps the first window into the effects of civic education in an inhospitable political context characterized by violence, acute ethnic conflict and democratic “backsliding.”

One possibility is that the inter-communal violence that followed the 2007 election might have attenuated, or even erased, the positive effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education. If this were the case, we would observe weaker effects in our sample than would have been the
case had we conducted the evaluation before the violence occurred. Of course, we cannot
directly test for this, but we may provide some indirect evidence for this claim by demonstrating
smaller effects of NCEP II-Uraia impact among individuals who were personally affected by the
violence than among those who were not. Another, perhaps more positive possibility, however,
is that exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education served in some ways to “inoculate” individuals
against some of the more deleterious effects of the violence itself. That is, individuals who
experienced violence and who were exposed to civic education may have been less likely to
adopt negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups, lose faith in democratic institutions and
processes, or withdraw politically than individuals who experienced violence in the control
group.

To test for these possibilities, we asked individuals whether “you or your family was
affected by the violence that occurred after the 2007 election”. 27.2% of the (CEM-balanced)
treatment group and 26.6% of the (CEM-balanced) control group reported that they had been
affected. We entered this variable (Violence) into a series of regression models predicting core
democratic and other ethnic-related orientations, along with the interaction between Violence and
NCEP II-Uraia treatment exposure. The signs and magnitudes of the various terms in the model
allow us to assess how civic education and the experience of post-election violence may have
influenced attitudes about democracy. In addition to the core democratic variables from the
previous section’s analyses, we include three additional ethnic or violence-related measures
(none of which were significant in simple treatment effects models): whether the individual
believes that “it is sometimes necessary to use violence to avenge past wrongs committed against
your family or ethnic community”; the extent to which the individual believes that the “equal and
fair treatment of all ethnic groups by the government” has improved over the past year, and the
extent to which the individual has “forgiven those responsible for the post-election ethnic violence.”

(Table 5 here)

Table 5 shows the results of the analysis. We present in the first column the estimated effect for treatment exposure, which, in the context of these models, indicates the impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure among individuals who did not experience post-election violence. The second column shows the estimated effect of Violence, which indicates the impact of post-election violence experiences among individuals who were not exposed to NCEP II-Uraia activities. The third column presents the estimated interaction effect: the additional impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure for those who experienced post-election violence, or, alternatively, the additional impact of the experience of post-election violence among individuals in the treatment group.

We see little support for the hypothesis that the violence reduced the impact of NCEP II-Uraia activities among those individuals who participated. For the Civic Competence and Engagement variables, we see that the treatment effect remains strong and significant, with very little influence of political violence on the process. Individuals who experienced violence were not significantly different on these dimensions than those who did not, and the interaction terms, aside from that seen in the internal efficacy model, are very close to zero.

For Democratic Values and Ethnic Orientations, it is also the case that the experience of post-election violence did not reduce the impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure. In no case is the interaction effect between Violence and Treatment negative, indicating that the effect of
treatment is never less for those who experienced violence than for those who did not. In fact, on several key variables, there are positive interactions between Violence and Treatment, such that the effects of NCEP II-Uraia exposure are stronger among treatment group respondents who were directly affected by the violence compared with treatment group respondents who were not.

The impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure was, for example, nearly zero on attitudes towards the rule of law, opposition to political violence, perceptions of government fair treatment towards all ethnic groups, and forgiveness of those who perpetrated violence if individuals did not personally experience post-election violence, while the effects are in the .13 to .15 range (and statistically significant) among individuals who experienced the upheavals directly. For ethnic group social tolerance, the effect of NCEP II-exposure is more than double in size for directly-affected treatment group respondents (.18 (.08+.10), compared to .08). We cannot determine if these effects occurred because the direct experience of violence reinforced messages of nation-building or tolerance that were presented in the civic education activities, or whether the experience of violence led treated individuals to think differently about topics related to ethnicity that were not specifically covered in their own activities. But there is an intriguing pattern suggesting that NCEP II-Uraia activities had longer-lasting impact on many ethnic and violence-related attitudes among those individuals who personally experienced the upheavals following the 2007 election.

An alternative way to interpret this pattern is to note that the experience of violence among individuals in the control group had negative effects on nearly all of the ethnic and violence-related orientations, with about half of these effects reaching statistical significance. Among the control group (our best proxy for the “average” Kenyan), the personal experience of post-election violence is significantly associated with less opposition to political and ethnic
violence, perceptions of less fairness in the way that government treats all ethnic groups, and less likelihood of having forgiven the perpetrators of the 2007-2008 violence and ethnic conflict. Negative (though insignificant) effects for violence among the control are also observed for support for the rule of law and opposition to violence in order to “avenge past wrongs”. In all but one of these cases, the effects of personal experience with violence are essentially reduced to zero among individuals in the treatment group. This lends relatively consistent support to the “inoculation” hypothesis put forward above, as exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities in effect blunted the deleterious negative impacts that the individual’s personal experience with post-election violence had on ethnic-related political and democratic attitudes.

This interpretation is further strengthened when we examine responses to the final set of questions we asked concerning the traumatic events following the 2007 election. We asked respondents to “Please think about the time right before the December 2007 elections, that is, before all the violence and dislocations that occurred in Kenya,” and then asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

- At that time I thought that democracy was a better system of government than I do now.
- At that time I thought I could influence the political process more than I do now.
- At that time I was more willing to consider the views of people from other ethnic groups than I am now.
- At that time I was more optimistic about building a true democracy in Kenya than I am now.

Positive responses on these items mean that the impact of the post-election upheavals caused individuals to become less optimistic about Kenyan democracy, their roles in it, and their consideration of other ethnic groups’ points of view. The overall responses to these questions are revealing, in that between 61% and 70% of all respondents “agree” or “strongly agree” with each of the statements.
We show in Table 6 the effect of the direct experience of post-election violence on each of these orientations, among individuals who were treated in NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities and individuals who were not. It can be seen that on three of these dimensions, Perceived Influence, Consider Other Ethnic Views, and Optimism about Kenyan Democracy, the effect of personal experience with violence had strongly positive effects on these variables only among the control group. That is, people in the control group who directly experienced post-election violence became more pessimistic about their Kenyan democracy and their role in it, and less willing to consider the views of other ethnic groups, while no such negative impact occurred among the treatment group. Thus we conclude that the NCEP II-Uraia program had some role in mitigating the negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-election period, and in mitigating some of the democratic “backsliding” that occurred in the election’s aftermath.

7. Conclusions

We explored two previously unexamined questions related to civic education programs: whether such programs have long-term effects, and whether they can be effective in the context of democratic backsliding. Our results provide evidence that large-scale civic education programs can produce relatively long-term effects, adding to a growing number of evaluations from other settings that report similar findings. As in previous research, however, the strongest evidence of long-term impact was found on variables related to civic competence and engagement, with only sporadic and relatively small effects found on most variables related to
democratic values. This supports an emerging pattern in civic education evaluation research, that donor-sponsored education programs can be relatively effective agents of political 
*empowerment*, but are typically much less effective agents of value change.

One important exception to this generalization is perhaps the most surprising finding that emerges from the analysis. We found that NCEP II-Uraia exposure had some “inoculation effects” related to the post-election violence that erupted in Kenya shortly after the program ended. Specifically, we found that participants in the program who subsequently were affected by the post-election violence were less likely (relative to non-participants who were affected by the violence) to adopt negative views on a range of important variables related to ethnic relations, tolerance, and conflict resolution. Participants were less likely to express support for the use of political and ethnic violence, less likely to believe that the government discriminates against some groups at the expense of others, and more likely to have forgiven those responsible for the post-election violence. These intriguing results imply that civic education has the potential to reduce at least some of the negative effects of democratic backsliding, and that the negative impact of the post-2007 election aftermath in Kenya would have been greater in the absence of the NCEP II-Uraia program.

The findings have additional implications for the future implementation and evaluation of donor-sponsored civic education programs. First, the limits of civic education in influencing core democratic values need to be taken more seriously in the design and implementation phases of future programs. The results here confirm that mere exposure to civic education is typically not enough to produce substantial gains in tolerance, support for the rule of law, or other important democratic values in either the long or the short term. But this is to not to say that influencing these orientations is impossible. Rather, we support the findings from previous
research (e.g., Campbell 2008; Finkel, 2003a; Finkel and Ernst 2005) that changing core
democratic values requires frequent, focused training with active, participatory teaching
methodologies and with high quality instructors. These are issues that need to be built into
program design, yet all too often are not. NCEP II-Uraia, for example, adopted a highly diffuse
strategy, seeking to affect a very wide range of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors rather than a
more limited but focused strategy. Moreover, the vast majority of NCEP II-Uraia activities were
relatively short in duration, with some being only a few hours or less, and this was simply not
sufficient time to impart the kind of information needed to bring about meaningful value change.
We suspect that a more intensive approach focused on a narrower range of outcomes might have
generated more substantial effects, and we urge future programs to adopt these design features to
maximize individual-level impact.

Second, our findings suggest a complex relationship between political context and civic
education impact that future research needs to explore more fully. The results here indicate that,
perhaps contrary to expectations, civic education can be a useful approach in countries
experiencing democratic reversals, and not simply in countries that are making steady progress
toward the consolidation of democracy. Indeed, our results suggest that civic education actually
was able to counteract some of the negative effects of violence, instability, and institutional
failure in the Kenyan context. But there are likely to be limits to these processes. Despite the
“backsliding” that Kenya experienced around the time of the 2007 election and thereafter, the
country was still in far better democratic shape than it had been only a decade or so before, and
was in far better shape than many autocracies and non-democracies around the world as well.
The impact of civic education in more chronically inhospitable contexts is still very much an
open question. As more evaluations of civic education (and other donor-sponsored democracy
assistance) programs are conducted in more varied political and social contexts, the interactions between the political environment and the micro-level effectiveness of these democratic interventions will come into greater focus.
References


### Table 1. Targeted and Sampled Activities by Uraia Consortium

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<tr>
<th>Consortium</th>
<th>Targeted Activities</th>
<th>Sampled Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>Poetry-Drama</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRECO</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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### Table 2. Distribution of Sampled Activities by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Targeted Activities</th>
<th>Number of Activities in Final Samples</th>
<th>Percent of Sampled Activities</th>
<th>Percent of Total Uraia Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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<td><strong>360</strong></td>
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Table 3. Covariate Imbalance, Pre and Post CEM balancing

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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Marital Status 0.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Memberships (Average)</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ever Group Leader 0.30</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of Political Party 0.30</td>
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<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of Civic Group 0.19</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
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<td>Political Interest 2.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics 1.54</td>
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<td>Uraia Media Exposure 0.41</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N of Cases 1800</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>1603</td>
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</table>

Note: Boldfaced comparisons indicate significant differences at .10 level between treatment and control groups.
### Table 4. Effects of NCEP II on Knowledge, Participation, Values, Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficient</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Civic Competence and Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Knowledge of Constitution</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed about Protecting Rights</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Participation</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Participation</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is Best</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Rule of Law</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of Vote Buying</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to the Use of Violence</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights Consciousness</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Women's Rights</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Identity and Ethnic Group Relations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National versus Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Political Tolerance</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance</td>
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<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose Ethnic Violence</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from OLS regressions; * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$
Table 5. The Effects of Post-Election Violence and NCEP II-Uraia Exposure on Democratic and Ethnic Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Violence</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic Competence and Engagement</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Participation</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed about How to Protect Rights</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Values and Ethnic Orientations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is Best</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Political Violence</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Violence as Ethnic Defense</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition to Violence to Avenge Past Wrongs</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Political Tolerance</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t Treats All Ethnic Groups Fairly</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forgive those who Perpetrated Violence?</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05 (two-tailed)     *p<.10 (two-tailed)

Table 6. The Effects of Post-Election Violence on Disillusionment with Kenyan Democracy among NCEP II-Uraia Participants and Control Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimated Effect of Experience with Violence among the Control Group</th>
<th>Estimated Effect of Experience with Violence among the Treatment Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standardized Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I thought Democracy was a Better Form of Government</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>I thought I could Influence Politics More Than Than Now</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was More Willing to Consider the Views of Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was More Optimistic about Kenyan Democracy</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05 (two-tailed)     *p<.10 (two-tailed)