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Editors’ Note

Increased interconnectedness from globalization has characterized the world since 1945. However, the present era also adds the complication of increased polarization. As technology becomes more advanced, communication speeds up growth and conflict. We see this in the field of international relations broadly as the academic literature has cultivated discussions on important issues such as globalization and legal standards surrounding artificial intelligence.

The journal received an especially large number of submissions for our Fall ’19 edition from undergraduate scholars around the world. In this issue, we have work represented from several undergraduate institutions in Europe and the United States. The following works present thought-provoking evaluations on the state of international affairs. The essays comment on a variety of topics that range from the economic and technological rise of China to Palestinian boycotts of Israeli elections. These pieces explore other key international issues that like civil resistance, political Islam, and influences on grand strategy. These articles contribute to the discussions taking place on how the world ought to address the most pressing issues of today.

*World Outlook* was fortunate enough to discuss a wide range of topics related to trade with Dan Ikenson, director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. His insight on popular perceptions of international trade and US–China trade relations makes for an especially relevant interview that complements the papers of the journal. We would like to thank Mr. Ikenson for taking the time to contribute to *World Outlook*.

We hope you will enjoy this issue’s contents as much as we have.

Sincerely,  
Luke Bienstock and Sam Koreman  
Editors-in-Chief
THE EFFECT OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN UNION COHERENCE: FACILITATOR OR MENACE?

Samuel Chan

The European continent has been, on various occasions, identified as a key destination of China’s ambitious, $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative. Through Gebhard’s conceptualisation and framework of European Union Coherence theory, this dissertation will demonstrate that, as a whole, the present evidence suggests that the Initiative has indeed reduced external coherence within the Union. This will be demonstrated via two empirical chapters, one dealing with the state-level response and how that demonstrates vertical incoherence, and the other addresses the Union’s institutional response and how that reveals a degree of horizontal and institutional incoherence that can be attributed to the Belt and Road. This paper will also call upon other scholars to further contribute to this discussion as there is presently an acute deficiency of academic literature in this sub-field.

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION

PREFACE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

In September 2013, President Xi Jinping unveiled China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan on his tour of Central Asia, consisting of a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) and a ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ (Huang and Zhou, 2018). The BRI claims to promote connectivity in the fields of trade and infrastructure via multi-layered collaboration amongst relevant countries and international organisations. BRI projects are poised to connect the vibrant East Asian economic circle with the developed European economic sphere (Xinhua 2015). They are also expected to allow the development potential of countries in the hinterland of Eurasia to be fully realized. Indeed, from geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives, the BRI has the potential to alter relations between China and Europe. Naturally, some have argued that facing new challenges in the international economic, political, and security systems, China and Europe are seeking to ‘rediscover’ each other and explore new paths tailored to their respective development and reform objectives (Casarini 2016). The Economist (2018) has observed that in 2016, BRI investment in European Union (EU) countries had doubled from 2015 to $40 billion, with much of this being state backed. Until then, the EU had generally welcomed Chinese investment without giving it much scrutiny. But these prodigious investments, and the resultant (or perceived) power and influence that Beijing was gaining, has caused disquiet in Brussels—particularly with regard to the Union’s smaller or less prosperous members (Herrero and Xu 2016; Kynge and Peel 2017).

BRI investment has been defined by regional tendencies. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the emphasis has been on infrastructure projects, presumably to

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solidify links between Europe and other BRI projects farther east. When several CEE countries became members of the EU, Beijing was interested in strengthening relations with this dynamic but less economically developed sub-region. As Szunomár (2018) has noted, Chinese investment and trade volumes in the region have constantly risen over the past two decades, accelerating after the 2008 economic recession. Furthermore, the establishment of the “16+1” Initiative in 2012—a “platform of dialogue” between Beijing and sixteen CEE countries, 11 of which are EU members—underscores the region’s importance to Beijing. It should be noted that while the “16+1” platform was established before the BRI was launched, it has since been used as a means by which BRI-related affairs can be discussed (Casarini 2015; Meunier 2014). Meanwhile, in southern Europe, Chinese state-backed buyers have enthusiastically engaged in the slew of privatizations in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis. In Portugal, Chinese investors have bought sizeable stakes in ports, hotels, and in the country’s main electricity provider. Similarly, Beijing has provided Greece with capital and investment throughout the economic crisis. All this raises the question of how the BRI’s increasing and varied presence in the Union may affect its coherence.

While an emerging, fascinating body of literature exists on the European response to the BRI (Van der Putten 2016a; Mohan 2018; Amighini 2017; Rolland 2017), and whether the BRI is economically beneficial to the EU (Hurley et al. 2018; Herrero and Xu 2017; Müller-Markus, 2016; Casarini, 2015), present literature has not addressed the potential consequences that the BRI might have on EU external coherence. External coherence is crucial for the EU as it determines its ability to “speak with one voice,” especially when a “swift and united” response is needed (Gebhard 2017, 124). This paper aims to bridge the gap in the present literature by answering the following research question: “To what extent has China’s Belt and Road Initiative reduced European Union external coherence?” In addressing this question, my dissertation will employ Gebhard’s (2017) conceptualization of the various strands of coherence in the EU and how they can be measured. The paper will then assess whether the BRI has infringed upon each of the three strands (vertical, horizontal, and institutional) of coherence (which, together, constitutes external coherence), thus evaluating whether it has reduced the Union’s external coherence—its ability to speak with a single voice.

The Significance of Coherence: “Actorness”

Scholars such as Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013) and Mayer (2013, 2016) have written comprehensively about the notion of “actorness”, and the extent to which the EU can be viewed as an actor in the arena of global politics. They have argued that the EU is a non-traditional or sui generis actor. Their framework of “actorness” comprises of three components: presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence refers to the “ability of an actor to exert influence beyond its borders…and shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour” (2013, 376) of other actors. The perception of EU unity from third- parties is crucial if the Union is to effectively influence other actors. On
the other hand, perceived divisions between the EU and its members will lead to inefficiencies and a lack of credibility in foreign affairs. Vertical coherence—commitment to Union ideals, adaptation of similar positions—is therefore essential to this aspect of “actorness.”

Meanwhile, opportunity refers to the potential for external ideas or events to facilitate or hamper the Union’s capability or autonomy. This relates to external coherence as the Union’s common foreign policy positions are not shaped exclusively by EU actors alone, but also by global power dynamics. The EU’s positions are thus not constructed in isolation and need to be ‘mutually reinforced’ by third parties (Mayer 2013, 110). Lastly, capability applies to the internal realm of the Union’s external action. Horizontal coherence is significant here as the ability for the Union’s institutions to harmonize policy into an integral strategy would directly affect its ability to engage in global affairs. Similarly, the ability within the Union’s institutions to coordinate policies and aims, or “institutional coherence,” contributes to its “international presence” as it will affect “understandings among third parties about the effectiveness of the Union’s policy processes, and appropriateness/availability of policy instruments…” (2013, 113)

**Structure of Article**

To answer the research question, the paper will be structured as follows. Section two will outline Gebhard’s (2017) framework of the different types of coherences that can be present within the Union. The section will then present the rationale for case selections of the empirical sections. Section three, the first of two empirical ones, will then explore how different EU countries have individually responded to the BRI, and whether there has been any perceptible reduction of vertical coherence as a result of that. Section four will then evaluate the Union-level response to the BRI in terms of specific policy frameworks, and whether this is a reflection of horizontal or institutional incoherence that has been caused by the BRI. Section five will make the link between the theoretical framework of section two and the empirical findings of section three and four. Particular attention will be devoted to two areas: firstly, the extent to which the EU members states studied have diverged from EU positions, standards, and norms as a result of the BRI and what the implications are for vertical, and thus external coherence. Secondly, whether the BRI has affected horizontal and institutional coherence—both components of external coherence—as evidenced by the EU-level response and strategy. Finally, section six will conclude by determining if the BRI has altered EU external coherence, or if the results are inconclusive.

**Section Two: Theory and Methods**

**EU Coherence Theory**

The notion of (in)coherence has plagued the European project from its outset, although the first use of the term is debated. Up to the seventies, “coherence” was primarily used in conjunction with “cohesion”, with the purpose of describing political
unity and the advantages that states would reap if they collaborated on issues related to foreign policy. The formation of the European Political Cooperation in 1970 precipitated the use of “coherence” as is depicted contemporarily, also for the intents and purposes of this paper—the intention and importance of bringing together the different strands of the EU’s foreign relations, both in terms of procedure and strategy (Gebhard, 2017, 123–125).

Scholars such as Laatikainen and Smith (2006) as well as Heldt and Meunier (2005) have demonstrated a correlation between EU coherence and its ability to be effective in external actions. Others such as Gebhard (2017) and Nuttall (2001) have noted that although ‘coherence’ has been a recurring issue from the 1970s, the concept has persisted in its ambiguity up to the present. By and large, there are two facets to the term: the first being a strategic/policy-related aspect that refers to incongruous objectives and incompatible political agendas and the second, a technical/procedural aspect that deals with the administrative ramifications of harmonizing the different mediums of policymaking, while simultaneously involving bureaucratic machineries and conceivably diverse manners of operation and culture (Gebhard 2017, 127). Nevertheless, Gebhard’s (2017) conception of European Coherence is best suited to address this question for two key reasons: first, she elucidates and separates the various facets of coherence into four discrete elements; second, evaluating the effects that the BRI may have on different facets of EU Coherence allows us to identify how, and to what degree the BRI affects the performance of the EU as an international player. She then goes on to identify four different strands of “coherences” that relate to EU external relations, namely: vertical coherence, horizontal coherence, internal coherence, and external coherence. Notably, external coherence is a product of the other three strands of coherence.

**Vertical Coherence**

This refers to the concertation (loosely translated as cooperation or cohesion) of member states’ positions and policies with regard to the overall consensus or common position at EU level—between the member states and the Union. Vertical coherence includes overall compliance with political arrangements laid down in EU treaties and the “technical compatibility” of specific state policies with EU regulations. Therefore, vertical coherence refers to matters of solidarity, compatibility of state-Union policy and the “bottom-up” dedication to continuing integration, as well as the habitual willingness to comply with the acquis (common rights and obligations that are binding on all member states) even as it evolves over time. Notably, vertical coherence refers specifically to the actions and pronouncements of national capitals, rather than member states working via an EU institution, i.e. the Council of Ministers (Gebhard 2017, 129).

**Horizontal Coherence**

This strand of coherence concerns strategic and inter-institutional concertation at EU level, especially the relationship between the supranational and intergovernmental
spheres of the Union. Consequently, it pertains to the relationship between the Council of the EU and the European Commission (EC), as they are the two key institutions that oversee these two spheres. Therefore, horizontal coherence is attained when the general aim(s) of a strategy or actions converge at EU level, augmented by procedural and technical coherence across the various institutions during planning and execution (Gebhard 2017, 130).

**Institutional Coherence**

Institutional coherence describes the soundness of operations within each sphere (i.e. supranational and intergovernmental) of EU external relations, such as the running of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Gebhard (2017, 130) also argues that internal coherence is chiefly a matter of administrative, procedural and technical development as opposed to strategic intentions or whether policy content converges or is at conflict. The fundamental difficulty here is integrating the amalgam of bureaucratic machinery into a decision-making system that successfully fulfils official policy objectives.

The sum of the three coherences detailed above is external coherence, the ability to “speak with one voice” (Gebhard 2017, 124; Mayer 2013, 108). It concerns the manner in which the Union presents itself to other nation-states or international organizations within a multilateral system, which would in turn affect the EU’s relationship with bodies such as NATO, the UN or with other superpowers such as China or the U.S. Gebhard (2017, 130) notes that in order for the EU to be perceived as a unitary actor and for it to be “functional and responsive”, it would have to establish “technical interoperability” with other global actors—a key measure of external coherence. Notably, external coherence is an inevitable product of the other three coherences: any lapses in coordinating positions or processes amongst member states or between the EU’s supranational bodies will inherently have an effect on the EU’s ability present itself to third parties, affecting its credibility as a global actor.

Notably, these seemingly separate strands of coherence are intrinsically interconnected, and are mutually strengthening. As an example, while the viability and effectiveness of the CFSP is determined primarily by vertical coherence; it also affects the capacity of the EU to “speak with one voice” and offer a prompt “common” response—a key determinant of external coherence. On the other hand, issues occurring in the sphere of internal coherence are regularly expressed in the context of concerns regarding horizontal coherence (Gebhard 2017, 131). Lastly, attaining horizontal coherence is inevitably connected with the credibility, consistency and interoperability of the Union as a global actor, which is in turn a function of external coherence. In short, while these four “coherences” are distinct from one another, they should not be treated as disparate entities.

**Research and Case Selection Methods**

**Comparative design of section three**

Section three, which analyses the manner in which different Union member states
have responded to the BRI, employs the use of comparative case studies. Bryman (2012, 73–74) has argued that the primary objective of a comparative method allows for the examination of “particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings…using the same research instruments.” This method was selected for section three as I believe that it would allow me to thoroughly compare and analyze how different EU nations have responded to the BRI, and in turn, what that tells us about the BRI’s effect on vertical coherence. In comparison, a single case-study, despite allowing for a more in-depth analysis, would have a more limited external validity—the analysis of a single EU member would not make for a meaningful or accurate evaluation of the Union’s collective response to the BRI. As the following sections will demonstrate, there is significant diversity in the responses of the different member states. Meanwhile, something like a longitudinal study on the BRI is not feasible as it was only announced in 2013, and only really began to manifest in the EU from late 2015.

**Case selection for section three**

The primary objective of section three is to determine the extent to which different states within the Union have engaged with the BRI, and then aiming to determine whether they have diverged with the EU’s positions on China or the BRI. Since a representative selection of different member states was made based on the information at the time of writing, fourteen EU nations have acknowledged the presence of BRI-related activity/investments in their countries (Van Der Putten et al. 2016). This data, alongside official infrastructure initiatives that have been announced by the Chinese government, allowed for an identification of the member states in which land-based or maritime infrastructure initiatives have taken material form. Using this criterion eliminates the Nordic countries as well as Portugal and Spain, who play no concrete role in the BRI at present (2016, 5–7). At the time of research and writing, the BRI’s key focus has been on Western Europe and CEE as well as Italy and Greece, whose proximity to the Mediterranean has given them a dominant role in the maritime aspect of the BRI (2016, 32). While Italy will make an interesting case as the first G7 country to officially participate in the BRI, it has not been selected as a case simply because its participation with the BRI is still in its infancy (Geraci 2019). Similarly, Britain would make for a unique case study because of its involvement in the BRI via its financial markets but it is scheduled to leave the bloc (Blitz 2016).

Naturally, a geographically representative selection would involve the analysis of countries in the Western European, CEE, and Mediterranean region while a politically representative selection would take into account the different countries’ varying levels of engagement vis-á-vis the BRI. The Netherlands was chosen, as despite its official involvement in the SREB via the Port of Rotterdam, it has appeared to be indifferent to other aspects of the BRI (Van Der Putten et al., 2016). Similarly, Germany is part of the SREB, but has publicly appeared to be wary of the BRI and has repeatedly stressed the need for a united EU response to China’s “infrastructure
diplomacy” (Gaspers 2016). Meanwhile, evidence suggests that Hungary and Greece have been actively engaged with the BRI, especially with regard to their respective domestic and foreign policies (Kynge and Peel 2017; Rolland 2017). Notably, they have assumed pro-China positions on various occasions. Therefore, section three’s selection of countries is composed of three groups: indifferent, cautious, and supportive of the BRI, respectively.

**Union-level response as single case study in section four**

Section four considers the Union-level response to the BRI as a single case study. This is because there has been no overarching EU-level strategy vis-à-vis the BRI; instead, the Union deals with the BRI within the rest of its China strategy, most predominantly in the EU-China Connectivity Platform. Generally, the EU also does not elaborate on the BRI in its official communiques or proposals, instead mentioning it in passing or merely as an aspect of broader Chinese investment. All this makes the demarcation of each component of the EU response into individual case studies problematic. Section four will therefore regard the EU’s institutional level strategy as a single in-depth case study, determining if there is evidence to suggest that the BRI has reduced horizontal or institutional coherence.

**Conclusion**

EU Coherence theory is of great importance to this study because it allows for the analytical explanation of whether the BRI has altered the Union’s standing in the global political arena. Breaking that down further into the different strands of coherence that Gebhard (2017) has theorized will enable a more specific evaluation of the extent or area(s) in which the BRI has reduced coherence—at a state or institution level or both—if it has. Consequently, there are three possible outcomes in the analysis of the BRI’s effect on coherence: there could either be no change on coherence, an increase of coherence or a reduction of coherence. Alternatively, the results presented in the empirical sections could be such that it is not possible to place the BRI’s effects into one of the above three categories. For example, section three could find that the BRI has caused vertical coherence to increase while section four has found that horizontal coherence is unchanged, and that institutional coherence is reduced. The results would then be inconclusive.

**Section Three: Member-State Responses to the BRI**

**Section Introduction**

The focus of this section is on how individual EU nations have responded to the BRI and test if this has had any influence on vertical coherence. This section will summarize and evaluate the individual responses of the Hungarian, Greek, Dutch, and German governments in three distinct sub-sections: firstly, the characterization of each member-state’s response, secondly, tangible projects that can be directly linked to the BRI, and thirdly, if the BRI has caused a divergence between the foreign-policies
of these countries and the EU. The sub-sections for the individual nations will end with a brief conclusion, followed by a section conclusion. Finally, the results from this empirical section will be analyzed in section five.

Hungary

Domestic policy position vis-à-vis the BRI

From President Orbán’s accession in 2010, his government has pledged “to effectively advance national interests... that go beyond Hungary’s borders, executing a value-based foreign policy” (Vörös and Tarrósy 2014, 142). Additionally, Hungary’s position seems to be promoting an ‘eastward opening’, placing China as a key partner. With warming Sino-Hungarian ties there has been an increased focus on engaging with the BRI, as the Orbán administration is keen on increasing investment into their economy, financing debt, and improving existing infrastructure (2014, 145–159). Hungary also became the first EU member-state to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China on the BRI in June 2015, pledging to promote the SREB during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Budapest (Matura 2015, 10; Szunomar 2018, 80).

Material BRI infrastructure projects

Among the most ambitious and prominent of all BRI projects is the construction of a new, 350-kilometer-long Belgrade-Budapest high speed railroad, valued at approximately $2.89 billion. It promises to reduce the travel times between the two capital cities from eight hours to approximately three and a half (Kowalski 2017, 3). For China, this railway line is strategically significant as it helps to connect the now Chinese-controlled Greek port of Piraeus to key cities in Eastern Europe, and comprises a key section of China’s so-called “Land Sea Express Route” that involves the construction of transport links in Hungary, Serbia, and Macedonia (Tiezzi 2015).

Notably, there were suspicions about the terms of the agreements that were not made public. In February 2017, the EC opened an investigation into the project to ascertain if the tendering procedure for the Hungarian section of the railway had been done in compliance with EU law (Kynge et al. 2017). Crucially, no contract related to the Hungarian section of the railway was made public. Instead, a bilateral Sino-Hungarian treaty from November 2015 featured a call for selected companies to cooperate on the project. The project was to be financed by China’s Eximbank, built by a joint venture of Chinese companies including China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company, and was to be implemented by the Hungarian State Railways (Kowalski 2017, 13–15). For the EC, at question are the
respective agreements signed by the Hungarian and Serbian authorities—with the primary attention on Hungary, a full member state that is bound by the full rigor of EU-procurement legislation (Kynge et al. 2017). This bilateral and arguably opaque deal is viewed by the European Chamber of Commerce as “completely bypassing European rules to public bids” (Pira and Oggi 2017).

**Foreign Policy: Divergence with the EU?**
The Orbán administration has actively fostered the Beijing-Budapest relationship, officially referencing the BRI on numerous occasions. Unsurprisingly, Hungary is viewed by various scholars such as Van Der Putten et al. (2016) and Macri (2019) to be one of the EU’s most diplomatically active states with the BRI, especially via the 16+1 mechanism (Weidenfield, 2018; Kowalski 2017, 4). Hungary has been amongst the most active countries in terms of its commitment to improving relations with China. President Orbán attended the BRI Forum in May 2017 with his Minister of Trade and Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó and signed the Joint Communiqué following the Forum, a document that the EU refused to sign as a bloc (Li 2017). Interestingly, Hungary was one of only six EU members who sent their heads of government to the forum, the other five being Poland, Greece, Czechia, Spain and Italy.

Perhaps more ominous for the EU is Hungary’s repeated recalcitrance towards the bloc’s official positions with regard to China, which can be attributed to the closer Beijing-Budapest relationship, of which the BRI has been a catalyst. In July 2016, when The Hague ruled on China’s claims in the South China Sea, Hungary repeatedly vetoed a forcefully worded EU memorandum that explicitly referenced China (Emmott 2016). Budapest also parried a joint EU declaration at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), criticizing China’s human rights record with regard to its treatment of ethnic and religious minorities (The Economist 2018; Emmott and Koutantou 2017). Finally, in April 2018, 27 of the 28 EU member states’ ambassadors to China signed a statement that accused the BRI of “running counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushing the balance of power in favor Chinese subsidized companies,” also accusing Beijing of capitalizing on the “unequal distribution power” in its bilateral engagement with the Union’s members. Hungary refused to be a signatory of this document, much to the chagrin of the EU (Prasad 2018).

**Greece**

**Introduction**
As the country struggles in “economic quicksand”, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras of the populist left-wing Syriza coalition has publicly stated that “this investment will be the start of a new series of investments” (Xinhua 2018), with regard to the BRI’s involvement in Greece. Naturally, Greece’s Mediterranean locale with its proximity to Asia, Africa and Europe, makes it a key strategic interest for Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road aspect of the BRI. As Tzogopoulos (2013) has opined, Greece “constitutes the most eastern part of the West...a starting point for the continuation and expansion of Beijing’s presence in the old continent.” Greece formalized its cooperation with the
BRI in August 2018 with a signing of a MoU during a visit by Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias to Beijing (OBOR Europe 2018). Notably, Greece’s relationship with the EU has been strained in recent times, especially with regard to the former’s debt-crisis and the latter’s resultant imposition of austerity measures on the Greek economy (Horowitz and Alderman 2017).

Material BRI infrastructure projects

Chinese shipping giant Cosco’s US$ 4.3 billion acquisition of the port of Piraeus (within the urban area of Athens) in January 2016 is the BRI’s most prominent infrastructure initiative in Greece to date. Specifically, Cosco has won a 35-year management lease for Piers II and III, the largest two of the three terminals in the port. After the privatization of the port, Cosco has continually invested money in upgrading the port’s infrastructure, which assisted it in attracting multinational corporations such as Hewlett-Packard, Huawei, and Maersk to operate out of Piraeus (Casarini 2015, 8). As a result of this Chinese investment, Piraeus has become the EU’s fastest expanding port in terms of twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU-unit measuring the volume of a shipping container). The traffic via the Piraeus container terminal (operated as a subsidiary of Cosco) has almost quadrupled from 880,000 TEU in 2010 to 3.6 million TEU in 2015, this has caused Piraeus’ international ranking in terms of container throughput to rise from the 93rd to 39th position in the same five-year period (Glass 2016). While the privatization of Piraeus is the only concrete BRI transport project in Greece to date, there have been proposals to expand and modernize the supporting infrastructure around the port. The most apparent example of which is China’s pledge to modernize the Greek railway lines, facilitating the speedier transport of goods from Piraeus to CEE regions via Thessaloniki and Macedonia (Casarini 2015, 4).

Foreign Policy: Divergence with the EU?

In contrast to Hungary’s actions on the contract awarding process of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, Greece allowed an open-tender bidding process for the privatization of the Piraeus port. Nevertheless, there has been concern about the potential effects that Chinese control of the port may have on the preservation of EU law. Van der Putten (2014) has written extensively about the likelihood of fake and undeclared goods from China entering EU markets via Piraeus. While there is little proof that Cosco’s control of the Piraeus port has exacerbated the inflow of contraband items into the EU, some experts believe that this inflow has “grown substantially” since Cosco began running Piraeus’ pier II terminal. It has been argued that this movement of fake goods is facilitated by corrupt Greek and Chinese port officials. Indeed, 64% of all fake goods confiscated at the borders of EU countries in 2012 had Chinese origins (2014, 62).

More broadly, evidence suggests that Greece’s engagement with the BRI has led it to diverge with the EU on a range of China-related foreign policy issues. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that that Chinese claims to maritime
areas within the “nine-dash line” were unlawful according to standards set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Following this verdict, the Union’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini issued a declaration that all parties, especially China, should resolve this matter in accordance with international maritime laws and norms. After three days of discussion in Brussels, officials from Hungary, Croatia, and Greece compelled the EU to “water down” its statement on Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea, avoiding a direct reference to China (EEAS 2016). As an unnamed senior EU diplomat remarked: “It is not easy to speak with one voice...the way we phrase the statement is very sensitive” (Emmott 2016). Similarly, Greece vetoed the bloc’s statement on the promotion of free speech and advocating the end of capital punishment at the UNHRC 2017 summit. Athens claimed that the statement’s direct reference to China was “unconstructive, selective criticisms” of China (Denyer 2017). Notably, this marked the first time that the EU 28 was unable to issue a communique at the conclusion of the UNHRC’s annual conference. An official from the Chinese foreign ministry responded to this by “expressing appreciation to the relevant EU country for upholding the correct position” (Emmott 2016). Lastly, Greece (and Czechia) “watered down” an EC announcement on a proposed screening mechanism for foreign investments into the EU, with the former stating that Chinese investment was the cause of its antagonism to this mechanism (Meunier 2019; Rasmussen Global 2017).

**Conclusions**

It is evident that Greece adopts a much more pro-China stance than Union does as a bloc. While this does not reduce vertical coherence per se, there are two aspects of the BRI’s presence in Greece that should worry the Union. Firstly, the likelihood that China is using its control of Piraeus as a means to facilitate the inflow of Chinese-made contraband goods implies that this BRI project has allowed Beijing to flout EU-law via Greece. One of the key criteria of vertical coherence is the compatibility of state policy with EU regulation, if this inflow is found to be true—and the preliminary evidence suggests so—then the BRI has reduced vertical coherence in this aspect. Secondly, Greece’s repeated rejection of various EU positions on China is at conflict with the “solidarity” and “policy compliance” dimensions of vertical coherence.

**Germany**

**Introduction**

As the EU’s largest economy and a founding member, Germany has had a long history of engagement with China. Despite being key trade partners, the response from Merkel’s government on the BRI can arguably be described as hesitant and wary. The German government sees only mediocre opportunities for its businesses to engage and profit from the BRI and is a strong advocate of a united EU position on China and the BRI (Benner et al., 2016).
Material BRI infrastructure projects

The BRI has neither yielded infrastructure investments in Germany nor has it been featured as a cornerstone of Chinese Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activities. Instead, BRI related projects in Germany have been confined to the retroactive re-branding of various infrastructure projects that were established from 2011 to 2015, examples of which include the Leipzig-Shenyang and Hamburg-Harbin railway links. (Van Der Putten et al. 2016, 25). Because of the important trade relationship between the two countries, it is unsurprising that Germany forms part of the BRI’s SREB. On official maps illustrating the BRI, the major hubs of Berlin, Hamburg, Duisburg, and Leipzig are clearly depicted. However, these were announced prior to the launch of the BRI in 2013 and were subsequently “retrofitted” into the BRI (2016, 27). This implies that Germany was never a key component for BRI projects; instead, this re-branding of German projects was to ensure that the Chinese government had a more united approach vis-à-vis the BRI in Europe.

Foreign Policy: Divergence with the EU?

During the May 2017 BRI forum in Beijing, Germany was represented by its Minister of Economic Affairs, Brigette Zypries. This is in contrast to other member states such as Hungary and Greece who sent their prime ministers as heads of delegations (Xinhua 2017). More significantly, Germany was not a signatory of the Communique issued upon the conclusion of the forum, choosing to adopt the EU’s official position of not formally endorsing the BRI. The German hesitance to fully engage with the BRI can be attributed to its concerns of an unequal relationship between Beijing and Berlin, where most of the decision making and contract awarding will be conducted by the former, particularly regarding the Eurasian transport corridor where German companies were perceived to be slighted in favor of Chinese ones (German Federal Government 2016).

While the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by its minister, has regularly dealt with the subject of the BRI in meetings and press releases, the emphasis has been on how Germany could engage with the BRI via existing EU frameworks such as the EU-China Connectivity Project. (Gaspers 2016) As an example, after China and Germany held their fourth bilateral summit in Beijing, they issued a joint declaration that explicitly stated the desire to deepen the “strategic partnership” between the EU and China as a bloc, and not between the individual countries as Poland and Greece have done (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016) All this is a reflection of the German government’s desire to approach the BRI as a unified bloc rather than bilaterally. It is therefore unsurprising that the Merkel administration is wary of the 16+1 mechanism between Beijing and several CEE countries, the majority of whom are EU member states.

Conclusions

Several hypotheses emerge from the evaluation of Germany’s response to the BRI. Firstly, while there is still a high level of economic engagement between the two coun-
tries via bilateral trade and investment, BRI involvement has been confined to the re-branding of previously announced projects. Secondly, the Merkel government has had very low expectations of the economic benefits that the BRI would bring to Germany, evidenced by the lack of domestic policies vis-à-vis the BRI. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the German government is a strong advocate of a united EU-level response to the BRI, and is hesitant to engage with it bilaterally, instead propounding the use of existing policy frameworks within Union such as the EU-China connectivity platform and the EEAS to integrate the BRI with the EU’s goals and ambitions.

The Netherlands

Introduction

Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) headed the Dutch government in a coalition with the Dutch labor party from late 2012 to late 2017, with its second cabinet (Van der Putten 2014). Rutte’s party was again re-elected alongside several others as a coalition government in the 2017 Dutch general election. The Rutte administrations have often been seen as both neutral and reluctant in relation to the BRI (Casarini 2015, 9). With regard to its foreign policy, the Dutch government does not consider the BRI to be of significant importance to the Netherlands in the short-run.

Material BRI infrastructure projects

While relatively few BRI infrastructure projects exist in the Netherlands, there have been several significant cases of Chinese investment in existing Dutch infrastructure and transport networks. One such example is Cosco Shipping acquiring a 33% stake in the Euromax deep-sea container terminal in the Port of Rotterdam in 2016, for which Cosco paid €125 million (Lockett 2016, 32; Zhong 2016). Interestingly, despite much attention being focused on China’s acquisition of Piraeus, a major Greek shipping port, Cosco’s CEO has indicated that Rotterdam’s port would continue to be the main hub for Chinese goods entering the EU for the short-to-medium term. Having said that, official BRI documents do not directly mention Cosco’s investment with the Port of Rotterdam as a full-fledged BRI project (Rupp 2015). The only explicit reference to the SREB aspect of the BRI is the Chengdu-Tilburg-Rotterdam Express freight railway service, where a Dutch logistics corporation, GVP, operates the Dutch area of the line (Van Der Putten et al. 2016, 41). The frequency of trains—consisting of one locomotive and 41 containers—was increased from once to thrice weekly in 2016, taking approximately 15 days to travel from Chengdu to Rotterdam via Kazakhstan and Russia (Port of Rotterdam 2017). However, this rail link between the countries is considered by scholars to be marginal at
best when compared with the scope of BRI projects in other countries.

**Foreign Policy: Divergence with the EU?**

There have relatively few signs of Dutch foreign policy engagement with the BRI. According to Lo (2018), neither the Dutch government nor its Ministry of Foreign Affairs have published any official documents or communiques that directly mention the BRI or the Sino-Dutch relationship, other than in an EU context. In an official visit to the Netherlands in 2014, President Xi did not mention the BRI, only mentioning his desire for the Sino-Dutch relationship to be deepened. Additionally, during the BRI forum of May 2017, the Netherlands’ delegation was only represented at “official level,” it did not send its prime minister or any member of the cabinet (Wong 2017). Like Germany, the Netherlands was not a signatory of the joint communique at the end of the forum that pledged deeper cooperation between China and the other signatories vis-à-vis the BRI (Xinhua 2017).

Overall, the Netherlands has assumed a neutral strategy in relation to the BRI, preferring to adopt a wait-and-see approach based on how the EU and its member states respond to or integrate into the BRI first. Nijbroek (2018) has found that search queries on official Dutch government websites produces a very limited number of documents that allude to the BRI. In one of the documents, the Dutch Minister for Infrastructure and the Environment opined that “the Chinese SREB is still at an initial stage. It is still unclear whether it will yield sustainable economic benefits for either China or Europe. We will await an EU response” (Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment 2015, 36).

**Conclusions**

As this case study has illustrated, the Netherland’s interest and engagement with the BRI is best described as marginal and ambivalent. With regard to foreign policy vis-à-vis the BRI, the Dutch government has not rocked the EU’s boat and has instead communicated and acted in accordance with official Union positions. The Dutch response can be summarized in Rutte’s words: “I would think we have to approach it as an opportunity, but not be naive…” (Lo 2018). In short, the Dutch case demonstrates that the BRI has not perceptibly affected vertical coherence between the Union and this member state.

**Section Conclusions**

This section has demonstrated that amongst the EU’s member states, there have been three different levels of engagement vis-à-vis the BRI. While Germany is wary of the effects that the BRI may have on the Union’s vertical coherence and is an advocate
of Union-level engagement, the Dutch approach is best described as a neutral one, preferring to adopt Union positions. Meanwhile, the Greek and Hungarian approach to the BRI has been a predominantly bilateral one, and they have been perceptibly welcoming to BRI-projects and investment. More importantly, while the BRI has not affected vertical coherence between the EU and Germany as well as the Netherlands, it has been reduced between Hungary, Greece and the Union.

**SECTION FOUR: UNION-LEVEL RESPONSE TO THE BRI**

**INTRODUCTION**

This section will examine the extent to which the BRI has affected horizontal and institutional coherence by examining the extent to which the EU has engaged with the BRI and whether it has presented itself as a united front in this respect. To do this, I will first look at the EU-China Connectivity Platform (EUCCP)—created with the intention to integrate the BRI with Union-wide infrastructure initiatives such as the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) (EC 2017c). The second segment of this section will provide an overview of other proposals or communications from the EU’s institutions that deal with the BRI. Finally, the findings from this section will be analyzed in section five.

**THE EU–CHINA CONNECTIVITY PLATFORM: MEAGER OR ROBUST RESPONSE?**

The Platform, formed in 2016, can be best identified as the Union’s principal response to the BRI. One of its key goals was to hold annual summits between and Chinese and European diplomats. They have met in 2016 and 2017 and will persist in doing so, according to the communiqué of the 2017 meeting. The Union has coordinated and structured the arrangements of the Platform via its Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, who oversees the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (EC 2016). Meanwhile the Chinese delegation was headed by the Vice-Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission. The Platform focuses on three key fundamentals: firstly, around the policy coordination and physical integration of transport infrastructure between China and the EU. Secondly, the preparation and promotion of environmentally sustainable connectivity provisions, and finally, the establishment of values and principles that are of concern to the EU, i.e. transparency, sustainability, trustworthiness, and a level-playing field for all parties involved (EEAS 2017). I shall pay particular attention to the first and third principles as they have been developed into explicit policy recommendations.

In relation to the policy coordination and integration aspect of the Platform, it essentially claims to connect China’s BRI ambitions with the TEN-T. The aim here is to “close the gaps between Member States’ transport networks, remove bottlenecks that still hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market and overcome technical barriers such as incompatible standards for railway traffic” (EC 2014, 166–167). For the TEN-T, the EC has highlighted certain ‘core network corridors’ that it views as the ‘infrastructural backbone’ of the Union. Inside this core network, the EC in-
tends to better coordinate the transport infrastructure between various member states. Amongst the corridors that the EC has shortlisted are the ‘Motorways of the Sea’ corridor in which countries with inland bodies of water are included, as well as the North Sea-Mediterranean corridor, and finally the Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor. Within the Platform, the EC has proposed the integration of several TEN-T projects with the BRI. Nijbroek’s (2018) analysis of the minutes from several Platform meetings indicate that these projects were shortlisted because the financial agreements of these projects had not been finalized (EC 2016; 2017b). The EU’s proposed integration of some of these infrastructure projects with the BRI can be best described as modest. Firstly, it has yet to be seen if China will accede to the EU’s request for funding into these projects. Secondly, the vast majority (17 out of 19) of these projects take place in the “16+1 countries”, which implies that the EU is merely trying to contain and integrate Chinese investment in CEE rather than coming up with a coherent and Union-wide response to the BRI. Lastly, the projects that the Connectivity Platform have been trying to integrate with the BRI are of a comparatively low value and can viewed as marginal when compared to other BRI projects such as the Belgrade-Budapest railway line. This raises questions on whether the EU chose not to integrate the BRI’s largest projects or if it was simply unable to.

Another aspect of the Union’s input to the Connectivity Platform stresses the importance of transparency rules, competition policy, fair public procurement, open tendering for infrastructure projects, as well as minimum sustainability and quality standards for all future transport projects. The Union submitted a position paper during the 2017 BRI forum that was distributed to all attending delegates, highlighting the need for the BRI’s projects to be complementary to EU aims and policies, as well as meeting minimum international regulations and standards (EEAS 2017). That paper also stressed that future BRI projects should be “technically interoperable,” which would “reduce borders” instead of creating new ones. Finally, the EU reiterated the need for future BRI projects to be based on transparent public tenders so EU companies could fairly participate in the bidding process—this was seen as a thinly veiled reference to the Budapest-Belgrade railway project (Brattberg and Soula 2018). Notably, these positions are consistent with those that the Union has presented in other conferences and summits where it has mentioned the BRI (EC 2017a; 2017b).

**Other EU Proposals that Reference the BRI**

Apart from the Connectivity Platform, there is little evidence to suggest that the Union, at the time of writing, has a clear strategy on how to cooperate with China vis-à-vis BRI. Recognizing this, the EC and the High Representative (HR/VP) in June 2016 jointly presented a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council titled “Elements for a new EU strategy on China.” The EC, in this report, suggests that “the EU needs its own strategy, one which puts its own interests at the forefront in the new relationship” (EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 2).
There are few key points that the Commission highlights in its proposal that directly relate to the BRI. Firstly, the EC and HR/VP support the maintenance of the Connectivity Platform as the primary vehicle for communication and cooperation between China and the EU in relation to the BRI. It goes on to argue that future EU-BRI policy should stress the importance of a “rules-based international order” and “good governance”; the importance of these have already been communicated via the Connectivity Platform and almost seems like little more than the reiteration of an existing modus operandi. Another notable section of this report stresses the need for a “whole-of-EU” stance in dealing with the BRI, one that harmonizes the respective actions of the Union’s institutions such as the EC and the EEAS (2016, 17–18). Additionally, it emphasizes the need for the Union’s member states to “reinforce agreed EU positions in their bilateral relations with China” and that the EC should ensure that “member states are made aware when EU interests need to be safeguarded.” Finally, it adds that, with regard to the BRI, “EU coherence and cohesiveness is vital...on the maintenance of the rules-based international order” (2016, 17–18).

I would argue that the “Elements for a new EU strategy on China” report (EC 2016) has correctly identified the underlying motivations of the BRI, and thus the need for a coherent and united strategy that involves EU institutions as well as member states. However, it is apparent that while this proposal has accurately identified what needs to be done, it has not suggested how the EU—at state or supranational level—should ensure that a united and cohesive approach is in place when interacting with the BRI. As Rolland (2017) has noted, it is entirely plausible that the EU has been unable to formulate a coherent response to the BRI simply because it has never faced a scenario of this nature and magnitude before. If this were to be the case (I would argue that any definitive conclusion is premature at this stage), it reinforces the hypothesis that the BRI has caused a degree of horizontal and institutional incoherence between and within the Union’s supranational institutions.

Finally, it should be noted that while there has been visible discontent by senior EU leaders on the effect that the BRI has had on the bloc, this discontent has not been matched with an appropriate strategy. In a March 2019 paper, the EC branded China as a “systemic rival” and called on China to stop its ‘unfair’ BRI investment practices in the bloc (Peel and Brunsden 2019). The paper concluded by advocating a “more balanced and reciprocal economic relationship” between the two powers. However, like the rest of the EU strategy on the BRI, it accurately identifies the potential threat that the BRI has on the Union but does not suggest how the bloc should respond. This suggests that a lack of horizontal and/or institutional coherence has prevented the EU from developing a timely and comprehensive response to the BRI. Whether this inability to respond is unique to the Union’s dealings with the BRI, only time will tell.

**Section Conclusions**
In summary, the Union’s position towards the BRI can be perceived as one that promotes openness, fairness, and good governance, particularly in relation to the tendering of contracts and the financing of projects. However, the Union’s position with
regard to the BRI is not dissimilar to its general stance towards other foreign trade and investment (Rolland 2017). This lack of a BRI-specific response, despite the increasing distrust and discontent from EU leaders towards the BRI suggests that a lack of horizontal and institutional coherence has prevented the Union's institutions from producing a Union-wide strategy to integrate the BRI. As Beattie (2019) has opined: "The [European] Commission is talking a robust game, but its means of engaging China [is]…slow, fragile and subject to internal divisions.”

**Section Five: Analysis and Implications on External Coherence**

This section will offer a more analytical interpretation of the findings that sections three and four have presented, and evaluate whether the BRI has reduced any of the three strands of EU coherence detailed in section two, which will consequently reveal whether the Union's external coherence has been affected. With its separate country sections, section three has found three different levels of member-state engagement vis-à-vis the BRI. The segments on Hungary and Greece illustrate how access to Chinese capital and warm bilateral ties appear to go hand in hand. While close bilateral ties in themselves do not affect vertical (and thus external) coherence, there is an observable link between Chinese investment and the diverging foreign policies of Hungary and Greece from the EU.

Notably, the findings from the case studies in section three are extrapolatable to other member states within the EU. This is consistent with the hypotheses presented by some scholars such as Rolland (2017) and Holslag (2017)—that some EU countries (Greece and Hungary, but also Poland, Czechia, and Italy) in the CEE and Southern regions are more welcoming towards BRI investment and infrastructure projects than the rest of the EU is. They view close ties with China as a means for procuring necessary investments to stimulate their economies; Beijing in return, expects some form of political commitment or support (Fallon 2016; Kynge and Peel 2017). Disagreements between these member states and the EU have risen as a result of this. As an example, an attempt by Germany and France to strengthen the Union's investment screening capability compelled—according to a Western European trade official—certain member states to threaten that “if the plan went through...they would have to be compensated financially for the loss of investment...some explicitly mentioned China” (Cerulus and Hanke 2017).

As section two has established, for the EU to be vertically coherent the foreign policy positions of member states must be aligned with one another, and more importantly, with the Union (Gebhard 2017). The cases in section three demonstrate that there is: firstly, a distinct lack of vertical coherence between the member states with regard to the BRI, with three levels of BRI engagement identified. Secondly, and more crucially, section three demonstrates that the BRI has exacerbated vertical incoherence between the Union and countries such as Hungary and Greece. The present evidence suggests that the relationship between BRI investment and the alignment of several EU countries with Beijing’s political interests is becoming an increasingly
positive one. The resultant reduction of external coherence was perceptible in various instances, such as when the Union was forced to rephrase its statement on the South China Sea dispute, when its inwards investment screening proposal was obstructed, and when it could not issue a statement at a UNHRC conference for the first time. I would argue that instead of speaking with a “single voice” (a key aspect of external coherence), it had to speak with “multiple voices” on several occasions—with Greece and Hungary (among other countries) assuming different positions—and with “no voice” in the UNHRC instance.

Meanwhile, section four analyzed the degree to which the BRI has affected the Union’s horizontal and institutional coherence via an analysis of the actions of its supranational institutions. The findings of this section are less explicit than those in section three as the Union, at the time of writing, does not have a “whole-of-EU” BRI-specific strategy, making it more challenging to determine if there is an inherent lack of coherence on the EU’s part or if the BRI caused or exacerbated it. The Union presently relies on the vague and imprecisely formulated Connectivity Platform to deal with the BRI as a subset of the Union’s broader China strategy. I would argue that this lack of an EU-encompassing strategy towards the BRI four years after one of its member states first signed up for the initiative is telling in itself. It implies that either the BRI has caused an unprecedented level of horizontal/institutional incoherence, or that the EU is unable to formulate a cohesive foreign policy response to an increasingly significant investment drive within its borders. As Gebhard (2017) has argued, a criterion for horizontal and institutional coherence is the coordination of aims between the Union’s different institutions, thus strengthening the capabilities of the Union’s policy processes. This also means that an integral and cohesive strategy should be aimed within and between the Union’s different institutions.

This lack of an EU-wide strategy is attributable to China’s bilateral approach with the BRI, making it difficult for the EU to deal with the BRI from a Union level. This bilateralism fits in with the “divide and conquer” and “pay for play” narrative that some scholars (Benner et al. 2018, 7; Meunier 2014, 998) have claimed China is using in its approach to the EU. In this sense, at least, it is clear that the BRI has reduced horizontal/institutional coherence; as Robert Cooper, a former EU foreign policy adviser, has opined: “China has discovered it can pick off different EU members and stop the EU having a China policy…” (Peel et al. 2017). It is worth reiterating Gebhard’s (2017, 131) proposition that the various strands of coherences are “mutually reinforcing”—in this instance it is likely to be quite the opposite of “reinforcing”: the present evidence suggests that the reduction in vertical coherence has had an adverse impact on horizontal and/or institutional coherence. A consequence of this is the difficulty that the Union has encountered in its attempts to coordinate a single foreign policy towards Beijing. Many countries within the Union are adopting a pro-China stance and are obstructing any policy/position that is deemed to be antagonistic towards China or the BRI. This is a clear indication that the BRI has reduced the EU’s ability to “speak with one voice” and demonstrate that it operates as a “functional and re-
responsive partner”, both of which are key facets of external coherence.

For some scholars such as Zeng (2017) and Cameron (2017), the BRI does not have enough significant investments nor a sufficiently cogent blueprint to warrant a coherent or comprehensive EU strategy. I will challenge this argument for two key reasons: firstly, while the BRI’s investments in absolute terms may be small when viewed in comparison to the EU economy, they have been increasing significantly on a year-by-year basis—from 2008 to 2016, there has been a 45% increase in Chinese investment activity in Europe (BBC News 2019). Secondly, if this supposedly “insignificant” investment has already been able to cause vertical (and external) incoherence, such as in the cases of Hungary and Greece rejecting several EU foreign policy positions, what will the effects be when BRI investments increase? After all, the BRI has managed to court its first EU founding-member, Italy. Furthermore, if the Union has been unable to develop a united and comprehensive plan on the BRI despite being in opposition of it, it suggests that the BRI, even in its (relatively) early stages has both shown and exacerbated horizontal and/or institutional incoherence.

**Section Six: Conclusions and Areas for Further Research**

The various sections in this dissertation have contributed to answering the research question posed in section one: “To what extent has China’s Belt and Road Initiative reduced EU coherence?” Section two set the framework for analyzing the research problem via EU coherence theory and highlighted the role of external coherence in the Union’s effectiveness in dealing with other global actors. Section three presented the different ways and varying levels at which individual member states engage with the BRI, while section four evaluated the ways in which the EU itself has responded to the BRI. Finally, section five scrutinized the evidence presented in sections three and four in determining the extent to which the BRI has affected EU coherence.

Notably, this paper has not attempted to determine the degree of incoherence prior to the BRI’s involvement in the region. I therefore encourage other scholars to explore this aspect more as there is a shortage of literature that deals with this issue at present. This would help to determine a more precise degree of incoherence resulting from the BRI. Similarly, a study that compares the BRI with other external circumstances (such as the refugee crisis) that require a Union-wide response, would be useful as it would help establish whether the BRI is an anomaly in reducing EU coherence. Other research worth considering would be a longitudinal study on the BRI’s effects on EU countries and institutions from both a short and long-term view: it is possible that the BRI’s effect on coherence is more apparent in the long-term or vice versa. Lastly, it will be interesting to study the effect of BRI investments in ascension states like Serbia and Montenegro, and whether EU coherence will be affected when these states eventually become full members. These cases and methods have not been utilized in this paper owing to its brevity and scope, as well as the contemporaneousness of the BRI, which continues to evolve at the time of writing.

Nevertheless, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, despite the BRI’s mar-
ginal (but increasing) presence in the Union, it is already apparent that it has reduced vertical coherence between the EU and several member states, amongst them, Hungary and Greece. I have also demonstrated that member-states who have a greater prospect of benefitting economically from the BRI will be unlikely to advocate for a cohesive EU response. Instead, they are more likely to break ranks with the EU in matters of foreign policy concerning China. Secondly, while the evidence on whether the BRI has significantly reduced horizontal/institutional coherence is inadequate to make a definitive assertion, the preliminary indications point to a reduction to either or both coherences. This is illustrated by the lack of a comprehensive response by the Union’s institutions, despite increasing wariness of the BRI. Finally, I wrote in section two that this paper would arrive at one of three possible hypotheses: the BRI could leave EU external coherence either reduced, increased or unchanged. At present, the evidence markedly points towards the first. Beijing’s investments into the EU have translated to diplomatic dividends for it, at the expense of EU external coherence. An EC report (2019, 2) summarizes it succinctly: “Neither the EU nor its member states can effectively achieve their aims with China with full unity.”
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**The Palestinian Boycott of Israeli Municipal Elections in Jerusalem: Politics of Identity, Legitimacy, and Civil Resistance**

Ieva Gailiunaite

Electoral boycotts are a form of civil resistance rooted in the refusal to accept the political status quo, and this is particularly notable in the East Jerusalem Palestinian boycott of Israeli municipal elections since 1967. The municipal boycott in Jerusalem has been studied as a part of wider analyses of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. The situation has been presented to be a result of passivity, disillusionment, and path dependency, or depicting East Jerusalemite Palestinians as the hostages of the political impasse within the region. This dissertation argues for the centrality of the boycott as a long-term movement that reinforces Palestinian identity, legitimacy, and agency within Jerusalem. It demonstrates that long-term identity-based factors are more important than short-term civil and material ones. Concepts of a Palestinian East Jerusalemite identity within a divided city show the importance of the boycott in maintaining agency within the city, without legitimising Israeli occupation. The role of pressure from political actors on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides is evaluated in their influence on the boycott. The steadfastness of the boycott by a third of the voting population in Jerusalem demonstrates the importance of the city’s Palestinian inhabitants and their active role from the heart of the issue within the wider scope of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

**Section One: Introduction and Method**

**Introduction**

The city of Jerusalem is a unique place where thousands of years of history, religion, and politics have intertwined and often clashed. It is held to be one of the holiest cities for all three Abrahamic religions and is the contested capital of the homeland of both Palestinian and Jewish people. In the last 150 years, the Holy Land has acquired even more political salience due to a conflict arising between the Jewish people, who claim it as their historical homeland, and the local Palestinians. Jerusalem has found itself in the eye of this hurricane. The historical and contextual situation is introduced to understand the complexity of the issue in answering the research question of why East Jerusalem Palestinians refuse to vote in Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem.

Throughout the last century, sovereignty over the city has been held by different political entities, from the British Mandate 1918-1948, a divided East and West Jerusalem between Jordan and Israel respectively between 1948-1967 and finally its current status quo as a divided city unilaterally annexed by the State of Israel after the 1967 war (Dumper 1997; Altayli 2013). According to the State of Israel, Jerusalem has been declared the capital of Israel, although this is contested by international law under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Altayli 2013, 43). The eastern part of the city, as divided by the Green Line, is predominantly inhabited by the local Arab Palestinian population, while the western part by the Jewish population (see fig 1.) (Dumper

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1997, 37). This is contested, with numerous Jewish settlements encroaching into the eastern part of the city.

Political actors from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides deem Jerusalem as one of the key non-negotiable issues, and thus the status of the city has often been the cause of a breakdown of peace negotiations (Altayli 2013, 32). Furthermore, several religious and social organizations hold stakes in the fate of the city and their respective Holy places, namely, the Muslim Awqaf Administration, various Christian Patriarchates, and the Jewish orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities (Dumpuer 1997, 174). Therefore, a complicated social and political horizon arises, setting the scene for this dissertation.

The divisions within the city reflect the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where de facto occupied local peoples of Palestine are in confrontation with the State of Israel and their policies. To further elucidate this, the civil and political status of East Jerusalemites is outlined. This highlights the importance of historical and social context in examining the research question of municipal election boycott. Since the 1967 war, which is the timeframe of focus for this dissertation, the occupation of the city east of the Green Line resulted in the creation of a new “East Jerusalem” identity within the Israeli national framework. Israel tried to incorporate the local Palestinian population, realizing that since its annexation, the Jerusalem under Israeli control was also predominantly “a Muslim city, a Palestinian Christian city and an Arab city” (Dumpuer 1997, 23). Upon the 1967 incorporation of East Jerusalem into Israel, the approximately 65,000 Palestinians living within the new borders were offered Israeli citizenship (Dumpuer 1997, 48). Only 1% of that number accepted it, as this required the forfeiting of Jordanian passports, which they had held since 1947. Consequently, the local Palestinians in East Jerusalem were given non-citizen permanent resident status, received Israeli identity cards, and were offered the right to vote in municipal elections (Dumpuer 1997, 48).

Focusing on the issue of East Jerusalem Palestinians participating in their local governance helps to pinpoint some of the issues behind this geopolitical conundrum. Since 1967, they have almost overwhelmingly chosen to boycott the local
municipal elections as a way to protest against their lives under occupation, as well as refusing to legitimate Israeli sovereignty over them (Altayli 2013, 50). A number of challenges and questions arise from their stance, which leads to the research question of why this choice is consistently made. The paper is structured accordingly. Section two will present an overview of the main literature and concepts, such as divided cities and identity politics within the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the issue of Jerusalem. It will provide insight into the demographic and political circumstances within the city since 1967, as these aspects will then help in the analysis of why the boycott is taking place. Section three analyzes the question from the perspective of legitimacy and identity politics within East Jerusalem, outlining its status and relationship with Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). Deliberate political inaction as a long-term political tactic will be juxtaposed against ideas of short-term local material and civil improvement. This supports the argument that long-term identity-related factors are more important, demonstrated by the fact that there has not been a significant change in voter turnout since 1967. Section four argues that while there are significant historical and contemporary pressures from political actors on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides to continue the boycott, they lack significant power to influence it. The role of East Jerusalemite Palestinian identity accounts more for the long-term steadfastness of the boycott. Section five summarizes these arguments, ultimately concluding that the boycott remains an effective resistance movement due to factors such as identity politics, resistance to occupation, and local disillusionment with democratic processes. It shows the choice to play the “long game,” as opposed to giving up their identity for short-term economic and material gain, which would result in a political loss of footing within Jerusalem, a crucial locus of the national struggle.

Jerusalem is one of the most contested areas of land within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Altayli 2013, 188; Khalidi 2010, xviii; Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 113) and between different religious leaders and pilgrims, making it a unique case to study politically. The role of elections and their effect on self-determination, quality of life, sovereignty, and identity are pertinent issues to analyze. This boycott is particularly interesting as it stands out against other electoral boycotts in the world, as the latter tends to occur on an election-by-election basis, carried out by opposition parties (Beaulieu 2014 in Blake et al. 2018). Further, this refusal and its changing trends over time can be examined and help to evaluate the political as well as social situation in the ever-changing conflict.

Methodology
This dissertation uses library-based secondary research for its analysis. As the issue of Palestinian boycott in Israeli municipal elections is a political one and is intertwined with the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, it is especially pertinent to be reflexive of the sources used. The dissertation analyses the causes of the boycott but is aware of the political undercurrent present in the scholarly literature about such a polarizing topic.
(Khalidi 2010; al-Jubeh 2017). The analysis is limited to works in the English language, thus omitting literature in Hebrew and Arabic. The use of sources in these languages would provide deeper insight and highlight the divisions of opinion on either side of the conflict. The speculative nature of some reports, in the form of policy recommendations, is noted, and only the relevant data is taken from them. Additionally, the nature of the conflict may skew the methodology when polling in East Jerusalem about issues related to the municipal elections. Khalil Shikaki notes that while the intentions to vote may be true, they may not translate to voting on the day of elections (Seidemann 2018). The advantages of focusing on a singular case study are the ability to concentrate on details and analyze the argument in depth. The importance of history and context within the issue of the Jerusalem municipal boycott lends itself well to a case study analysis. The unique nature of the situation and lack of comparability is also noted, hindering the generalisability of the analysis and its conclusions.

The terms and framework used in this dissertation will be defined and clarified. The case study of the city of Jerusalem, with particular focus on East Jerusalem Palestinians, is chosen due to the exceptional political and social divisions within the city. Further, this municipal boycott is a long-term resistance movement within the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, making it relevant to ongoing studies of the issue in international relations. This paper focuses on a specific timeframe from 1967 until the 2018 municipal election and utilizes mostly qualitative data for analysis. The term “elections” refers to the Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem, where the mayor and municipal council are elected. Municipal elections are run every five years by the Israeli Ministry of Interior, making the council accountable to the State of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Boycott, in the case of this dissertation, means the non-participation in Jerusalem’s municipal elections by the East Jerusalemite Palestinians who hold the right to vote. The division between East and West Jerusalem is a blurry one as the Jewish and Palestinian populations are not exclusively divided by it. For the sake of clarity, the Green Line of the 1949 Armistice Agreement will be used to denote the division between the east and west of the city. The political and social vicissitudes within the historic Old City will not be considered due to the scope of this paper, although its Palestinian inhabitants may be counted in some East Jerusalem statistics on voting (Dumper 2002; Seidemann 2012).

It is worthy to note that the ever-changing nature of the conflict makes it difficult to pinpoint the main actors on either side, as fractures within both Israeli and Palestinian sides are numerous and shifting (Crisis Group 2012, 23). In terms of the actors this paper refers to, the main Israeli actors are the government of the state of Israel and the chosen representatives in the Jerusalem municipality. The Arab Palestinian population living in East Jerusalem with the right to vote in municipal elections will be referred to as Palestinian East Jerusalemites. This sample of the population is distinct from West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians in the fact that they possess the Jerusalem ID and thus have the right to vote in municipal elections. In terms of Palestinian political actors within East Jerusalem, the matter is more complicated. The area
is part of the Jerusalem Governorate, in the sub-district Jerusalem J-1, and is under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (Pcbs.gov.ps, 2012). This is overlapping with Israeli politics and is disputed after the legal annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel in 1980 (Knesset of Israel, 1980). Thus, the PNA is the main political actor within East Jerusalem, with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) holding historical agency which has been diminished over the past decades. The presence of the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, is minimal in the city and will be discussed further on (Crisis Group 2012, 23). Therefore, as the actors are numerous and their influence varies in political and social scope, they will be explicitly stated throughout this dissertation.

SECTION TWO: DIVIDED CITIES, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND VOTER TURNOUT IN EAST JERUSALEM
RELEVANT LITERATURE AND CONCEPTS

The question of why East Jerusalemite Palestinians refuse to vote in Israeli municipal elections has been a pertinent one in academia and outside it since 1967. The political and social implications of this situation have been studied from different angles, questioning whether this gives East Jerusalemites agency for change or is another way of legitimizing Israeli occupation. This section will outline the key arguments and theoretical concepts that have been made regarding the political situation within the Holy Land, the city of Jerusalem, and East Jerusalem. This will support the analysis of this dissertation and provide direction to the main research question of why the municipal election is boycotted by a third of the voting population. Factors such as identity-based refusal to accept Israeli rule, political and social pressures, economic inequalities, as well as disillusionment with the municipality and democracy will be drawn out. While the existing literature acknowledges the reasons for this boycott and its relative importance in the resistance movement, it does not place enough emphasis or analysis on this phenomenon. This dissertation argues that the Jerusalem municipal boycott is an important matter to analyze separately and more in-depth as it reflects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within a singular long-term movement.

Michael Dumper focuses on the political and geographic dominance and encroachment of East Jerusalem by Israeli actors. He argues that this occurs through the blurring of “the concept and practice of Israeli sovereignty” by introducing “incremental change…without provoking overwhelming resistance” (Dumper 1997, 24). He exemplifies the argument with the “tacit anomaly” of granting resident status and right to vote in municipal elections to a de facto occupied population. Effectively, the city is still controlled by Israeli actors, with power over issues such as house demolitions and settlement creation. This argument is further strengthened in his framework of divided cities. Dumper places Jerusalem in a subset of these; as a city whose division comes from ethnic and political conflict at the national level (2013, 1247). Thus, he links this to the boycott in East Jerusalem through a discussion of law and security enforcement within a divided city. It is a city whose stability affects the wider
regional conflict and where claims to legitimacy of the occupying state are explicitly noted. Therefore, the Palestinian refusal to vote in municipal elections demonstrates the lack of legitimacy in certain areas of the city, namely East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the author argues that instead of granting them agency, this deepens the inequality of the situation as the Palestinians are treated as a threat. Thus, Israel further encroached on the eastern part through settlement creation and increased policing in order to retain control of the divided city (2013, 1263). The framework of divided cities aids in understanding the main question of this dissertation, yet its conclusion diverges from the argument. Dumper’s view of the boycott as a pretext for Israeli forces to increase policing and settlement into East Jerusalem, marking its Palestinian inhabitants as politically passive and unable to resist, contrasts with the argument made through this paper. Further analysis will show that the boycott remains a key rallying point for identity, long-term resistance, and a form of agency in East Jerusalem Palestinians.

A more nuanced constructive view is held by Hillel Cohen. He argues that the Palestinian boycott of municipal elections in Jerusalem can be explained by the idea of a distinct Palestinian-Jerusalemite identity, which links to one of the key themes in this dissertation. The author highlights the historical and political importance of Jerusalem, whose identity is shaped by Palestinian and Israeli political processes within the city (Cohen 2011, x). Rashid Khalidi corroborates this stance, by positing that the Palestinian view of Jerusalem is historically interlinked with the city’s perceived vulnerability (2010, 36). Since the times of the crusaders, Jerusalem was the holy center of worship for three religions and thus politically salient and constantly threatened by outsiders. Additionally, Cohen details the main contemporary factors that reinforce this identity-based the resistance. He focuses on the importance of the annexation and division of the city, Israel’s declaration of increasing control and encroachment, the physical barriers separating the city from the rest of the territories, and increased interaction with the Jewish population of Jerusalem (Cohen 2011, xviii). Thus, the Palestinian-Jerusalemite identity embodies a sense of responsibility and can be linked to the present-day steadfastness of the boycott and resistance. These concepts will be used throughout the dissertation as a framework to understand the persistence of the boycott as a symbol of Palestinian identity.

It is noteworthy that these authors discuss the subject of East Jerusalem in juxtaposition with Israeli actions. While this is an appropriate way to look at it, due to the city’s occupied status, specific issues within East Jerusalem are also pertinent. The agency wielded by the Palestinian Jerusalemites through the right to vote and choice to refuse is overlooked by the authors. While they provide a coherent introduction to the complex situation within Jerusalem, they do not place enough emphasis on the boycott as unique agency granted to East Jerusalemites to resist the occupation. This drawback within the academic discourse is noted by Khalidi, who demonstrates that Zionism and the conflict with Israel formed only a small part of the construction of Palestinian identity (2010, 17). Even though this clash of identities reinforces their distinctiveness, it is important not to fall trap to seeing the East Jerusalem Palestinian struggle only in reaction to Israeli occupation. This critique links to the main argu-
ment which shows that in the long run, identity and stability are more important than short-term reactions to political changes.

One of the most contemporary papers on this issue can be found in the Rand Corporation’s overview of the municipal boycott in Jerusalem. In their paper, a reverse situation to the current status quo is simulated. While the recommendations are speculative in nature and the non-academic and partisan nature of the corporation is noted, the paper provides a concise and up-to-date examination of the East Jerusalemite municipal boycott. They use a combination of Dumper, Cohen, and Khalidi’s arguments, suggesting that the choice of boycott “transcends local issues and reaches the plane of national politics and national identity” (Blake et al., 2018, 13). The authors argue that if Palestinians started to vote, there would be different reactions from either side of the conflict. The Israeli government would be pleased with a more robust Palestinian turnout, on condition that it was limited and be used for public relations and not substantial change. The East Jerusalem side would focus on economic and social issues and would only manage to achieve small local level changes within the municipality (2018, xiv). It also provides several explanatory factors for the boycott, which are in line with the literature. For example, they propose the argument that voting would constitute legitimization of Israeli occupation and the importance of identity. Thus, their analysis provides this dissertation with important questions and an up-to-date overview of the situation and views held by either side. The question of whether the boycott is a form of political passivity and path dependency will be challenged in the following section.

Having introduced the literature on the reasons why East Jerusalem Palestinians boycott municipal elections, an overview of the counterarguments is presented. Authors such as Sari Nusseibeh propose the normative speculation for a radical change of policy. A reason for this is the on-going civil, social, and political interest in the issue and its unresolved status. Nusseibeh argues that policy change would encourage Palestinian participation and increase voter turnout in municipal elections. He cites the fact that were Palestinians to vote en masse, they would be able to gain a considerable number of seats in the municipality (Dumper 1997, 48). He uses this to pose questions that would address the existing reality in a situation created and ruled by Israel (2011, 11). Therefore, advocates of this stance support the argument that given the reality of Israeli occupation of Palestine (and especially Jerusalem), Palestinians need to act accordingly and use the means given to them to do so. This would entail using the rights and privileges given to East Jerusalem residents, especially those of local political participation (Nusseibeh 2011, 148).

The argument of accepting reality and adapting to it also has some local Palestinian support, especially in recent decades (Rasgon 2018; Blake et al. 2018). Notably, Palestinian East Jerusalemites employed by the municipality argue for participation defining the elections as a local contest “over the equitable allocation of services” (Dumper 1997, 48). Furthermore, advocates for political participation argue that denouncing all contact with the municipality only strengthens the Israeli occupation and control, giving “the occupiers a pretext for dodging its responsibilities”
This is the line taken by Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who decide to run in municipal elections (Rasgon 2018). It is important to note these counterarguments in the context of this dissertation, as they show multifaceted reasons East Jerusalemites have for choosing to vote or boycott municipal elections. It also explains the changing trends in relation to this boycott. However, this dissertation ultimately demonstrates that these dissenting voices are not convincing enough to make significant changes in the Palestinians refusal to vote. The lack of significant change in voter turnout reinforces the argument that long-term resistance is favored at the expense of short-term mobilization and minor changes.

This section has outlined the key strands of thought in scholarly analysis on the issue of East Jerusalemite refusal to vote in municipal elections. Key concepts such as divided cities and the role of Israeli policing and encroachment were introduced and exemplified. They were built upon notions of identity, a national Palestinian, as well as a distinct East Jerusalemite one. Ideas of resistance to occupation and maintaining a strong voice in a long-term project for self-determination were introduced. These concepts will be used throughout the paper to frame the discussion and support the argument. Lastly, some counterarguments were presented to highlight the practical reasons for encouraging an end to the boycott. This juxtaposition of arguments provides a base for further discussion regarding a conceptual struggle between civil, political, and economic rights against the right to national self-determination and whether the two are ever compatible.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EAST JERUSALEM
The city of Jerusalem is one of the most uncompromising parts of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine (Altayli 2013, 32). The importance of the “indivisible” Holy City cannot be overstated, as its status has been the downfall of several peace negotiations (Goddard 2010, 158). Most notably, the 1991 Madrid conference, the Oslo process, and 1994 Oslo Accords did not manage to bring the issue of Jerusalem to the table, resulting in little political progress (Altayli 2013, 188). Further, the Camp David summit of 2000 was the first time the issue of Jerusalem was officially tackled in negotiations. The discussion between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, which was convened by Bill Clinton, demonstrated the steadfast positions of either side. Their irreconcilable wishes not only reflected the deep cultural, social and political meaning of the city to both parties but also led to a breakdown of negotiations, which have since been stuttering (Altayli 2013; Khalidi 2010, xviii). Thus, the unique social and political East Jerusalemite position is summarized by Nusseibeh: “since the 1967 war they had to begin habituating themselves to living under Israeli occupation, neither Jordanians nor Israelis but, perhaps, Palestinians-in-waiting” (2011, 75) illustrating ideas about the possible future of the Palestinians and their hopes for a state of their own (Khalidi 2010, 204).

Similarly, from a social perspective, the city of Jerusalem is one of many inequalities. It is the politically most important yet economically poorest major city in the Holy Land (Blake et al., 2018, 7). Demographically, East Jerusalemite Palestinians
represent approximately 38% of the population, yet receive only 10-12% of the Jerusalem Municipal budget (Seidemann 2018). Thus, the fact that more than a third of the geographically distinct population does not vote plays a key role in the inequality and underrepresentation of the eastern part of the city. The Palestinian neighborhoods are lacking in essential infrastructure, have minimal access to social and welfare services, and face shortages in the education sector (Dumper 1997, 46; Blake et al. 2018, 7). Additionally, the issues of revocation of residency permits, house demolitions, and settlements are key, resulting in insufficient housing for local Palestinians. Another important connection between politics and material civil inequalities is the building of the Separation Barrier in the 2000s, which has cut off 120,000 Palestinians from the city (2013 1263). The Barrier has also physically, socially, and politically disconnected East Jerusalemites from the West Bank and the interim capital of Ramallah (Blake et al. 2018, ix). The significance of this disenfranchisement on the electoral boycott and disengagement from politics will be discussed in the coming sections.

Moreover, evidence of the voter turnout by East Jerusalemites in municipal elections since 1967 is important to look at, as it provides the foundation for analysis. Fig. 2, shows significantly low voter turnout at all Municipal elections between 1967 and 2013. The highest is noted in 1969, and that is mainly due to the large number of officials who were threatened to lose their jobs at local municipal offices if they did not vote (Dumper 2014, 67). Similarly, the 1983 election turnout can be explained by similar rumors being circulated among municipal workers that if they did not vote, they might lose rights and entitlements (Seidemann 2018, 2). The data in the table demonstrates the long-term trend of very low voter participation in municipal elections. The newest figures show the steadfastness of the Palestinians in the boycott, as the three latest elections depict an ever-decreasing turnout.

![Fig. 2. Table of Palestinian Voter Turnout in Municipal Elections in East Jerusalem, 1969–2013. (Blake et al., 2018)](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Voter Turnout (Percentage of Eligible Palestinian Voters)</th>
<th>Number of Palestinian Voters</th>
<th>Mayor Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>21–22*</td>
<td>7,500–8,000</td>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7,000–8,000</td>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10,000–11,600b</td>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,000–4,000</td>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5–8*</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Ehud Olmert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3–7*</td>
<td>2,000–6,500</td>
<td>Ehud Olmert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>Uri Lupolianski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>Nir Barkat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.7–1.6</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Nir Barkat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 It is important to highlight the methodological difficulties of collecting data on East Jerusalem Palestinian voter turnout. Due to the inclusion of Israeli settlements, the Armenian and Jewish quarters in the Old City as part of East Jerusalem electorate, the turnout numbers may not show only East Jerusalem Palestinian engagement.
The municipal elections of 2018 show a small increase from 0.9% (1,600) in 2013, to 1.5% (2,900) in 2018 (T-j.org.il 2018). While it can be argued that this signals an 81% increase in the voter turnout, the numbers of eligible voters casting their vote in the election do not show a significant increase. Additionally, the voting patterns for the municipal council and the mayoral race are in line with the above trend of non-participation. It is pertinent to note that the Palestinian activist Ramadan Dabash and his party list received approximately 72% of all East Jerusalem Palestinian vote, yet most of these came from two neighborhoods nearest to his home (Haaretz, 2018). This implicates Dabash as a one-time phenomenon, especially if noted along with the fact that in twelve Palestinian neighborhoods there was a decline in voter turnout compared to 2013 (Seidemann 2018). In terms of the mayoral race, only 0.4% of eligible Palestinian voters cast a ballot, reinforcing the trend of boycott.

This section has examined the existing literature on the issue of the Palestinian boycott in Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem. Most focus was placed on the concepts of divided cities and identity politics, which will provide the foundation for the analysis in the following sections. Further, the counterargument that this boycott has gone on so long as to lose political salience and capacity for change was noted. This led to calls for a significant change in policy and halting the boycott. Further, the political and demographic situation and divisions between East and West Jerusalem were outlined, in order to ground the next sections. Lastly, empirical data on the voter turnout for municipal elections in East Jerusalem was presented and analyzed in order to demonstrate the situation since 1967. Thus, this section has paved the way to answer the research question of why East Jerusalem Palestinians boycott the Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem.

**Section Three: Politics of Identity and Legitimacy**

**Why do Palestinians refuse to vote in Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem?**

The previous section has shown the different stances and concepts used when studying the active non-participation of East Jerusalemites in Israeli municipal elections as well as the social and demographic issues stemming from it. Deeper reasons such as Palestinian identity and resistance were highlighted by the continual decision to boycott elections at the expense of material economic and social advantages. The analysis in this section will build upon the argument that there is not one overarching reason for the boycott but a combination of historical, political, and identity-based factors. The main aspects of understanding this boycott will be drawn out by examining the status of Jerusalem and how it reinforces identity. Further, issues regarding disillusionment with social change through political means under the reality of the occupation will be analyzed. These arguments demonstrate the reality that the interplay of these factors is significant enough for Palestinian East Jerusalemites to choose to suffer systematic municipal neglect with little prospects for positive change.

The most cited explanation of why East Jerusalemite Palestinians boycott local municipal elections is one of “refusal rooted in a rejection of the legitimacy of Israeli rule in East Jerusalem and a vital strategic interest in having East Jerusalem be
the capital of a future Palestinian state” (Blake et al. 2018, 11). Palestinian opposition to the municipality is both a symbol of resistance to the annexation of East Jerusalem and a protest against the daily life grievances and social inequalities (Dumper 1997; Cohen 2011; Altayli 2013). Moreover, ethnographic data shows the importance of non-participation as a method of resistance to reinforce identity and as a symbol of independence against the reality of occupation (Kroll- Zeldin 2014, 157). The issue with this line of argument is the passivity induced by non-participation as well as the authors’ tendency to overlook the numerous other factors influencing the choice to boycott. This is particularly pertinent to note in relation to the longevity of the boycott, whereby this may have been the key reason in the beginning, yet as time went by and little change was noted, the complexity of the issue expanded (Crisis Group 2012, 29).

The act of voting is seen as an act of complicity to Israeli occupation and a tacit acceptance of the unacceptable status quo. The municipality is held responsible for a “lack of satisfactory zoning plans, home demolitions, the poorer education system and many more aspects of urban dereliction and harassment” (Cohen 2011, 34), which affect everyday lives of Jerusalem’s residents. By overtly spiting the “privilege” of municipal voting rights, East Jerusalem Palestinians reinforce their opposition to the occupying power and partake in a continual everyday resistance movement. This is a pervasive and often oversimplified reason used to explain the situation. Nevertheless, it is historically important as, in the years immediately after 1967, the municipal boycott was used as an active strategy in the hope of gaining material and social autonomy (Crisis Group 2012, 2). However, the situation after the 1990s, following numerous failed mediation attempts, shifted to more violent resistance, such as the two intifadas (Altayli 2013, 29). This points to disillusionment with political processes and the prolonged nature of the conflict. Further, in the past ten years, East Jerusalem has found itself “simultaneously marginalized from and integrated into West Jerusalem” (Cohen 2011, Crisis Group 2012, 2), demonstrating a blurring of social, political, and cultural boundaries. This “blurring” can be linked to Dumper’s notions on divided cities, whereby, politically, it is indivisible, demographically, it is divided, yet socially there is some spill-over and integration (Crisis Group 2010, 26; Goddard 2010, 246). Thus, interacting with the West Jerusalem “other” strengthens the Palestinian East Jerusalemite conception of a separate self.

The Status of Jerusalem
Ideas about the future of the Palestinian state are compromised over the status of Jerusalem. By denying legitimacy to the occupation, East Jerusalem Palestinians cling to the hope that Jerusalem will be the capital of a future state of Palestine, which Israel denies (Kroll-Zeldin, 2014, 149; Crisis Group 2012, 26). Thus, the boycott of the elections helps to unite the East Jerusalemite community and provides the opportunity to voice their claim over the city. Through this, they demonstrate their projection for the future of the city and their state as one where they can vote for
their own municipality. These reasons strengthen the idea of a Palestinian Jerusalemite identity as responsible actors for the safety of the Holy City and a crucial point of negotiations (Khalidi 2010, 32). By not surrendering to Israeli incentives and pretensions at democracy, the Palestinian population believes in holding the State of Israel and the international community accountable to the illegality of the annexation and occupation.

This form of protest directly contrasts with Israel’s claims over Jerusalem as an “undivided and united capital of the Jewish people” (Knesset of Israel 1980). Thus, not only does the boycott represent the hope for Jerusalem as a future Palestinian capital, but it also denies Israel sovereignty over it. Furthermore, the international community’s stance on the status of Israel within the city was brought into question in 2017, when the sitting United States President recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (govinfo.gov 2017).

The constant encroachment of Israeli actors into the eastern part of the city through policing and infrastructure furthers the divided cities’ narrative (Dumper 1997, 43). These factors strengthen the East Jerusalemite Palestinian grievance of de facto living in Israel, being governed by its laws and paying taxes, yet lacking political representation and access to more than municipal elections (Cohen 2011, 34). As the systemic neglect of East Jerusalem demonstrates, this situation of “taxation without representation” forms a strong sense of injustice in an already precarious political state of affairs (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 27). Israeli exclusion of Palestinian rights to vote in the Knesset, coupled with Palestinian refusal to accept the limited “privilege” of a voice at the municipal level, demonstrates not only a lack of coexistence but also disadvantages the Palestinian side (Seidemann 2018, 10; Dumper 2013). While this exclusion poses physical and material problems, it also results in creating a rallying point for resistance to the occupying state and its policies.

Furthermore, Palestinian identity and ideas of a communal struggle for an occupied city and land at the face of impossible odds are reinforced through the boycott (Khalidi 2010, 195). By participating in elections, ideas central to the Palestinian struggle and sense of self—of Sumud or steadfastness—would be compromised (Khalidi 2010, 162; Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 146). Staying in Jerusalem and not voting is seen as “a way of ensuring cultural survival and shifting the history and politics of the present” (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 147). It also serves to show feelings of agency in resisting the election as a statement of Palestinian identity. Thus, they choosing to stay in Jerusalem and wield agency by ignoring calls to political action by the occupying state. This is done at the expense of material incentives and at risk of municipal maltreatment. The choice to suffer the consequences of not being represented or supported by the municipality has also become a form of solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who are often not allowed to enter Jerusalem (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 151). Kroll-Zeldin presents the importance of Jerusalem as a “symbol of Palestine and of Palestinian resistance” (2014, 151), with the boycott being the key way to reinforce this imagery. Thus, political participation would be perceived as an act of giving up their agency over the fate of Jerusalem as well as creating a chasm between
East Jerusalemites and their West Bank compatriots (Seidemann, 2018, 12). This line of reasoning supports the argument of this dissertation as it demonstrates short-term sacrifices being made as a result of long-term, identity-based resistance. Conversely, the idea of the struggle for Jerusalem being a representation of wider Palestinian solidarity carries drawbacks. The unique nature of the East Jerusalemite identity alienates them from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and even the interim capital of Ramallah, which is less than 30 km away. The issues faced by East Jerusalemites are very different from their compatriots, as are their privileges. This is especially pertinent in the post-Oslo years when a physical separation of Jerusalem from the Palestinian territories was at its peak. Cohen notes that while officially, this was done for increased security, “its security effectiveness was limited and the harm it did to Arab Jerusalem was extensive” (2011, 35). This, he argues, reinforced the differences, creating a new generation that came to regard the Palestinian Authority as a “neighbouring entity, rather than a source of authority and identity” (Cohen 2011, 36). The privileges of holding a Jerusalem ID have strengthened this feeling of alienation, whereby East Jerusalemites can still worship in the Al Aqsa mosque, travel through Ben Gurion airport, and access health and social services (Seidemann 2018). Therefore, the arguments of Palestinian identity and the importance of Jerusalem for the Palestinian national struggle cannot be the only ones in explaining the boycott, and one needs to delve into the issues within the city.

If the boycott is seen as a form of civil resistance to the occupation of East Jerusalem since 1967, its on-going status can be viewed as a form of path dependency. Ethnographic research shows that this idea is held by critics and a number of East Jerusalemites. They stand for the idea that it would be a mistake to change strategy now after so many years of boycott (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 151; Crisis Group 2012, 29). As one of the longest-lasting methods of resistance, it is also one of the most important for Palestinians, given the importance of Jerusalem to hopes of national self-determination. Thus, there is a widely held idea that voting in one election “would undo all the hard work put in since 1967” (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 151). While this is convincing and reflects the ideas of steadfastness and resilience, a critique arises in the form of the deteriorating state of the eastern part of the city, with no change on the horizon (Crisis Group 2012, 28). It can be argued that the boycott has become a symbolic form of politics masking a clear absence of such as well as enabling both Israeli and Palestinian leadership to evade responsibility for the situation (Crisis Group 2012, 28). Thus, the status quo of East Jerusalemite inaction remains, resulting in day-to-day hardships for its inhabitants with slow but methodical Israeli encroachment.

**Disenchantment with democracy and the status quo?**

Systemic, political, and identity-related factors show the extent of the reasons for the boycott and point to a wider problem with democratic processes. The Palestinian East Jerusalemite boycott of municipal elections demonstrates frustration with their current situation and indeterminate status, which can lead to more public disillusionment with democracy (Bavli and Gerver n.d.). The boycott displays more than just
resistance to the occupation: it is a boycott against the perceived unfairness of the election itself. The municipality is widely perceived as a “cog in the machine of occupation and colonization” (Kroll Zeldin 2014, 151). Similarly, the Palestinians view their votes as insignificant as they believe it would not make substantial changes to the status quo of Israeli political hegemony (Cohen 2011, 126). The long-term nature of the boycott, coupled with several failed peace negotiations, have played a significant part in the East Jerusalemite disillusionment with political processes. Additionally, this may not be a unique issue to East Jerusalem and reflects a more global trend of declining political participation and trust in democratic processes (idea.int, 2016).

The structural inequalities between East and West Jerusalem feed into the idea that the boycott is a form of political disillusionment and lack of faith in agency for change. The municipal neglect of the eastern part of the city is often quoted as an important aspect of the boycott. On the other hand, it must be noted that this “inequality in services is not unrelated to the lack of Palestinian participation in the political system” (Dumper 1997, 48). The lack of advocacy for East Jerusalem at the municipal level is a contributing factor. Thus, this situation reflects “an ironclad rule of politics: politicians and senior civil servants will rarely if ever allocate anything—be it time, effort, budgets, or entitlements— to those who do not vote” (Seidemann 2018, 11). These arguments introduce a circular problem whereby underrepresentation and inequalities in the eastern part of the city affect turnout, which in turn affects further neglect. While this stance is valid and possibly generalizable to wider analysis, authors focus either on quantitative data or personal grievances. They do not address the deeper political undercurrents behind this neglect, and the wider-scale political games played between the Israeli administration and Palestinian actors as well as the international community. This links to Dumper’s concept of divided cities and the importance of legitimacy and control, exemplified by Israeli encroachment in maintaining influence within the wider national conflict.

This section has demonstrated the factors that help to analyze the municipal boycott. The focus on East Jerusalemite identity and refusal to legitimize the occupation has been in line with the overall argument of the dissertation. Further, the structural inequalities and grievances within the city, as well as disillusionment with democratic processes, work together in supporting the argument. They show the complex reasons behind the boycott as an interplay of historical, political, and identity-based factors.

**Section Four: Social and Political Influences on the Municipal Boycott**

Political and social pressures from both Palestinian and Israeli governmental actors present another set of factors in understanding the East Jerusalemite boycott of Israeli municipal elections. This is a long and historically fraught problem, as the issue of East Jerusalem has been used as a political tool throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Cohen 2011, 18; Dumper 1997, 233). Evidence shows that, while East Jerusalem Palestinians who hold the Jerusalem ID are theoretically free to vote in their local
municipal elections, a number of actors have influenced their actions relating to this right (Seidemann 2018, 10). The following section will discuss the roles played by both Palestinian and Israeli political actors in the boycott as well as the impact they have had on the situation in East Jerusalem. This links to Dumper’s idea of divided cities, whereby, in the case of Jerusalem as a key locus of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, stability, and legitimacy of rule are disputed between both sides. Therefore, efforts to influence the East Jerusalem Palestinian population to boycott the municipal elections are noted from a different lens—that of external political pressures.

Moreover, the political and religious strategic importance of Jerusalem as a contested city within the wider conflict is highlighted. Sovereignty and legitimacy of rule in the city are contested between the Zionist project, Palestinian statehood, and global geopolitics, making it prone to influence at national and international levels from both sides of the conflict. This is demonstrated by the internal and external politics that impact the outcome and turnout of local municipal elections in Jerusalem. Dumper highlights the city’s particularity and the difficulty of administration within it (1997, 46). He argues that the small size of the city is contrasted with its great importance to both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict making it especially vulnerable to bureaucratic and economic influences (Dumper 1997, 46). Significant Palestinian national actors have, since 1967, encouraged the boycott of municipal elections by Palestinian Jerusalemites (Dumper 1997, 48). Further, the Israeli side has also been accused of making polling stations less accessible (Cohen 2011, 33) as well as fewer in number in East Jerusalem (Seidemann 2018, 10).

**Israeli Historical Legal Pressure**

Historically, due to the politics of the annexation of Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli side has incrementally introduced legal frameworks to strengthen their position. According to most of the international community, these actions are a violation of international law (Dumper 2013, 1250). A number of UN resolutions emphasize Israel’s actions in Jerusalem as lacking legitimacy and affirm the eastern part of the city as a part of the occupied Palestinian territory (Altayli 2013, 43). This is not substantially different from how the issue has looked since 1967 when Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem was put through Israeli legislation. Through the adoption of Amendment No. 11 of the Administration and Ordinance Law and Amendment No. 6 of the Municipalities Ordinance Law and the Protection of Holy Places Law, Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration were extended to the occupied part of the city (Berkowitz 2018). Further legal action was taken in 1980 through the adoption of the “Basic Law: Jerusalem” (Knesset of Israel 1980), whereby the city of Jerusalem was declared as the capital of Israel. This has been widely contested in the international community, where no country has recognized it, with most embassies and consulates found in Tel Aviv. This position has been revisited in international relations after the United States announced Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and moved its embassy to West Jerusalem in May 2018 (Govinfo.gov 2017; U.S. Department of State 2018).
The role of the Israeli government in limiting East Jerusalemite Palestinian access to municipal polls is often overlooked, demonstrating the incremental approach in extending Israeli rule in East Jerusalem (Dumper 1997, 24). Despite pledges to enable participation for all its inhabitants, evidence suggests that fewer polling stations are made available in the eastern part of the city. For example, in the run-up to the 2018 municipal elections, only six polling locations were provided in East Jerusalem, while 187 were available in the West (Seidemann 2018, 11). After some backlash, notably from the Palestinian candidate Ramadan Dabash, the number was increased to 21 (Seidemann 2018, 11). While this highlights the systemic inequalities faced by East Jerusalem Palestinians, it can also be considered a result of the minimal turnout in every previous election. Further, while the lack of effort from the municipality to improve East Jerusalemite participation is notable, the reason may be a pragmatic and economic one. A larger Palestinian turnout would enhance the political legitimacy of Israeli rule over Jerusalem and thus would be politically and socially advantageous. This idea links to Dumper’s argument that the boycott is only increasing the inequalities between the two sides of the city.

On the other hand, the lack of East Jerusalemite political participation in municipal elections serves Israeli municipal and national political actors as it can be used for avoiding responsibility for the territory they have occupied. In a municipality lacking Palestinian representation due to the boycott, a predominantly Israeli cabinet can implement “discriminatory policies without internal pressure from Palestinian politicians serving on the municipal council” (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 150). Furthermore, comparisons can be made to the minimal concessions reached in the Knesset by representatives of the Arab-Israeli community. Thus, the critique arises that the cost of minimal change in Jerusalem’s municipal civil life is too high a price to pay for reinforcing Israel’s legitimacy and “façade of democracy” within Jerusalem (Crisis Group 2012, 25). This aligns with the argument made in this dissertation that long-term resistance is favored over tentative short-term changes to the unsatisfactory status quo.

**Palestinian Political Actors and the Boycott**

The role played by Palestinian governmental actors in influencing the boycott is of key importance in this analysis. The situation is harder to examine, as it is historically enmeshed, and different conceptions of Palestinian self-governance have made varying claims about the municipal boycott by East Jerusalemites. The overarching stance has been to support the municipal boycott so as not to legitimize Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and to demonstrate solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians in the West Bank and diaspora (Kroll-Zeldin 2014, 151; Cohen 2011; Blake et al. 2018; Seidemann 2018). Since the 1990s, in conjunction with numerous peace negotiations and their subsequent failures, East Jerusalem has become more an icon of resistance in Palestinian political and social imaginations than a strong political actor. The Oslo Accords excluded the city from the temporary governing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus physically and politically alienating its inhabitants. This
chasm was further deepened by the building of the Separation Barrier in 2002. The importance of the city in Palestinian politics was diminished in the post-Oslo period due to a conjunction of factors such as the death of Faysal Husseini (a notable political activist in East Jerusalem), the suppression of the Second Intifada, and the shutting down of the Orient House, which had been the PLO’s headquarters in the city (Crisis Group 2012, 23). Thus, Palestinian political access to the city is increasingly limited by Israeli rule, supporting the idea of divided cities through policing, encroachment, and use of force (Dumper 2013, 1248). These elements, as well as the move and creation of many national institutions in Ramallah, have overshadowed the political centrality of Jerusalem. This section analyzes the roles of various Palestinian political actors within the city.

The PNA is rooted strongly in the interim capital of Ramallah, making it distant and ineffective when it comes to dealing with issues within Jerusalem (Crisis Group 2012, 23). Israel also greatly limits the outreach of two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas. This results in their weak presence in Jerusalem due to restricted funding, which can only be deployed by third parties (Crisis Group 2012, 36). Additional attempts to expand Palestinian presence in the city, such as efforts to organize events marking the Arab League’s designation of the city as the “cultural capital of the Arab world” in 2009, have been blocked by Israel (Crisis Group 2012, 5). This demonstrates the effective Israeli obstruction of Palestinian political actors from gaining political footing within the city, linking to the argument of encroachment and legitimacy in a divided city.

Regarding the issue of municipal elections, the PLO has strongly urged the East Jerusalemite population to boycott them as they run against the “Palestinian national interest” and legitimizes Israeli authority (Crisis Group 2012, 23). This stance is demonstrated in the most recent municipal elections in 2018, whereby Saeb Erekat, the Secretary-General of the PLO’s Executive Committee, urged East Jerusalemites to continue the boycott. He noted that “participating in the elections will help the Israeli establishment in promoting its Greater Jerusalem project…and play a complementary role in implementing its colonial settlement plan and ethnic cleansing operations” (Rasgon 2018). Therefore, the stance promoted by the PLO shows steadfast support of the political impasse in the city, showing the symbolic importance of the boycott at the expense of daily local grievances. This reflects many of the arguments made in this paper, such as the alienation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the oPt, the weak presence of Palestinian actors, and the strong role of Israeli encroachment.

While the role of Palestinian actors in influencing the perpetuation of the boycott is certainly present, the strength of this argument must be questioned. By comparing the turnout of voters in the 2005 PNA elections in East Jerusalem, a similar pattern is noted. The PNA urged for participation in these elections, and Israel facilitated the voting process by opening several checkpoints (Seidemann 2018, 10). Yet, despite active encouragement and fewer limitations, the turnout in East Jerusalem was 6% of the 100,000 eligible voters (Seidemann 2018, 10). Thus, this demon-
strates that neither Israeli or Palestinian political actors have significant power over the turnout and choice to boycott in East Jerusalem Palestinians. Links can be drawn to physical and social disparity and separation of East Jerusalemites from their West Bank counterparts as well as a general disillusionment in democratic change for the deadlock in Jerusalem.

**Local Activism: a Shift in Attitudes Towards the Boycott?**

The issue of East Jerusalemite Palestinian political consciousness and identity can help to elucidate the factors behind the boycott. As noted above, a significant factor behind the longevity of the boycott is the acceptance of the status quo, the lack of hope for change, and the support of this stance by Palestinian political actors. On the other hand, the most recent elections show some shift in these attitudes. This is illustrated by the East Jerusalemite activists who decided to run in the 2018 elections. For example, Ramadan Dabash stated, “we are saying that we need to make sure we receive better services. We need to have a voice on the city council to fight for our rights” (Rasgon 2018). His stance exemplifies the most common reasons for increased Palestinian involvement in Jerusalem’s politics: increased accountability for the municipality over the eastern part of the city, higher representation allowing better access to municipal services and resources, and the acceptance of the reality of the situation and making the most of what is given (Nusseibeh 2011). This demonstrates a shift in attitudes from staunch refusal to a realization that this impasse is not making a significant change, and thus new options must be explored. This is corroborated by a Crisis Group interview whereby a local civil society leader noted that if PLO were to license electoral participation, “it will find Palestinian civil society in East Jerusalem more ready to mobilise for elections than many assume” (2012, 23).

While these arguments are true, this is only to an extent, as the current situation clearly demonstrates that they are not significant enough for mass mobilization and change (Blake et al. 2018). Intimidation, threats, and political pressures have played a role in almost every election since 1967, with Palestinian activists proposing the idea of voting or running for office allegedly being targeted (Seidemann 2018; Blake et al. 2018). A recent example of this is the candidate Aziz Abu Sarah stepping down in the 2018 race due to threats from Palestinians and difficulty with documentation from the Israeli side (Berger 2018). Conversely, the issue has deeper roots and the PLO does not have enough power to influence the entire population of East Jerusalem (Prince-Gibson et al. 2018). Therefore, the issue links to Cohen’s idea of a distinct Jerusalemite Palestinian identity. The new post-Oslo generation is both more aware of their relatively better social and political position in relation to fellow Palestinians and less willing to lose it. This distinguishing identity has awarded them with a sense of stability “in the face of the Israeli government’s whims, on the one hand and those of the PA on the other” (Cohen 2011, 36).

On the other hand, the social and economic deterioration of the city has added to political complacency, whereby the East Jerusalemites feel increasingly aban-
doned by both the Israeli administration and the PNA. As a result, a certain political passivity has pervaded the city, with the inhabitants left in the crux of a conflict “situated between Israel and the PA, between local and national Palestinian leadership, between personal interest and national struggle” (Cohen 2011, 34). Additionally, the lack of a coherent “Jerusalem Agenda” has further exacerbated the problem, whereby even those willing to act would not find a worthy scene or a population ready to mobilize (Cohen 2011, 67). This problem is concisely summed up by a Palestinian Jerusalemite interviewed by the Crisis Group: “we can’t just wake up one day in ten years and say, “we dub this desolate city our capital” (Crisis Group 2012, 28). Thus, this argument provides a critical point against the hope for a changing status quo. While there has been some change and activism, it is not strong enough to mobilize such a historically ingrained movement.

This section has looked at the way local Palestinian political activism in East Jerusalem reflects changing attitudes towards the municipal boycott. It has demonstrated the problems faced by activists trying to change the status quo of the boycott, showing the pervasive ideas of disillusionment with politics, passivity in the face of the occupation, and the actions of Palestinian political actors. Contrarily, the argument of East Jerusalemite Palestinians wielding a unique identity and political agency can be brought in. Instead of looking at the relative failure of local political activism within the city as passivity and inert path dependency, a conscious decision to refuse Israeli occupation and encroachment through the boycott is noted. The long-term resistance movement of the municipal boycott thus supports the argument that ideas of self-determination and steadfastness are more important than short-term political and material gains.

**SECTION FIVE: CONCLUSION**

To conclude, this dissertation has argued that, in order to answer the research question of why Palestinians refuse to vote in Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem since 1967, an interplay of historical and contemporary factors have to be taken into account. An analysis of factors such as the identity-based refusal to accept Israeli rule, the status of Jerusalem, and economic inequalities was used to understand the reasons behind the boycott. Furthermore, the role of Israeli and Palestinian political actors in imposing political and social pressures and affecting disillusionment with the municipality and democracy were examined. The longevity of the municipal election boycott has been analyzed through concepts of identity and the issue of power politics within a divided city. The importance of Jerusalem as a locus of resistance to the Israeli occupation is highlighted, supporting the argument for the centrality of the boycott in maintaining agency within the city without legitimizing Israeli occupation and maintaining hopes for the future of the Palestinian state. The paper has shown evidence that deliberate political inaction is consistently selected when faced with the choice between short-term civil, political, and economic rights and long-term rights to national self-determination and resistance.
Section two presented the main literature and concepts on the issue of the electoral boycott in Jerusalem. The drawbacks of the existing literature were noted, namely the use of the conflict with Israel as a key explanatory tool. Thus, this paper argued for the importance of placing focus on East Jerusalem and its inhabitants, as the boycott reflects more than just resistance to the occupation. The concepts of divided cities and identity politics within Jerusalem were introduced and guided analysis throughout. To lay a foundation for section 3, the demographic and political condition of Jerusalem since 1967 was presented.

Section three focused on the issues of identity politics and legitimacy within Jerusalem and how this is reflected in the boycott. It explored the issues of voting as a legitimization of the occupation, importance of the status of Jerusalem in ideas about a future Palestinian state, and resistance to Israeli encroachment of the eastern part of the city. In addition, dissatisfaction with material and civil inequalities within the city, disillusionment with democracy, and feelings of detachment from their Palestinian compatriots in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were analyzed. As a result, the importance of a Palestinian East Jerusalemite identity in resisting the occupation, “safeguarding” Jerusalem, and feeling distinct from the rest of the occupied Palestinian Territory is demonstrated. This supports the argument that long-term resistance is chosen at the cost of social, material, and political benefits as a result of identity politics.

Section four demonstrates the different roles Palestinian and Israeli political actors have played in the electoral boycott. The argument covers both Israeli encroachments into East Jerusalem and why turnout in elections is important to them in de facto ruling the divided city of Jerusalem. Further, the question of how various Palestinian political actors have approached the boycott was analyzed. This was done to show the decreasing influence of the PNA in Jerusalem, which contrasts with the importance of the city as a symbol of Palestinian national resistance and the role of the PLO as consistent supporters of the boycott. Thus, the way a unique East Jerusalemite Palestinian identity was formed in relation to both Israeli and Palestinian political actors was demonstrated, supporting the argument that identity politics is one of the main reasons for the boycott. The deep-rooted and contextually important self-perception of East Jerusalemites has resulted in consistently low voter turnout in municipal elections. This was done as a long-term resistance movement, disregarding the possibilities for short-term, minimal material gain. It is argued that the failure of the relatively increased local activism in the 2018 election did not show the passivity of the East Jerusalemites but instead demonstrated their choice to support the boycott as active agency in playing the “long-game” against the occupation.

Furthermore, the limitations of this research paper must be acknowledged. The scope of such a complicated issue cannot be fully elaborated within an undergraduate dissertation. Further research could focus on more factors, such as how Palestinians view democratic processes by looking at various elections in the oPt. Alternatively, instead of focusing on the Palestinian boycott of the municipal elections in Jerusalem,
the role of the municipality on the divided communities within the city could be analyzed, as well as looking at the tensions within the Old City. The role of global geopolitical shifts in impacting the status of Jerusalem could add to this research in showing how international changes affect local political participation. Additionally, stemming from the findings in this paper, further research could use this for comparative analysis of similar cases within the Holy Land or in cases in Ireland or South Africa as examples of divided cities. Lastly, the lack of political agenda within East Jerusalem since the 1990s could be analyzed and thus shed light on why there is a lack of candidates or a politically active community.

Finally, in the fast-paced reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the importance of analyses such as this one remains key. It helps to elucidate the lived experiences of a uniquely positioned demographic and the way they choose to utilize this. The municipal election boycott on behalf of East Jerusalem Palestinians is an illuminating example of a long-running civil resistance movement, highlighting the importance of identity-based factors in exchange for minimal, short-term material gains. Thus, the steadfastness and perseverance of East Jerusalemites in the face of continuous complex obstacles is an impressive example of long-term resistance held for the sake of one’s identity, city, and homeland.


A(rtificial) I(mages): The American Approach to Artificial Intelligence and its Intersection with a “Rising China”

Mollie Martin

Despite the vast literature that explores the Western representations of China, there is little focus on how these representations actually influence US political action. Moreover, there is also very little academic discourse that explores the United States approach to artificial intelligence (AI), due to the recency of its developments. Accordingly, this dissertation aims to investigate how news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions enables and justifies the US approach to AI. By employing a social constructivist framework and conducting a discourse analysis of 29 purposively sampled articles from The New York Times, this dissertation finds five key constructions of China emerge, which together enable and justify the US approach to AI: China’s AI ambitions as (1) dystopian, (2) based upon the theft of Western countries (China the “cheat”), (3) a “threat” to the US-led global order, (4) part of an “AI race”, (5) and “winning” in the aforementioned “race”. The dissertation shows how the discursive construction of China’s AI ambitions are inextricable from the US approach to AI. It is the aim of this work that these conclusions will add a nuanced interpretation of events to the growing body of research that focuses on representations of China and their influence on US political action. The findings contribute to an understanding of how the US approach to AI intersects with a “rising” China and uncovers how news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions is underpinned by, and ultimately reaffirms, the “China threat” discourse.

INTRODUCTION

On May 25th 2017, Google’s AlphaGo beat Ke Jie, the world’s best player at the Chinese game of Go (Hern 2017; Lee 2018). AlphaGo is an AI application created by Google subsidiary, Deep Mind. The complexity of Go, with an infinite number of moves the player can make and long cited as requiring “human intuition,” subsequently meant that the triumph signalled the mounting capabilities of AI (Lee 2018). The success of AlphaGo represented decades of ambition, innovation, and persistence from an entire research community, with one unifying goal: to create intelligent machines. Two months following the victory taken by the US, the State Council of China announced its NGAIDP. This plan explicated China’s ambition to build first-mover advantage in order to become, by 2030, the “major artificial intelligence innovation center of the world… and lay an important foundation for China’s entry into the forefront of the innovative countries and economic power” (State Council Department 2017).

Using a social constructivist approach and building on contributions to the literature which have studied the role of news discourse in justifying political action (Turner 2014; Ooi & D’Arcangelis 2018), this dissertation addresses a gap within the literature: the ideational of China’s AI ambitions, which can be considered inex-
tricable from the US approach to AI. As this dissertation will illustrate, the discursive construction of China’s ambitions for AI both reaffirms the “China Threat” discourse which has then supported the US approach to AI, and correspondingly constructs a new paradigm for AI, where AI is considered intrinsically linked to global power politics. To understand the how the ideational forces of China’s AI ambitions are inextricable from the US’s approach to AI, the dissertation carries out a news media DA. Hall (2018) defines discourse as a way of representing something, which produces the knowledge that forms the architecture of opinion and action. The dissertation seeks to answer the following question: How does news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions enable and justify the US approach to AI?

China’s AI ambitions are understood as the aim to lessen the country’s vulnerability of dependence on Western technologies and to build an AI industry which will secure future economic growth and strengthen national security, as articulated in the NGAIDP (State Council Department 2017). By “enable and justify,” the dissertation intends to explicate how the relevant news discourse is inextricable from the US approach to AI. This phrasing is taken from Turner’s (2014) American Images of China, where Turner uncovers how American images of China enable and justify US China Policy. This dissertation does not seek to show a causal relationship between the news discourse and US official action. Building on Turner (2014), the dissertation aims to show that the “power of imagery lies primarily in its ability to circulate and become truth so that certain courses of policy are enabled whether its intended purpose was to facilitate action or not” (Turner 2014, 7).

The dissertation will argue that a discursive construction of China’s AI ambitions emerges from the studied articles and this construction is inextricable from the US approach to AI. The studied news articles (hereafter, articles) are found to be underpinned by existing “rising China” discourse, which the emerging AI news discourse is then built upon. The intersection of “rising” China and AI signals the development of a new paradigm, emerging in parallel to a lively discussion surrounding the future of global order (Hurrell 2006; Ikenberry 2011; Acharya 2014; Duncombe & Dunne 2018), where AI is conceived as intrinsically linked to global power politics.

The first section sets out the core concepts of the dissertation: China’s AI ambitions and the US approach to AI. Section two reviews the existing literature on both AI and a “rising” China. This reveals several gaps in the literature. First, AI has not been explored in relation to its ideational forces. Second, a consideration for the impact of “rising China” discourse on the emerging discursive construction of AI has not yet been addressed anywhere within the academic literature. Finally, the US approach to AI is yet to be analysed from any theoretical perspective. The recency of much of what the discussion is based upon is an explanation for these literature gaps. This, therefore, provides a unique opportunity for this dissertation to make a timely contribution to the emerging discourse. Section two also provides the conceptual framework, which this dissertation grounds itself in.
Section three will then establish the dissertation’s methodology and its limitations before sections four and five present the findings of the DA. The findings reveal five principal themes which emerge, both enabling and justifying the US approach to AI: China’s AI ambitions as (1) dystopian, (2) based upon the theft of Western countries (China the “cheat”), (3) a “threat” to the US-led global order, (4) part of an “AI race,” (5) and “winning” in the aforementioned “race.” Section four provides an understanding of how the first three discursive constructions enable and justify the US China Trade War. This “knowledge” of China justifies the expanded jurisdiction of CFIUS and justifies US-China Trade War as it can be understood as necessary to prevent the endangerment of US values and US-led global order. Section five focuses on the analysed articles that reveal a construction of an “AI race” through the lexis of Cold War rhetoric. This strand of the discourse frames China as the probable “winner” due to a lack of US governmental engagement with providing a national strategy, thus justifying the eventual announcement of the AAI and enabling the DoD AIS’s conceptualisation of AI as critical to national security and global order.

Lastly, the conclusions of the research are drawn and the wider implications of the findings of this research are briefly explored to position the dissertation within the wider context of the literature. Overall, the dissertation shows that the US discursive construction of China’s ambitions in AI is inextricable from the US approach to AI.

**Section One: Core Concepts**
Both AI and China are complex subjects to examine; being opaque in what they “are” and how they ought to be understood. It is therefore beneficial to provide a summary of AI and China’s ambitions for the technology. An overview of the US approach to AI is also included in this section. It is appropriate to include these sections separate from the literature review since there is limited academic scholarship pertaining to each of the subject matters.

**AI: A Summary**
The concept of AI first reached the imagination of the scientific community in the post-World War II period (Nilsson 2009). A robust definition of the concept is yet to be established (Sarangi & Sharma 2019). The first definition was given in 1957 by John McCarthy, defining AI as “the science and engineering of making intelligent machines” (McCarthy 2007). Most AI-focused academics, researchers, and commentators would agree that AI involves some level of making machines capable of performing tasks which require human intelligence (Boden 1990; Lee 2018; Sarangi & Sharma 2019). This broad understanding alone does not encapsulate all that AI is or could be. The current understanding of AI focuses its attention on DL (Lecun, et al. 2015; Lee 2018; Sarangi & Sharma 2019). DL is able to recognise patterns in data and digest this data with the intention of making decisions based on the learnt experiences from previous pattern recognition (Lee 2018). DL is reliant upon two
resources: computing power and large amounts of data (Ding 2018).

**China’s AI Ambitions**

In July 2017, China released its NGAIDP: the official articulation of China’s AI ambitions. The NGAIDP states that China intends to lead global AI development and “promote the overall competitiveness of the country and leapfrog development” by 2030 (State Council Department 2017, 3). The NGAIDP comes after the announcement of Made in China 2025 to focus specifically on AI. However, Made in China 2025 will provide much of the required infrastructure for Chinese AI (Ding 2018).

The plan addresses key tasks which will be crucial in achieving the plan’s goals. One task reveals the ambition to use AI to strengthen “military and civilian intelligence technology” (State Council Department 2017, 21). AI has been said to be viewed as a “trump card” in the future of warfare (Kania 2017). However, the material evidence for the militarisation of AI technologies in China is limited (Ding 2018).

Other than for military applications, AI can benefit the Chinese economy, which is the primary focus of the NGAIDP (Ding 2018). AI applications could have a disruptive impact on China’s economic growth, which is especially important as the population ages (McKinsey & Company 2017). The potential for productivity growth as a result of AI technologies, is a key driver for its research and eventual adoption as China comes towards the end of its demographic dividend (McKinsey & Company 2017).

Overall, China’s AI ambitions centre on its aim to lessen its vulnerability of dependence on Western technologies with the purpose of securing future economic growth and stability (Ding 2018). AI is conceptualised within the NGAIDP to increase economic competitiveness and strengthen national security. AI is therefore understood by the Chinese State Council as pivotal to future Chinese prosperity.

**The U.S. Approach to AI**

The US approach to AI is characterised by three key developments: one which took place before the specified timeframe the articles are taken from, one during the timeframe of the articles and one the day after the specified timeframe. First, in 2016, under the Obama Administration, the National Science and Technology Council released the PFAI, outlining the future for AI within the US (US National Science and Technology Council 2016). The report provides an extensive review of how AI will impact society and the economy in the US. The PFAI focuses on opportunities and challenges that AI will pose to public policy concerns such as education and employment, whilst also briefly discussing the role of AI in national defence. The US published the PFAI in line with AI reports published by the EU and UK (Cath, et al. 2018). Taken together, the three reports emphasize the importance of cooperation between countries, where AI is used to make a positive impact upon both society and the respective economies (Cath, et al. 2018).
The second development can be traced to the Trump Administration’s August 2017 investigation, aiming to “investigate China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development” (Trump 2018). This investigation, in addition to the US-China Trade Wars, are related to AI. The findings refer to China’s NGAIDP and AI more generally (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2018). An unofficial disclosure of the US demands at US-China Trade Talks, in April 2018, reveals that China was asked to halt subsidies to its Made in China 2025 program which, among other advanced industries, focuses on AI development in China (Bradsher 2018). Moreover, in November 2018 the role of CFIUS was expanded to include areas of “critical technology” through a new pilot programme (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2018). Semiconductors and machinery used to manufacture semiconductors is classified as a “critical technology” under the new programme (Mnuchin 2018), this is of relevance since semiconductors are a critical component of AI technology (Ding 2018). The recency of the Trade War means there is a limited amount of published academic literature. However, numerous grey literature sources identify the AI industry to be a cause of the US-China Trade War. This is not to argue that the motive for the US-China Trade War is solely focused upon technology, specifically AI. Partial motivation for the US-China Trade War can, however, be found to be inextricable from the rise of technological competition between the US and China.

The third, and most recent, development is embodied in the AAII and the DoD AIS. On February 11th 2019, a US Presidential Executive Order launched the AAII—signaling the growing importance of AI on the official agenda. The DoD AIS was released the following day. The AAII begins by stating the importance of US leadership in AI to maintain “the economic and national security of the United States and to shape the global evolution of AI in a manner consistent with our Nation’s values, policies, and priorities” (Trump 2019). Whilst, the introduction of the DoD AIS reads:

“Other nations, particularly China and Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military purposes, including in applications that raise questions regarding international norms and human rights. These investments threaten to erode our technological and operational advantages and destabilize the free and open international order.” (United States Department of Defense 2018, 5)

Both the AAII and DoD AIS draw on the importance of AI in respect to impacting US values and norms. With the DoD AIS developing this further by explicitly raising concern with Chinese investment in AI and the “threat” of this to the “free and open
international order” (United States Department of Defense 2018, 5). Talking of AI and its implications for the international order can be interpreted as the development of a new paradigm for AI, where AI is considered to be intrinsically linked to global power politics. “Paradigm” is understood not as something scientific or objective but “as a fundamental image, [which] serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained.” (Ritzer 1996, 637). Thus, as a paradigm, discourse related to AI is not merely what is frequently said of AI, but how AI ought to be understood.

**SECTION TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

This section reviews the relevant literature relating to AI and “rising” China. Literature pertaining to China’s AI ambitions and the US approach to AI is scarce. However, a review of the literature on AI and “rising” China, more generally, is able to bring the dissertation into focus. The section also sets out the conceptual framework of the research. Together the core concepts (outlined in section one), the literature review and the conceptual framework form the basis of the analysis.

**AI: FROM TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TO AN “AI RACE” FOR SUPREMACY**

The enquiry of AI has elicited a vast body of literature within scientific discourse; however, it is only recently that its impact on socio-political realms have been considered. The advent of academic literature, whereby AI is considered from the political perspective, stems partly from the release of AI policy frameworks preparing for the widespread use of AI in society, published by UK, EU and US governmental bodies in late 2016 (Cath, et al. 2018). Literature pertaining to AI within the context of China is only now becoming more readily available following the announcement of the NGAIIDP in July 2017. Current literature surrounding AI and China’s AI ambitions identifies three main themes: AI as a technological development, China’s advantage in AI, and the “race” to AI supremacy.

Much of the contemporary literature focuses on the progress made in the AI subfield of DL (Lecun, et al. 2015; Sarangi & Sharma 2019). DL allows for AI technologies which can further the national development and economy of a country (Jin, et al. 2015; Lee 2018). The key technological requirement of DL is a wealth of available data (Lecun, et al. 2015) and the requirement for its practical application is AI-friendly governmental policy and ambitious entrepreneurs (Lee 2018). These three findings form the logic behind the literature which argues China has the competitive advantage in AI.

Lee (2018) argues that China’s competitive advantage stems from the abundance of accessible data available to AI developers in China. For example, the Chinese mobile application, WeChat (developed by Chinese tech-giant Tencent) collates unprecedented levels of valuable data which is then accessed from one central place, whilst in the US, data of this sort is dispersed across multiple app developers. Similar-
ly, the role of protectionism in providing a competitive advantage to China is considered within the literature (Aaronson 2018; Ding 2018). The internet in China exists closed-off to the rest of the world, therefore China maintains the exclusive control over data which has been generated from the large Chinese population (Ding 2018). This has prevented foreign rivals from accessing the vast amounts of data which can be used to fuel AI applications. Additionally, it is argued that weak data protection laws and regulations in China enable the easier collection of vast amounts of data (Larson 2018).

Conversely, Ding (2018), highlights the overstatement of China’s advantage in AI. Ding’s (2018) Deciphering China’s AI Dream, dedicates a section of its research to looking at “China’s AI capabilities” (2018, 23). By developing an “AI Potential Index” (Ding 2018, 28) based on a comparison of the US and China, the empirical research finds that China trails in every measure, except access to data. Semiconductors are a critical component of AI hardware, which China currently lacks in capabilities (Ding 2018).

Interestingly, the recent literature on AI shows a developing understanding of the role of AI technology, which has been absent from previous AI springs. This indicates a third theme within the literature. Previously, AI is explored in reference to its technological developments and applications (Boden 1990; Nilsson 2009). However, recent literature conceptualises AI to be intrinsically linked to the stability of the international system (Garcia 2018; Horowitz 2018; Payne 2018). AI is argued to be significant in the future of global military affairs, providing a strategic advantage in realm of international security (Kaspersen 2016; Horowitz 2018; Payne 2018). In September 2017, Putin was quoted saying that whoever leads in AI “will become ruler of the world” (Thornhill 2017). This outlook emphasizes that (regardless of material realities of the technology) AI is emerging to be crucial to national interests and the global balance of power, signaling the new paradigm for AI.

This dissertation seeks to understand the discursive construction of China’s AI ambitions. Therefore, it is logical to review relevant “rising China” literature because this forms the current dominant discourse when speaking of China (Shambaugh 2007).

“RISING CHINA”

The phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy over the past forty-years has motivated substantial interest in a “rising” China (Pan 2004). Central to the “rising” China discourse is the strand of discourse which identifies “rising” China as a “threat.” A smaller sub-literature of this strand has also emerged. This sub-literature points to the importance of recognising the role of ideas in constructing the “reality” of the “China threat” literature, explicating that this discourse is based upon more than the material forces of a “rising” China (Pan 2004, 2012; Turner 2013). A second theme of the literature is to explore the idea of China as an “opportunity,” which centres on both the economic opportunity of China and its political opportunity for global integration.
China Threat Theory posits that the rise of China constitutes a growing “threat” to the US and the unipolar system (Pan 2004). Throughout the “China threat” literature, it is argued that China is emerging as a threat to the global order as a result of increasing economic capacity and growing military capabilities (Pan 2004). Mearsheimer’s (2006) influential work argues that China’s economic growth will result in immense security competition between the US and China. This view of an antagonistic China is shared by Cohen (1997, 2007) who argues that China will seek some form of regional and eventually global influence. Much of the “China threat: literature centres on China’s military capabilities (Bernstein & Munro 1997; Roy 2003).

Pan (2012) in his assessment of this trend highlights that if military capabilities were the “sole criterion for threat assessment, the US would be more of a threat to China than the other way round” (2012, 26); going on to argue that this is either ignored within the paradigm or circumvented by shifting the focus to the alleged “asymmetric warfare capabilities” of China (Christensen 2001; Ahrari 2009). In addition to material forces, ideational forces must too play a crucial role in perception and embracement of a “rising China.”

Pan (2004) and Turner (2013) both devote attention to the role of ideas in constructing the “threat” of a “rising” China. This sub-literature is part of a much broader discourse. Since the 1950s a significant body of work has emerged exploring American representations of China. A theme within the literature exploring historical US images of China emerges: positive and negative images of China are generally found to change in response to the external global circumstances at that given time (Isaacs 1958; Steele 1966; Iriye 1967). Harold Isaacs’ (1958) seminal work identifies six “ages” where US representations of China can broadly be determined as positive or negative: the final era being the “Age of Hostility (1949-present).” This negative representation of China develops in line with establishment of a Communist China and its ideological opposition to the US. Within this strand of the discourse, the literature shows that the subjective truths of China develop according to the assumptions of the American-self (Thomson, et al. 1981; Pan 2004). Pan (2004) advances the view that the “China threat” literature is “best understood as a particular kind of discursive practice that dichotomises the West and China as self and other” (2004, 310). The “China threat” discourse comes under criticism when the large levels of continuing poverty are highlighted and the size of the country is brought into comparison with similar sized countries who are not considered a “threat” (Pan 2004). Therefore, the “threat” attached to a rising China must derive from more than just material forces (Pan 2004). Several scholars adhere to this idea, reasoning that the China “threat” has as much to do with ideational forces as it does with the Chinese economy and military capabilities (Chan 1999; Pan 2004; Turner 2013). This argument rests on the “us versus them” discourse advanced by Said (1995). Pan (2004) argues that the US believes that those outside of the “we” should become like “us” and those who refuse or cannot “are by definition the negation of universality, or the other” (2004, 312).

Much of the literature exploring the economic opportunity of China cen-
tres on its one billion customers (McGregor 2005) and its reputation for being the “world’s workshop” making it ideal for outsourcing (Hutton 2006). This outsourcing has previously been argued to then allow Western firms to focus on higher value industries and more advanced research and design, so allowing them to maintain the competitive advantage (Engardio 2007).

The political opportunity of China focusses on two core ideas, both of which centre on the opportunity of democratic transition. First, the “wealth-democracy” connection is cited whereby as the wealth of a country increases, the political freedoms of its citizens increase too (Lipset 1960; Rowen 1996). Second, the idea that a gradual transition to democracy in China ought to and, in fact, is occurring (Pei 1995; Ogden 2002). An opposing strand of literature exists, whereby this modernisation theory is rejected as it is found to be not applicable in the case of China (Chen & Lu 2011; Dickson 2016). Chen and Lu (2011) found, using empirical research, that the growing Chinese middle class support the CCP due to preferable present conditions and a close dependency on the state. Moreover, one strand of the literature finds is that the CCP acts as the primary obstacle to the democratisation process (Jacobs 1991; Wenli 2003; Nathan 2015), suggesting that a full and open Western-style democracy is unlikely whilst the CCP maintains its leadership position. Finally, China as an opportunity for global integration focuses on the prospects of China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” (Pan 2012). This is based on the assumption of it becoming more open politically and economically (Pan 2012) and becoming more interdependent with other nations, specifically the US (Lake 2006).

**Literature Review: Explaining the Rationale**

An exploration of the recent literature reveals several gaps which help to understand the rationale for this dissertation. First, AI has not been explored for its ideational forces. AI has been reviewed in relation to China’s material advantages, and the material impact that AI technology could have on the international balance of power. Yet, absent from the literature is an analysis of how AI is conceptualised and how the discussion of AI today can be seen as forming a new paradigm for AI. Discourse is not a closed system (Hall 2018), hence entwined with this is a consideration for the impact of “rising China” discourse on the emerging discursive construction of AI, which too has not yet been explored within the literature. Lastly, the recency of both the US China Trade Wars and the announcement of the AAII hinders the availability of any academic analysis of the US approach to AI.

This article makes an original contribution to the developing literature through its research question, which is positioned at the intersection of these three considerations identified as absent from the current literature.

**Conceptual Framework**

When considering the developing conceptualisation of AI, it is useful to draw on the social constructivist approach, that “reality is socially constructed by cognitive struc-
tures that give meaning to the material world” (Alder 1997, 319). Social constructivism emphasises the role of ideas, norms and identities in the international context (rather than placing emphasis solely on the distribution of material forces) (Wendt 1992; Hurd 2008). Within the context of this dissertation, this theoretical approach is valuable since it is able to help understand how AI is conceptualised. This does not mean that the material forces of either AI or China are insignificant. However, this dissertation argues that the ideational forces of AI, and the ideational forces of China, are too of interest to the research of the US approach to AI. Pan (2004) provides insight for this rationale:

“I do not deny China’s potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context… Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as “Chinese reality” that can automatically speak for itself, for example, as a “threat”. Rather, the “China threat” is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers” (Pan 2004, 313)

Thus, China’s AI ambitions must also be studied from a perspective of social constructivism to uncover the ideational force of both AI and China and the influence this may have upon the US approach to AI. In this sense, this dissertation adopts a post-positivist approach as it aims to understand “how” events are spoken about (Hollis & Smith 1991). In the analysis of current AI news discourse, addressing “how” discourse has conceptualised China’s AI ambitions is useful to better understand the US approach to AI.

This dissertation departs from Turner’s (2014) persuasive contribution to the literature. Turner (2014) highlights a relationship (albeit not necessarily causal) between imagery and policy action. A core argument made by Turner (2014) is that “American images of China have always been central to the formulation, enactment and justification of US China policy in Washington” (Turner 2014, 7, 88). Turner (2014) focuses on the justification of US China foreign policy; this dissertation differs since it explicates the impact of news discourse on the US approach to AI – not direct foreign policy towards China. However, the US approach to AI is shown to centre on national security concerns. A “vital and intimate relationship” (Kissinger 1976, 182) exists between national security and US foreign policy, hence supporting the adoption of Turner’s (2014) exposition.

Finally, Foucault (1980) finds that power and knowledge are inextricable from one another, meaning the advancement of one is not possible without the presence of the other. The impact of the power-knowledge nexus means that the given meaning of material forces (such as the material capabilities of AI) is derived from the “knowledge” about them (Wendt 1995). The acknowledgment of the power-knowledge nexus is fundamental to this research project; discourse is a way of representing
something, which then produces knowledge that forms the architecture of opinion and action (Hall 2018). The power-knowledge nexus is addressed within the analysis sections (4 and 5) to show how the news discourse uses different displays of power to advance “knowledge” of China’s AI ambitions.

**Section Three: Methodology**

This dissertation employs the method of DA to investigate how US news discourse on China’s AI ambitions enables and justifies the US approach to AI. Discourse is understood as the social construction of reality (Foucault 1972, 24) and more specific to this dissertation, news media is found to actively construct reality instead of replicating it (Robinson 2001; Kuypers 2002, 74). Moreover, news media is shown to influence how readers interpret world affairs (Bennett & Paletz 2004, 8; McCombs 2004, 56). Further to this, several studies maintain that news discourse is inextricable from political action (Belle 2003, 7; Turner, 2014, 88). With this in mind, it is appropriate to use DA to understand how news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions enables and justifies the US approach to AI.

DA is preferable to alternative textual analysis approaches due to its function of being both interpretive and constructivist (Halperin & Heath 2017, 31). DA assumes that the authors of the articles act on a system of values and ideologies which give meaning to the construction of the articles (Halperin & Heath 2017, 31). This is critical to understanding how the discursive construction of China’s AI ambitions is built upon existing “rising” China discourse and an “American” ideological perspective held by the authors.

Sections four and five conduct an analysis of 29 purposively sampled articles from The NYTimes—published between the date of the Chinese State Council announcement of the NGAIDP (July 20th 2017) and President Trump’s announcement of the AAII (February 11th 2019). A list of the sampled articles is found in the Appendix. The articles were published both in print and on the NYTimes online platform. For access reasons, the cited articles are sourced from the online platform, however, a version of each article was also published in print. While the headlines between the two publications differed slightly online as they take into account search engine demands (Bednarek & Caple 2012, 6), the content of both the printed and online articles is identical.

The NYTimes was selected due to its high levels of daily readership and recognition for being a source of outstanding journalism, evidenced by its numerous accolades – most notably being awarded almost double the number of Pulitzer Prizes than its nearest competitor (New York Times, 2018). Moreover, the NYTimes is understood to exhibit “an overall ‘American’ ideological perspective on news events and the world” (van Dijk 1998, 92).

Article selection for this dissertation is a limitation of the research. Selection of the articles relied on subjective personal judgment, which can introduce bias into the sample. Selection bias introduces a possibility of over or underestimating exag-
gerated generalizations (Halperin & Heath 2017, 31). During this timeframe, the NYTimes published 57 articles that referred to both AI and China. To minimize bias, selected articles needed to meet specific selection criteria. The 29 sampled articles were selected on the basis of dealing with a) China's AI ambitions, b) the US approach to AI, c) questions over the control of future technologies. Within this dissertation, AI is defined in line with the AAII. Where AI is understood to include core AI technologies, in addition to “architectural and systems support for AI” (Trump 2019, 86). This includes technologies such as 5G (Sharma 2013; Aijaz, et al. 2017, 3) and key hardware components (for example, semiconductors and microchips) (Ding 2018, 22). Therefore, articles referring to these technologies or technological components are included within the analysis as they are considered integral to the US approach to AI.

As with all DA, there is no standardized method (Wood & Kroger 2000, 98). As recommended by Mautner (2008), the analysis undertaken in this dissertation engages in an analysis of linguistic resources. Specifically, the lexis of the sampled articles is carefully considered, in addition to the use of modality and argumentative devices helping to understand how China's AI ambitions are spoken about within the articles. DA is a subjective practice, and so Wordbanks Online was consulted to confirm the evaluation of connotations for specific words. This ensures that the evaluation is grounded, and connotations are neither under nor overinterpreted (O’Halloran & Coffin 2004, 68).

SECTION FOUR: CHINA’S AI AMBITIONS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE US CHINA TRADE WAR
This section presents the findings and analysis of the news discourse. Three central themes illustrate how the sampled articles construct China’s AI ambitions, which then enable and justify the US China Trade War. First, China’s ambitions are constructed as an AI “dystopia”. Second, China is constructed as a “cheat”. Third, China’s AI ambitions are constructed as “threatening” to the current global order. Taken together, these three themes, enable and justify the US-China Trade War—the second development in the US approach to AI.

FORMULATING CHINA AS AN AI DYSTOPIA
Within the articles, China’s AI ambitions are associated with the authoritarian state, which formulates China as an “AI dystopia”. The construction of an “AI dystopia” is built upon existing ‘China threat’ discourse, whereby the imagined “other”, since unlike “us” and not adhering to Western liberal ideals, must then be considered as a ‘threat’ (Chan 1999, 13). Using the “knowledge” of authoritarian China, helps to formulate a construction of an “AI dystopia” within ten of the articles (articles 4, 6, 7, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 25 & 27). Article 6 and 20 are explicit in this connection:
Both excerpts highlight the role of AI in supporting the CCP. Moreover, in both cases, these assessments are formulated using affirmative modalities (Mautner 2008, 46); the technology “will be abused” [1] and China “is building” [2] a certain type of future (italics added to emphasize use of modality). Neither excerpts express the possibility of these outcomes, only certainty. Other articles rely on the existing ‘knowledge’ of an authoritarian China to make this connection; with authoritarianism seen as the antithesis to democracy, the liberal ideals of privacy and freedom are the reverse image of what can be expected of the Chinese State. Thus, this “knowledge” of China brings meaning to the lexis within the articles.

Except 3 further contributes to a negative image of China’s AI ambitions in its use of “zealously”, which carries negative connotations. In all three excerpts, AI in China is constructed to help the CCP maintain social control, though a surveillance apparatus. Within the literature, the political ‘opportunity’ of China to democratize is found to be undermined by the leadership of the CCP (Jacobs 1991; Wenli 2003; Nathan 2015). Therefore, the use of AI to support the CCP, is an obstacle to China democratizing, hence undermining China as a political “opportunity” and reaffirming China as a “threat”.

Within the articles, a focus was placed upon the role of AI in building a surveillance state and the “dystopian” impact of this. Existing China discourse is crucial to the formation of the emerging discourse surrounding China’s AI ambitions. These already constructed ideas of China influence the association between AI and a dystopia. When considering the case of facial recognition in China, the discourse focuses on, not the use of this in fighting crime, but the “enabling [of] of full techno-police state” (article 7) and its facilitation of tracking citizens (articles 1, 6, 7, 20, 21 & 27). To strengthen the impression of full-scale mass surveillance, numerical figures were given for rhetorical effect:

[4] “Already, China has an estimated 200 million surveil-
lance cameras – four times as many as the United States” (Article 20)

This statement illustrates two points. First, the number of cameras in both countries is proportional to the size of the population. Second, by making a comparison to the US, the author uses the rhetorical tool of implying a “good” US versus a “bad” China. Overall, this theme of the discourse constructs a “truth” about China that has mostly unethical uncivilized AI ambitions.

**China: “The Cheat”**

China is portrayed as being unable to progress its AI development without the use of cheating or thieving. This constructs an image of an inferior China, which is unable to develop without some form of support from more advanced countries. For example, Made in China 2025 is expressed as being “cribbed” from Germany’s strategic initiative to be a global leader in advanced manufacturing processes—Industries 4.0 (article 4). A construction of thieving and cheating China is also evident in the opening sentence of article 21:

[5] “The Chinese immigrant found fortune harnessing Canadian talent to develop cutting-edge technology, everything from semiconductors to facial recognition to take back to China” (article 21)

The use of a nationalistic dichotomy is effective in “othering” the Chinese immigrant. Within the literature, “othering” is found to be crucial to shaping and justifying the political action of the US (Turner 2014, 88). The article continues by explaining that it was later found the “Chinese thieving immigrant” has ties to the Chinese government. The context of this within the wider discourse is important. Using this single example of a “thieving immigrant” who “enjoyed ties to the Chinese government” (article 4) supports the wider rhetoric of the Chinese government cheating to obtain advanced technologies by means of intellectual property theft (articles 3, 4, 8, 14, 19 & 24) or by using Chinese governmental pressure to share US technology with Chinese companies to gain access to the Chinese market (articles 2, 3, 12, 14, 19 & 24).

Only one article (article 5) contradicts the general theme of constructing China as a “cheat” or “thief”. Article 5, instead, describes China as “taking advantage of the United States’ open approach to foreign investment to access sensitive technology”. This equally is not a neutral position, as it still insinuates an ambition to access technology, which is critical to US national security. However, rather than constructing China as a “cheat”, it has described China to be acting on a weakness of a “loophole” in the CFIUS review process. These constructions of China enable the call to broaden the scope of CFIUS under the new pilot program (outlined within section 1.3).
NEED TO PROTECT US-BASED GLOBAL ORDER

Some of the sampled articles (4, 11, 22, and 25) refer to the potential impact of AI development on the US-led global order. One online headline reads:

[6] “China’s Technology Ambitions Could Upset the Global Trade Order” (Article 4)

The lexis of the headline uncovers the ideology it is built upon; to “upset” the order would suggest that in the opinion of the author, the current order is preferable. Another article asserts the importance of a “democratically elected government” (article 22) in having “input” in how AI is deployed. The inverse of this statement would be that a non-democratic, non-elected government ought not to have an input. Therefore, the hidden meaning of this text can be interpreted to be that China, by not having a “democratically elected government”, ought not to have an input in how AI is deployed.

Moreover, the US is constructed as the protector of the liberal order. US companies are shown to be concerned with the protection of individual liberties such as freedom and the ethical deployment of AI, as opposed to Chinese companies who do not. US company, Google, is shown within multiple articles (13, 17 & 25) to be concerned with ensuring the ethical deployment and design of AI technology. Article 25, whilst not specifically naming China, explicates the conflict between applications of AI for surveillance purposes and the liberal order:

[7] “a Google spokesman said… that the company’s ‘A.I. principles’ stated that it would not design or share technology that could be used for surveillance ‘violating internationally accepted norms’.” (Article 25)

The impact of this statement on the wider construction of China is important. Only two of the articles refer to the case of Snowden exposing US surveillance practices (articles 13 and 15), whilst three times as many refer to Chinese State Surveillance (articles 1, 6, 7, 20, 21, and 27).

Contrasting the US, which is shown as having ethically conscious companies, Chinese companies are highlighted to lack the same principles:

[8] “Eric Hsu … an American data scientist … said he worked on artificial intelligence capable of recognizing a person’s face across multiple surveillance feeds … ‘A lot of these security applications were both humanitarian and ethically troubling,’ he said … ‘Chinese clients had lots of ideas for ways they would use our applications.}
Some of those raised red fags.” (Article 21)

[9] “They found Chinese tech executives to be less reflective about the social impact and potential misuse of their technologies” (Article 27)

Both excerpts 8 and 9 assist in constructing an impression of the unethical Chinese industrialist. This extends beyond the role of the “authoritarian state” in creating an AI “dystopia” to include the individual. Therefore, creating an image of an entire country, top-to-bottom, with troubling AI ambitions.

**How This Enables and Justifies the US-China Trade War**

China is constructed as an irresponsible stakeholder in the creation and deployment of AI technologies, whilst the US is constructed as the guardian of liberal norms that have come under threat in the advancement of AI. The discursive construction of an “AI dystopia”, China the “cheat” and China’s AI ambitions as a “threat” to the US-led global order first, reaffirm “China threat” discourse and second, undermine China as an “opportunity” discourse. China’s AI ambitions are constructed as a “threat” to the unipolar system and show China, in the case of AI, to not act as a “responsible stakeholder” in the global system. Thus, enabling US action that acts to prevent China advancing its AI capabilities. This discourse justifies the US China Trade War because it creates a “reality” whereby unless the US acts to prevent it, China will endanger the US-led global order and liberal values.

The NYTimes, in their “power” of being a trusted news source, contributes to the production of “knowledge” about China. Within the analyzed articles, China is the “immoral” engineer of AI-enabled surveillance technology. The US is juxtaposed as the conscientious “moral” navigator of AI. However, the US is not a flawlessly “responsible” actor and too has used surveillance capabilities on its population (Greenwald 2014). As Turner (2014) shows, double standards such as these “can only occur in a world given meaning by discourses which tell us that certain actors are ‘responsible’ and legitimately able to judge the responsibility of others” (2014: 151). This is how the US is able to justify its actions during the US-China Trade War.

Regardless of the material “truth” of China’s AI ambitions, this dissertation shows that the discursive construction of China’s AI ambitions is inextricable from the US-China Trade War. Eight of the articles (14–16, 18, 19, 22, 25 & 29) all link China’s ambitions in technology to the US-China Trade War. Alternative justifications for the US-China Trade War should not be discredited. However, within the discourse China is understood as having unethical AI ambitions, which it seeks to achieve through the immoral practices of cheating and thieving. China’s AI ambitions are shown to threaten the US-led global order and so it is the “responsibility” of the US to prevent China from realizing its AI ambitions.
SECTION FIVE: CHINA ‘WINNING THE AI RACE’ AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE AAII AND DoD AIS
Two additional themes develop within the sampled articles which, when considered in conjunction with the three initial themes of section 4, enables and justifies the AAII and DoD AIS. First, AI is conceptualized through the lens of Cold War politics to create an ‘AI race’. Second, China is formulated as currently “winning’ this ‘race”, whilst the US is juxtaposed as “losing” due to the absence of an official US strategy.

CONCEPTUALIZING AI THROUGH THE LENS OF COLD WAR POLITICS
As with the reviewed literature, some of the articles refer to the development of AI using Cold War metaphors; the impetus for AI development (both in the US and China) is conceptualized as the “Sputnik moment” (articles 13, 18 & 22). The conceptualization of AI through the lens of Cold War politics is also evidenced in article 10, 15 and 26. Article 10 conceptualizes China’s AI ambitions as “the country’s own version of the Apollo 11 lunar mission”. Moreover, article 26 draws on the historical example of US corporations in assisting the national interest during the Cold War to support Microsoft’s recent decision to supply the Pentagon with AI technology. Metaphors are essential for the discursive construction of social realities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In using Cold War metaphors, AI leadership is understood within a “network of entailments” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 132), which then constitutes a license for political action (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 132).

When reporting on the advancement of the development of the AI industry, multiple articles referred to national security and the military applications of AI (articles 1–3, 10, 15, 17, 23, 26, & 29). For example:

[10] “Artificial intelligence research has enormous potential and enormous implications, both as an economic engine and a source of military superiority” (Article 17)

Excerpt 10, using the repetition of “enormous” emphasizes the size of the perceived positive and negative impact of the technology, indicating to the reader, the critical importance of AI. The articles when taken together, support the development of the new paradigm for AI where the technology is understood within the scope of international security and global power politics. The articles define the parameters for how AI is discussed and how it ought to be understood (Ritzer 1996). Excerpt 11 is the accumulation of this construction, explicating the precedent for government funding, and the involvement of the Defense Department, in the US AI industry:

[11] “Thanks to government funding, we got the nuclear industry, the space program, the aviation industry, and the internet, which was initially sponsored by the Defense Department” (Article 22)
Moreover, making a comparison between AI and nuclear weapons constructs an idea of the devastating capabilities of AI applications and successfully conceptualizes AI as a requirement for the US national defense. Thus, supporting the expansion in the jurisdiction of CFIUS.

**CHINA LEADING THE WAY IN AI DEVELOPMENT**

Entwined in the discourse, are numerous examples of “China’s technological prowess” (article 7) against that of the US. China’s AI capabilities are drawn upon to eventually build an impression of a “winning” China in the “race” to AI superiority (articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 20 & 22). For example:

[12] “Two years before Microsoft did, Baidu, the Chinese internet search company, created software capable of matching human skills at understanding speech. This year the Shanghai-based start-up Yitu took first place in a major facial recognition contest run by the United States government” (Article 6)

Explicating the “loss” of Microsoft, a symbol of US technological capabilities, China is shown to be the stronger contender against the US. Moreover, the reporter draws attention to the ability of Chinese firms to “win” even when under the “legitimate judge” of the US government, and therefore insinuating the capabilities of Chinese technology firms is more than the propaganda of the Chinese State. The use of these three examples of Chinese triumphs within close succession constructs an impression of a “winning” China, whilst the “loses” of Chinese AI beyond these chosen examples are not shown.

The legitimacy of the idea that China is leading in the “AI race” is further enhanced through the use of authoritative voices. Within the article headlined “As China Marches Forward on A.I., the White House is Silent”, prominent voice Kai-Fu Lee is quoted as “former Microsoft and Google executive who now runs a prominent Chinese venture capital firm dedicated to artificial intelligence”. Lee is quoted within the article:

[13] “China is going to become one of the most powerful – if not the most powerful – A.I. countries in the world,” (Article 10)

This quotation provides a strong evaluation of the “race” between the US and China, which may otherwise not have been included as such a statement lacks impartiality and objectiveness from the NYTimes (Bednarek & Caple 2012, 6). Article 10 emphasizes the drive for AI in China, whilst highlighting the lack of US government en-
gagement with the industry. The quotation from Lee summarises the outcome of the “AI race” if the US continues on the pathway of a lack of engagement in developing an official AI strategy. The use of a direct quotation, rather than an indirect quotation, distinguishes the voice of Lee from that of the NYTimes (Fairclough 1988). This enables the paper to remain objective whilst working to construct an impression of the future of AI supremacy. The “power” of this authoritative voice and its impact upon the “knowledge” of the “AI race” is illustrative of the power-knowledge nexus (Foucault 1980, 24; Wendt 1995), explored in section two of this dissertation.

Entwined within the idea of China leading the way in AI development, and following from the literature, a recurring trend emerges, drawing on the advantage China has when it comes to AI (articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 27 & 28). The discourse explicates the advantage endowed from a large population size, which enriches the scope of the creation of valuable data that can then be used in AI applications. Moreover, China is also portrayed to have dominant ambitions that are not challenged by the US. A selection of the sampled articles discursively constructs the Trump Administration as “reluctant” to commit to the development of the US AI industry. The articles are critical of the trade wars and the negative impact of tariffs on US AI development (articles 22 & 29), whilst pointing to an insufficient budget for AI development (articles 10, 19 & 22) and the absence of a national strategy to for the US to lead the way in AI (articles 10, 19 & 23). Articles 19 and 22 are particularly critical of the US approach to AI through the implementation of tariffs to “punish Beijing” (article 19). For example, one sentence reads:

[14] “If the United States is worried that the Chinese will win the future because they’re actually spending money to win the future, why aren’t we doing the same?”
(Article 22)

The use of “win” in the excerpt uncovers the “AI race” discourse this statement is built upon. Also, the rhetorical question used within this article a rapport is built with the reader by appealing to the “unifying force of common sense” (Mautner 2008, 46). Several of the sampled articles make indirect call for a US strategy for AI and increased funding:

[15] “[Many economists] say the administration needs a proactive strategy to bolster American innovation and technology” (Article 19)

Whilst “many economists” is an unnamed source, it adds credibility to the argument advanced in the headline of the article: “In Hitting China on Trade, Trump Is Seen Neglecting U.S. Emerging Industries”. Moreover, the use of the indirect reported speech (many economists) contributes to persuading the reader towards a specific
viewpoint (van Dijk 1998, 92). Persuading the option of the reader is also seen in excerpt 16, where the excerpt calls for official US action:

[16] “Americans should respond as we did in 1957, when we sharply increased government spending on science after the Soviet Union launched the world’s first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1” (Article 22)

The modal verb “should” informs the reader, with certainty, what ought to happen.Whilst, a shared identity between the reader and the author of the article is established by the construction of “we” the “Americans”. The excerpt, using a set of linguistic tools, including the use of “should” and “we”, acts to inform the reader what is the moral obligation of “them” the “American” and “their” government.

**How This Enables and Justifies the American AI Initiative and DoD AIS**
The discursive construction of an “AI race” with a “winning” China coupled with calls for an official governmental strategy enables and justifies the AAII and DoD AIS. The articles illustrate a discursive construction of the “AI race” where Cold War metaphors are used as a linguistic tool in the construction of this social reality. Conceptualizing AI as important for the security and defense of the US, justifies the most recent US approach to AI. The AAII emphasizes US intentions to maintain leadership in AI. This can be considered inextricable from the discursive construction of a “winning” China because previous US approaches to AI have not focused on taking the “AI leadership position”. It also signifies the development of a new paradigm for AI, where AI is discussed in relevance to global security and order. The themes discussed within section four can additionally be found to justify the most recent US approach to AI. Both the AAII and the DoD AIS draw on the importance of leadership in AI to maintain the hegemony of US values in the global order, as shown in section one, part three (1.3).

Moreover, the analyzed articles can be seen as inextricable from the timing of the announcements of both the AAII and DoD AIS. News media is found to actively construct reality (Robinson 2001, 74; Kuypers 2002, 32), to influence how readers interpret world affairs (Bennett & Paletz 2004, 8; McCombs 2004, 56) and to shape reader opinion (Hall 2018). Therefore, the articles can be understood as creating a “knowledge” of the US approach to AI. This is a “knowledge” where the Trump Administration was slow in its response to China and initially passive in providing a strategy to guide the US AI industry. Thus, shaping the reader’s opinion based upon the position of articles: the US government needs to create a strategy. Hence, providing an understanding of how the AAII and DoD AIS was both enabled and justified.

**Conclusion**
The research focus of this dissertation has been to understand how news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions enables and justifies the US approach to AI. This disser-
tation addresses an important research area, which has not yet been addressed within the literature: the ideational forces of AI and its intersection with a “rising” China, and the subsequent influence on the US approach to AI. The research finds that news discourse pertaining to China’s AI ambitions is inextricable from the US approach to AI. The conclusions of this dissertation contribute to an analysis of the US approach to AI and the wider literature that has explored the role of news discourse in justifying political action (Turner 2014, 88; Ooi & D’Arcangelis 2018).

To answer the research question: “How does news discourse relating to China’s AI ambitions enable and justify the US approach to AI?” the dissertation carried out a DA of 29 NYTimes articles. Section four shows how China is constructed to have “dystopian” AI ambitions, to be a “cheat” and to have AI ambitions which are a “threat” to the US-led global order. Overall, China’s AI ambitions are constructed as unethical and their capabilities were stolen from the West. Moreover, the AI ambitions are closely linked to the authoritarian government using the technology for social control. These findings reaffirm “China threat” discourse, whilst undermining the political “opportunity” discourse of China, since AI is expressed as bolstering the CCP leadership and thus preventing the democratization process (Jacobs 1991, 32; Wenli 2003, 86; Nathan 2015, 74). These three themes found within the articles work together to enable and justify the US-China Trade War – the second development in the US approach to AI. This “knowledge” of China, constructed within the studied articles, justifies the pilot program which has expanded the jurisdiction of CFIUS. Moreover, the Trade Wars, understood as a response to China’s technological “rise”, are justified as they can be understood as necessary to prevent the endangerment of US values and US-led global order.

Section five illustrated how two additional themes work in concert with the findings of Section four to enable and justify the third development in the US approach to AI, the AAII and DoD AIS. First, within the articles, a discursive construction of an “AI race” emerges. Second, China is constructed as “winning” this “race”, whilst the Trump Administration is slow to respond. This construction of the “reality” of the AI has three consequences. First, by using Cold War metaphors to construct an “AI race” AI is conceptualised as important for the national security of the US. Second, the construction of the “reality” of AI is argued to be inextricable from the timing of the announcements of both the AAII and DoD AIS. Finally, AI is conceptualized in a way that can be seen to have established a new paradigm for how AI should be understood and discussed.

It would be valuable for future research to examine the US approach to AI and its intersection with other national AI strategies. The salient news coverage of AI in China and the US could distract from the other countries devising strategies to become major players in AI (for example Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Israel, India, France and Canada). Justification for the US approach to AI cannot alone be the “rise” of China, but instead will draw on the need to ensure that US AI is more advanced than all countries aiming to make progress within this industry.
A wider implication of this research is the further questions that arise from an early inquiry into the US approach to AI. One question that ought to be considered is could the US approach to AI be considered a form of neo-containment policy? It is found that “military haws and Christian conservatives” usually demand firmer approaches to China (Gries & Crowson 2010). Under the current US administration, it could therefore be suggested, that China is viewed as a “threat” which ought to be “contained”. Whilst, this not the focus of this dissertation, this is an area of research that could complement the analysis of this dissertation. Additionally, an investigation into the securitization of AI to examine the conceptual transition between the 2016 and 2019 would have helped to better understand the US approach to AI.

The US approach to AI ought to be given attention by researchers of US-China relations and specifically, those who devote attention to Western representations of China. Discourse pertaining to China’s AI ambitions does not stand insulated from the neighbouring discourse of “rising” China; the “knowledge” of China’s AI ambitions is built upon it and reaffirms it.


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Evaluating the Impact of Economic Globalization on Political Polarization: The Electoral Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America

Vanessa Young

One of the prime examples and consequences of economic globalization, the Great Recession in 2008 demonstrated the high stakes and global consequences of living in an increasingly integrated, interconnected world. Even as globalization holds the promise of bringing greater prosperity to more states and their people, it has also exacerbated political clashes and uncertainty over economic futures. These frustrations have been accompanied by a rise in populist leaders and growing polarization in many electoral landscapes; in the case of Europe, scholars have argued that the 2008 financial crisis helped increase support for populist leaders. This paper investigates whether the global financial crisis had similar political repercussions in Latin America, specifically in terms of support for politically extreme political parties, and runs a series of t-tests and regressions to test this hypothesis, finding that the financial crisis did not subsequently increase political polarization in the region. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of these results as well as considering more recent trends in Latin American electoral politics, which suggest political extremism may now be increasing.

Section One: Introduction

While the 2008 Great Recession primarily affected the United States and Europe, the subsequent contraction in international trade and the decline in commodity prices also greatly affected Latin American economies, many of which relied and continue to rely heavily on exports to the United States (Ocampo 2017, 722). The global financial crisis represents one of the most recent and significant manifestations of economic globalization and remains a defining experience in the 21st century. The crash demonstrated that even as growing economic, political, and social connections around the globe have the potential to bring greater prosperity to more people, the nature of an intensely globalized economy also means that economic crises may have further-reaching effects than was previously the case. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the U.S. and Europe experienced an intensification of political polarization and an increase in the popularity of anti-establishment or populist ideologies (Algan et al. 2017, 309–400). Scholars have additionally linked past financial crises to subsequent increases in political polarization (Mian et al. 2014, 1–28), including the emboldening and increased electoral success of far-right political parties (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2016, 227–260). Beyond the context of the 2008 crash, scholars have argued we are witnessing a new era of political polarization because of fears about the rapidly changing and highly integrated nature of the global economy and globalization more...
broadly (Rodrik 2017). Analyses of these related phenomena—political polarization, economic globalization, and financial crises—have been primarily focused on western democracies (Autor et al. 2016), yet anxieties about economic globalization and its consequences are not limited to the west.

In Latin America, disdain for the neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programs implemented in the 1980s and 1990s led to an electoral surge in far-left political parties and a growth of populism in the region (Clayton et al. 2017, 614–646). Such trends reflect persisting concerns about the integrated nature of the global economy and can be interpreted partly as a reaction to economic globalization. Although Latin America experienced a period of relatively successful economic growth between 2003 and 2007 (Córdova and Seligson 2009, 673–678), the 2008 crisis brought this to a halt. Latin America’s social unrest and dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, rampant poverty, and corruption is by no means a direct result of the 2008 crash, but the financial crisis provides a specific, unique opportunity to study whether alleged frustrations with economic globalization have translated into electoral support for ideologically extreme political parties. Latin America did not produce the crisis, nor had any direct control over it, but it was considerably affected, largely due to Latin America’s large trade volume with the U.S. and the highly interconnected nature of the global economy.

Research has demonstrated a relationship between financial crises and a subsequent increase in votes cast for ideologically extreme politicians (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2016). Additionally, scholars of globalization theorize that the U.S. and Europe have experienced greater political polarization in the 21st century partly as a consequence of economic globalization. It remains to be seen whether the 2008 crisis should be considered an unfortunate byproduct or a key aspect of the process of global economic integration. Still, it is undeniable that the global reach of the crisis was due at least in part to the heightened economic connectivity that characterizes the present era of globalization. Given the association between financial crises and political polarization as well as the increased potential severity of future crises in the context of globalization, I will investigate whether the crisis had a similar effect in Latin America as it did in the U.S. and Europe. Secondly, I will investigate whether any observed reaction to the crash can be situated in the context of broader theories about the reactions to globalization. Focusing on the global financial crisis and its political effects in Latin America provides a step forward in answering a larger puzzle that is central to the study of globalization: whether or not economic crises have more polarizing effects in the context of increased trade and fears about such global integration.

Since the literature examining fears about globalization and political polarization is often primarily concerned with western or advanced democracies, I believe it will be useful to the field of Global Studies to investigate whether present analytical frameworks concerning these ideas are also relevant and applicable to Latin America. I wish to interrogate whether the global financial crisis had similar political repercussions in Latin America, specifically in terms of support for politically extreme parties. I
will therefore explore how the global dynamics of markets and resources have affected attitudes about governance in Latin America and ultimately electoral outcomes in the region.

This area of research is pertinent because political polarization has important consequences for the future of the international order. Around the globe, ideas about governance and populism have not only ignited important intellectual debates, but the implementation of far-right or far-left policies has also had immediate, tangible consequences, spurring tension, conflict, and even violence. The rise of political polarization and fears about economic globalization pose important, challenging questions about our conceptions of fairness, economic justice, and freedom and dependency in the international economy. This subject also helps us think about how social and political ideas about globalization spread and induce people to take action to express their frustrations, such as through voting for more extreme political parties; electoral outcomes can be manifestations of a particular historical moment and tell us about people’s reactions to globalization.

In the context of these motivations, I investigate how the 2008 financial crisis affected Latin American political preferences. I also investigate what an analysis of this question through the lens of globalization can reveal about how global economic integration affects perceptions about globalization and what the manifestations of such attitudes or fears are in electoral outcomes.

My research is therefore focused on the relationship between global economic forces and political polarization in Latin America in the 21st century. Specifically, I examine whether the global financial crisis in 2008—an exogenous economic shock with a global impact—affected electoral support for ideologically extreme political parties in Latin America. I use data on national legislative elections in Latin America to measure whether there was an increase in the share of legislative seats held by far-right and far-left political parties after the global financial crisis. Initially, I hypothesized that I would find evidence of increased electoral success among ideologically extreme parties post-crash. I speculated that if this was true, it would indicate that international markets can to some extent affect electoral outcomes, which would also suggest that economic globalization could indirectly affect the future of democracy, sovereignty, and effective governance in Latin America and in other developing countries. In spite of the literature connecting financial crises to subsequent increases in extremism, my empirical tests revealed that this was not the case: Latin America does not appear to have experienced an increase in political polarization directly after the 2008 crisis. Although the results contradicted my initial hypothesis, they still provide insight into understanding how perceptions of economic integration and globalization more broadly have evolved in Latin America.

SECTION TWO: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRASH IN LATIN AMERICA

While the U.S. and Europe were the two regions hardest hit by the global financial cri-
sis, the rest of the globe, including Latin America, also suffered. As Figure 1 indicates, the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Latin America fell to -3.069% in 2009, compared to -3.624% in the U.S. and -4.636% in the European Union (World Bank). The crash impacted Latin America primarily through grave contractions in commodity prices, remittances, and global demand for exports (World Bank 2009, 1). The global contraction in demand affected Latin America because of its substantial dependency on exports to the U.S. In the 21st century, the U.S. has consistently been listed as Latin America's top export trading partner, and Latin American exports to the U.S. averaged 49.71% as a share of the region's total exports between 2003 and 2007 (World Bank 2006). Latin American exports increased rapidly in the 21st century as part of an era of economic growth in the region fueled by increased during 2003 to 2007 (Ocampo, Bastian, and Reis 2018, 233). Thus, the abrupt decline in American demand for Latin American exports impacted the region heavily and in essence the financial crisis was more of a trade crisis for the region (Ocampo et al. 2012, 37). Figure 2 illustrates the sharp decline in exports in 2009, compared to the booming trade in the earlier 2000s.

The combined impact of the reduction in trade, commodity prices, and remittances, led to a severe impact on the economies of Latin American countries overall. The unemployment rate increased to 8.5% in the first quarter of 2009, meaning an estimated one million Latin Americans became unemployed during the crisis period (Seligson and Smith 2010). Table 1 additionally illustrates the severity of the crisis, confirming the significance of the decline in GDP per capita and in exports as a percentage of GDP, as well as the increase in unemployment. Latin America’s recovery from the crisis began in the second half of 2009 and improved considerably by 2010 (Latinobarómetro 2010). By this time, export prices recovered and Asian demand for raw materials, as well as the increase in commodity demand from the U.S. restored the region's economy (Latinobarómetro 2010).
Figure 1: VOLUME OF EXPORTS IN LATIN AMERICA

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank)

Figure 2: GDP PER CAPITA ANNUAL GROWTH RATE

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank)
Table 1
T-test results: The economic impact of the crash in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Pre-crisis Mean</th>
<th>Post-crisis Mean</th>
<th>Difference in means</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decline in GDP per capita</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5845.394</td>
<td>5600.514</td>
<td>244.88</td>
<td>127.385</td>
<td>.072*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in exports</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.998</td>
<td>28.447</td>
<td>4.551</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>.0002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as a % of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.877</td>
<td>6.824</td>
<td>-.947</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.0024***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Data source: World Bank Development Indicators

Section Three: Related Literature
The Political Consequences of Economic Crises in Latin America

A few scholars have considered the effects of economic crises on voting outcomes and attitudes in Latin America. For instance, Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project and Americas Barómetro to predict the political effects of the 2008 economic recession (2009, 673–678). Their line of thinking hypothesizes that worsening economic conditions may induce people to have less faith in democratic institutions and therefore turn to alternative, authoritarian leaders. Using multilevel modeling techniques, they conclude that the poor economic conditions caused by the 2008 recession have the potential to produce discontent and unrest that will translate into low support for democracy and a turn to “non-democratic” choices (Córdova and Seligson 2009, 675). While their analysis is more formulated in terms of how economic crises lessen general support for democracy and trust in government, I focus on how this specifically relates to support for ideologically extreme political parties in the context of economic globalization. I do so by looking at electoral outcomes rather than survey data (Córdova and Seligson 2009, 675). Additionally, Córdova and Seligson’s article was published in 2009 while the crisis was still ongoing, but no subsequent publication has taken up the subject and confirmed or disproved their predictions. Their work also lends credibility to my initial hypothesis that the crisis would induce some voters to look to more radical alternatives, although my empirical tests eventually disproved this theory.

The scholarship most similar to my own in terms of analyzing the political effects of an economic crisis in Latin America is Karen Remmer’s “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s,” which considers the effects of the economic crisis on electoral outcomes in the region (1991). At the time she published the article, Remmer identified a large gap in the literature—a lack of research conducted on the electoral effects of economic crises in the developing world more broadly. Her assessment can still be considered pertinent today as her study remains the only one of its kind with regard to Latin America. She hypothesizes that “Economic crisis undermines support for established democratic forces and promotes the growth of political extremism,” and surprisingly, her study does not find support for this theory (1991). Though her hypothesis proved to be incorrect, it is worth noting that
the 1980s was a unique period in Latin American history, as this period of economic crisis also coincided with democratic growth and the dawn of competitive elections in Latin America (1991). Furthermore, the growth of political extremism has often been attributed to frustrations about economic globalization. Research in the field has grown immensely since her study was published.

Overall, much of the literature relating to the political effects of economic crises in Latin America is concerned primarily with changes in party systems, rather than specific voting outcomes or the context of economic globalization. There has additionally been a lack of research that compares political polarization across countries in Latin America, largely because of the difficulty of classifying political parties and the generally understudied nature of polarization in the region.

Michael Coppedge developed the first known classification of Latin American political parties (1997). Since then, more work has been conducted on classifying parties, work that lends itself to studies on political polarization and comparing the electoral effects of economic crises across countries in Latin America. Sebastian Saiegh has placed some major political parties and presidents on an ideological spectrum using survey results and Bayesian scaling methods (2015, 363–384). While there are other scholars working on the intersection of political parties, ideology, and voting preferences in Latin America, many of their works are forthcoming. Thus, the intersection of economic globalization, political parties, and political polarization remains relatively understudied.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC CRISSES IN LATIN AMERICA

There is a substantial body of literature that confirms a relationship between large economic crises and increased political polarization, anti-establishment voting, and electoral success for far-right parties. For instance, Manuel Funke, Moritz Schulrick, and Christoph Trebesch study financial crises in Europe between 1870 and 2014. They find that political polarization increases after financial crises and in particular, far-right parties increase their vote share by an average of 30% (2016, 227–260). Though the majority of existing studies on this subject are limited to Europe and the United States, the scholars Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi analyze a sample of 70 different countries, including most Latin American countries, and show that political polarization increases after financial crises (2014, 1–28). The existing body of literature demonstrates the relevance of studying the relationship between economic globalization and political polarization, and helped inspire my own curiosity in the subject.

In a work that considers the political effects of the 2008 crisis, Kenneth Roberts, one of the leading scholars on Latin America, draws on lessons from the Latin American experience with the debt crisis in the 1980s, providing a comparative analysis of Latin America in the 1980s and Europe in 2008-2009 (2017). Roberts confirms the association between recessions and votes for more politically extreme, anti-establishment, or populist political parties (2017). While his work is
more focused on how crises affect the nature of party structures, rather than on electoral outcomes or political polarization, it is useful in theorizing about the impact of crises and economic interconnectedness on voter preferences and attitudes towards globalization in Latin America.

Section Four: Theory
Given the body of literature that establishes an association between economic crises and political polarization as well as Córdova and Seligson’s prediction that the 2008 crisis would produce greater support for alternative, undemocratic politicians (2009), my initial hypothesis was that the Latin American economies which suffered during the 2008 global financial crisis subsequently experienced greater political polarization both as part of their reaction to the economic downturn and as a result of growing fears about economic globalization. This assessment was based on my review of the literature as well as the concepts and theories discussed throughout my Global Studies coursework. More specifically, I expected to find that countries with greater export dependencies, higher unemployment, and lower GDP per capita would experience greater levels of political polarization in terms of the share of legislative seats occupied by more ideologically extreme political parties as a result of the crash. Although my hypothesis was ultimately contradicted by my empirical tests, the findings do not necessarily disprove broader theories about polarization as a consequence of economic globalization; reasons for this will be discussed at greater length in Section Five.

Section Five: Research Design, Empirical Tests & Findings
Research Design
In order to study the effects of the 2008 crash—a manifestation of economic globalization—on political polarization in Latin America, I chose to examine electoral outcomes because they represent a concrete manifestation of voter attitudes and preferences. I use the term “political polarization” to refer to the electorate’s preference for more politically extreme candidates or parties as reflected in electoral outcomes. While populism and outsider candidates are important in studying the effects of economic globalization, I chose to focus specifically on political polarization because it is more clearly defined and measured than concepts like populist or anti-establishment candidates, especially given the lack of data and complications associated with conducting analyses across countries in Latin America.

Though the tide of populist and leftist Latin American leaders has been well-researched, far less attention has been paid to legislative elections. The benefit of looking at national legislative elections as opposed to presidential elections is that the multi-party systems that exist in Latin America allow for a more complete analysis of the electorate’s preferences and polarization. I therefore analyze political polarization by examining data for national legislative elections throughout Latin American countries prior to and after the 2008 crisis. While other scholars have examined
political polarization using survey data (Saiegh 2015, 363–384), I chose to analyze voting data because it is more concrete and would more easily allow for measuring changes in the popularity of ideologically extreme parties. Additionally, making comparisons across countries and determining whether the crisis is associated with subsequent changes in political polarization requires that there be a method for classifying political parties along an ideological spectrum.

In 1999, Coppedge developed what appears to be the first classification system that places existing Latin American political parties on the left-right political spectrum, and his classification remains the most comprehensive classification to date (1997). For the purpose of making comparisons about electoral ideological positioning across countries in the whole region, Coppedge’s categorical classification is the most appropriate and simplifies the concept of ideological placement. Coppedge categorizes Latin American political parties on a left-right spectrum, designating each under one of five primary categories: left, center-left, center, center-right or right (1997). Under his classification, parties classified as “left” are those “that employ Marxist ideology or rhetoric and stress the priority of distribution” (Coppedge 1997). “Right” parties are defined as those that appeal to the traditional elite, “employ a fascist or neo-fascist discourse,” and/or are “sponsored by a present or former military government” (Coppedge 1997). These criteria were chosen so as to maximize the comparability of parties across the region. Though Coppedge refers to these two ideological categories as “right” and “left,” I will hereafter refer to them as “far-right” and “far-left” for the sake of clarity and given their extreme ideological positions. Additionally, references to a combined group of both far-right and far-left parties will be synonymous with “ideologically extreme parties.” Although Coppedge’s work only includes designations for Latin American political parties up until the mid-1990s, his classification has been built upon by the scholars Evelyne Huber and John Stephens, who updated party classifications through 2012 to reflect any ideological shifts parties may have undergone (2012). In addition to providing a useful classification of political parties, the dataset also reports the shares of seats held by each ideological block for the lower chamber of the parliament, as this is the most complete data available. I was therefore able to utilize this dataset both for its data on national legislative elections and its classification of political parties, which enabled me to match the electoral data with parties’ political orientations on the left-right spectrum in order to then test whether there was a substantive post-crisis change in extremism.

My methodology is based partly on a similar study conducted in Europe, where the authors examine the impact of the Great Recession on votes for ideologically extreme, populist, and anti-establishment political parties throughout Europe (Algan et al. 2017, 309–382). In their empirical tests, the authors of this study use data on unemployment and GDP per capita in order to demonstrate an association between the contraction in demand, employment, and trade that resulted from the global crash and the subsequent increase in votes cast for ideologically extreme or populist parties. Their methodology is more complex than my own, as they are able to
account for confounding variables and make additional modifications in their model that allow for more accurate testing (Algan et al. 2017, 309). Still, I have relied closely on the framing of their paper, using the same indicators and drawing similar comparisons in my own work.

**Empirical Tests and Findings**

In order to measure whether there was greater political polarization after the 2008 crisis and whether this change could be considered significant, I ran a series of t-tests comparing pre- and post-crisis values for the share of legislative seats held by far-right, far-left, and leftist political parties in Latin America. For pre-crisis values, I calculated the average share of legislative seats held by far-right and far-left parties in 2003-2007, the time period when Latin America experienced substantial economic growth and general prosperity (Córdova and Seligson 2009, 673-678), as well as the immediate pre-crisis value in 2007 for each ideological block. I also calculated the same proportion in the immediate post-crisis elections. My methodology does not mean to suggest that votes for extreme right and extreme left political parties are necessarily equivalent in terms of their extremism, but my question is focused on general polarization in voting and thus, for the purposes of this research, both categories are treated similarly at times. Although not all the seats in the legislature are up for re-election every time there is an election and countries hold elections in varying years, I determined that any national legislative election held between 2009 and 2011 in Latin America would have been sufficiently close to the aftermath of the financial crisis for the crash to factor into voters’ decision making. As such, the countries included in these empirical tests are as follows: Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The first measure of the relationship between the crash and political polarization examines the change in political extremism as reflected in electoral outcomes before and after the global crash in 2008. Table 2 presents the results from the t-test comparing pre-crisis and post-crisis shares of legislative seats held by combined far-right and far-left parties (termed “extremism”), as well as independently for far-left, moderate left, net left, and far-right legislative shares. The post-crisis values of extremism did not differ significantly from either the averaged or immediate pre-crisis values. The first row in the table reports the immediate pre-crisis and post-crisis mean seat shares captured by extreme parties, and the p-value of 0.531 indicates this change is not significant. The results indicate that there was no significant increase in support for ideologically extreme parties in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, neither combined nor independently with respect to far-right and far-left shares. We can therefore conclude that political extremism did not substantially increase in Latin America, at least electorally, after the global financial crash.
Although the t-test results reveal that the increase in political extremism was not independently significant, for my second test, I examine whether there is a correlation between political extremism and the level of economic impact from the crash. In order to assess and factor in the economic impact of the crash in Latin America, I use three separate independent variables from the World Bank’s database of “World Development Indicators,” and calculate the change in these variables as a result of the crisis: change in GDP per capita, change in the unemployment rate, and change in the volume of exports as a percentage of GDP. The first two variables capture the change in overall welfare and job loss due to the crisis, and are used in the aforementioned European analyses that analyze congruous effects. (Hernández and Hanspeter 2015). (Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou, and Passari. 2017). The last variable measures individual countries’ dependency on foreign exports, given that Latin American countries may have been affected by, or insulated from, the crisis to varying degrees based on the importance of exports to the U.S. and Europe in their economy. I also include the same economic variables in the regression independently: post-crisis GDP per capita, post-crisis percentage of unemployment, and export dependency on the eve of the crisis.

Based on the work of Algan et al., I run a regression to measure the effects of unemployment, GDP per capita, and export dependency on political polarization as well as the post-crisis change in these variables. (Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou, and Passari. 2017). Table 3 presents the results from this series of regressions. The value in the first row and first column indicates that there is a significant negative relationship between the post-crisis decline in exports and an increase in extremism. In other words, countries that experienced a greater decline in their exports actually experienced less political extremism, while countries less affected by a decline in exports witnessed
greater extremism. This relationship is the opposite of what one would expect. However, close examination of the data reveals that nine out of fifteen countries in the sample experienced no change in extremism, and that the three particular countries that experienced the greatest change in extremism—Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela—skew the rest of the data. Eliminating these countries from the sample, as is depicted in Figure 3, suggests that across the region there is no discernable relationship between the post-crisis decline in exports and political extremism. Furthermore, the value in the first row and second column of Table 3 also identifies a negative relationship between the decline in exports and the combined change in far-left and moderate left legislative seat shares. This relationship is skewed by one outlier—Venezuela—and removal of this data point results in a moderate negative correlation between the decline in exports and change in leftist legislators. However, the modified statistical analysis in Table 4 with outliers removed indicates that the decline in exports has neither a statistically significant impact on the change in extremism nor on the change in leftist legislators. While further research may refine this methodology to account for a number of other factors, this provides suggestive evidence that the crash did not impact Latin American views on politics as much as our theories on globalization and polarization might suggest.

### Table 3

Regression results: The relationship between the crash and extremism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ extremism</td>
<td>Δ net left</td>
<td>Δ far left</td>
<td>Δ extremism</td>
<td>Δ net left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in exports</td>
<td>-0.444**</td>
<td>-0.904***</td>
<td>-0.305</td>
<td>1.974</td>
<td>-0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(1.519)</td>
<td>(0.885)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline in GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.963*</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>2.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(2.518)</td>
<td>(1.467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports on eve</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>unemployment</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.325***</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.949***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are in parenthesis

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Economic data source: World Bank Development Indicators

Voting data source: Huber and Stephens, Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset
There are several factors that can help explain both why there was no significant change in extremism post-crisis and why there was no observed relationship between any of the economic indicators and levels of extremism. First and foremost, there are a few methodological aspects that may have affected the test outcomes. The sample size of fifteen countries is relatively small compared to other analyses, and I was unable to isolate other potentially confounding variables in my model. Additionally, seven of the fifteen countries in the sample held elections in 2010 or 2011, at which point there were clear indications that Latin America would weather the crisis relatively successfully. By 2010, GDP per capita annual growth had bounced back to 4.583% from -3.069% in 2009 and remained somewhat promising at 3.17% in 2011.
(World Bank). The only three countries with reported increases in extremism—Bolivia, Chile, and El Salvador—were among the countries that held elections in 2009, while the crisis was still ongoing. Given the distribution of the 2009–2011 election cycle I examined, by the time other countries began their election cycles in 2010, there may have been less anxiety about the crisis and therefore less pressure to turn to radical alternatives when voting.

Survey data also corroborates this explanation as to why the crash does not appear to have increased political extremism in the elections. In 2009, the Latino-barómetro Corporación surveyed Latin Americans about a number of issues, including their perceptions of their respective country's economic performance in the context of the crisis. When asked to rate how much they believed the crisis was affecting their country on a scale of 1 to 10, Latin Americans responded with an average of 7.1, suggesting the crisis was a fairly serious consideration at the time (Latinobarómetro 2009, 84). Unfortunately, the same question was not surveyed in 2010 so we are unable to ascertain to what extent Latin Americans perceived the crisis as still substantially affecting their country by the time elections came around in 2010 and 2011. However, we can compare results from a broader survey question that asked Latin Americans to describe the economic situation in their country. In 2009, 40% considered the economy to be bad or very bad, and this proportion fell to 35% in 2010, reflecting some optimism about economic prospects for recovery (Latinobarómetro 2010, 8). This improved perception of the national economies appears to reflect the general sense in 2010 that the region was recovering from the crisis (Latinobarómetro 2010, 25). In addition, the only other Latin American-focused survey project, the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP), surveyed perceptions about the crisis in 25 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2010, and its findings also seem to corroborate the interpretation that perceived recovery may have mitigated potential political extremism (Seligson and Smith 2010, 1–159). When asked about the existence of the economic crisis in 2010, 45.7% of Latin American respondents indicated that there was a crisis and that it was very serious, while another 45.7% responded that there was a crisis but that it was not very serious (Seligson and Smith 2010, 13–14). The results here are evenly split, but nonetheless suggest that by 2010, a substantial proportion of citizens generally perceived that the crisis was no longer a serious threat. This is not to say that the real and perceived recovery for the region in 2010 meant that the crisis was entirely unimportant for voters heading to the polls in 2010 and 2011. Still, the anticipated recovery likely meant that Latin American voters were not as troubled by the crisis as of 2010 and therefore may have been less desperate for solutions, reducing the likelihood that they would turn to politically extreme parties for alternative solutions to the economic downturn.

Furthermore, since the crash originated outside of Latin America, we might also speculate that voters were less likely to blame their own governments for the crash, therefore diminishing the likelihood that extreme political parties could capitalize on the crisis and successfully appeal to voters in the way similar parties were able
to in Europe. Surprisingly, as Figure 4 indicates, when respondents were asked in 2010 who bore responsibility for the crisis, most of the blame was assigned to either the previous or current government and only 7.8% of Latin Americans elected to blame rich countries for the crisis (Lodola and Seligson 2011, 15). The fact that most respondents did not blame rich countries for the recession suggests that the ways in which Latin Americans experience economic globalization are as subjective as they are real. The lack of blame placed on rich countries—though the crisis originated in the U.S.—might suggest that Latin Americans are less anxious about the unfortunate byproducts of global economic integration having experienced the benefits of increased trade in the early 2000s. Alternatively, it may indicate that they simply did not perceive the crisis to be a consequence of the global adoption of free market economics, and did not associate this manifestation of economic globalization with the controversial market reforms enacted on the region by the IMF and the World Bank in the late 20th century (Veltmeyer 1993, 2080–2086).

It might also be the case that traditional, more moderate Latin American political parties were sufficiently effective at explaining how they would handle the crisis and thus ensured extreme parties were not a popular alternative. Latin American expert Kenneth Roberts suggests that the popularity of alternative, radical parties and politicians depends on how successfully the traditional party system allows for the expression of anxieties about economic performance (2017, 218–233), which would include any anti-globalization sentiments. We can thus infer that even if Latin Americans voting after the crisis were anxious about the downturn or about global integration more broadly, citizens may have been sufficiently satisfied that their concerns were being heard by traditional, less extreme political parties, giving them less reason to turn to politically extreme alternatives. Roberts’ work also suggests that even if there were frustrations, Latin Americans may have chosen to express them through other mediums than electoral outcomes. It is thus possible that voting outcomes do not provide a complete picture of Latin American sentiments about economic globalization (2017, 218–233). Still, based on the available evidence, the most convincing explanation as to why there was no post-crisis increase in extremism is that the 2003–2007 boom gave Latin Americans confidence in the region’s prospects for future growth and once the 2008 crisis hit, it was perceived as sufficiently limited and did not fully destroy this optimism, thereby reducing the likelihood of potential desperate turns to ideologically extreme alternatives.

Having more specific polling data on how Latin Americans felt and continue to feel about economic globalization would be beneficial in interpreting the impact of this force on the Latin American elections between 2009 and 2011. Though perceptions of globalization remain largely under surveyed in the region, some questions serve as useful proxies in trying to determine attitudes towards economic globalization and why the crisis did not produce greater political extremism in the region. In its 2009 survey, Latinobarómetro asked Latin Americans about their satisfaction with the market economy and 59% responded that the market economy was the best option
for their country despite the ongoing crisis (Latinobarómetro 2009, 90). In the same year, 47% of respondents in the region (Latinobarómetro 2009, 92) also thought that the market economy was the only option among economic systems through which countries can attain development (Latinobarómetro 2009, 92). This figure increased to 58% in 2010, demonstrating a continued belief in the overall benefits of economic integration and the market reforms associated with globalization (Latinobarómetro 2009, 92). The level of support for the market as the sole option for development had previously peaked in 2005 at 63% after three years of sustained economic growth; this provides some evidence that the improved economic performance between 2003 and 2007 boosted Latin Americans’ views of the market system and that even after the crisis occurred citizens were still optimistic about future prospects for growth and development. Such analysis is also corroborated by the fact that prior to the crisis, the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that since 2002 support for free markets had increased in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Peru (Pew 2015).

Still, the lack of direct and frequent surveying on attitudes towards economic globalization makes it difficult to definitively conclude whether Latin Americans hold favorable views of economic globalization or not. This survey data also reminds us that people can experience economic globalization both literally and subjectively. That is to say, economic crises and changes in economic welfare matter as much as how people subjectively perceive the benefits of trade and interconnectedness (Haslam 2012, 334). This overall satisfaction with the market economy in Latin America can be interpreted as a general acceptance of economic globalization, especially in the context of the 2003–2007 trade boom. This generally positive view of economic integration at the time, combined with the predicted and actual economic recovery of the region between 2009 and 2012, helps explain the lack of an observed increase in extremism after the crash.
Thus, given the limited availability of data on perceptions of the crisis and of economic globalization more broadly, the best evidence we have to explain the absence of an increase in post-crisis extremism is the effect of the 2003–2007 period of economic prosperity, which made many hopeful about future growth in the region, and secondly, the relatively effective management of the crisis as well as the region’s quick recovery. On the whole, despite some initially dire predictions, Latin America was relatively successful at handling the crisis (Lodola and Seligson 2011), primarily due to its implementation of counter-cyclical and poverty alleviation policies (Seligson and Smith 2010). According to the Inter-American Development Bank, a combination of low inflation, fiscal surpluses, international currency reserves, flexible exchange rates, and strong banking systems, among other features, enabled the Latin American economies to mitigate the impact of the crash and weather the storm more successfully than in past crises (Seligson and Smith 2010, 8). Additionally, the period of growth experienced by the region between 2003 and 2007 led to stronger economic foundations upon which most of their economies rested. Ultimately, the actual and perceived recovery of Latin America by 2010 likely meant that while voters were still concerned with the economy, they were not so worried as to turn to radical or extreme alternatives.

Despite the region’s recovery and the lack of an increase in political polarization, there are some concerning trends exposed by the crisis. Latin America’s implementation of counter-cyclical policies and its general recovery from the crisis may seem to provide evidence that as developing countries deepen their integration in the globalized economy, some have also improved in terms of their understanding of and ability to deal with the externalities imposed on them by their increased participation in an interdependent economic structure that is prone to cycles of booms and busts (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2009). However, Latin American scholar and former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs José Ocampo argues it was not so much that the region established a long-term pattern of improved macroeconomic policies during the boom, but rather that increased revenues and “improvements in the external balance sheet” between 2003 and 2007 helped prepare Latin American countries to implement counter-cyclical policies during the recession (Ocampo 2009, 722). Thus, it was mostly external favorable conditions and the fortunate convergence of additional factors, rather than institutionalized changes in economic management, that enabled the region to weather the storm. Additionally, as the region showed promising signs of recovery, several scholars and experts predicted that the 2010s would be “the Latin American decade,” since the region appeared to be headed back on track after years of poor growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Ocampo, Bastian, and Reis 2018, 235). Even the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Luis Alberto Moreno, endorsed this idea and suggested there was cause for optimism (Ocampo, Bastian, and Reis 2018, 235). Unfortunately, it is now clear that there was not as much cause for optimism as economic projections and the initial post-crash period suggested.
Although the region did recover from the crisis by 2011, the years following the recovery proved to be less economically successful than experts had hoped. As commodity prices began declining again in 2012-13, the rate of economic improvement waned and many Latin American countries witnessed a deceleration in growth, making many less optimistic about prospects for the future (Ocampo, Bastian, and Reis 2018, 249). As growth declined, Latin America fell into recession again from 2015 to 2017, and has since struggled to fully recover (IMF). The boom in commodity prices and trade was short lived, and Latin America still has yet to figure out how to integrate itself into the global economy in a way that maximizes its growth and leads to long-term sustenance. The region has struggled to develop and implement countercyclical policies to deal with the vulnerabilities associated with commodity cycles (Ocampo 2017, 51–76). While returning to inward-looking strategies is clearly unrealistic in the context of globalization, there are some opportunities within the internal market that would help boost growth and allow governments to better handle the crises and commodity price cycles that are a feature of an economically globalized world (Ocampo 2016, 98). The collapse of commodity prices in 2008 demonstrates that this dependency on exports can leave the region vulnerable to external economic forces and thus, it must take greater action to prepare its economy for the volatility of commodity price cycles.

As the region currently suffers from economic stagnation, it is possible that the optimism and generally favorable views of economic globalization that survived the crisis and helped prevent post-crisis extremism will gradually dissipate, threatening to undermine democracy and increase polarization (The Economist 2019). In fact, the recent elections of leaders like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, where voters abandoned traditional political parties, provide some evidence that political extremism and populism may be on the rise in several Latin American countries (The Economist 2019). If I had access to complete election and political party data up to the present day, I would have also tested whether extremism increased in subsequent elections waves in 2014–15 and 2018–19, as commodity prices have fallen considerably and Latin American economies have contracted, contrary to the forecasts in 2009–2011 that painted a hopeful picture for the region’s recovery and future growth (Pozuelo et al. 2016). Though there was no evidence of a politically extreme electoral reaction directly following the global financial crash in 2008, the stagnation of economic growth and more recent elections still suggest we should be concerned about the potential relationship between globalization, economic suffering, and the appeal of more extreme or populist political parties. If traditional parties in Latin America cannot successfully manage the economy and boost growth, then it will be unsurprising when voters cast them aside in favor of more radical alternatives.

SECTION SIX: CONCLUSION
This research project has aimed to analyze the impact of the 2008 global financial
crisis on political polarization in Latin America, in the context of anxieties about economic globalization. Examining data from national legislative elections in Latin America and measuring changes in seat shares for ideologically extreme political parties, my statistical analysis found that there was neither a significant increase in political extremism after the crisis nor any association between the economic severity of the crisis and changes in extremism. Interpreting these results, I contend that the lack of post-crisis electoral extremism can most plausibly be attributed to Latin American confidence in future growth generated by the 2003-2007 period of economic success, as well as the general optimism which persisted throughout the crisis and seemed validated as the region recovered by 2011. Though the results of my statistical analysis were somewhat surprising and initially difficult to explain, these findings affirm the complexity and often contradictory effects of globalization in the region (Haslam 2012, 331–339). The results do not necessarily imply that electoral outcomes in Latin American countries are resistant to global market forces nor that future economic crises will similarly fail to produce increases in political polarization. In fact, the recent economic stagnation of the region suggests that optimism about Latin America throughout 2003–2007 and during the recovery period was largely misplaced. If the lack of an observed increase in post-crisis extremism is truly attributable to this general optimism, as I have argued, then in the context of declining growth in the region and accompanying despair, future crises and other unfortunate byproducts of economic globalization may still produce political polarization.


EXPLORING THE COMPATIBILITY OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY
Leina McDermott

This paper compares and contrasts the values of Islam and democracy in order to explore the existence of a political system in which the two are compatible. The text draws upon the writings of Arab political thinkers, the Qur'an, and foundational democratic documents in order to consider the major conflicts (sovereignty and the role of the state in private life) and synergies (consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), the obligation of public allegiance (bay'a), and independent reasoning (ijtihad)) between Islam and democracy. The paper finds that while Islam is not compatible with the Western democratic model, a new model for Islamic democracy can be constructed based on universal democratic values.

Since the first interactions of the Arab world with Europe in the 17th century, the question of Islam's role in modern government and state-building has occupied the thoughts of both Arab and Western thinkers. Islam's compatibility with democracy holds particular significance as many consider a democratic political system to be the hallmark of a modern state. With the emergence of several “Islamic Republics” and the rise of Islamist political parties beginning in the mid-20th century, the question of compatibility between political Islam and democracy has taken on new relevance. Based on a review of both the theoretical underpinnings of Islam and democracy and real-world examples, this paper argues that political Islam cannot be reconciled with the “Western” or “liberal” democratic model due to fundamental issues of sovereignty and the role of the state in governing the private sphere. However, a non-essentialist interpretation of both Islam and democracy allows for the understanding of a distinct political system in which the two are compatible.

The global modernizing force that began in Europe with the Age of Enlightenment and French Revolution catalyzed a reconsideration of government and state-building in the Arab world. Early thinkers on this topic were predominantly liberal Islamic scholars who envisioned modern governments based on Islam. Throughout the following two centuries, many views on the relationship between Islam and government emerged, providing a vast pool of discourse on which the modern discussion now sits. While a significant portion of this discussion concerns secular democratic governments in majority-Muslim states, this paper is only concerned with democratic systems based on political Islam. Early liberals Rifa‘ah Al-Tahtawi and Khayr Al-Din advocated for such a system, drawing parallels between Islamic and democratic values. Tahtawi writes, “what is called freedom in Europe is exactly what is defined in our religion [Islam] as justice [adl], right [haqq], consultation [shura], and equality [musawat]... This is because the rule of freedom and democracy consists of imparting justice and right to the people, and the nation’s participation in determin-

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ing its destiny” (Islam 2017, 5). Both Tahtawi and Kahyr Al-Din make clear that the principles of democracy can be adopted without violating the Shari’ah, and are not dissimilar to what Islam already provides. Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh further contributed to the discourse on the concept of Islamic democracy. Afghani strongly opposed despotic governments and viewed a republican government as “a source of happiness and pride” for its people (Islam 2017, 7). However, like their liberal predecessors, both Afghani and Abduh imagined a political system with Islam at its core and opposed the adoption of any reform that comprised the fundamentals of Islam. Yet they all acknowledged the need to modernize Islamic thought. For Abduh, modernization relied on the revival of *ijtihad*, or independent reasoning concerning the interpretation of Shari’ah (God’s law). These thinkers and their peers laid the foundation for a modern concept of Islamic democracy, a political system distinct from the Western model of democracy.

The fundamental difference between Islamic democracy and Western or liberal democracy is the issue of sovereignty. The Quran explicitly states that the supreme sovereign power belongs to Allah (God) (Islam 2017, 10). Humans may exercise political sovereignty by participating in their government; however, a government that confers supreme sovereignty upon a human being or earthly institution contradicts Islam. Thus, the people or government in an Islamic political system may never contradict Shari’ah. In contrast, the Western model of democracy confers sovereignty upon the people. This popular sovereignty is closely tied with the notion of individualism foundational to liberal democracy. In liberal democratic theory, individuals enjoy the status of sovereign persons; each is self-ruling and free to make decisions to protect their liberty. The preamble of the United States constitution cements this status: “We the people of the United States… secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity” and in the French constitution: “the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights.” In the liberal system, human sovereignty is only limited by the law (which is determined by the people), and the necessity of protecting the sovereign status of individuals. In political Islam, on the other hand, the status of individuals is that of vice-regents to God (Benhenda 2010, 99). In other words, individuals act in the name of God, not of themselves. The contradiction between Islamic and Western conceptions of sovereignty is at the center of the political thought rooted in the ideas of the Egyptian intellectual and Islamist Sayyid Qutb. Qutb calls the conception of God’s sovereignty hakimiyya and deems anything that contradicts it as *jahiliyya* (idolatrous condition). Based on these beliefs, Qutb finds that “all regimes that explicitly ratify human sovereignty are *jahili*, whether they call themselves communist, liberal, democratic, socialist, or nationalist” (Qutb 131). Though Qutb is widely considered the father of modern Islamist thought, not all contemporary Islamists maintain his extreme views, and many have shifted toward a more moderate position that embraces the idea of Islamic democracy. However, the issue of sovereignty precludes the incorporation of political Islam and liberal democracy.
The secondary ideological tension between political Islam and Western democracy is the role of the state in governing the private life of individuals. This issue is related to the issue of sovereignty, as it relates to the practical consequences of government based on Shari’ah. Though here we are mainly concerned with the political aspects of Islam, these cannot be separated from its religious and moral principles. Shari’ah governs aspects of an individual’s private life in a way that contradicts individual rights provided by liberal democracy. For example, though a tenet of Islam is religious tolerance, the Shari’ah forbids conversion from Islam (Islam 2017, 13), which conflicts with the total freedom of religion afforded to individuals by Western democracy. Additionally, a common point of contention when considering Islamic democracy is the status of women in the Shari’ah. Common marriage laws based on Shari’ah afford women fewer rights in terms of divorce, and female heirs receive half the share of male heirs according to Islamic laws of inheritance (Islam 2017, 14). These are only examples of the broader issue of the contradiction between political Islam and democracy in terms of individual rights and the private life, which in turn stems from the previously discussed issue of individual sovereignty versus God’s sovereignty.

These contradictions do not preclude the compatibility of political Islam and democracy, but rather clarify the distinction between Islamic democracy and the Western model. As previously mentioned, the basis for Islamic democracy is provided by the 19th-century thought of Tahtawi, Kahyr al-Din, Al-Afghani, and Abdul. It relies on finding common ground in the fundamental principles of Islam and democracy and rejecting a monolithic or essentialist interpretation of either system. While the many possible interpretations of Islam lead to corresponding interpretations of Islamic democracy, most agree it is rooted in four aspects of Islamic political thought: consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), the obligation of public allegiance (bay’a), and independent reasoning (ijtihad). In addition to these, an important stipulation of Islamic democracy is that it is a procedural democracy, and all rights are procedural rather than individual (Benhenda 2010, 103). Procedural rights are those “constitutive of the political process,” such as the right to vote, as opposed to liberal or individual rights, such as the right to non-political expression (Benhenda 2010, 93).

Shura, or consultation, provides the strongest link between Islam and democracy. Many thinkers have paralleled shura with the concept of a parliament. According to the Quran, the Prophet was commanded to consult those around him in important matters (Islam 2017, 12). In the context of Islamic democracy, shura is interpreted as the obligation of a ruler to take into account the outcome of consultation with the umma before making decisions (Benhenda 2010, 104). In a parliamentary democracy, the umma is represented by elected officials who serve as a consultative body for the executive branch. Shura goes hand in hand with another Islamic concept of bay’a, or the process by which the public pledges allegiance to the ruler. This process resembles an agreement between the ruler and the public through which “the ruler takes authority from the umma, which is then obliged to obey him” (Benhenda 2010, 102).
Bay’a is similar to the democratic process of elections, with an important difference being that once the public pledges its allegiance to the ruler through bay’a, it forsakes its ability to make new decisions in the future (i.e., partake in future elections) as the ruler is assumed to rule for life. However, as the ruler derives authority from the public with the responsibility of upholding Shari’ah, if he fails to do so, he becomes taghut and breaks his bay’a. For example, if the ruler fails to consider the consultation of the umma as required by shura, his bay’a would be broken, and the public would be free to elect a new leader. Add to this the concept of ijma, or consensus, and a democratic procedure of elections can be constructed from principles of Islamic political thought.

The concept of *ijtihad*, or independent reasoning, is perhaps the most important concept for the legitimacy of Islamic democracy. It is the main support for Tahtawi and Abduh’s arguments for Islam’s compatibility with the modern world. *Ijtihad* allows for the interpretation of God’s law to best serve the welfare of the people (*maslaha*) and the development of time and place. *Ijtihad* is what can allow for the survival of a modern Islamic political system by providing a method for the adaptation of Shari’ah to the needs and desires of a contemporary public. However, the centrality of *ijtihad* to an Islamic political system is also problematic and exposes one of the major limits to this form of government.

In a political system that enforces the sovereignty of God’s law, an obvious limitation is the uncertainty inherent to a system in which the supreme sovereign is not human. On undisputed aspects of Shari’ah this does not pose a problem, but when the law is open to conflicting interpretations, Islam does not provide a definitive method for resolving such conflicts. Islam does not have a clergy, and though religious scholars may interpret the law under the principle of *ijtihad*, “this is not sufficient for the extreme case in which the arguments of all parties have been exhausted and disagreement still persists” (Benhenda 2010, 106). With Shari’ah at the center of a political system, “the fundamental problem comes down to the fact that no earthly institution can claim an exclusive right to interpret religious texts” (Benhenda 2010, 106). This presents not only a procedural problem, but also an opportunity for exploitation. As the Christian secularist, Farah Antun, voiced in his objections to ‘Abduh’s proposed Islamic state: the compromise between modernity and religion can lead to the cooption of power and resulting undue influence of religious leaders (Hourani 2013, 258–59). One could argue that this is the case in Iran, where the Council of Guardians, the body responsible for upholding Shari’ah by approving bills passed by the parliament, is the most influential political body in Iran despite reformist attempts to reduce its power (CFR).

Another limitation has to do with the fragility of a system so open to interpretation and so dependent on the interpretation of those in power. This dependency causes the system to be vulnerable to movement to the left or right, which could cause the system to become either not Islamic or not a democracy. For example, the Ennahda party in Tunisia rose to power as a moderate Islamist party under the leadership of Rached Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, one of the most influential advocates for Islamic
democracy, argued strongly for the compatibility of political Islam and democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring. His party facilitated Tunisia's transformation into one of the most functional democracies in the Muslim world, and yet by 2016, the party was distancing itself from the label of Islamism and rebranding itself and Tunisia as a democracy guided by the values of Islam. Essentially, the idea of Islamic democracy was used to popularize democracy in a Muslim-majority country to achieve the ultimate goal of implementing a Western democracy. This is clear from the ways in which the Tunisian democratic model conflicts with the Islamic principle of sovereignty as shown by Ghannouchi's address to the World Movement for Democracy in Dakar, in which he stated: “the government is and must be of the people, by the people, and for the people—not in the name of God, who is sovereign and watching over all of us” (Ghannouchi 2018, 6).

On the other side of the issue is Turkey, a nominally secular democracy led by the Islamically rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Erdogan. While Tunisia has swung away from the Islamic aspect of its Islamic democracy, Turkey is undergoing a movement of increasing Islamist influence. In recent years, Turkey’s government has begun to selectively enforce its interpretation of Shari’ah on the public without any of the democratic provisions discussed above. This phenomenon reflects concerns of secularists, modernists, and universalists that including political Islam in a democratic political system introduces an unacceptable risk due to the unpredictable degree to which the party may align itself with the extremist minority after coming to power.

Practical limitations aside, the argument that political Islam is incompatible with democracy is based on a monolithic understanding of both democracy and Islam. When the Western model of democracy is distinguished from the basic and universal principles of a democratic system, and Islamism is not reduced to its extremist minority, a new model for Islamic democracy can be constructed. Whether or not this model is the optimal one for advancing Muslim-majority states is another question, one which certainly depends on the state and its specific version of Islamic democracy. At the same time, many disagree that the universal concept of democracy can be separated from the Western model at all, in which case, the conclusion must be that Islamic democracy does not truly exist. However, a belief in the legitimacy of procedural democracy, and an acceptance of the limitations of political Islam allows one to view this hybrid system as a tool for modernization and development in the Muslim world.
REFERENCE LIST


THE EFFECT OF CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ON INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHINA

Stephanie Galbraith

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has increased drastically in the past two decades from 464 million to 18.5 billion dollars. This study examines how Chinese FDI into SSA influences individual attitudes towards China. I run statistical regressions of data from the PEW Global Attitudes Project survey and bilateral FDI stocks in ten nations across SSA in 2007 and 2013. I find that individuals who perceive China as having “a great deal” of influence on their country were nine times more likely to have a “very favorable” view of China than a “very unfavorable” view.

INTRODUCTION

As Chinese influence in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) becomes more apparent, individuals in the region express conflicting attitudes about the impact they believe China is having on their country. Some see Chinese influence as harmful to their country, while others believe it will bring economic benefits that outweigh any negative impacts. In October 2018, The New York Times quoted David Kinyua, a manager of an industrial park in Kenya, as saying “[the Chinese] are the ones with the capital, but as much as we want their money, we don’t want them to treat us like we are not human in our own country.” Only a few months later, CNN quoted a Kenyan student with a much more favorable attitude towards China: “I chose to learn Chinese first because... I would want to travel and do business in China.” These cases demonstrate both opposition to and support for Chinese influence within SSA. This contentious debate is especially apparent when considering the impacts of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region as it has resulted in more visible economic impacts in recipient countries, and few attempts have been made to systematically study its effect on individual attitudes in SSA.

Chinese stocks of FDI in SSA have increased in the past two decades from $464 million in 2005 to $18.5 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD 2014). In comparison, US stocks of FDI in SSA over the same time period increased from $10.3 billion in 2005 to $30.9 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD 2014). However, unlike US FDI, which is typically privately owned, the Chinese government is actively involved in and the owner of much of the Chinese FDI in SSA. To begin, many of the Chinese enterprises investing in SSA are state-owned (Pigato and Tang 2015). Additionally, the Chinese government promotes FDI from privately-owned, Chinese enterprises. In 2006, China began the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation Summit (FOCAC), which drove the increase in FDI into SSA that began at the time (UNCTAD 2014). Wang and Elliot identify how, as a result of the intentions set by FOCAC, “the Chinese government actively finances, encourages and organizes Chinese business ventures into Africa” even

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when the businesses are not state-owned (2014, 1016). Consequently, Chinese FDI into SSA has political motives and consequences, such as increasing Chinese soft power in the region, distinctive from FDI that originates in other countries (Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2012). Since individual attitudes towards a foreign nation can be used to measure the strength of that nation’s soft power, it is important to determine how Chinese FDI affects individual attitudes in SSA in order to understand the influence China has gained in the region.

In addition to measuring soft power, understanding how Chinese FDI affects individual attitudes towards China is valuable as voter preferences affect government policy, and individual attitudes determine the internal stability of a recipient country. Despite these widespread implications, FDI into SSA has not been given significant attention in studies on FDI preferences because it has historically received a small percentage of global flows of FDI. As the earlier quotes from Kenyans demonstrate, this absence of systematic studies results in ambiguity surrounding individual attitudes in SSA towards China. My study will fill this gap by examining individual attitudes towards China and how these attitudes are affected by changing Chinese influence in the region as represented by FDI. This will provide important insight into the strength of China’s soft power in SSA. If China can become the most favorably viewed foreign country in SSA by increasing its FDI in the region, then it can quickly become the dominant power across the globe supplanting Western powers that have long held that position.

Upon assessing the determinants of individual attitudes towards China in SSA, I argue that individual attitudes are more likely to be influenced by the publicized economic improvements resulting from Chinese investment rather than any less visible social or environmental injustices that result from the investment. Therefore, as Chinese FDI increases in a country, individuals in that country should have more favorable attitudes towards China. To test this argument, I run a statistical regression of data from the PEW Global Attitudes survey and bilateral FDI stocks in ten nations across SSA in 2007 and 2013. As predicted, Chinese FDI has a significant effect on individual attitudes towards China: as Chinese FDI increases, individuals view China more favorably. Additionally, the level of influence an individual perceives China to have in their country is also a significant predictor of how favorably that individual views China. These findings, when combined with how the media in SSA publicizes the benefits of Chinese FDI (Wu 2012; Skjerdal and Gusu 2016), support the burgeoning work on the sociotropic determinants of attitudes towards globalization (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). In this instance, individuals will develop their attitude towards China based on their sociotropic perception of Chinese FDI—how Chinese investment is helping or harming their country as a whole.

Existing studies have determined key individual-level variables that influence

1 Moyo (2009) suggests widespread corruption, large bureaucracies, and a lack of infrastructure in the region as reasons that more FDI is not directed to SSA, even with its low cost of labor.
attitudes on FDI to include education and skill level (Pandaya 2010; Kaya and Walker 2012). Other studies have also completed country-level analyses on the benefits and costs of Chinese investment in SSA (Moyo 2009; Pigato and Tang 2015). However, limited studies focus on individual attitudes towards Chinese FDI in SSA (Hanusch 2012; Rebol 2010). This research concludes that individuals in SSA tend to have positive attitudes towards China, but there is no consensus on the factors that influence these attitudes. My study investigates the intersection of individual attitudes on FDI and Chinese investment in SSA to determine the influence of Chinese FDI on individual attitudes.

**Literature Review**

Chinese FDI is linked to many visible economic activities in SSA, including new infrastructure and an influx of Chinese workers in the region (Adisu, Sharkey, and Okoroafo 2010). Individuals in the region likely determine the magnitude of Chinese influence in their country through these conspicuous impacts of FDI. Therefore, individual attitudes towards China in SSA, the focus of my study, may have similar determinants as those identified by a small group of existing studies on individual attitudes towards FDI in general. Kaya and Walker (2012) find that individuals with higher levels of education have a more positive view of FDI and multinational corporations, viewing them as a positive influence on local businesses. Pandaya (2010) determines that higher skilled workers are more likely to view FDI as beneficial. However, the applicability of these studies on FDI in SSA may be limited. Kaya and Walker (2012) include over thirty countries in their data set, with South Africa being the only country in SSA. Pandaya (2010) focused exclusively on countries in Latin America.

Limited research exists on individuals’ attitudes towards Chinese FDI in SSA. Rebol (2010) reviews multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative data and concludes that individuals in SSA generally have favorable attitudes towards China. Hanusch (2012) concludes, based on the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, that these favorable attitudes stem more from trade with China than FDI from China. However, Rebol (2010) is less quick to dismiss the explanatory power of Chinese FDI, arguing that FDI captures the large infrastructure projects being undertaken by the Chinese in SSA, an important determinant of individual attitudes. Rebol (2010) argues that these projects are both a catalyst for further economic development and a fulfillment of unrealized promises for infrastructure by colonial powers and the country’s own government.

Rebol (2010) and Hanusch (2012) use surveys conducted in 2008 to reach their conclusions. However, Chinese FDI in SSA began to skyrocket at this time from $6.5 billion in 2008 to $18.5 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD 2014). This increase has made the impacts of Chinese FDI more apparent to residents and garnered coverage in national media, both of which may have caused individual attitudes towards China to change. Therefore, my study closes a gap by examining Chinese FDI in SSA from the perspective of previous studies on FDI preferences in other regions while also con-
sidering the new developments in Chinese–African relations in the past decade.

**ARGUMENT**

Building on these studies, I argue that the economic improvements resulting from Chinese FDI are more likely to be publicized than any negative impacts and will be influential in shaping individual attitudes towards China because of the importance of sociotropic determinants in FDI preferences. Therefore, as Chinese FDI increases in a country, individuals in that country should have more favorable attitudes towards China.

Studies have found that sociotropic factors are influential when determining individual perceptions of globalization.² Mansfield and Mutz (2009) concluded that, in the US, attitudes towards trade are formed by perceptions of how the nation as a whole is affected rather than how trade personally influences the individual. Therefore, the visible effects of FDI on an individual’s country, and whether they are positive or negative, are expected to be influential determinants of individual attitudes towards China in SSA.

Macro-level studies of Chinese FDI in SSA determine that Chinese FDI does have positive economic benefits for the region through job creation and economic growth (Moyo 2009; Pigato and Tang 2015). However, Moyo (2009) also identifies the negative externalities of Chinese FDI to include human rights violations and environmental damage. While both the positive and negative impacts described here are possible sociotropic determinants, I argue that individual attitudes on China should be primarily influenced by the positive economic improvements because they are more publicized than any negative social or environmental injustices. Skjerdal and Gusu (2016) found that Ethiopian newspapers tended to show Chinese involvement in the country as favorable. Even when being critical, these newspapers did not discuss any relevant human rights issues. Similarly, Wu (2012, 5) finds that as a part of “the [Chinese] leadership’s emphasis on soft power… Chinese broadcasting is finding a new voice in Africa.” If the aim of Chinese-backed media is to increase the country’s soft power, the presence of this media in SSA will increase the general public’s awareness of the benefits of Chinese investment. In their study on the importance of sociotropic determinants on individual attitudes towards globalization, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) found media to be one of the main factors that influence national perceptions and the resulting individual attitudes. In the context of Chinese influence in SSA, Rebol (2010, 179) concurs with this assessment, stating that “opinions of China are mainly formed on national levels through media.”

Additionally, Wang & Elliot (2014, 1018) explain that individuals in SSA view China “as a non-confrontational political and ideological partner, in sharp contrast to the old Western relations.” Given the importance of sociotropic determinants, individuals in SSA may prefer Chinese investment to other international sources be-

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² Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 432) define sociotropic determinants as those that “[rely] on collective-level information rather than personal experience.”
cause of similarities between their national identity and China, even if they would derive greater personal benefit from other sources. Therefore, since the economic improvements derived from Chinese FDI are publicized at a national level, individuals will see China as a positive influence in their country, and any negative effects they experience themselves or witness happening to others are anomalous. Furthermore, Chinese influence is portrayed as a departure from traditional colonialism and, thus, beneficial for countries in SSA. Consequently, as Chinese FDI increases in a country, these sociotropic factors will cause individuals in that country to have more favorable attitudes towards China.

**Empirical Findings**

**Data**

To test the hypothesis and assess the determinants of attitudes towards China in SSA, I employ data from the 2007 and 2013 PEW Global Attitudes surveys. In 2007, 13,004 respondents were surveyed in SSA in the countries of Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In 2013, 5,043 respondents were surveyed in the countries of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. PEW Global Attitudes conducts interviews either on the telephone or face-to-face. Nationally representative samples of the adult population were used for all countries except for South Africa and the Ivory Coast in 2007, where urban populations were over represented. PEW Global Attitudes ascribes a margin of error ranging from 3% to 5%, depending on the country and the year.

The dependent variable is an individual’s opinion of China in the PEW Global Attitudes survey. This variable is operationalized as: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of China?” The dependent variable measures how favorable of an opinion of China an individual has on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is very unfavorable and 4 is very favorable. Therefore, higher values of the dependent variable are associated with more positive attitudes toward China.

The first independent variable of interest is Chinese FDI into the country where the individual resides. Data on Chinese FDI into SSA was taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which provides data on stocks and flows of FDI organized by the host country and recipient country in US dollars. This data is available from 2003 to 2012 for Chinese FDI in most countries in SSA. UNCTAD gathers data from national sources, which could be associated with an underestimation of Chinese FDI (Pigato and Tang 2015). I used FDI stocks rather than FDI flows, as this variable aims to capture Chinese influence in a country. This influence may be significant even if no new investment, the only investment captured by FDI flows, occurs in a given year. Additionally, the value of Chinese FDI is divided by the recipient country’s GDP to control for the different size economies within SSA. This variable is a proxy for the actual influence that China has in a country, compared to the amount of influence an individual in that country believes China to have.
The second independent variable of interest is how much influence an individual perceives China to have on their country. This variable is based on the following PEW Global Attitudes survey question: “How much influence do you think China is having on the way things are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all?” This variable is measured on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is an individual who believes China has “no influence at all” on their country, and 4 is an individual who believes China has “a great deal of influence” on their country. Therefore, the higher the value of this independent variable, the more influence an individual perceives China to have on their country. This variable measures perceived influence, but when considering individual attitudes, perceived influence functions as the actual influence of China for that individual. Additionally, this variable is a sociotropic measure of Chinese influence since it specifically asks about how an individual believes China is influencing their country rather than their own life.

Individual-level control variables are age, gender, wealth, education, opinion of the US, and view of the economic situation in their country. Pandaya (2010) and Kaya and Walker (2012) identify education and wealth as key determinants of individual attitudes on FDI. Additionally, following Hanusch’s (2010) findings, I included variables representing the opinion of the US, view of the economic situation in one’s country, and imports from China. At the country-level, I control for GDP per capita. A country’s level of democracy was highly correlated with GDP per capita (r=.719), so it was omitted from the regression, although results also held when the measure of democracy was substituted for GDP per capita. I considered GDP per capita and a country’s level of democracy as control variables based on Kaya and Walker (2012), who found the political and economic circumstances of a country to be significant. Country-level data is taken from the United Nations Statistics Division (2017), UNSD Comtrade (2017), the World Bank (2017), and the Economist Intelligence Unit (Kekic 2007). With the omission of the measure of democracy, there is no multicollinearity between independent variables. For a list of all variables, their sources, and possible values, see the appendix.

**Trends**

Regardless of how much influence China had in their country or how much influence they perceived it to have, 79.3% of respondents had either a “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” view of China. This aligns with previous studies (Hanusch 2012; Rebol 2010) on individual attitudes towards China in SSA, which found that the majority of individuals in this region view China favorably. However, as shown in Figure 1, there is no clear positive or negative trend in the relationship between FDI stocks from China in a country divided by the country’s GDP and individual attitudes. This counters my hypothesis, as it suggests that FDI stocks from China in a country may not influence individual attitudes towards China in that country.
In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 reveals a positive relationship between an individual’s perceived influence of China on their country and the individual’s favorable opinion of China. Therefore, the more influence an individual believes that China has on their country, the more favorably they will view China. The discrepancy between perceived influence, which has a positive relationship with individual attitudes, and actual influence through FDI stocks, which has no clear relationship, is further demonstrated through the low correlation between the two variables (r=.010). As a result, while Figure 1 counters my hypothesis, Figure 2 demonstrates a link between the influence of China and individual attitudes towards China. This suggests that the actual amount of FDI is less important than an individuals’ awareness of Chinese investment in their country.
Figure 1

Existing studies on individual attitudes towards FDI identify an individual’s level of education as an important determinant of individual preferences for FDI. Kaya and Walker (2012) found that individuals with more education view FDI more favorably. Diverging from this conclusion, Figure 3 shows that individuals in SSA with higher levels of education tend to have less favorable opinions of China than their peers with lower levels of education, but perceive China to have the same amount of influence. One possible explanation for this divergence is the difference in dependent variables. Here, the dependent variable does not directly ask about FDI, but instead asks for opinions on a specific country that is known for high levels of FDI. Therefore, while education may still influence preferences for FDI in SSA, higher levels of education may make an individual more aware of the negative aspects of Chinese influence, such as social and environmental injustices, leading to a decreased preference for Chinese FDI.
Based on Hanusch (2012), who found a significant, positive relationship between an individual’s attitude towards China and their attitude towards other international investors, I included an individual’s attitude towards the US as a likely determinant of an individual attitudes towards China. Figure 4 shows that individuals with a more favorable opinion of the US also have a more favorable opinion of China when compared to their peers who perceive China’s influence on their country similarly. This trend is consistent with Hanusch (2012), as it suggests a positive relationship between individual attitudes towards the US and attitudes towards China. In contrast, some studies argue that individuals support China because they do not like the US and former colonial powers investing in their countries (Wang and Elliot 2014). The trend in Figure 4 suggests this dichotomy between the US and China is not a reality in SSA.
**Empirical Test: Ordered Logit Regression**

In order to test my hypothesis, I ran a statistical regression of the data described. An ordered logit regression is used because the dependent variable is on an ordinal scale. The ordered logit estimation is given by this equation:

\[
Favorable\text{Opinion of China}_i = \alpha_i + \beta_1 FDI\text{Stocks from China} + \\
\beta_2 \text{Perceived Influence of China}_i + \beta_3 \text{Age}_i + \beta_4 \text{Gender}_i + \beta_5 \text{Education}_i + \beta_6 \text{Wealth}_i + \\
\beta_7 \text{Economy}_i + \beta_8 \text{Favorable Opinion of US}_i + \beta_9 \text{GDP per Capita}_i + \\
\beta_{10} \text{Imports from China}_i + \epsilon_i
\]

The ordinal logit estimation in Table 1 reinforces the trends seen in the previous graphs. An individual’s perceived influence of China is positively related to their favorable opinion of China. This relationship is statistically significant. There is also a positive, statistically significant relationship between FDI stocks from China and favorable opinion of China.
Consistent with Hanusch (2012), Pandaya (2010), and Kaya and Walker (2012), males have a more favorable opinion of China than females. Also consistent with the aforementioned studies, age is statistically insignificant. Wealth did not have a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards China, which is accordant with Kaya and Walker (2012). As seen in the model created by Hanusch (2012), imports from China negatively affect individual attitudes towards China, while good economic performance of an individual’s country positively affects their attitude towards China.

Using the ordered logit regression, I found the predicted probabilities of an individual having a favorable or unfavorable opinion of China, given their perceived influence of China. Figure 5 shows the probability of a favorable opinion, and Figure 6 shows the probability of an unfavorable opinion. As hypothesized, individuals who perceive China as having “a great deal” of influence on their country were nine times more likely to have a “very favorable” opinion of China than a “very unfavorable” opinion. These graphs reinforce the conclusion that an individual’s perception of Chi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Ordered Logit Estimation of Favorable Opinion of China</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FDI stocks from China</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived influence of China</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Wealth</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Favorable opinion of US</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imports from China</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R-Square = .156</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard errors in parentheses</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chinese influence in their country has a statistically significant effect on how favorably they view China.

**Figure 5**

![Graph showing probability of favorable view of China given perceived influence of China.]

While the actual amount of influence, as measured by FDI stocks from China, is also statistically significant, these two measures must not be equated as they have a low correlation ($r=.010$). This low correlation suggests the importance of media in determining individual attitudes since this affects how an individual perceives Chinese influence, thus, causing it to differ from the actual influence China exerts. Wu (2012) describes this considerable presence of Chinese-backed media in SSA. Furthermore, even independent media in the region tends to highlight the benefits of Chinese FDI over the negative impacts (Skjerdal and Gusu 2016). Therefore, since sociotropic determinants shape individual attitudes towards international issues such as trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009), the positive portrayals of Chinese FDI in the media will be influential in determining individual attitudes towards China in SSA. This is consistent with my findings that individuals tend to have a favorable attitude towards Chinese influence in their country, despite the negative impact of Chinese investment on human rights and the environment.

**CONCLUSION**

While Chinese FDI into SSA has increased substantially since 2005, there is no consensus about individual attitudes towards Chinese investment in the region. Macro-level studies tend to focus on the negative social and environmental effects of Chi-
nese investment in SSA, but survey data shows that individuals in SSA generally view China favorably. My empirical findings confirm that individuals in SSA have positive attitudes towards China. I argue that these attitudes stem more from the publicized benefits of Chinese FDI for a country than any injustices individuals experience because of the importance of sociotropic determinants and the role of media in publicizing benefits. Chinese-backed media and local media that favors China focus on promoting the benefits of Chinese FDI in a country to the masses. This plays a greater role in determining individual attitudes than the negative impacts that individuals personally experience do. Media also likely causes the discrepancy between the actual magnitude of Chinese influence as measured by FDI and the influence an individual perceives China to have because the media emphasizes the benefits of Chinese influence. Therefore, this is not simply a gap in magnitude between perceived influence and actual influence but a divergence in what positive and negative impacts are attributed to Chinese FDI in the minds of individuals in SSA.

These findings have consequences that are relevant to the global political economy as China and the US compete for influence worldwide and especially in SSA. I conclude that individuals who see China as having a significant influence on their country are nine times more likely to have a favorable opinion of China than an unfavorable one. Therefore, China is growing its soft power in SSA through not only large amounts of FDI but also a concerted effort to publicize the benefits of this investment to the population in the region. Currently, individuals in SSA view both the US and China favorably. However, if Chinese FDI and concomitant Chinese-backed media can alter this equilibrium so that individuals view Chinese influence more favorably than US influence, this will tip the balance of power in the global political economy to benefit China. To better understand China’s growing soft power in SSA and the role of FDI in this development, further studies should determine how this relationship varies between countries, as well as examining actions by China, in addition to the use of media outlets, that can account for the discrepancy between perceived and actual Chinese influence.


## APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Values</th>
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</table>
| Favorable opinion of China (Dependent variable) | "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of c. China?"
PEW Global Attitudes Q16c in 2007 and Q9c in 2013 | 1: Very unfavorable
2: Somewhat unfavorable
3: Somewhat favorable
4: Very favorable |
| FDI stocks from China (First independent variable of interest) | FDI stocks from China from UNCTAD - Country's GDP (purchasing power parity, current international dollars) from World Development Indicators | FDI stocks from China divided by the country's GDP in that year |
| Perceived influence of China (Second independent variable of interest) | "How much influence do you think China is having on the way things are going in our country? Would you say it is having a great deal of influence, a fair amount, not too much, or no influence at all?"
PEW Global Attitudes Q84 in 2007 and Q79 in 2013 | 1: No influence at all
2: Not too much
3: A fair amount
4: A great deal of influence |
| Age                                           | How old were you at your last birthday?
PEW Global Attitudes Q108 in 2007 and Q165 in 2013 | |
| Gender                                        | PEW Global Attitudes Q107 in 2007 and Q164 in 2013 | 1: Male
2: Female |
| Education                                     | PEW Global Attitudes Q118 in 2007 and Q180 in 2013 | 0: Less than secondary school
1: Some secondary school or more |
| Wealth                                        | "Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money a. to buy food your family needed? b. to pay for medical and health care your family needed?"
PEW Global Attitudes Q121 a and b in 2007 and Q182 a and b in 2013 | Range from 2 to 4 where 4 is the wealthier individual |
| Economy                                       | "Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation in (survey country) – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?"
PEW Global Attitudes Q11 in 2007 and Q4 in 2013 | 1: Very bad
2: Somewhat bad
3: Somewhat good
4: Very good |
| Favorable Opinion of US                       | "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of c. the United States?"
PEW Global Attitudes Q16a in 2007 and Q9a in 2013 | 1: Very unfavorable
2: Somewhat unfavorable
3: Somewhat favorable
4: Very favorable |
| GDP per capita                                | Per capita GDP at current prices - US dollars from United Nations Statistics Division |
| Democracy index                               | Democracy index from the Economist Intelligence Unit | Scale of 1 (authoritarian regime) to 10 (full democracy) |
| Imports from China                            | Imports from China as a percent of all imports from UN Comtrade | Between 0 and 1 |
“Cut Obama Some Slack?” Political Slack and the Determination of Foreign Policy

Shira Hornstein

It is easy to assume that US presidents’ foreign policy behavior follows a partisan trendline marked by distinctly “Republican” or “Democratic” policies. This paper, however, questions that assumption through an analysis of Obama’s foreign policy in the context of the structure of international system. A close examination of “war-inheriting” presidents, Nixon and Obama, versus “war-initiating” presidents, Johnson and Bush Jr, reveals that the structure of the international system and corresponding “slack” available to each president due to the United State’s involvement or lack thereof in foreign wars may be a better indicator of a president’s foreign policy grand strategy than political party affiliation. Therefore, Obama’s lack of geopolitical and domestic slack as a result of the wars in the Middle East can explain his realist and constrained foreign policy, which did not, in many ways, align with the ideals of the Democratic Party.

Partisan politics have dominated every aspect of the American political climate, polarizing the public, policies, and ideologies. Though politicians and the public squabble over the importance of having a president on “their” side of the divide, a president’s foreign policy outcomes have much less to do with their political affiliation than what meets the eye. Instead, the structure and constraints of the global system presidents inherit—whether in a state of war or peace, recession or prosperity, activism or isolationism—dictates their foreign policy grand strategy. Thus, I will argue that the pattern of foreign policy decision-making behavior does not follow a partisan trendline dictated by presidents’ party affiliation, but follows a pattern of situational flexibility dictated by the degree of “political slack” possessed by each president. As the state of war is a great determinant of slack, I will compare the policies of war-inheriting presidents, Nixon and Obama, to those of war-initiating presidents, Johnson and Bush, in order to elucidate how an examination of slack provides a better explanation of policy than party affiliation. In this vein, Obama, a president incredibly constrained by the inheritance of a destructive war in the Middle East and a resulting lack of political slack, was forced to conduct a conservative, “realist” foreign policy largely aimed at exiting and minimizing the damages of war.

From the onset of his presidency, Obama was left with little “slack” to determine his own grand strategy due to the international constraints of a foreign conflict combined with the American public’s exhaustion from war. According to Peter Trubowitz, “leaders have little geopolitical slack when… security is scarce and their state is exposed and vulnerable to foreign intimidation and aggression” (Trubowitz 2011, 19). Obama, therefore, had little geopolitical slack as the US faced the security threat of antagonistic non-state actors in the Middle East. Furthermore, the US

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was confronted by complicated relationships with “allies” like Pakistan who harbored terrorists. Additionally, on the domestic front, Obama faced a public tired of war. Fearing Afghanistan would become “his Vietnam,” Obama knew that he needed to initiate a strategy to win—or at least exit—the war. Stephen Sestanovich, an expert on presidential foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, simply noted: “If you come into office in the middle of a war that is not going well, you’re convinced that the American people have hired you to do less” (Goldberg 2016). Not only was Obama constrained by the complications of a messy war, but also he was constrained by the reality that he was elected with the expectation that he would exit the Middle East.

In light of these constraints, Obama formulated a calculated foreign policy which focused on winning in Afghanistan. First, Obama employed a counterinsurgency program in Afghanistan with the addition of 17,000 troops (Sanger 2013, 18). With this, Obama aimed to stabilize the region by nation-building. In many ways, this approach was in line with his ideals of “promoting values like democracy and human rights and norms and values” (Goldberg 2016). Obama, however, quickly realized that this approach was costly, ineffective, and ultimately infeasible. Instead, Obama turned to further troop escalation in hopes of accelerating an end to the conflict. Thus, Obama’s ideological optimism in the success of Afghanistan as an independent democracy began to wither and a new vision for Afghanistan began to take shape: “Afghan good enough” (Sanger 2013).

With this shift, Obama pivoted away from the typical liberal internationalism associated with his Democratic Party and shifted towards a realist, Jacksonian approach which prioritized American security and minimized cost. In 2010, the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, declared that Afghan National Security forces would lead the country independently of international support. Obama saw Karzai’s declaration as an opportunity to exit Afghanistan (somewhat) honorably. Thus, Obama’s strategy in the Middle East became “escalate and exit” (Sanger 2013, 28). Instead of working towards ensuring a successful, democratic Afghanistan, troops would only “conduct basic training, mentoring, and kill-or-capture operations. They would not be there to win hearts and minds. They would not be there to build schools or roads or clinics.” (Sanger 2013, 46). Karzai’s eagerness to regain control of his country gave Obama a way out. Prioritizing a swift yet effective withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, Obama stated: “My goal… is to make sure that by 2014 we have transitioned, Afghans are in the lead, and it is a goal to make sure we are not still engaged in combat operations of the sort we are involved in now” (Sanger 2013, 46). Obama’s willingness to prioritize American withdrawal over the ultimate success of the nation-building mission in Afghanistan demonstrates that the burden of war constrained Obama’s ability to carry out his own foreign policy ideals and priorities; without political slack, Obama was forced to opt for the “least costly” option, exit. Thus, during the Obama administration, Operation Enduring Freedom became “Afghan Good Enough.”

From his experience dealing with the War in Afghanistan, Obama came to
realize the hard truth that as president, he could not achieve all of his idealized goals. Obama admitted, “‘I suppose you could call me a realist in believing we can’t, at any given moment, relieve all the world’s misery’” (Goldberg 2016). Due to the inflexibility of the geopolitical climate he inherited, Obama focused less on promoting US values internationally, such as democratic nation-building, and prioritized a level of calculated restraint. He opted only to enter into new conflicts or commitments where he saw low-risk success as possible: “his strategy [made] eminent sense: Double down in those parts of the world where success is plausible, and limit America’s exposure to the rest” (Goldberg 2016). Throughout his second term, Obama turned away from messy conflicts, despite even contradicting prior US liberal ideas: he avoided confrontation with Russia in Crimea, failed in a humanitarian intervention in Libya, and neglected to act on his “red line” in Syria. As Obama felt that “the Pentagon had ‘jammed’ him on a troop surge for Afghanistan,” he did not want to be “jammed” into a conflict in Syria too (Goldberg 2016). Having learned the lessons of a costly war, Obama declined to act on his strong declaration against Assad’s use of chemical weapons and instead elected for a diplomatic approach via Russia. He decided that avoiding the potential for another war outweighed the possibility of providing humanitarian intervention (Goldberg 2016). Though Obama faced criticism for this decision, the American public was still recovering from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama acted similarly in Libya, abandoning humanitarian initiatives when intervention became messy.

Though Obama tried to avoid another fixation on the Middle East, Middle Eastern policy dominated his foreign policy agenda. From the beginning of his presidency, Obama wanted to “pivot to Asia,” as he felt that taking a part in China’s rise was a key aspect of securing economic and technological security in the future (Goldberg 2016). Even as Obama tried to exit the Middle East, fears of a rising ISIS came to occupy his presidency and “the president [got] frustrated that terrorism [kept] swamping his larger agenda, particularly as it relates to rebalancing America’s global priorities” (Goldberg 2016). Ultimately, throughout his presidency, Obama was unable to escape entanglement in Middle Eastern politics. Although Obama was focused on exiting Afghanistan, he held a continued presence there during both his terms. At the start of his tenure, Obama inherited a messy war which fundamentally constrained his decision-making flexibility and subsequently his grand strategy. Obama did not determine his strategy based on his own belief system nor that of his own party, but conducted a pragmatic, “realist” strategy based on his experiences and constraints as a wartime president, giving rise to his self-proclaimed doctrine: “don’t do stupid shit” (Goldberg 2016).

Like Obama, Nixon inherited a messy war. By the time Nixon took office, the American public was exhausted from the Vietnam War. Johnson’s Operation Rolling Thunder had been largely unsuccessful in its aim to shut down North Vietnamese aid of the Vietcong. Similarly to Obama, Nixon faced a reality in which the public desperately wanted to exit a war from which the US was not yet prepared to withdraw. As
a result, Nixon’s presidency became completely occupied with Vietnam and Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization took shape. Nixon saw the South Vietnamese Government as an opportunity for exit; if he could transition the US control of war back to the South Vietnamese he could exit appropriately—what he called “peace with honor.” However, the US could not simply leave Vietnam; the US needed to adopt a policy which would be conducive to a peace settlement. Nixon believed this meant showing US resolve by increasing its military operations in Vietnam in order to force the North Vietnamese to the negotiation table. Nixon escalated bombings in the North with “Operation Linebacker” and bombed North Vietnamese strongholds in Laos and Cambodia. This strategy appears analogous to Obama’s “escalate and exit.” Then, Kissinger and Nixon entered into peace talks with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. Ultimately, “the peace settlement enabled the United States to withdraw from the war... Neither of the Vietnamese parties abided by the settlement, however, and the war continued” (United States Department of State 2016) Nixon’s exit of Vietnam did not restore democratic peace, but did allow for swift American withdrawal from the conflict.

Obama’s foreign policy closely mirrors that of Nixon. As both inherited complex wars, Obama and Nixon alike were forced to conduct foreign policies focused foremost on ending wars they, themselves, did not start. Wartime therefore constrained both presidents’ abilities to determine their own foreign policy, as neither Obama nor Nixon could focus on other goals—for Nixon calming tensions with the Soviet Union and opening to China and for Obama “pivoting” to Asia—until the wars they inherited were resolved. With both a public and an economy suffering as a result of war, neither Obama nor Nixon had the flexibility to focus on other objectives. Even though Obama is a Democrat and Nixon was a Republican, their foreign policies converged due to similar geopolitical and domestic conditions. Both presidents exited their respective wars to please and appease the American public, rather than to enact policies “in line” with their respective parties or idealized foreign policy goals. Facing similar global conditions and domestic demands, Obama and Nixon ultimately conducted similar policies focused on exiting a costly war and limiting future US military commitments abroad.

I have argued above that a combination of domestic and international constraints governs a President’s foreign policy determination, explaining the similarities in foreign policy execution between Nixon and Obama despite a difference in political party. Just as war-inheriting presidents conduct similar foreign policies, war-initiating presidents do as well; war-initiating presidents must respond to a perceived external security (or even ideological) threat. In the following section, I will examine the policies of Johnson and Bush, who each respectively initiated the disastrous wars that Nixon and Obama inherited.

Unlike Nixon or Obama, Johnson operated under ample political slack. As a Cold War president, Johnson led under the constant, rumbling threat of the Soviet aggression and spreading Communism. However, this threat was unlike other his-
torical threats the US had faced prior to the Cold War. Most of the time, the Cold War threatened ideology rather than US security itself. Therefore, Johnson inherited a world which afforded him domestic slack fueled by consensus anti-communism combined with an international system that posed little direct security threat. Nevertheless, the threat of the spread of Communism was so potent that it had the power to determine the US foreign policy agenda and pattern of intervention: “During the Cold War, successive presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, so feared a domestic political backlash for ‘losing a country to communism’ that they attached value to places of little intrinsic geostrategic interest” (Trubowitz 2011, 18). In the midst of an election season, Johnson was at first unsure of how to handle Vietnam, hesitant to jeopardize his election. Fortunately for Johnson, the Tonkin Gulf Incident provided an “accidental opportunity” for Johnson to harness support for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and US entrance into Vietnam (Goldstein 99). The Tonkin Gulf Incident signaled a “crisis” in Vietnam, which provided Johnson with even further domestic slack to respond.

Therefore, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution afforded Johnson great flexibility to determine his foreign policy in regard to Vietnam; Johnson held both the authorization from his government, (with a democratic majority in both the House and Senate), and the steadily increasing support of the American public to engage militarily in Vietnam. Johnson so feared losing Vietnam to Communism that he eventually escalated the US intervention to war, abusing the ambiguity of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution: Johnson initiated the three-year bombing campaign known Operation Rolling Thunder and sent in Marines to mainland Vietnam. In doing so, Johnson was the first President to escalate the situation in Vietnam to a full-scale war. In the Vietnam War, it became clear that Johnson was far more concerned about maintaining the independence of South Vietnam than the reality that a war in Vietnam would be long and costly: “‘LBJ isn’t deeply concerned about who governs Laos, or who governs South Vietnam—he’s deeply concerned with what the average American voter is going to think about how he did in the ball game of the Cold War’” (Goldstein 2008, 98). Despite the fact that intervention in Vietnam was arguably unimportant to US vital interests and security, a combination of the Cold War geopolitical and ideological situation and domestic flexibility gave Johnson the running room to engage in military intervention in Vietnam. Thus, as Johnson was an unconstrained President, he was able to choose a high level of involvement and aggressive approach to his foreign policy in Vietnam.

Like Johnson, George W. Bush was a war-initiating president. At the turn of the century, the US was unopposed as a unipolar power, affording the new president copious geopolitical slack: “On Bush’s watch as president, the United States faced no peer challenger. The threat of military attack against the United States by another power was low” (Trubowitz 2011, 20). Furthermore, with the September 11th attacks, the United States spiraled into a state of crisis. This provided Bush with the domestic support to act to punish the attackers; “when Americans believe their security
is threatened—real or perceived—they will back the use of force” (Western 2015, 354). This combination of national crisis and US unipolarity provided Bush with a “unassailable leadership position” to engage in an activist presidency (Trubowitz 2011, 100).

Harnessing his slack and popular support, Bush launched into war in Afghanistan to pursue the terrorists who attacked the US as well as the country that harbored them. Demonstrating the amount of political slack George W. Bush possessed, the war in Afghanistan, “Operation Enduring Freedom” was preventative. In fact, Bush’s “preemptive” action became known as the Bush Doctrine. Bush entered Afghanistan and then Iraq “because even defense may not be possible against terrorists or rogues, the United States must be ready to wage preventive wars and to act ‘against emerging threats before they are fully formed’ as Bush puts it” (Jervis 2003, 369). As an unconstrained president, Bush held the unusual ability to wage an offensive war. Bush’s expansionist and interventionist policy signaled an end to America’s Vietnam Syndrome and period of international military inaction. Similar to Johnson, Bush engaged in an aggressive foreign policy with seemingly little concern for the inevitable consequences. Bush escalated war while refusing to raise taxes, borrowing funds and creating a $10.6 trillion debt by the time Obama took office (Bump 2015). Bush then passed along the burden and incredible cost of his war onto the next president.

As war-initiating presidents, Johnson and Bush conducted similar approaches to foreign policy and similar reactions to their respective threats. Both Johnson and Bush took advantage of their unconstrained presidencies, launching into expensive full-scale wars, emboldened by publics which supported intervention. Thus, Johnson and Bush conducted foreign policies which took advantage of the international system they controlled and took expansionist stances against a foreign threat. Though Johnson and Bush differ in political party, they each instigated complex wars which were ultimately seen as unsuccessful and furthermore constrained their succeeding presidents. In this way, Johnson and Bush conducted convergent policies not due to similarities in ideology but due to similar domestic and international conditions which afforded them great flexibility in overreaching with aggressive, expansionist military policies.

In examining the foreign policy of war-initiating versus war-inheriting presidents, the lack or prevalence of domestic and international constraints provides a clearer picture of grand strategy than political party ties. President Obama conducted a “realist” foreign policy—which in many ways contradicted his own ideological beliefs—as a result of his acute lack of geopolitical and domestic slack. Extending this analysis to the Johnson, Nixon and Bush presidencies, it becomes clear that national and global constraints serve as the driving force behind foreign policy decision-making. Though party affiliation contributes much to a president’s domestic perception, the state of the international system and the America’s involvement or entrance into conflicts shapes America’s action abroad. In this way, presidents, regardless of political affiliation at home, devise grand strategies in response to situations in the internation-
al system and gage involvement based on their domestic and geopolitical slack. As a result, party affiliation does not unite the foreign policy grand strategies of presidents; instead, it is similarities in the international system which presidents inherit that determines the pattern of foreign policy involvement while allowing us to predict the pattern of grand strategy development in the future.
REFERENCE LIST


Interview with Dan Ikenson

Dan Ikenson is the director of the Cato Institute's Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies. Ikenson holds a MA in economics from George Washington University and is an authority on various aspects of trade policy that include US–China trade relations, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and manufacturing policy. In 2003, Ikenson co-authored the book Antidumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law. Prior to joining the Cato Institute in 2000, Ikenson worked in several areas of trade consulting and international accounting.

Dan Ikenson: I’m Dan Ikenson, I’m the director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.

World Outlook: Thank you so much for sitting down with World Outlook. We’re just going to go through a few questions to discuss you and your work and your thoughts on trade policy.

DI: Sounds good.

WO: So our first question is for you to describe your education and your early career. What was it like working in international trade consulting and what was it like looking at trade from the standpoint of international trade law and how is this perspective different from a policy perspective?

DI: Excellent questions. Well, I got into trade because my father was a trade lawyer. In fact, he still is practicing. He’s getting up there but still practicing. I was going to go to law school after undergrad and get a degree and work in the international trade area. So, I worked for my father’s firm the summer before I was supposed to go to law school which was the summer of 1989 or 1990. I found that I wasn’t really liking the legal aspects. I found the minutia to be a bit overwhelming, a bit tedious, and I ended up working with an economist who was hired by my father’s firm to work on a project on the anti-dumping law, which is an unfair trade law—maybe we can get into that a little bit later—but I really liked the economics of it. And over the course of the summer I decided not to go to law school and applied to grad school to get my master’s in economics. It turns out that after I got my master’s in economics, I got a job working for another law firm, a large law firm—my father’s firm was sort of a small boutique firm representing U.S. companies caught up in trade disputes that would file these cases—these unfair trade cases. I ended up working in law firms that represented the foreign companies and the importers and that is where I started to hone my understanding of the importance of free trade because we were defending companies that were accused of dumping and selling subsidized products in the United States, which is considered unfair. And I very much enjoyed it. There’s an economic aspect to
it, there’s a legal aspect, there’s a lot of logic, opportunities to write, to number crunch, to present findings.

And I really enjoyed that. After working in the law firm environment until the late 1990s I ended up working with a guy named Brink Lindsey at a law firm called Willkie, Farr & Gallagher. He left Willkie and started the trade center at Cato and he invited me to come join him to write a couple of papers on the anti-dumping law—one of the unfair trade laws—and to write a book with him about how the law works, how it doesn’t fulfill the purpose that its defenders say it’s intended for, how it’s unfair, how it actually hurts American companies and American consumers. So, we wrote a book about that and it was supposed to be a two-year project, beginning in 2000.

Here it is in 2019 and I’m still here, as is the anti-dumping law and the other unfair trade laws.

WO: So moving on from that you’ve just mentioned that you’ve been at Cato for a long time. How has your job changed since you first started, what do you do on a daily basis at Cato, and what sort of long-term projects has Cato allowed you to work on?

DI: Well, I’ve been here for 19 years. And at first I focused exclusively on the unfair trade laws—anti-dumping, countervailing duty—and then I was invited to stay because there was a sort of a copacetic relationship that had developed. I was interested in writing [on more issues] beyond the minutia of trade remedy laws, so focusing on manufacturing issues; US-China issues, just when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) back in 2001; I started focusing on the auto industry and some of the issues it has with protectionism; agricultural protectionism; trade agreements; [and] the World Trade Organization, which came into being in 1995 and started adjudicating cases that were brought in the early 2000s—I would read and evaluate the arguments in those cases and began writing about ways to reform the WTO. In 2001, a new round of multilateral negotiations was initiated. It was called the Doha round. Before the WTO was established in 1995 as the crowning achievement of the so-called Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986–1994), the global trading system was governed by a looser set of rules known as the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was established in 1947 by twenty-three original contracting parties. Over the ensuing 50 years or so, there were eight additional rounds—they call them rounds—of multilateral negotiations to reduce trade barriers further, to expand that liberalization to more products and services, and to include more countries. And in 2001, the Doha Round was launched. The Doha round was the first round to be launched that didn’t produce a favorable outcome. It ended in failure.

But during the Doha round there was a lot of opportunity to put forward ideas for
reforming trade rules. And we did a lot of that at Cato. I became the director of the trade center in 2011 and we’ve been covering the waterfront of trade policy issues ever since. We do trade law; we comment on trade deficits and try to address and refute the common myths about trade that Americans tend to believe—like the fallacy that the trade deficit means that we’re losing a trade, that trade is a zero sum game, that trade and globalization killed U.S. manufacturing, that outsourcing is bad for the economy, and that trade only benefits big corporations and the rich. These are all myths that underpin President Trump’s protectionist nationalism.

Trump is a major departure from previous administrations in that he sees trade as a zero-sum game and he doesn’t seem to recognize its importance in fostering good relations among nations. But Trump has changed the way we approach things here at Cato. It’s always been the case that at the beginning of the year I sit down with my staff—I have seven people that work in the Trade Center—and we will talk about our offensive agenda, things that we’re going to write about and work on regardless of the political environment. And then we also have what’s called the defensive agenda—responding to policy matters, to things that the White House does or that Congress does. Over the years, the offensive agenda has accounted for 60, 70 percent of our time and the defensive agenda 40 to 30 percent. It’s shifted quite a bit during the Trump era because he just defies all conventions. He is an unorthodox president who’s done a lot of things that we never expected a president to do. So, we’ve had to react a lot to point out the perils of protectionism that he’s flirting with and engaging in.

WO: When you talk about the myths that are so prevalent in the United States, I think would be worthwhile to kind of combat that. So why is trade so important to the United States and what would you say to those people who view trade as a zero-sum game?

DI: Well, trade is important. We all trade on a daily basis. I’m trading right now by focusing my productive efforts on being an economist—a trade policy analyst. If I had to spend all of my time making my own clothes and hunting and growing my own food, building and fixing my humble shelter, and concocting remedies for illnesses that might ail me, I would be pretty destitute. I’d spend all of my days toiling. But instead I specialize. So, I’m an economist and a trade policy analyst and I focus my efforts on those endeavors. My output is monetized in the form of a salary and I use that salary to purchase that I need or want, but cannot produce as efficiently. That is what trade is all about. We trade so that we can specialize, and we specialize so that we can produce more and we produce more so that we can consume more, and by consume more I mean consume and save more. So, the purpose of trade is really to consume more or higher quality goods and services. If we get rid of border barriers, get rid of all tariffs, there’s a larger market. And when you have a larger market, you can realize economies of scale more readily, you can tap into the supply chains that make your production processes more efficient. Trade is important just on its face.
you look at the demographics and the numbers, the United States represents five percent of the world’s population. That means that 95 percent of the world’s population lives outside of the United States. So, if U.S. companies are going to be able to avail themselves of the best inputs to their production, if they’re going to have access to the most lucrative markets, they need to be engaging in trade.

Ironically, the United States is the world’s largest trader. However, trade—as a share of our economy—is relatively small because the U.S. economy is so large and has been relatively self-sufficient over the years. If you add up our imports and exports and divide by our GDP, you get 27 percent. When you do that for China it’s 37 percent, so China is more dependent on trade. The world average is about 53 percent. Most countries in the world depend on trade much more than the United States does because we have this large internal market. But that said, the rest of the world is coming online. They’re getting richer. They’ve adopted better policies in many places. We need to stay engaged and right now we’re doing the exact opposite because the president sees trade as a zero-sum game. He has launched a trade war against China after pulling us out of something called the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a very large trade agreement involving twelve countries at the time. Now, we’re losing ground because many other countries around the world are entering trade agreements which lower barriers for their own companies and their own consumers. And we’re on the outside looking in. Others are moving ahead as we’re standing still [and] relatively we are falling behind in terms of creating new and better opportunities for our consumers and our businesses.

**WO:** It can’t all be doom and gloom. So, in our current system where do you see bipartisan agreement on trade policy if there is any?

**DI:** You know, there used to be bipartisan agreement. From the end of the Civil War until the early 1930s, the Republican Party was the party of protectionism. They represented big industrial interests in the Northeast, the tariff was considered the mother of the trust, and so Republicans were in favor of protecting US industry. Democrats were more the party of agrarian interests—it used to be primarily in the South—and they wanted access to foreign markets and recognized that if we had trade barriers that foreign governments would put up barriers to U.S. exports, as well. Democrats were the party of free trade. And Republicans were the party of protectionism.

Then in 1930 we had the Tariff Act of 1930, the infamous Smoot Hawley Tariff Act, which initiated this bout of tit for tat protectionism which sent the global economy into a tailspin and really contributed to prolonging and deepening the Great Depression. It was in 1934, four years after, when a Democratic Congress and a Democratic president passed something called the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act which made it easier for the United States to start liberalizing trade again. And it set the table for the mechanisms that led to the global trade rules: The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, GATT.

Democrats were by and large pro-trade from before the Civil War up until about 1994, around the time of the NAFTA vote. Republicans started to become more internationalist after the Second World War and so I would say from the mid 1940s until around the beginning of the Trump administration, Republicans became favorably disposed to free trade. Meanwhile, Democratic support for free trade started to dissipate in the early 90s, around the time the North American Free Trade Agreement became a real possibility. For around the past twenty-five years, there’s been a general absence of bipartisan support for trade. The Democrats, who count organized labor and environmental lobbies among their biggest political benefactors, soured on trade liberalization. Contrastingly, Republicans learned to embrace it.

That dichotomy seems to be in the process of changing, now. Trump, a Republican, is indulging in all sorts of protectionism. He’s making protectionism radioactive. He’s imposed tariffs on about 300 billion dollars of imports and foreign governments have retaliated with their own tariffs on about two hundred billion dollars of U.S. exports. Meanwhile, he withdrew the United States from a large and important trade agreement negotiated under the Obama administration called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The pain inflicted on the economy from Trump’s tariffs and the retaliation has so far been concentrated in certain regions, but generally muted by a strong economy that is pumped full of fiscal stimulus. But as the economy slows, I think the pain from the trade war is going to start to be felt more broadly, and I suspect Democrats will try to distance themselves from protectionism.

At that point I think we’re going to see the Democrats, at least forward-looking ones, recognizing that this is an opportunity to exploit: “Let’s move the Democratic Party back to the Center on trade by disassociating ourselves from protectionism—that’s Trump’s problem. We’re not Trump, we’re in favor of trade.” I see the potential for the flip to happen again. However, there is one area where there’s been bipartisanship over the past few years and that is with respect to China. Trump’s trade war on China—as discomfobulated and as poorly thought out as the strategy has been, I think—precedes Trump, predates Trump, and has broad bipartisan appeal.

This really started around the Great Recession when people in the Obama administration, in Congress, and in the intelligence community started worrying about China’s rise and its objective of leapfrogging the United States to the technological fore. This has been building and building and I think had Hillary Clinton won the election in 2016 we would have found ourselves in a trade war of some sort with China; we’d be holding their feet to the fire probably in a different way—[we] probably would’ve brought complaints about China’s practices to the WTO with our trade allies instead of pursuing a trade war unilaterally. But when Trump is gone, I think that there will
still be bipartisan consensus that China’s practices need to be disciplined. The tone and tenor of the policies might be different, but I’d say there’s bipartisanship support for doing something to rein in China’s offensive practices.

WO: Would you mind talking more about our specific problem with China?

DI: Sure. So, China’s a miracle really. It was a destitute country when Nixon went to China in the early 1970s and even when formal relations were restored in 1979. China was reeling from a couple of decades of really onerous, tragic policies and trade and cross-border investment was minuscule. And after beginning to embrace market reforms in the late 70s, China started to grow at a faster clip. And then we had the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and the George H.W. Bush administration was sort of handwringing about what to do: should we isolate China? should we turn our backs on China since they’re these autocratic rogues? should we engage with China? And I think it was a lot of concern that if the US moved to isolate China and didn’t engage in trade with it that the Brits, Germans, and French would move in and take advantage of the opportunities there. The US came to the conclusion that—for those reasons and other—we should continue to engage with China. And I think maybe ex-post it was justified as, “If we engage more with China, they’ll become more like us. Once they get the economic liberties, the civil and political liberties will follow, and they’ll be more like us and that’ll be a good thing.” Well the fact that China was engaged and permitted to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 is a great thing. I mean we’re talking about one fifth of humanity, we’re talking about hundreds of millions of people having been lifted out of poverty.

The world is a better place because China is a middle-income country now. China joined the WTO in 2001 and there were a lot of interests, particularly import competing interests in the United States—labor unions, the steel industry—who didn’t think it was a good idea and wanted us to crack down on China and hold their feet to the fire. But during the George W. Bush administration, the first five or six years of China’s membership in the WTO, the US didn’t really bring any cases against China at the WTO. What I mean by that is China agreed to all sorts of reforms and it had to engage in all sorts of reforms to qualify to join the WTO. And the George W. Bush administration wanted a sort of honeymoon period, rather than to press China too hard.

Well then the WTO cases started to come in the second Bush term and then they really picked up in the Obama years because people started saying, “Look we’ve been complaining about this for years, nothing’s been done about it; the Chinese need to do a better job of fulfilling their commitments.” And there seemed to be this kind of Groundhog Day situation where U.S. interests would complain about certain Chinese practices that would be brought to the attention of the Chinese authorities. The Chinese would say “OK we’re going to do something about this.” And then they never
would. And so, there are a couple of sets of issues.

One is that China has yet to fully comply with the obligations it committed to when it joined the WTO. It needs to liberalize more and discriminate against imports and foreign investment less. We do have some legitimate complaints and those legitimate complaints should be brought to the World Trade Organization to adjudicate there rather than having ourselves act in a vigilante manner and prosecute a trade war unilaterally.

Outside of these strictly trade-oriented issues is the emergence of national security concerns, cybersecurity concerns. These started to manifest themselves in the mid 2000s. It became evident to US policymakers that the Chinese were intent on doing whatever it takes to get to the technological forefront; to borrow Western technology, and to grant favors to companies that registered their technology in China; to compel Western companies to turn over their technology to the Chinese when they joint ventured and then it became a major priority of the national security and intelligence communities that some of the big companies in China, beneficiaries of their technological and industrial policies, companies like Huawei, pose a national security threat because they have access—if they’re going to be building out the world’s 5G networks and even adding components to the 4G networks—they will have access to information that the US government wouldn’t want the Chinese government to have.

There’s been this nexus, or this connection, made between Huawei and the Chinese government. I don’t know how true it is, there have been a lot of allegations and I’m sure Huawei presents some sort of a threat but the perceptions of that threat have been really politicized to the point where now we are talking about totally banning any kind of commerce between US companies and Huawei. So, US companies won’t be able to sell components to Huawei, software to Huawei, and US networks will not be allowed to use Huawei gear in the 5G build-up. Additionally, the US is extraterritorially trying to compel other governments to rip out any Huawei gear that’s in their telecommunications networks and to compel them to stop doing business with Huawei, so that transcends the trade agenda. But really, it’s become the elephant in the room in the relationship between the United States and China—what to do about something that is sort of the equivalent of the arms race with the Soviets.

It’s hard to imagine a set of circumstances under which the Chinese would agree to not try to advance technologically. It’s hard to imagine a set of circumstance where the United States would not do what it can to thwart China’s efforts to do that. But that’s ultimately what we’re going to have to do. And if we can’t find a way to mitigate the threat and come up with some way to “trust but verify,” we are going to have two competing sets of 5G standards around the world. If that happens, if we have this bifurcation then the scope for economies of scale for these Internet of Things products
and everything that 5G is going to provide for humanity to improve our lives is going
to raise the costs of all of these products. It’s going to slow the process of rolling out
this infrastructure and developing these life enhancing products. And if we have a bi-
furcated global economy, we have to worry about growing animosity and the specter
of bloc-wide tariffs being imposed to protect your sphere from the countries in the
other sphere. Anyway, to me that’s a big and very real threat to the global economy.

WO: It seems like that’s a relatively new problem. So, in the spirit of tracking the changes of
trade across time how do you feel that the conversation around trade has changed through-
out your career from your end, so in the private sector?

DI: Well when I started at Cato we were just emerging from a period where we were
really worried—a lot of American businesses and American policymakers—were wor-
ried about the rise of Japan and that Japan present[ed] this existential threat. And we
needed to do something about it and we needed to embrace industrial policy. And
then the Japanese threat sort of went away. The economy was doing well. China start-
ed to rise slowly. There was sort of this triumphalist view that trade liberalization had
contributed to the end of history: that we were all going to get along and that trade
disputes would be the exception not the rule. And for the most part it was kind of like
that. But now people are revisiting the whole concept and saying: “Well weren’t there
costs to this? Didn’t we forfeit some sovereignty in the process? Doesn’t globalization
undermine democracy to some extent?” Danny Roderick at Harvard talks about that
a lot. I totally disagree with that perspective because there’s nothing mandatory about
globalization. Democracies are equipped with the capacity to advance what the people
want to do there.

There used to be a lot of talk about liberalizing more trade—essentially, applying the
regime that was so successful at reducing tariffs on goods to services, as well. In the
United States, we Americans consume something like four to four and a half trillion
dollars’ worth of goods and about 60% of that is imported. We consume about nine
trillion dollars of services but something like 800 billion of that is imported, so a very
small percent of what Americans consume in terms of services are imported. That’s
because there are a lot of behind the border barriers to competition in health care and
in education and services. And, you know, throughout the entire services industry—
lawyering, accounting, architectural services. So, there was talk about liberalizing the
services trades. That has slowed down because the global trading system is in duress.
The World Trade Organization is under threat of implosion for a variety of reasons,
including the US administration taking a very hard-nosed approach under the prem-
ise—false premise—that the WTO is somehow anti-American and it rules against the
United States all the time and therefore the system needs to be fixed.

And I think Trump’s view and his advisers’ views are more in line with “all animals
are equal but some are more equal than others”—because the US played a big role in the creation of the trading system, we should get a pass; when we break the rules, we shouldn’t be called out on it, something to that effect. But anyway, there’s now a lot more focus on holding the line and not backsliding into protectionism. Whereas the focus for many years had been on how we continue to liberalize, today we’re asking questions like: can the global trading system withstand the US–China trade war? can it withstand the resurgence of nationalism and protectionism? And there’s protectionism going on elsewhere, it’s not just Trump. We’re revisiting a lot of ground that we thought had been settled in the past.

But that said I’m still 100% sure that free trade—lowering barriers to trade in goods and services, labor, and investment—is key to growing the global economy and fostering good, strong relations among people.

WO: Let’s switch gears a little bit to talk about you—everyone’s favorite topic.

DI: I didn’t know I was everyone’s favorite topic. That’s good.

WO: In this interview, you’re everyone’s favorite topic. So, you are the co-author of Anti-Dumping Exposed: the Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law. Would you mind talking about that book and your work on it?

DI: Sure. This could be a cure for insomnia for your readers, though.

As I said earlier, I had worked in law firms in the 1990s basically as an analyst, as an economist focused on the anti-dumping law. The anti-dumping law is one of the so-called trade remedy laws that we have in United States. Dumping is said to occur when a foreign company is selling its products in a foreign market—let’s use the U.S. market as an example—at prices that are lower than what he charges in his home market. And it’s actionable under the anti-dumping law if those practices cause “material injury” to the domestic industry—the industry that brings the petition filing for relief, relief being the imposition of tariffs. For most of my time in the law firms, I’d represented foreign companies who were caught up in these cases.

And what happens when a domestic industry brings a case and anti-dumping case? Let’s take the example of Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, which is the case that I worked on for a number of years. The U.S. petitioner was Dole, which produced pineapple fruit in Hawaii. They were claiming that imports of canned pineapples from Thailand were being sold at “dumped” prices (lower prices in the U.S. than those charged at home in Thailand), and causing material injury to their business in the U.S. In order for the case to proceed, the domestic industry has to file a petition with the US International Trade Commission and the US Commerce Department.
And what it has to demonstrate is that it is materially injured by reason of less than fair value imports. The Commerce Department sends out these questionnaires to the largest exporters in the country that’s been accused of dumping. And these are very thick questionnaires that ask them questions about their home market sales, their customers in the home market, what expenses they incur, what products they sell. They want to know everything about your business in the home market. They want to know everything about your sales in the US market: what expenses you incur in the US, who you work with, and whether you have intermediaries. They want to know everything about your costs of production: how do you allocate costs for making this canned pineapple fruit. The questionnaires are very detailed and very technical. They’re sent to companies in foreign countries—these Thai producers, many of whom don’t have staff that speak or read English well, if at all—so they need a legal representation. Usually a US law firm represents them. So that’s what we did.

In this case I spent a lot of time going to Thailand and helping these companies respond to the Commerce Department questionnaires. The narrative responses to these questionnaires are supplemented by databases. The Commerce Department wants to see records of all your sales in both markets and your costs of production so that it can calculate, can determine whether you’re dumping and by what degree. So I did that for a number of years representing a bunch of different industries a bunch of different countries and then I came to Cato and I worked with Brink Lindsey who was a trade lawyer. He and I worked together for a few years and our objective was to expose the insanity of the anti-dumping law and how unfair the law itself is. It’s couched in this rhetoric of preserving upstanding American jobs from predatory foreigners when in fact the law doesn’t do that at all.

The law is slanted incredibly toward finding high dumping margins and the law is used primarily by US companies going after other US companies to try to cordon off their customers from alternative sources of supply, and to try to go after their domestic competitors, some of whom have outsourced some of their production to foreign countries. Anyway, so we wrote four policy papers, Cato policy papers, and then we did a synthesis of those papers, added some extra material, and bound it in a book. The whole point was to show how the dumping calculations work and how the process is so slanted, and to show that US exporters are now getting caught in the crosshairs because other governments have adopted the US anti-dumping regime.

We came up with ideas for reforming the anti-dumping agreement at the WTO and the US anti-dumping law. But it turns out that there is, to this day, broad bipartisan support for the anti-dumping status quo because policymakers, politicians, and Congress don’t really care. They want to be able to say: “you know what, we are responding to unfair trade abroad with the anti-dumping law and we’re not going to let our trade negotiators negotiate away this law.” But although the antidumping law doesn’t
affect directly a very large portion of imports, it is a huge political irritant because the United States uses the law so aggressively, so recklessly, and in violation of our WTO obligations that it makes it easy for other governments to justify skirting their own obligation to the WTO. So that book, was a good resource to about 40 or 50 people in the world. But it’s a specialty and I go back to it every once in a while. But through my years at Cato since the book came out in 2003, I’ve written mostly about things other than dumping. I think I’ve written a couple of papers on dumping since that book came out, but it’s becoming more topical again because under the Trump administration, there’s been an increase in the use of these laws.

WO: We will definitely tell our much smaller readership than that to buy your book because it does seem like an important issue at this time.

DI: Excellent. The book jacket…is pretty cool looking though, at least.

WO: That’s always a good thing. So, in talking about more of your work, looking long term, what would you say is the most meaningful way you’ve been able to influence the conversations surrounding trade?

DI: Meaningful. That’s a good question. I mean, the most effective ways, I think—and this goes against my instincts—is to keep repeating the same points. Find a message that resonates and keep repeating it. And to me that is mind-numbing to say the same thing time and time again about trade: the benefits of trade come through imports, exports are the price we have to pay for imports. Exports are not our points and imports are the other team’s points. The trade account is not a scoreboard. The trade deficit doesn’t mean we’re losing in trade. Having to say those things time and time again gets frustrating, but every two years there’s a new Congress and there are freshman with new staffers who need to understand these basic concepts. And so you go back to Economics and Trade 101 and say the same things and sometimes it’s frustrating but turns out that providing those sorts of building blocks to policymakers and their staff has helped dissuade or deter some of the worst policy ideas. My work has been cited on the floor of the Senate and the House and in debates and I’ve been able to testify before Congress. Those are useful channels for influencing policy although more often than not these hearings are really like show trials that are designed to make committee members look good, you know. They get a video of themselves asking a question with a really stern look on their face and their glasses perched over the end of their noses.

My favorite way to communicate is by speaking to student groups and particularly ones who are engaged like the Cato intern classes. I always get a lot of excellent questions and I feel like I’m helping shape minds. In Washington there’s clearly a lot of cynicism about trade. And many of us who’ve been doing it for a long time look a little worse for the wear. So, when you have a fresh batch of people who could make a
difference—the next generation of people—that’s gratifying and I think it’s effective.

WO: Looking at that next generation of people, World Outlook is an undergraduate journal and so most of our readership does tend to be people who are looking at figuring out what their life plan looks at. Do you have any advice or recommendation for undergraduate or graduate students that are interested in either think tank work or work on trade policy?

DI: Well, in trade policy in general, I think the field is becoming more crowded because of the uncertainty over the future of trade policy that has been fomented over the past couple of years. Many businesses have actually brought people in-house to analyze trade, where this used to be a domain almost exclusively for think tanks and other public policy organizations, research organizations, and trade associations. So, there are more opportunities. But I don’t know if there’s a way to distinguish the skills you would use in the private sector for a Wall Street investment bank versus for a think tank like Cato. If people want to work in a think tank they’ve got to sort of adjust any ambitions that you may have had for having three houses: a summer house, a winter house, and a nice big house in the city somewhere because, you know, it’s not the best compensation in the world. But it’s a tradeoff that we make.

I love to get up every day and I think as long as you have a desire to make the world a better place and you’re open to facts that might contradict some of your a prioris and you’re willing to go with those facts and either publish them or incorporate them into your conclusions and into your research, then the think tank world is good place to be. Of course, it depends on the think tank too. Some are more liberating than others. I’ve been at Cato for nineteen years and I have never once been told by anybody from our board or from any of our donors that: “Wow, you’re out of bounds and you shouldn’t be saying that and you should be saying more of this.” I’ve been totally free to pursue the research that I’ve wanted—I mean it turns out that I believe in free trade and therefore I don’t drift to too far from our orthodoxy—but some think tanks are more rigid and they don’t allow you to get outside of a predefined box. Because we’re non-partisan we get a certain level of respect that other think tanks that are associated with political parties don’t. I mean I think a lot of things that come out of maybe Heritage or the Progressive Policy Institute are just assumed to be “the party line.”

So, read a lot and make sure that you’re genuinely interested in the world and policy, and expect, at best, incremental progress. If you’re lucky you’ll have a major breakthrough on your watch.

WO: That is very heartening. Thank you so much for your time.