“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brash familiarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree of magnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

— President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey, 1947 Convocation Address
The Editors of World Outlook would like to express gratitude to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.
About the Journal:
World Outlook is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduate students. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by our own staff. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey. Please visit our website at http://sites.dartmouth.edu/worldoutlook.

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Editors’ Note

Since our last issue, politics, societal change, and economic conditions have continued to evolve throughout the international arena. Isolationism has increasingly become a foreign policy priority of the Trump Administration in the United States, upheaval on the European continent as well as the uncertainty surrounding Brexit have altered the dynamics between world powers, and global market uncertainty concerning the U.S.–China trade conflict has put many on edge. For the Fall 2018 issue of *World Outlook*, we sought to capture some of the change occurring by including pieces focusing on a wide range of global issues from all corners of the world.

This issue begins with a paper by Michelle Gellar, a student at the University of Southern California, that explores possible solutions to the health inequities associated with landmines in Cambodia through the lens of Sothearam Tong, a Cambodian citizen. Ms. Gellar’s paper is followed by an essay on the commitment of the Obama Administration’s support for democracy abroad in the wake of the Arab Spring that explores the varied levels of assistance given to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. This paper, written by Marc Bachman, finds no correlation between democracy promotion by the U.S. and successful transition to democracy. Next, Lauren Bishop’s paper on Soviet recruitment in the years after World War II, undertaken to consider the more recent U.S. policy of recruiting insurgents in Iraq, provides this issue with a historically-centered yet forward-looking piece. The final essay in this issue, written by Billy Kosmidis, explores the challenges associated with and the possible solutions to the rapidly growing Sub-Saharan population.

We conclude this issue with an interview with Visiting Professor of Latin American, Latino and Caribbean Studies at Dartmouth, Peter DeShazo. Since graduating from Dartmouth in ’69, Mr. DeShazo has served in a number of positions within the U.S. foreign service, including postings in Washington D.C. and embassies abroad. He has continued his career in both academia and the non-governmental organization world, holding positions as a lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, director of the America Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Executive Director of the Harvard-affiliated LASPAU, or Academic and Professional Programs for the Americas. The interview, conducted by Lexi Curnin, Mark Daniels, and Luke Bienstock, covers a range of topics relating to Latin America, including recent political developments in the region and in Colombia more specifically.

We would also like to extend a special thank you to the Dartmouth classes of ’57 and ’82 who gifted the Great Issues Innovation Funds that allow Dickey Center Organizations like ours to continue their work. We hope that you enjoy reading these pieces, which represent the best work on international affairs of the Dartmouth student body’s, as well as of students from other institutions, as much as we did while producing this issue of *World Outlook*.

Sincerely,
Lexi Curnin ’19 and Mark Daniels ’19
Editors-in-Chief
SOLUTIONS TO HEALTH INEQUITIES IN CAMBODIA CAUSED BY LANDMINES: GOALS BY THE YEAR 2050

Michelle Geller

Health inequity as a result of injuries from landmines is a major issue in Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambodia. Globally, landmines have injured an estimated 100 million people. Cambodia is home to at least 63,000 of those injuries. In order for progress to be made in addressing these health inequities, systematic changes need to be adopted. In this paper, the author explores potential options through the lens of a case study involving landmines and highlights international trade, national budget alterations, and community-based initiatives.

INTRODUCTION

Global health inequities, defined as systemic disparities in health status that arise from societal means rather than a direct biomedical causality, are unjust. As contributors to global health inequities, landmines have injured an estimated 100 million people worldwide, with at least 63,000 in Cambodia (Haas 2013). For example, individuals like Sothearum Tong were unwilling to access to proper health care in order to mitigate the injuries associated with the explosion of a landmine. Through ‘chains of causation,’ non-health sector disciplines contribute to the challenge of providing individuals with healthier lives.

The aim of this paper is to provide a solutions-based approach to create feasible, adaptable, and equitable sustained change for health systems in response to the case study of Sothearum Tong. The paper will address what needs to occur by 2050 to ensure that the outcome of this case is benign, such that Sothearum Tong avoids disability, by exploring multidisciplinary solutions in three main areas: international trade, national policy, and local sustainability.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Cambodia can look to improve the welfare of the country by turning to the international political economy, specifically through trade. The health of the country can be directly related to economic stability, which can be greater achieved through export competitiveness. The current economy relies on agriculture, garments, tourism, and construction (International Trade Centre). The most important service activity in Cambodia is tourism, which is one of the major sources of overseas investment and the fastest-growing segment of the economy (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.) Many consider Cambodia a lower-middle income country in which the economic sector is not industrialized and instead focuses primarily on agriculture and low-cost goods. While local governments seek to improve the business environment and institute economic sustainability, barriers still re-

Michelle Geller will graduate in May 2019 from the University of Southern California as a Global Business Major. She is proud to attend University of California Los Angeles Law School in the fall.
main in place, including poor regulations, corruption, and weak infrastructure.

Nonetheless, Cambodia has previously signed bilateral trade deals, which offer benefits in future customs unions or free trade areas and agreements relating to taxation (International Trade Administration 2018). Previous bilateral trade deals have included ones with post-communist countries such as Austria, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Hungary, Laos, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In 1999, Cambodia became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and in 2004, it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO); both implemented reciprocal tariff reductions and other legislation which should have improved its economy. Even with these trade deals, Cambodia has a long history of trade deficits (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). With a trade history focused on countries primarily in the Southeast Asian region, Cambodia can look to sign other trade deals, specifically a bilateral agreement with Bangladesh. There have been talks regarding a potential deal by end of 2018. Aiming to boost bilateral trade, Cambodia can import medicines from Bangladesh, and focus on cooperation for tourism and collaboration and implementation of sustainable development goals (Star Business Report 2018). This will decrease the use of illegitimate exports because this sector must be highly regulated. A trade deal with Bangladesh will help curb international trade imbalances for Cambodia, improve the availability and access to medicine, and create a sustained tourist interest with increased cooperation.

**National Policy**

A closer look at Cambodia as a nation-state gives us greater insight as to how the welfare and health of the nation can be improved, particularly through public spending. Cambodia has a history of civil and political unrest. It was colonized by France in the middle of the nineteenth century to form part of Indochine. The Indochina Wars soon followed from 1946 until 1989 (Kiernan 2002), even after becoming independent in 1953. During the Cold War, decolonization and older regional rivalries met in a particularly destructive combination. After a history of changing regimes, the Khmer Rouge took the capital Phnom Penh in 1975 and immediately embarked on a program of “purification” through mass killings. Doctors, teachers, and the intellectual elite were murdered to form the “ideal” society. They are estimated to have killed at least two million, with the majority of deaths being native civilian Cambodians (Kiernan 2002). Halting economic activity, schools and hospitals were closed. The Khmer Rouge, among other regimes and groups throughout Cambodia’s history placed landmines and did not record their placements. This history holds enormous ramifications, especially in terms of health and educational results for the country. There still remains a lack of qualified teachers and trained health workers. One thing that cannot be addressed is future political troubles, yet the country can still implement new strategies to account for its violent past. Cambodia has made strides to help those living in poverty. In the past decade, progress towards the targets of the health-related Millennium Devel-
Development Goals (MDGs), which were goals set by the UN at the turn of the century, has been largely successful. It achieved most of the targets, except for four exceptions: measles immunization, contraceptive use, HIV prevalence, and notified cases of TB. These still lay as priority areas for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cambodia WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2016 – 2020).

The SDGs are a global set of goals that seek to “end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity” (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). While Cambodia has not met these goals, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works with the Cambodian government to help the economy follow a sustainable and inclusive growth plan. Other programs which aim to improve Cambodia’s situation include the UNDP’s Export Diversification and Expansion Programme, which seeks to diversify the sources of exports from Cambodia. Part of the program includes the “Cassava Project,” which, in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce, works to increase the cassava production, thereby creating more formal exports with trade partners (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). Other programs seek to build resilience, including “Mine Action for Human Development.” Now on the third phase, UNDP works with the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority to develop and manage mine action performance monitoring systems (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). Even though they have made considerable progress with demining the land, it is only in areas they can afford to get to, leaving rural populations vulnerable. These expensive and slow demining operations are handled by various non-government groups, such as the UNDP and NGOs. Additionally, the high cost for locating mines means that these groups are inadequately resourced to cover all affected areas.

Although these programs seek to uphold to the Sustainable Development Goals, they are simply not enough. Cambodia has not met the SDGs, and poverty still remains a difficult task for the government to tackle (World Bank 2018). By an analysis of its national budget, the Cambodian government spends a disproportionate amount of money focused on security and only a portion on health and education. The country’s budget for health is only about $1 per person per year (World Health Organization 2016). Opposition to the current ruling party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, was stated saying that “health sector spending is only 1.5 percent of GDP compared to Thailand and Vietnam, which spend 5 to 6 percent of GDP.” At the same time, there was a 22.7% increase to the Defence Ministry in 2017 (Sokchea 2016). These two sectors in the national budget must be increased, and government initiatives must be better spent on focusing on issues such as health and education.

The quality of public service healthcare delivery through more effective public spending will depend on the national budget. The government can choose various specific and measurable goals, such as the establishment of an emergency response unit that can reach rural areas (Appendix). These response units may be in tuk-tuks or narrow vehicles to meet the demands of small roads with the ability to bypass traffic in cities. Improving national healthcare measures will re-
quire services for people of various geographies and social groups. In doing so, it must account for greater access to suitable health care, particularly in rural areas.

One positive step from the government, however, was the Health Equity Funds (HEFs) and voucher schemes policies (Center for Human Services, n.d.). These initiatives help ensure that Cambodians have availability to quality health services. Access to safe drinking water has improved over the last few decades, yet these improvements only reach a portion of the population. According to WHO, 69% of rural residents having access to sources of improved drinking water compared to more than 90% for urban residents. Similarly, only 30% of rural residents have access to improved sanitation facilities, as opposed to 80% of urban dwellers (World Health Organization 2015). The government should continue with its initiatives in subsidies so that facilities are reimbursed for treatment of low-income patients. Subsidies provide a valuable role to those who are most vulnerable (Annear 2012). Should the government continue not putting adequate funds into education and health sectors of the national budget, it should at least focus on tourism and economic sustainability to support its population. By default, tourism requires educated individuals, especially when tourists speak different languages. Boosting tourism throughout the country will provide an incentive for the government and local municipalities to provide better education that prepares students for vocational opportunities beyond farming or cheap labor.

Since education is not uniform across the country, the government can implement a uniform health care lesson plan to be required in primary schools. It could address, using illustrations and different languages, how to approach problems such as infectious diseases, where local hospitals are located by region, the importance of washing hands and contraception, and various other initiatives. The plans should also align with Cambodian culture; for example, rice noodles and rice are important foods in the Cambodian diet. These dishes can be demonstrated by a woman washing her hands before cooking. As more and more young children learn these lessons, they will be able to teach their elders and implement behavioral change within the country. A uniform healthcare lesson implemented in schools will help serve the health of the nation, as well as circumvent the challenge of unqualified teachers. While Cambodia has had a difficult history and must overcome these setbacks to achieve the SDGs, it can implement strategies by increasing the national budget, continuing with subsidies, and a nationalized health care education platform to overcome health inequities.

**Local Sustainability**

Although international and national means contribute to better health-care systems for Cambodia, improving the quality of services in the long-term depends on sustainability. Through community-led development, Cambodians can focus on three main pillars: prevention, economic sustainability, and community and health system integration. All three of these pillars require community partici-
Community-led development gives Cambodian locals the agency to plan and prioritize which issues they want. In the case of landmines, a community may want to focus on putting up fences around potential areas before working on solutions to prosthetics. The community will have the agency to manage, deliver, and control health care services, which will empower a greater sense of confidence and freedom. (Appendix) The Comprehensive Rural Health Project has come up with a five-step strategy to ensure the success of community-led development in healthcare which can be utilized for community development in Cambodia (The Comprehensive Rural Health Project, n.d.):

1. Work in teams
2. Community health workers and volunteers use task shifting — skills/knowledge are shared broadly
3. Attention to incentives and motivation of health workers
4. Use of appropriate technology
5. Essential drug lists and rational drug use

Utilizing these core strategies within the community-led health system, new healthcare practices can be addressed across the three core pillars to advance the community.

**Prevention**

As previously mentioned, agriculture in Cambodia constitutes a main economic sector. Farming provides opportunities for families to make a living; however, this is where landmines are widespread.

Prevention starts by getting rid of the landmines. Demining operations are known to be expensive, slow, and challenged by inaccessibility to affected areas. Common demining practices include using metal detectors; this requires infrastructure, time to clear the vegetation, and is dangerous to those searching. Sniffing dogs can be trained to find landmines, but this requires training, transportation expenses, and would require a long period of time. Recent findings have shown that rats have an extraordinary sense of smell and can “discover hidden landmines by sniffing out the explosive TNT (Becker 2015). It is unknown what these rats will do to the local environment, but if they can be contained during these demining processes, rats may prove to be a viable option. They are low-cost in materials, easy to transport, sustainable for the long-term, and adaptable to various environments.

Another aspect of prevention is the process of immunization for communities in Cambodia. Local health care clinics must have the means to provide tetanus immunization to manage wounds, especially those that are infected. Hepatitis B and D will prevent nosocomial transmission in healthcare settings. These vaccinations can be priorities for NGOs to bring to health clinics. These practices can be aligned with the nation-
eral healthcare education plan, so children learn the importance of vaccinations. Within the community-led development structure, volunteers and local health workers must be able to administer these vaccines, so these practices can be sustained in the long-term.

**Economic Sustainability**

It is crucial that the implementation of a new healthcare system at the local level be aligned to create sustained economic development. Local governments can seek to recruit and train both male and female deminers so that the contaminated communities are part of the clearing process. They will also need to employ locals to be in healthcare clinics and industries to develop the infrastructure needed for medical solutions. Local communities can create sustained initiatives to make cheap prosthetics, both in processes and materials. Currently, programs seek to teach local community members to make prosthetics from metal. Low-cost materials, accessibility (locally sourced), and sustainable practices ensure that locals can reproduce medical services, while also receiving funding—a key incentive to produce these types of goods (Comprehensive Rural Health Project, n.d.). A technical understanding of production, in addition to maintenance and repairs, requires instructions with diagrams.

While it may be easier for local members to design and manufacture low-cost goods for prosthetics, it is more difficult to fund ophthalmology services. This requires specially trained doctors. Thus, it is in the best interest of the Cambodian government to institute a national initiative for medical students in the country to obtain scholarships should they choose to study and work in the field. In the meantime, local communities must rely on NGOs and foreign help to provide the necessary skills that are required for optometry. When these NGOs serve communities, they must be ready to teach local members. Local health clinics can be trained in basic ophthalmologist skills to serve as a baseline for providing care. This must also be at the hands of not just the top doctors, aforementioned in the task-shifting model. Additionally, family members can learn services, such as physical therapy; this will allow health clinics to focus on the most pressing medical injuries.

Economic sustainability also ensures that those affected by disabilities must be able to contribute to the workforce thereafter. If farm work is not an option, there must be other options for means of work and supporting families. This starts with behavioral changes that alleviate social stigmas. Traditional views mean that disabled people were thought to be unlucky, in which their own bad karma led them to a life of misery. If it is assumed that those who are disabled are not productive members of society, then they will not fight to seek other means of occupation. Local governments must assist or provide subsidies for those disabled. A potential job could be working in the community-led health system itself, seeking to help provide new opportunities for those who are disabled. Nonetheless, this role must have some sort of financial benefit.
COMMUNITY AND HEALTH SYSTEM INTEGRATION

Community integration means including those who are disabled in decision making to create sustainable outcomes for health systems. Health system integration refers to vertical and horizontal implementation; programs and health clinics must include and cross-sector programs.

The twin-track approach can be used to address inclusion. This model promotes two sets of actions: “disability-specific activities targeted toward those with disabilities” and “mainstreaming disabilities into broader activities” (CBM 2012). Education services can be tailored to meet the requirements of someone with loss of limbs, and trained workers to help those who are blind. Additionally, schools must have infrastructure that allows wheelchairs, crutches, etc. to promote this inclusion.

The young are most vulnerable to landmine explosions. Children are taught from an early age to avoid known minefields, but this does not stop children from unknowingly straying into the fields. One potential solution is to have a community effort to build fences around fields with sticks and leaves woven together, which are left over after each agricultural season.

Health system integration must be addressed through multiple aspects. First, clinics must be integrated vertically and horizontally (Walley 2008). If someone goes to a large hospital to attend to landmine injuries, local clinics must be able to provide the physical therapy and other medical services to follow up on the referral. Different parts of the health system must work together through horizontal integration. The doctors who prescribe prosthetics must be met by the proper infrastructure. Those making prosthetics at the local level can work together with the doctors who require these instruments. This will also require multidisciplinary teams, multi-skilled practitioners, and the availability of a single point of access to services. In the case of landmine injuries, one must have trained health workers, treat those injured at the time of the incident, help those who already have prosthetics but need repair or replacement, and provide physical therapy services. These demands for local health clinics can be met with the help of NGOs. Moreover, this outside aid and doctors who travel throughout the country must be ready to train local health workers when they go to various communities.

Health system services can also work with other sectors. As previously mentioned, health can be a required topic in primary education and disability inclusion should be in mainstream programs. Additionally, new laws for infrastructure, particularly in cities that may be met with greater municipality regulation, can require disability access.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that Cambodia still faces a number of healthcare system development challenges, partially as a result of their complicated history with landmines. With the solutions outlined in this paper, Cambodia can address these challenges by maintaining macroeconomic stability through international trade, improve the national budget for health and education, and implement local initiatives to assist communities in achieving long-term health sustainability. Improving
the quality of public health services through national spending while letting Cambodian communities decide what they need and how to effectively include their own members should be at the forefront to mitigate the nation's health inequities.

APPENDIX

1. Community Health Workers
   - Three workers, all chosen by the community, includes one male and \( \text{one female} \), and one who has a disability. They gain trust and respect amongst community. Their role requires inclusion of community members needs.

2. Door to Door Health Checkin
   - Health workers can include members of the community by directly understanding the health services needed by members.

3. Education Programs and Support Groups
   - Programs will include worsening circumstances, vocational skills, health promotion programs (nutrition and vaccination), and others that the community see fit. This is led by community health workers.

4. Local Health Clinics & Hospitals
   - Local health clinicians provide communities immediate services. Accessible in hospitals are set in rural hospitals. Hospitals will include emergency, general, and pediatric care. Poor can receive free treatment and specialized treatments and services such as eye care can be free.

5. Landmine Initiative
   - On community programs will work as a landmine disaster plan for children: prevention, and medical and psychological treatment.

6. Public Health Support
   - Increasing the national budget for health will mean further access to subsidies, medicines, and services.

7. Education
   - Local communities can focus on the implementation of health in primary schools, aligned with the nation's health program in schools.

Goals for the National Health Ministry

- Funds committed: National budget, National Organizations, NGOs, Private donors.

- Internal funds: Increase in national budget for health and education

- Geographic focus: Health systems in cities and rural areas

- Infrastructure focus: Transportation, health facilities

- Education focus: Build education services beyond primary levels and include national health programs in schooling

- Public spending: Allocation of budget for health systems

- Members in rural regions

- Ages 5-18

- Members with disabilities/Unah e to work

- Those without access to quality health services

Criteria

- Financing
- Allocation
- Resources to implement
- Achievability
- Monitoring of progress
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Political Transition in the Arab Spring: The Obama Administration’s Commitment to Democracy Promotion

Marc Bachman

This paper addresses the United States’ funding for democracy promotion in Arab Spring states. It analyzes data from the United States’ federal and appropriations budget in an attempt to understand the correlation between democracy promotion strategies and political revolutions during the Arab Spring—a revolutionary displacement of autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North African states beginning in 2010. This paper concludes that during the Arab Spring, the United States prioritized their own geopolitical interests and stability in the region over democratic transition in the Arab world. Furthermore, analyses of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen find no correlation between United States providing funding for democracy promotion and a successful democratic transition.

Introduction

The “Arab Spring” is a term coined by the Western media to describe the series of anti-government uprisings against oppressive Arab dictatorships in the Middle East and Northern African (MENA) region, beginning in 2010. The global consequences of this political and social movement forced US policy makers to balance the substantial geopolitical and national security concerns with the unique opportunity to promote democratic institutions in emerging governments. The allocation of bilateral democracy assistance funding following the Arab Spring provides meaningful insight into the prioritization of democracy building as a US foreign aid objective, as well as the US government’s faith in the viability of democratic reform in a revolutionary environment (Scott & Carter 2015, 739). In this paper I ask, “Why did US democracy promotion assistance funding following the revolutionary displacement of autocratic regimes during the Arab Spring vary country to country? And furthermore, does an increased allotment of democracy promotion assistance result in improved democratic reform for transitional governments?” This paper summarizes the Bush administration’s determined focus on democracy promotion aid in the MENA following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the initial democracy promotion strategy of the Obama administration after taking office in 2009. Prior studies characterize the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 as the two major paradigm shifts in US democracy promotion strategy, and this paper seeks to further this analysis by examining the Arab Spring uprisings as a third paradigm shift (Scott & Carter 2015; Masaki 2016). Although political insurrections occurred throughout the MENA region, this paper focuses on four case studies: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. The revolutions in these four states successfully overthrew their respective incumbent regime, entering a phase of transitional government. Additionally, each of these countries shares a similar history of a long-

Marc Bachman is a member of Dartmouth College’s Class of 2018. He is a double major in Government and Environmental Studies. This paper was originally written for a Senior Seminar on Foreign Aid with Professor John Carey.
standing autocratic regime, yet they represent varying levels of wealth, geopolitical importance and political cooperation with the United States (Saleh et al, 2014). I examine the United States' bilateral funding for democracy promotion assistance throughout the Arab Spring uprisings in the MENA as a whole, and in response to the regime upheaval in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. Individual case studies identify the US strategic interests affecting allocation of foreign aid and the correlation between the level of US democracy assistance disbursed and relative democratization of each nation.

**POST-9/11 CONTEXT: THE FREEDOM AGENDA**

In order to effectively analyze the US foreign aid response to the Arab Spring uprisings, it is important to understand the political climate in Washington preceding these events. While the MENA region has received the largest net sum of US foreign aid since the Vietnam War, existing research emphasizes the clear shift towards democracy promotion in this region following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Scott 2014). Shortly after the attacks in New York, President Bush elucidated his focus on democracy promotion abroad in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), saying “The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom—the freedom we prize—is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind” (Bush 2003). The mean proportion of US foreign aid allocated to democracy in the post-Cold War era of 1989–2000 was a mere 6.1%, however, from 2000–2010 this allocation rose to 20.4% of the total financial aid given to the MENA region (Scott 2014, 751). President Bush’s Freedom Agenda aimed to expand political and social liberty across the globe while serving US strategic interests by targeting tyrannical regimes that provided “the conditions for terrorist organizations seeking weapons of mass destruction to recruit and flourish” (Hassan 2011, 46). The Freedom Agenda led to the creation of broad initiatives focusing on the Arab world, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa Agreement (BMENA), the Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA), the 2007 ADVANCE Democracy Act (ADA) and National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) (Alessandri 2015). MEPI emerged as the “central hub” for the implementation of the Freedom Agenda and between fiscal year (FY) 2002 and FY2008 Congress appropriated a total of $497.7 million to the program (Alessandri 2015). MEPI’s objectives are distributed by four overarching objectives: political reform, economic reform, educational reform, and women’s empowerment, yet the allocation of Congressional funding demonstrates the administration’s clear emphasis on economic reform and the theory that free markets and free trade institutions are both politically and socially progressive (Sharp 2005; Alessandri, 2015). As the occupation and democratic transition of Iraq dragged on and President Bush’s tenure came to a close, public support waned and the future of the Freedom Agenda faced political uncertainty.
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

As Obama took office in 2009, his administration quickly distanced itself from Bush’s Freedom Agenda, publicly criticizing the radical implementation of regime change in Iraq. During his first year as president, Obama articulated his “new beginnings” approach in a speech at Cairo University saying, “America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard around the world, even if we disagree with them. And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments—provided they govern with respect for all their people” (Obama 2009). Despite Obama’s critique of the Freedom Agenda, democracy assistance in the MENA remained as a central goal of Secretary Clinton’s foreign policy and MEPI accumulated roughly the same level of funding during Obama’s presidency (Hassan 2011). Figures 1 and 2 utilize EUSPRING’s data to compare funding for the MEPI program between the Bush and Obama administration from FY2002-FY2014, finding that the MEPI received an average of $68 million annually under the Bush administration and $71 million annually during Obama’s presidency (Alessandri 2015).

![Figure 1: Bush Administration MEPI Funding FY2002-2009 (US Millions)](image1)

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![Figure 2: Obama Administration MEPI Funding FY2010-2014 (US Millions)](image2)

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<td>762.7</td>
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<td>FY2013</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>827.7</td>
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<td>FY2014</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>902.7</td>
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Clearly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 established democracy promotion in the MENA as a top priority for the United States, dramatically increasing the flow of civil and economic foreign aid to MENA states long before the Arab Spring uprisings. Despite rhetorical differences, the Obama administration increased funding to the MEPI after taking presidency. The dynamic political revolutions in the Arab world beginning in 2010 provided another breaking point in the allocation of US foreign aid and forced the Obama administration to define their role in democratic transitions abroad.

**Obama Administration’s Response to the Arab Spring Uprisings**

Beginning in Tunisia in December of 2010, a fierce wave of protests, riots, coups and civil wars swept across the MENA region, challenging the oppressive authority of incumbent regimes. This revolutionary movement known as the “Arab Spring” shined a spotlight on the historically ambiguous and contradictory nature of foreign aid assistance in MENA states. As revolutionary forces pushed President Ben Ali from Tunisia and ignited nationwide riots in Algeria during the beginning of the Arab Spring movement, the Obama administration attempted to stay neutral to the matter (Heydemann 2014). The initial indecisiveness of US support for the promotion of democratic rights, however, quickly shifted as President Mubarak fought back against revolution in Egypt, large scale human rights violations erupted in Syria and militant Islamic extremist groups gained traction throughout the region (Heydemann 2014). In May of 2011 President Obama responded to the momentous crisis unfolding in the Arab world by reinforcing the liberal grand strategy proclaimed by his predecessor George W. Bush, emphasizing the role of democratic institutions and liberal economic development as the driver for political and social growth (Hassan 2012). In a speech delivered from the Department of State, Obama proclaimed, “America’s support for democracy will therefore be built on financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets each other and the global economy… starting with Tunisia and Egypt” (Obama 2011).

The fallout effects of the Arab revolutions in the MENA region posed severe geopolitical problems for Western nations and the United States in particular. The Obama administration attempted to negotiate negative consequences stemming from the collapse of their authoritarian allies, the rise of political Islam in the region, the immediate security of regional allies, and the uncertainties regarding the price and supply of Middle Eastern oil providers (Metawe 2013). The Arab Spring uprisings forced the United States to make difficult decisions between taking advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to aggressively promote democracy in newly forming governments and pursuing security and counterterrorism goals in the volatile region (POMED 2017). After initial uncertainty, President Obama placed firm support behind Arab revolutionaries in May of 2011, pledging “all diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal” to defend human freedoms abroad (Obama 2011.)
**US Foreign Assistance to MENA: FY2010–FY2015**

In order to see the overall trend of US foreign assistance to the MENA throughout the Arab Spring I have collected Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data tracking US official development assistance (ODA), other flows (OOF) and private flows, beginning with President Obama's first federal budget in FY2010 through FY2015 (OECD Statistics). In figure 3, I compiled annual US total flows to all 13 MENA countries affected by the Arab Spring uprisings and compared that to the annual flows to my four case study countries undergoing governmental transition.

This graph shows that Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen do not differ significantly from regional funding trends throughout their respective revolutions and political transitions. Between FY2010 and FY2015 Arab Spring nations received more than $22 billion dollars of US foreign assistance, with 62% of that money allocated to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Though this proportion is largely due to Egypt’s historically strong aid relationship with the United States, this data shows a significant financial commitment to the Arab political transitions. To analyze the level of financial support for democracy promotion in the MENA following the 2011 uprisings I examined statistics from the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)’s annual analysis of the US federal budget and appropriations. Democracy promotion aid is categorized as “Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD)”. GJD funding is made up of four program areas: 1) rule of law and human rights, 2) good governance, 3) political competition and consensus building, and 4) civil society. The Obama administration channeled GJD aid through six main bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental (NGO) programs during this time: the State Department’s MEPI, USAID’s Middle East Regional office (MER), the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor office (DRL), the United Nation’s Near East Regional Democracy Fund (NERD) and the nongovernmental National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
Overall, GJD funding as a percentage of total bilateral foreign assistance decreased consistently from 7.4% in 2010 to 2.7% in 2015. Figures 4 and 5 break down the annual GJD assistance sent to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen by country.

Egypt received the majority of total GJD aid given to these countries, however ranked last in percentage of total assistance directed to GJD programs. The relatively minimal proportion of bilateral assistance engaged in democracy promotion following the crumbling of an autocratic regime seems contradictory to the supportive rhetoric issued by the Obama administration. The erratic GJD expenditures reflect the unstable realities of each political transition, illustrating the immense challenges and limitations of foreign aid within a violent national revolution. The complexities of the Arab Spring con-
Conflict prompted the Obama administration to adopt a “case-by-case” approach, crafting personalized, heterogeneous political responses to each revolutionary uprising, including the allocation of foreign aid. The following case studies will analyze each country’s individual funding levels within the context of their respective Arab Spring timeline.

**Egypt**

Egypt represents a substantial percentage of US bilateral aid to the MENA each year, averaging 21.5% of total assistance between FY2010 and FY2015 (POMED 2017). The United States has maintained a cooperative relationship with Egypt since 1973, exchanging large amounts of annual foreign assistance for military access to the country and naval use of the Suez Canal, as well as the continued adherence to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Pillar 2016, 2). In the post-9/11 era, the United States looked to Egypt as an ally in counterterrorism and President Hosni Mubarak’s oppressive regime fought to subdue violent Islamic groups within its borders (Pillar 2016, 3). January 25th, 2011 marked the beginning of the revolution in Egypt when millions of citizens gathered across the nation to protest the oppressive regime and demand the resignation of President Mubarak (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014). After initially voicing his administration’s support for Mubarak, President Obama denounced the regime on February 1st, calling for the immediate peaceful transition of power and stating that “[democracy] is not a secondary interest… it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal” (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014; Obama 2011). Unlike his Libyan and Yemeni counterparts, Mubarak did not wage war against his people, and instead relinquished power on February 11th, giving way to a 16-month transitional period of military rule (Sharp 2014, 49). In response to this regime change, the Obama administration maintained $1.3 billion in total assistance from the year before but slashed GJD funding by almost 70% in order to increase economic assistance (POMED 2012). Egypt selected its first democratically elected president in June of 2012, handing over power to Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood. This step towards democracy was short-lived however, as President Morsi failed to spark economic growth or quell secularist uprisings and the military forced him from office in July of 2013 (Sharp 2014, 50). The new military-backed government quickly arrested thousands of Muslim Brotherhood protestors, passed laws repressing civil rights, and elected the head of the military, Abdel Sisi, as president by June of 2014 (Rieffer-Flanagan 2014, 447). The Obama administration conveyed their disapproval of these undemocratic actions by suspending $575 million in aid and military equipment in October of 2013, yet the economic aid was quickly resumed in 2014 and the military weapons suspension was lifted in March of 2015 to aid in Sisi’s battle against Islamic terrorism (Sharp 2017). Despite compelling rhetoric, democracy promotion assistance never emerged as a priority in the Obama administration’s financial reaction to Egypt’s revolution. GJD funding fell from its peak at 3% of bilateral assistance in FY2011 to 0.5% of the budget in FY2015 (Figure 6). Figure 6 shows the distribution of the Congressional...
bilateral assistance budget to Egypt, categorized by strategic objective throughout the Arab Spring. The Obama administration turned away from democracy promotion aid and implemented large sums economic and military aid, using this as an investment in relative stability, military allegiance and counterterrorism assistance (Sharp 2014, 47).

President Sisi now presides over a “managed democracy,” lacking legitimate political opposition, fostering inadequate political participation and suppressing basic human rights of citizens (Hill 2017). Fierce religious divisions, lack of civilian control of the military, rampant terrorist insurgency and Egyptian hostility towards Western NGO groups highlight the long list of challenges facing US democracy promotion programs. The Congressional funding data clearly shows that while the Arab Spring provided an exceptional opportunity to promote democratic reform, US foreign policy makers viewed democracy aid as unfeasible in Egypt and insignificant compared to domestic geopolitical interests.

LIBYA

In stark contrast to the Egyptian case, Libya did not receive significant flows of US aid under Qaddafi’s rule as Libya does not suffer from the devastating economic pressures of many of its MENA neighbors (POMED 2013). Additionally, the Libyan revolution against Qaddafi raged into a bloody civil war, as the autocrat fought back violently against protestors, killing thousands of civilians (POMED 2013). President Obama voiced his initial concerns about intervening in the Libyan revolution in 2011, saying “we have learned from our experience in Iraq just how costly and difficult it is to try to impose regime change by force—no matter how well-intentioned it may be” (Obama 2011). As the violence mounted through the spring of 2011, the Obama administration threw its support behind UN Security Council Resolution 1973, approv-
ing a “no-fly” zone over Libya and authorizing NATO intervention to protect Libyan civilians (Alessandri 2015). Following this UN resolution, President Obama vocalized his support for the Libyan rebels by stating, “when Qaddafi inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end, and the transition to a democratic Libya can proceed” (Obama 2011). The President’s prediction soon came to fruition as Qaddafi was captured and killed by the Misrata militia on October 20th, 2011.

In response to the political crisis in 2011, Congress mobilized $140 million to provide humanitarian assistance for war victims, refugees and displaced persons (POMED 2013). The annual fiscal budget remained steady at just over $5 million of bilateral assistance in FY2012, which Congress approved weeks before the ultimate collapse of the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, the National Transition Council (NTC) took power, sparking international optimism for a moderate, secular government. Yet Prime Minister Shagour lasted less than a month in office before being ousted by the Islamist General National Conference (Kuperman 2017, 67). Still, the Obama administration responded positively to Libya’s free elections and push for democratization by increasing their assistance in 2013 by over 400% and funneling $22.5 million into the country in peace and security, GJD, and economic assistance (POMED 2013, USAID 2013). Despite this increase, US aid to Libya represents an indiscernible proportion of US assistance to the MENA and could not begin to address the challenges facing civil society in Libya following the civil war. By 2015, the US-backed Libyan revolution had produced a failed state. Libya recognized four different prime ministers between 2011–2015, secessionists split from the nation in 2013, religious and tribal divides prevented any meaningful governmental reform, and the instability following Qaddafi’s death created a violent breeding ground for ISIS and other insurgency groups (Kuperman 2017). Congress reacted accordingly by reducing Libyan assistance back to minimal levels after the spike in 2013. Between 2014 and 2015, the Obama administration directed a mere $900,000 to democratic assistance programs in Libya (POMED 2013). The Obama administration denounced the Qaddafi regime and approved Western military assistance to rebel forces in 2011, fully backing the Libyan revolution. When Qaddafi fell, the United States made feeble funding attempts within the nation in FY2013 before almost completely withdrawing once again, letting the new Libyan state fail (Kuperman 2017). President Obama and his advisors acted decisively against pro-Qaddafi forces, fearing a “Rwanda-like” genocide (Kuperman 2017, 67). However, the Obama administration also feared another “Iraq-like” rebuilding effort. Therefore, Congressional funding to Libya remained insignificant and democracy promotion assistance persisted at the bottom of the list of US strategic priorities.

**TUNISIA**

Similar to the Egyptian case, the Tunisian revolution caught the United States almost entirely by surprise, as they supported the Ben Ali regime financially and politically up until the beginning of the revolution (Selim 2013, 259). The “US-friendly” autocratic Arab regime offered regional stability, economic growth and local alliances in the
global fight against terror. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December of 2010 and the subsequent Tunisian revolution forced US foreign policy makers to weigh the value of Ali’s stability against the promotion of democratic ideals in the Arab world. The Tunisian uprisings stemmed almost exclusively from the political and social repression of the Ali regime, as Tunisia consistently produced high economic and educational rankings and seemed relatively prosperous compared to its neighbors (Noor 2011). As in Egypt, the Obama administration abandoned its initial support of the regime when the protests gained momentum and sided with the revolution as Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia January 14th, 2011 (Dalacoura 2012). Constituent assembly elections in October of 2011, which were judged as “free and fair” by BBC and Freedom House observers, nominated the Islamist Party Ennahda (Durcan 2013). President Obama proclaimed that the United States “stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people” (Obama 2011). The Congressional budget for FY2012 reflected that support, increasing bilateral assistance to Tunisia by 347% (Figure 7). Despite the increase, the majority of funding was directed toward peace and security and economic assistance, channeling only $1.6 million of the allotted $89 million to GJD funding.

Political instability dominated 2012 and 2013 in Tunisia, as the assassination of opposition leader Mohammed Al-Brami led to massive public protests of the Ennahda party and the Tunisian-based terrorist organization Ansar al Sharia launched an attack on an American school in Tunis days after the Benghazi massacre (CNN 2017; Arieff 2014). Hope for democratic transition persisted through the initial growing pains as the Ennahda party peacefully handed power to a caretaker government, the National Congress ratified a new constitution, and, in 2014, Benji Caid Essebsi was elected president (POMED 2015). Following the successful democratic transition of power Assistant Secretary of State to the Maghreb, William Roebuck, declared Tunisia a top priority in the region. President Obama soon welcomed Prime Minister Jomaa to the
White House in 2014, publicly stating “the United States has a huge investment in making sure that Tunisia’s experiment is successful, and we want nothing more than Tunisians to determine their own destiny” (POMED 2015; Obama 2014). Interestingly, the administration’s enthusiastic promise of democratic investment in the Middle East did not shift Congressional support for a larger bilateral assistance account for Tunisia, and in FY2015 Tunisia still ranked ninth on the list of MENA countries in terms of US foreign assistance (POMED 2015). A possible explanation for the gap between White House rhetoric and Congressional funding could be security concerns and restrictions in the region following the 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi and Tunis. The majority of USAID Offices for Transition Initiatives (OTI) withdrew from Tunisia in 2014, leaving one senior development advisor and constituting the smallest presence in the Arab world (Arieff 2014). Additionally, aside from the political transition, Tunisia ranks much higher in GDP per capita and economic development measures than most nations receiving USAID assistance (POMED 2015). The political protests in Tunisia ignited the Arab Spring in 2011 and the country’s democratic transition represents a beacon of hope for democracy in the MENA, yet this momentous political movement failed to elicit a meaningful fiscal response from the Obama administration and persisted with miniscule US democracy promotion funding.

**Yemen**

Modest Yemeni protests against President Ali Abdullah Saleh sputtered following the ousting of Ben Ali Tunisia, but the Yemeni revolution began to gain momentum following the fall of Mubarak in Egypt. Opposition parties banded together to form the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and organized an energized group of youth and civil society activists (Dalacoura 2012, 65). As in Libya, the Saleh regime responded to the protests with a brutal show of authoritarian force, and in March of 2011 military snipers killed 60 Yemeni citizens (Falk 2016). Again, the Obama administration was hesitant to denounce the Saleh regime, as it played a major role in the fight against al-Qaeda in the region. When Saleh narrowly survived an assassination attempt in June of 2011 and fled to Saudi Arabia, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Saleh not to return and the United States turned their focus to pro-Western opposition regimes (Pinho 2012). In September Saleh publicly stepped down from power and in February of 2012, his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, won the presidential election, although he ran unopposed (Falk 2016).

The Yemeni revolution prompted an immediate fiscal commitment from the Obama administration, and in FY2012 US bilateral assistance jumped 240% to $135 million, and an additional $150 million in separate US funding was allocated through a variety of global initiatives (POMED 2012). Furthermore, this aid package included $23 million for GJD programs, constituting the largest proportion of democracy assistance funding of any nation facing a regime change during the Arab Spring. The rationale for such strong support from the Obama administration may have been in response to regional ethnic tensions involving the Shi’a minority in Northern Ye-
men and the fierce, Saudi-backed Sunni groups in the south (Falk 2016, 2330). Apprehension about the Yemeni revolution in the White House increased throughout 2012 as al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized the political instability as an opportunity to rise to power in many regions of Yemen (Pinho 2012, 119). President Hadi agreed to transitional terms of power and signed a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-led pact to respect the outcomes of elections in 2014 (POMED 2015).

Following the aggressive support from democracy promotion in FY2012, FY2013-2015 saw consistent decreases in both total bilateral assistance and GJD assistance, shifting the focus to peace and security programs (Figure 8). Yemen’s democratic transition has been frustrated and stalled by widespread poverty, prominent al-Qaeda militant groups, and Southern secessionist movements (POMED 2015; Falk 2016). The controversial use of CIA drone strikes within Yemen increased anti-Western sentiment and undermined the credibility of Hadi, the US-backed president. Subsequently, the Obama administration abandoned its initial democracy promotion agenda and focused aid efforts humanitarian efforts and stability forces (Pinho 2012). Following the collapse of the Hadi government in 2015, the United States evacuated its embassy and USAID mission and Yemen remains entrenched in a humanitarian crisis (POMED 2016). The case study of Yemen represents the most aggressive democracy promotion strategy throughout the whole crisis, yet democratic institutions were never able to take hold, leaving the country ripe with poverty and violence.

**CONCLUSION**

The Obama administration’s ambiguous and inconsistent responses to the Arab Spring uprisings fail to assert this time period as the third paradigm shift in US democracy funding. The case studies reveal that US bilateral assistance responses to the Arab Spring differ widely due to US geostrategic interests, historical alliances, and re-
The Obama administration’s bilateral assistance allocations almost perfectly maintained the status quo despite the monumental political upheaval sweeping the region. Additionally, the subtle variances in GJD assistance in the four regions of governmental transition appear to have little effect on the outcome of the revolution. Tunisia, the region’s best hope to complete a democratic transition, achieved this while receiving only $9 million of democracy assistance aid from the United States over a six-year period. Yemen, on the other hand, accepted a 700% increase in GJD assistance in the fiscal year following their revolution, yet digressed into a bloody civil war. This study fails to reveal any correlation between US democracy assistance and successful democratic reform in Arab Spring uprisings. For decades US policymakers have doubted the viability of democratic transformations in the MENA region due to a multitude of political, cultural and geographical factors (Scott & Carter 2014, 739). For the Obama administration, with the Iraqi War directly in its rearview mirror, the risks of engaging in a large-scale democracy promotion effort abroad were too great. President Obama publicly supported the revolutionaries’ pursuit of democratic reform while electing to fund safe and strategic objectives. The violent transitions of power, brutal suppression of opposition parties and terrorist insurgencies dismissed any illusions in Washington of a peaceful transition to democratic institutions (Arieff 2014). Today’s fiscal data rejects the proposition that the Arab Spring explains a third paradigm shift for US democracy promotion, however, future analysis might identify the Obama administration’s response to these uprisings as the death of democratic grand strategy.


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RECRUITING RESISTERS: THE UTILIZATION OF FORMER INSURGENTS IN POSTWAR SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY

Lauren Bishop

This paper examines the Soviet strategy of recruiting former insurgents after World War II to quell unrest in Ukraine and Lithuania. The author utilizes a broad arrange of literature and archived materials to conclude the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy successfully weakened resistance within the two countries, while noting that mass deportation and violence did not have as profound effects. This analysis has potential implications for future counterinsurgency efforts around the globe.

In the past decade, a number of studies analyzing the success of US counterinsurgency strategies against the Iraqi resistance have raised questions about the tactical effectiveness of recruiting former members of an insurgency to dismantle a resistance movement. Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro argue that, in combination with the massive influx, or ‘surge,’ of American troops into the country, the Awakening, a widespread movement of former Sunni insurgents disillusioned with the civilian violence perpetrated by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, played a key role in the 2007 de-escalation of violence (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012). While other scholars concur that tribal mobilization of former resistance fighters in southern Iraq contributed to the de-escalation, they also point to historical factors such as Baghdad’s homogenization as the cause of the decrease in violence (Lindsay and Peterson 2012). However, the success within the Anbar province proves that the former insurgents within the Awakening movement had a broad impact on the level of violence in the region. The Awakening was able to influence counterinsurgency efforts because the movement took thousands of insurgents “off the battlefield as opponents” and provided critical information to American troops about the remaining resistance (Lindsay and Peterson 2012). While the US military did not create the Awakening, the successful collaboration between former Sunni resistance fighters and US state counterinsurgent forces to mitigate the Iraqi insurgency offers broad implications to COIN strategy.

To assess the importance and viability of incorporating former resistance fighters into counterinsurgency strategies beyond the unique Awakening movement in Iraq, this study analyzes Soviet security forces’ utilization of former “bandits” within their counterinsurgency tactics in Ukraine and Lithuania during the decade after WWII. Unlike the Awakening, the Soviet incorporation of insurgent fighters into their broader counterinsurgency policy was not caused by a widespread movement rooted within the resistance. Instead, Soviet forces adapted to the changing structure

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of both insurgencies by recruiting former ‘bandits’ who not only provided tactical information about covert resistance bunkers and leading insurgents, but also carried out a series of assassinations that crippled the insurgent movement. Although the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Lithuanian partisans were able to recoup membership lost to Soviet recruitment, voluntary or otherwise, Soviet bandit forces sowed widespread paranoia and effectively isolated both insurgencies from Western support, which weakened the populations’ backing of the armed resistance. A close analysis of Soviet counterinsurgency measures in postwar Lithuania and Ukraine show that the systematic utilization of former insurgents successfully weakened resistance movements in both countries where mass deportation and indiscriminate violence did not.

However, some scholars believe that indiscriminate killing or the targeting of civilians by occupying forces leads to successful COIN campaigns. In his article “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Edward Luttwak argues that the only successful COIN strategy is “out-terrorizing the insurgents,” through the liberal killing of civilians and local leaders (Luttwak 2007). Luttwak admits that liberal democracies like the United States may not be able to commit such heinous acts in order to suppress an insurgency, but Yuri Zhukov claims that authoritarian regimes are under no such restraint due to their indifference towards human rights. His analysis of Soviet COIN strategy in post-war Ukraine shows that destructive violence against civilians successfully eliminates public support for resistance movements, but all too often this violence backfires as unrestrained COIN forces take their abuse too far. (Zhukov 2007). Similarly, Jason Lyall argues that under certain situations, indiscriminate violence may repress insurgent movements through the tension such actions place on the relationships between insurgents and their civilian support system (Lyall 2009). While Lyall encourages scholars to reconsider the effectiveness of such COIN measures, his study only focused on highly localized resistance in Chechnya. He admits that indiscriminate violence may in fact “redistribute” insurgent violence away from highly populated areas but the organizational structure of the Chechen insurgency in particular prevented such displacement (Lyall 2009). The highly mobile structure of both the Ukrainian and Lithuanian insurgencies did not face such barriers.

Instead of reliance on unmitigated violence, many scholars point to the adaptation of human intelligence (HUMINT) as the key to successful counterinsurgency efforts. In their article “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” Josh Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III argue that intelligence is the key to successful counterinsurgencies. Their analysis shows a decrease in COIN success after World War I from 81% to 40% which they attribute to the mechanization of warfare (Lyall and Wilson 2009). Lyall and Wilson further claim that increased utilization of trucks, planes, and other machines during military maneuvers has been detrimental to COIN operations because the widening divide between occupying soldiers and the local population “inhibits the collection and vetting of the context-specific information required to wield power discriminately” (Lyall and Wilson 2009). The absence of this intelligence prevents selective COIN tactics and compounds the “identification
problem” which Stathis Kalyvas defines as the inability of COIN forces to differentiate between insurgent fighters and the civilian population (Kalyvas 2006). Lyall and Wilson go on to argue that indiscriminate violence against an insurgency due to a lack of local intelligence can strengthen the resistance as such actions increase blowback within the local population. Recent US military doctrine concurs that “without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm” (Petraeus and Amos 2006).

Lyall and Wilson’s critique of the lack of HUMINT characteristic of modern mechanical COIN strategy holds true for the Soviet Union’s initial attempts to eliminate insurgencies in Ukraine and Lithuania. The lack of reliable intelligence due to an overreliance on Red Army soldiers who had few ties to the local communities ultimately proved ineffectual at eliminating either resistance movement. The Soviet COIN forces were only able to successfully oppress both resistances after they recognized the failure of their intelligence network and started recruiting former insurgents who were able to overcome the “identification problem.” In order to analyze the importance of former ‘bandits’ to the success of the Soviet COIN strategy, this paper will evaluate the strength of the post-war Lithuanian and Ukrainian insurgencies before and after the implementation of the new bandit-based intelligence network. Due to the lack of credible data concerning the overall numbers of insurgents and counterinsurgents killed or wounded from 1944 to 1953, this paper will rely on internal documents from both the Soviet government and the insurgencies themselves to evaluate success, which are more credible than other sources released to the public in the form of propaganda because they were never intended for public consumption and therefore better represent truthful evaluations of Soviet COIN strategy (Statiev 2005). Many of these documents were not publicly accessible until the collapse of the Soviet Union which explains some irregularities between Cold War scholarship on Soviet COIN efforts and more recent publications.

While the Soviet COIN strategies were quite similar in both Lithuania and Ukraine due to the coalescence of COIN forces from both areas, this paper will analyze the countries separately to show that the recruitment of former insurgents was key to the success of Soviet COIN across different ethnicities and cultures. The first section will offer a brief overview of the Lithuanian insurgency before evaluating the initial failure of Soviet counterinsurgency tactics in Lithuania and then analyzing the impact former insurgents had on the later success of Soviet forces. Similarly, the second section will recount the history of the Ukrainian resistance before analyzing Soviet COIN failures in Ukraine and the effect of the bandit-based intelligence network during the latter stages of Soviet COIN strategy. A final section evaluates the importance of other COIN tactics that could account for late-stage Soviet success and extrapolates lessons for future COIN efforts.

LITHUANIA

The Lithuanian postwar resistance movement, commonly known as the “For-
est Brothers,” had learned how to resist COIN forces from two previous occupations, the first Soviet occupation in 1940-1941 and the German occupation in 1941-1944. When the German military evacuated in 1944, Lithuanian resisters captured discarded German weaponry and fled to the forests in preparation for the second Soviet occupation (Reklaitis 2003). Misiunas and Taagepera estimate that the Lithuanian insurgency consisted of .5% to 1% of the total Lithuanian population at its peak which included a total of 30,000 fighters (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993). Statiev, on the other hand, calculated that the Lithuanian resistance movement included over 40,000 insurgents at its peak and 100,000 fighters over the entire insurgency (Statiev 2010). While there is some debate about the total number of Lithuanian insurgents, it is clear that they enforced a sustained and impactful resistance until the end of the decade. Unlike the centralized Ukrainian insurgency, the Lithuanian resistance movement included a number of military and political organizations that became active at different points during the insurgency. The Council for the Liberation of Lithuania, the United Democratic Resistance Movement, and the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK) all advocated for a combination of political and nonviolent resistance, but were soon overshadowed by more radical insurgent groups who promoted violent resistance of the Soviet occupiers (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993). By the end of 1944, the Lithuanian Liberation Army (LLA) splintered from the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania and formed a militant insurgent network throughout the rural countryside (Statiev 2010).

Initially, the LLA operated in large insurgent groups that pursued frontal attacks on the Red Army soldiers stationed in Lithuania (Statiev 2010). In the spring of 1945, an LLA division of 800 fighters successfully attacked a Red Army division near Tartu, and another insurgent battalion of over 300 fighters operated out of the Vilnius Province (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993). A large force of 350 insurgents also stormed the local jail in Zarasai, and were able to free the Lithuanian partisans imprisoned there (Reklaitis 2003). In fall of 1944, a Soviet officer reported that, Political banditism in the Lithuanian territory continues to grow. The bandits are attacking State and Party facilities, and killing Party, State, NKVD, and NKGB officials, and threatening and terrorizing leaders of the collective. The battle with the bandits to this point has not produced positive results, since the majority of the bandits hide in the woods (Reklaitis 2003).

While the large insurgent battalions were initially successful, the veteran soldiers of the Red Army were able to turn the tide, for they were better equipped for frontal battle than the insurgents who utilized a range of former German and Soviet weapons and had little military discipline. A month after its inception, the insurgent battalion in Vilnius was destroyed when the Red Army successfully killed
132 of the 300 fighters and arrested the rest (Statiev 2007). Another clash with the Red Army resulted in the deaths of 100 insurgents along the German-Soviet front while battalions of 194 fighters in Rokiskis and 218 insurgents in Marijampole were all destroyed in 1945 (Reklaitis 2003). The frontal attacks proved unsuccessful, and the battalions were unable to covertly reside in the dense Lithuanian forests without drawing the attention of Red Army patrols due to their large size.

In the face of failure, the Lithuanian insurgents altered their tactics in the winter of 1946-1947 to be more covert by restructuring the armed movement into smaller cells consisting of 5 resistance fighters that were able to live within the small rural towns without raising suspicion among the Soviet security forces (Reklaitis 2007). The conventional army forces that originally occupied Lithuania, and were thus in charge of oppressing any resulting resistance, became bogged down by the wooded terrain that prevented armored units from pursuing the elusive insurgent cells. The Soviet forces, while strong within urban centers, could not consolidate authority within the Lithuanian countryside which remained within the hands of the resistance movement. A Soviet officer reported that,

There is no trace of Soviet authority: Republican leaders do not visit the countryside, functionaries of the provincial party and administrative agencies do not travel beyond the district centers, and officials of the district centers do not visit villages and homesteads (Statiev 2007).

The evolution of the Lithuanian insurgency forced Soviet counterinsurgent forces to face the reality that their tactics were no longer viable. Even before the change in insurgent organization, Soviet efforts were ineffective in rooting out the leadership of the LLA, due to a lack of reliable intelligence and widespread utilization of regular Soviet army forces instead of special police operatives from the NKVD (Reklaitis 2003).

In order to rectify the major counterinsurgency failures, MVD Major A. M. Sokolov, a counterinsurgency expert who had previously worked in Western Ukraine, was placed in charge of the new Soviet COIN strategy in Lithuania. Sokolov attempted to overcome the cultural and ethnic differences that normally exposed Soviet covert operatives by utilizing local Lithuanians. However, the first attempts utilized operatives from the notorious “peoples’ defenders” with horrid results. Sokolov reported that,

The first special operation group organized from “peoples’ defenders” as bandit groups, produced poor results. Of the 18 special group members, 12 were thieves, who instead of working would steal, cause problems, and avoid all tasks assigned (Reklaitis 2003).

The local militias, which the Soviet forces referred to as the “peoples’ defenders,” had a deplorable reputation both among the Soviet officers and the local Lithuanian civilians. These bands of Lithuanian volunteers were poorly trained and often violent toward
civilians, which undermined the legitimacy of Soviet security in the rural communities.

It seemed at first that the destruction battalions were helpful and were working well and, since we did not have an army stationed here they would be an adequate fighting force against the bandits. Lately however, it has become evident that we can honestly say that with such a fighting force we will be unable to eliminate the existing bandit groups (Reklaitis 2003).

The Lithuanian volunteers were not only massively ineffective, but also “constantly drunk, driving through the farms and stealing possessions from the farmers” (Reklaitis 2003). Due to their incompetence and abuse against the local populous, Soviet police forces gradually phased out the use of “peoples’ defenders” until there were less than two hundred in 1954 (Reklaitis 2003).

After dismal results with the “peoples’ defenders,” Sokolov suggested an even more radical strategy: the utilization of former bandits themselves as Soviet counterinsurgency agents. He pinpointed the absence of an intelligence network as a key cause for the ineffectual raids against insurgent units:

I believe it’s best to organize these groups from bandits who have either been captured, legalized, or who have turned themselves in. We do not need to train such people how to be bandits. On the other hand, it has proven impossible to teach the “peoples’ defenders” how to carry-on like partisans. They did not know the bandit jargon, did not know how to properly wear bandit emblems, and were always stealing. The true bandits noticed all this and naturally suspected them of being soldiers. Thus we must use former bandits for these groups (Sokolov 2003).

While some bandits voluntarily joined the Soviet forces due to the extension of amnesty and protection for their families from being deported, the Soviet police mostly used insurgents captured through covert raids, whom they pressured to work with the counterinsurgents through torture and the threat of violence to their families.

Before the deportations, the leaders of these [bandit] bands never came forward and an organized legalization of these bands never occurred. After the deportation of their families, 29 gang leaders and 45 gangs, comprising 419 people, came, of their own volition, and legalized (Reklaitis 2003).

The 419 insurgents that came of their own volition paled in comparison to the entire movement, which boasted 100,000 resistance fighters. More often, insurgents would be captured by NKVD forces during a raid or when wounded fighting Soviet forces. During the interrogation, Soviet police would utilize
torture and intimidation to pressure bandits to turn on their fellow resisters.

If interrogators were unable to coerce insurgents to become Soviet agents, the COIN forces used a number of inventive tactics to extract information. When the insurgent leader Stankevicius was arrested by the Soviet police, he refused to divulge any information on local resistance fighters. Instead of continuing to pressure Stankevicius, the police informed him that he would be transported to Vilnius to be questioned further. During the journey, the two Soviet police officers simulated car malfunctions that required them to escort Stankevicius on foot to the next town for help. Along the way, former bandits dressed as insurgents ‘attacked’ the trio, ‘killing’ the officers and capturing Stankevicius. Once the former insurgents had Stankevicius sequestered in the woods, they accused him of being a double agent and demanded information as proof he was actually Stankevicius. He complied and the Soviet police were able to kill five insurgent chiefs based off his information (Reklaitis 2007). The former bandits were able to trick Stankevicius because they not only knew the language and local customs, but also understood protocol within the resistance due to their former roles. Once the insurgents agreed, voluntarily or otherwise, to become Soviet agents, they were offered ongoing compensation on a sliding scale depending on the validity and importance of their information as a method of ensuring loyalty (Statiev 2007).

The Soviet Union’s recruitment of former insurgents rooted out covert bunkers and resistance units, aided in the assassination of major insurgent leaders, created an unprecedented level of paranoia among the populous and resistance movement, and ultimately lead to the isolation of the insurgency from the West. While a systematic comparison of the actual number of bunkers and units targeted before and after the utilization of former bandits is hard to assess due to the lack of full access to Soviet records, the counterinsurgents themselves believed that the intelligence gleaned from former bandits was the key to oppressing the insurgency. A Lithuanian insurgent noted that “the enemy presses us most severely with their secret army, the agent network. Here we have our greatest reversals” (Statiev 2010). Statiev claims that by 1951, the Soviet police had 27,700 informers and hundreds of former insurgent agents strategically stationed with the resistance movement (Statiev 2010). Furthermore, four of the 46 chief Lithuanian insurgent leaders were Soviet agents by 1950 including Dr. Juozas Markulis, codename “Azuolas,” who became influential in the assassination of several other leaders within the movement and the obstruction of tactical Western support for the Lithuanian resistance (Rekalitis 2007). Former bandits that infiltrated the insurgency on behalf of the Soviet police not only ferried information to the counterinsurgents, but also acted as key agents in the Soviet effort to decapitate the Lithuanian resistance movement. Former bandits were known for mixing poison into drinks they served to high level insurgent leaders during resistance meetings (Rekalitis 2007). Once successfully recruited, the former bandits would suggest that insurgent leaders hold meetings at one of the 500 apartments in Lithuania run by the Soviet police for the sole purpose of trapping or assassinating resistance members. When the leaders exited the house after the meetings con-
cluded, they would be assassinated by the soldiers waiting for them (Rekalitis 2007).

The widespread presence of Soviet double agents created an environment of paranoia that led insurgent leaders to create and circulate kill lists that routinely purged the resistance of suspected traitors. While the insurgents were able to identify some genuine double agents, many of those killed did not work for the Soviet police. Therefore, the insurgents not only decimated their own ranks, but also propagated the belief that the resistance was unreliable and doomed to failure. The distrust created by a combination of Soviet COIN strategy and the insurgent’s own paranoia seeped into the civilian population which alienated supporters of the resistance, for they grew distrustful of the insurgents’ integrity (Rekalitis 2007). While previous insurgent proclamations cautioned the Lithuanian population against cooperating with Soviet collectivization efforts, their warnings about Soviet agents within the resistance took on a more desperate tone. One such warning stated,

The Bolsheviks have released provocateurs into our nation… These provocateurs, pretending to be partisans, collect food, clothing, and other materials from residents. What has occurred is that provocateurs manage to find people with weak orientations, who, not meaning any harm, tell them everything they know and end up helping the enemy. The Lithuanian partisans caution all inhabitants to not interact with these insidious types and to avoid contact with any unknown partisans or their supporters or provide them with any information or aid. If suspicious persons are seen, they should be immediately reported to the nearest partisan detachment. Those who ignore this declaration will be punished as enemies of the nation (Rekalitis 2007).

Unlike other warnings, this proclamation concerning ‘provocateurs,’ former bandits working as Soviet agents, encouraged the population to turn on each other in order to root out the Soviet agents and ultimately decimated insurgent recruitment. Other Soviet actions such as deportation strained the relationship between the populous and the insurgency, but eventually backfired as the indiscriminate deportation of Lithuanian peasants prompted thousands of civilians to join the resistance (Statiev 2005). The widespread intelligence network of former bandits created distrust between the resistance movement and their civilian supporters, as compared to the deportation era, during which the supporters were simply cautious. As the Lithuanian insurgency heavily relied on the rural population for supplies and legitimacy, the distrust fostered by the prevalence of former bandit-agents decimated the resistance.

Furthermore, the Lithuanian and Ukrainian resistance forces heavily relied upon the assumption that the West would eventually go to war with the Soviet Union or at the very least support the independence of Lithuania and Ukraine (Misiunas, Rein Taagepera 1993). While the United States and Britain never substantially supported either insurgency, there were attempts to smuggle émigré insurgents whom the
CIA and MI6 had trained in communications into the Western Borderlands to aid the technological capabilities of the resistance movements. However, Soviet double agents were able to alert the police of the drop sites which effectively eliminated tactical support from the West. During one such operation, M16 attempted to smuggle three émigré communications operatives through the Lithuanian-Baltic coastline. One of the émigrés, codenamed ‘Butautus,’ was a double agent working for the Soviet Union who alerted the Soviet police of the communications operatives immediately after they landed on the coast (Reklaitis 2003). The infiltration of double agents into the émigré network working with the Western intelligence agencies made Western tactical support futile. In a letter to the Ministry of State Security (MGB) chief in Lithuania, Soviet MGB Deputy Minister Pitovranov declared that their mission was “to send the English Intelligence agency down the wrong path and, by creating fictitious opportunities, the Soviet security forces can capture their agents” (Reklaitis 2003).

By 1953, the Lithuanian insurgency had, for all intents and purposes, ended. While the nationalist movement continued within the realm of politics and non-violent protest, the violent resistance of the LLA and other guerrilla groups had petered out. Misiunas and Taagepera estimate that Lithuanian insurgents numbered only 5,000 in 1950 and continued to decrease to 700 by the start of 1953 (Misiunas, Rein Taagepera 1993). While the last Lithuanian insurgent leader, Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas, wasn’t assassinated until 1956 after holding out in the Lithuanian wilderness for several years, the lack of Western support coupled with a robust Soviet intelligence network allowed the Soviet COIN force to eliminate most active resistance (Misiunas, Rein Taagepera 1993).

Ukraine

Unlike the Lithuanian resistance movement which was defined by a number of separate insurgent groups, the Ukrainian insurgency was highly centralized. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) acted as the political umbrella organization for domestic and émigré resisters from 1944 to the early 1950s. While the OUN created shadow government organizations in order to gain legitimacy among the population of Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) acted as the military branch of the OUN and conducted violent resistance against the Soviet occupiers (Zhukov 2007). Zhukov classified the OUN-UPA resistance movement as a separatist insurgency that fought for the Ukrainian independence in the face of both German and Soviet occupations (Zhukov 1997). The UPA’s experience fighting the Nazis gave it an advantage, as it galvanized nationalistic sentiment among the Western Ukrainian population and allowed the insurgents to create an entrenched support network throughout the countryside (Zhukov 1997). At their peak, the OUN-UPA boasted around 40,000 insurgents, while Statiev estimates that 400,000 Ukrainians actively supported or fought in the resistance movement from 1944 – 1959 (Statiev 2010). These numbers gave the UPA confidence in its ability to wage a protracted popular war against the Red Army. However, their confidence led to massive loss
of insurgent life during the initial surge against the Soviet occupiers (Burds 1997).

The Soviet forces were able to devastate the UPA’s ranks during the first stages of the insurgency, for the UPA initially fought a conventional war. The battle-hardened Red Army outmanned and outgunned the poorly organized insurgent units, but not without significant Soviet casualties. The most devastating conventional battle occurred during the Cheka-Military Operation which officially aimed to eliminate German-Ukrainian nationalists bands in Western Ukraine. 30,000 Soviet troops targeted 5,000 UPA insurgents who were forced to retreat, but were able to inflict a staggering 33% casualty rate among the Soviet soldiers (Johnson 1990).

After devastating initial losses, the UPA abandoned their use of frontal attacks on Soviet security forces and, instead, issued orders for the insurgency to reorganize into small covert units that were better equipped to utilize guerrilla warfare against the Soviet police as well as hide among the farms and villages in rural Western Ukraine. A Soviet COIN analyst reported that,

The active part of the “UPA” bands and OUN organizations do not as yet show any signs of disintegration and continue to operate. Proceeding from the [new] situation taking shape for them, they are changing the tactics of their struggle against Soviet power. At the present time “UPA” units have begun to avoid open struggle with the [Soviet] border troops (Burds 1997).

The UPA confirmed this assessment with their 1945 instructions to “continue[...] organizational, political and war work with full intensity, but more conspiratorially, in the deep underground” (Burds 1997). Furthermore, the OUN-UPA instructed the covert insurgent cells to dig a minimum of five underground hideouts per insurgent fighter in each village which thwarted the Soviet counterinsurgents’ ability to capture the armed resisters (Burds 1997). Even though the Soviet forces discovered 28,969 underground hideouts in 1946, the number of actual insurgents captured or killed in these hideouts was disproportionately small (Burds 1997). The Ukrainian insurgency knew their adoption of a more decentralized organizational structure would make it much more difficult for the Soviet COIN forces to successfully target the insurgency. “The Bolsheviks know that they cannot liquidate us with armed activity and terror alone” Ukrainian insurgent Bohun wrote on an internally circulated report in 1946 (Burds 1997).

When it became clear that the use of indiscriminate violence threatened the Soviet Union’s legitimacy in the region without effectively suppressing the Ukrainian insurgency, the Soviet COIN forces changed tactics. A lack of local intelligence prevented the counterinsurgents from taking targeted action against the resistance, In view of their weak agentura preparation, [Soviet] military operations in a majority of cases bring no results. Of 3,752 operations conducted in July [1946] in all [seven] western oblasts [of Ukraine], 2,813 or 75% [produced] no results whatso-
ever; of 4,238 ambushes, 3,929 or 93% likewise [produced] no results (Burds 1997).

The Soviet counterinsurgents had to rely upon human intelligence (HUMINT) due to complications with the rocky terrain and intermixing of insurgents with the local populations which prevented widespread technical surveillance. According to Lyall and Wilson, the Soviet’s clear inability to utilize machines in the mountainous Ukrainian countryside proved to be beneficial because it forced the counterinsurgents to create a comprehensive HUMINT network.

In order to remedy the intelligence deficit, Soviet counterinsurgents attempted to infiltrate the resistance movement. However, this proved more difficult than anticipated, due to local suspicion toward new resistance fighters. MVD Major A. M. Sokolov who worked with both the Ukrainian and Lithuanian counterinsurgent efforts reported that,

In order to gain admittance into bandit groups, our specialists often have to go through the families, supporters, or leadership of these bands, people living legally. This group often acts as a filter for newly arrived bandits. Thus our specialists now have to undertake bandit activity in order to gain the trust of the bandit support networks. Sometimes it involves a pre-arranged theft, but sometimes it involves an actual gunfight with our own troops (Reklaitis 2003).

However, Yuri Zhukov argues that “due to a number of distinguishing cultural and linguistic traits,” Soviet officers were immediately recognizable and thus unsuccessful at infiltrating resistance organizations in Ukraine (Zhukov 2007). Therefore, it became clear that the Soviet counterinsurgents would need to recruit local agents to infiltrate the Ukrainian resistance movement. Local militias in Ukraine, much like the “peoples’ defenders” in Lithuania, were ineffective. A Soviet report in 1946 stated that of the 42,175 raids conducted by the local militias, otherwise known as ‘destruction battalions,’ only 10% were successful (Burds 1997). Thus the Soviet police turned to former bandits to be the base for their “agentura” network.

In addition to providing a salary for converted insurgents who acted as informants or double agents, the Soviet police extended amnesty to insurgents who wished to defect from the resistance. Some low level insurgents were exonerated without any further service to the Soviet COIN effort beyond an initial divulgence of information. However, mid- and high-level insurgents were required to work for their amnesty by assisting the Soviet COIN effort (Zhukov 2007). More commonly, Soviet counterinsurgents would arrest entire villages in order to uncover UPA insurgents living among the civilian population; if they were able to successfully turn an insurgent, then that former bandit would often divulge the identities of other resisters in the area. The Soviet counterinsurgents would keep a number of villagers imprisoned so that the resistance movement could not identify which insurgents had been turned into Soviet agents. They often used this method to collect information from their agents as well. Khrushchev declared that,

In order to protect our informers and confuse bandits so that they could not identify the persons connected with NKVD and NKGB,
we ordered the heads of NKVD and NKGB provisional offices to summon many local residents… form interviews. This will protect our informers, because the confused bandits will commit terrorist acts against the hostile elements… In addition, the local population terrorized by bandits will be forced to actively resist them (Statiev 2010).

By 1948, the former insurgent network of agents and informers was so prevalent, that a UPA officer complained that “had I attempted to cleanse the [MGB] underground agents from Bukovina, only tress and stones would have remained” (Statiev 2010).

Former insurgents not only formed the basis of the Soviet intelligence network in Ukraine, but also conducted operations aimed at decapitating the OUN-UPA. Unlike ethnic Russian Soviet forces, commando groups of former bandits were able to successfully imitate insurgents, which allowed them to glean intelligence from local populations. A Soviet police officer explained that, “the population, intimidated by bandit terror and sometimes supporting OUN, is extremely reluctant to give information about bandits” (Statiev 2010). Yet former bandits operating in Soviet commando units could successfully impersonate insurgents and “enter into contact with the local population [and] receive information from it” (Statiev 2010). The Soviet bandit-agents were so prolific that one OUN officer commented,

The informer network works meticulously. It is impossible to move across the area without being spotted. Lodging in the village is out of the question. Informers are trained as well as circus dogs. They attentively study every resistance member passing by…. No hideout unknown to MVD-MGB exists in the village. The liaison between the informer network and MVD-MGB officers is excellent… They [the police] receive comprehensive information about the daily events in the village…. The number of informers among us is growing (Statiev 2010).

Based on information gathered by former insurgents within the agentura network, the Soviet police became increasingly successful at rooting out members of the insurgency. A Soviet field report concluded that “if there had been no agentura information, we would have found nothing” (Burds 1997). The Soviet network of former insurgents within Western Ukraine was so successful, that the UPA command explicitly blamed the agentura network for their downfall. OUN leader Ruslan wrote,

The Bolsheviks try to take us from within, through agentura. And this is a horrifying and terrible method, [since] you can never know directly in whose hands you will find yourself. At every step you can expect [an enemy] agent. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated … Agentura has brought major losses to the [Ukrainian underground] organization (Burds 1997).
Furthermore, the commando units carried out an impressive list of successful assassinations against major Ukrainian insurgent leaders including Fedir Vorobets, chief of the OUN-east region; Vasyl’ Sydor, head of UPA-west; Oleksa Hasin, commander of the UPA general staff; Vasul’ Okhimovych, leader of the OUN Carpathian region; and Vasyl’ Halasa, chief of the OUN-north-east region (Statiev 2010). The combination of raids conducted using information provided by the agentura network and assassinations carried out by strategically placed double agents crippled the Ukrainian resistance movement.

The prevalence of former bandits within the insurgency created a pervasive paranoia that strained the relationship that had developed between the insurgency and the local populous. The OUN-UPA became so worried about the agentura network, that they ordered local bands to exterminate traitors “with all available means (execution by firing squad, hanging and even quartering) … In the course of liquidating the designated persons, spare neither adult members of their families nor their children” (Burds 1997). Although the UPA had previously targeted civilian populations while disguised as Soviet soldiers in order to increase resentment toward the occupiers, their blatant actions against civilians and insurgents alike created distrust among the local populations. This environment of doubt harmed the basis of the insurgency identified by Zhukov as a “popular protracted war.”

The final act that broke the Ukrainian resistance was the Soviet Union’s obstruction of tactical Western support for the Ukrainian insurgents enabled through the information gleaned by former bandits imbedded within the émigré and domestic resistance movement. The Ukrainian insurgents, much like the Lithuanian resisters, relied on Western interference and support that they had given Greece and Turkey after the war. One insurgent reflected that “our people placed their hopes on America, England, the United Nations, on their ‘white ship’ of hope” (Peterson 2001). Initially, the Western powers did provide some tactical support for the Ukrainian insurgency. From 1948 until 1952, the CIA trained Ukrainian émigrés in Munich to operate as wireless communication operators and were parachuted into southern Poland and Ukraine along with radio equipment. These so called ‘couriers’ were codenamed APOSTLES, and were ordered to connect with members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground and report back with information. The CIA sent a total of 20 APOSTLES into Ukraine while the British SIS (M16) sent an additional 50 couriers from the OUN (Kuzio 2012). Soviet double agents such as Kim Philby were able to infiltrate the SIS and inform the Soviet intelligence service of the courier drop sites (Kuzio 1998). By 1952, it became clear that strategic assistance to the Ukrainian insurgents was a failure and the CIA turned to more indirect means of support such as the Prolog Research and Publishing Association which published Ukrainian nationalist material that was then smuggled into the Soviet Union (Kuzio 1998). However, widespread strategic support from the West never materialized due to the initial failures caused by the agentura network.

After 1952, the Ukrainian insurgency was effectively non-existent within Western Ukraine even though resistance leaders still operated outside of the Sovi-
et Union and any hope for resurgence ended with the 1959 assassination of OUN leader Stephan Bandera in Munich (Zhukov 2007). The success of the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy rested largely on the extensive network of former insurgents who revitalized the formerly ineffective effort through their information and assassination operations. Jeffrey Burds concurs that “the Soviet victory was won with the development of an effective spy network in West Ukraine” which relied upon former bandits and double agents who were able to covertly work within the resistance movement (Burds 1997). Similarly, while Yuri Zhukov critiqued the Soviet COIN strategy for neglecting the political and economic aspects in favor of a militaristic approach, he admitted the importance of “UPA defectors and captured insurgents who could effectively infiltrate the OUN-UPA apparatus” (Zhukov 2007).

**Conclusion**

Soviet counterinsurgency tactics in postwar Eastern Europe were remarkably similar across ethnicities. While the timeline differed between the COIN efforts in Lithuania and Ukraine, Statiev notes that the pacification strategy was largely uniform (Statiev 2010). Information and Soviet officers flowed between the two countries, which allowed the COIN forces to learn from their collective failures and successes in the Western borderlands. One counterinsurgency expert, Sokolov, who worked in both Ukraine and Lithuania concluded that “we can extend such [counterinsurgency] practices to all countries in the Soviet western borderlands, since the same NKVD/NKGB officers often move from one republic to another, depending on the degree of local resistance” (Reklaitis 2007). While there is little evidence that the two insurgencies ever collaborated or communicated regularly, they both followed a similar pattern. The UPA and LLA both initially pursued a conventional war against the Red Army through the use of large battalions before reorganizing their military due to the substantial loss of insurgent lives sustained during frontal attacks. After both insurgencies reorganized into covert units that operated among the civilian peasantry, the Soviet counterinsurgents were forced to change tactics when their indiscriminate attacks proved ineffective at eliminating the insurgencies. In both cases, the Soviet police were able to establish a widespread intelligence network through the recruitment of former insurgents, which not only decreased the number of enemy combatants, but also solved the information gap that had formerly crippled Soviet COIN efforts. It was only after the adoption of former bandits as informants and agents that the Soviet counterinsurgents saw sustained success against the Lithuanian and Ukrainian resistance movements.

While many Cold War scholars attributed the success of the Soviet counterinsurgency to the erosion of the resistance’s support through the widespread deportation of any civilians who supported the Lithuanian and Ukrainian insurgencies, documents released after the collapse of the Soviet Union cast doubt on this argument. In his article “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations in the Western Borderlands,” Alexander Statiev argues that deportations were highly effective at eliminating popular support for the insurgencies in the West-
ern Borderlands when they were first introduced in 1944. A Soviet official noted, 

Of course, the deportation of the [guerrillas’] families is not a goal but a means for the promptest eradication of banditry, but I must say that this means is very effective (Reklaitis 2003).

However, later that same year General Tkachenko who was the acting NKGB Chief in Lithuania commented that “the bandits have intensified their resistance. Over just 4 days in September, they have killed or abducted 27 Soviet activists” (Reklaitis 2003). Statiev claims that if the Soviet government had used deportation selectively, only against civilian supporters of the insurgency, then the tactic may have succeeded in eliminating popular backing of the insurgencies. However, due to the additional targeting of wealthy and productive ‘kulak’ farmers, those peasants joined the insurgency in droves which counteracted the original effect of the deportation scheme. Of the civilians scheduled to be deported, 10,000 of the expected 48,000 Lithuanians fled to the woods (Statiev 2010). A Soviet official stationed in Lithuania noted that “the majority of the bandits hide in the woods” when it was time for them to be deported (Reklaitis 2003). Deportations were a strategic part of eliminating mass numbers of the insurgent’s civilian support network, but this tactic was unable to eradicate the resistance movement and even backfired, as disgruntled Lithuanians and Ukrainians who had originally been neutral, chose to join the insurgency instead of being deported to Siberia. Jeffrey Burds concurs that the sheer size and resiliency of the UPA negated other COIN efforts such as deportation, and that “the war against the well-entrenched and highly conspiratorial Ukrainian underground could only be won with a wide base of informants and local agents [former bandits],” which also holds true in the Lithuanian case (Burds 1997).

The success of the Soviet bandit-based intelligence network has far-reaching implications for COIN strategy. Future counterinsurgents may be able to counteract both the intelligence gap produced by the overreliance on mechanical warfare and an inability to differentiate between resistance fighters and civilians by utilizing former insurgents as agents as well as informants. However, it is important to note that the Soviet method of recruiting former bandits may not be palatable for democratic nations with a strong commitment to human rights. While the Soviet Union was able to entice a number of insurgents to become Soviet operatives through the promise of amnesty and payment, many of the bandits were subjected to intense and often abusive interrogations before complying with their captors. Zhukov notes that “information obtained while the subject is under extreme duress can often be unreliable,” and such acts can be utilized by the resistance as propaganda to stoke resentment amongst the civilian population (Zhukov 2007). However, the bandits proved reliable in postwar Lithuania and Ukraine, for the Soviet counterinsurgents were able to oppress both insurgencies through the widespread bandit-based intelligence network. Nonetheless, liberal democracies should be cautious in what methods they use to recruit insurgents.
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**ADDRESSING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES**

Bill Kosmidis

This paper discusses the opportunities and potential pitfalls of the demographic expansion occurring on the African continent. A country’s or region’s population determines much about its future, including resource distribution, economic growth, and policy initiatives. By analyzing the current challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa in relation to its young, rapidly growing population and the measures implemented by other countries that historically faced similar challenges, this paper offers several policy recommendations that could help the region take advantage of its demographic dividend.

I. Introduction

The population size of a country is a powerful indicator of that country’s ability to provide its citizens with crucial services, manage its resources, and organize society. Therefore, overpopulation, the condition of being populated with excessively large numbers, poses a massive threat to the ability of a country to systematically support its people. This threat is mitigated when countries implement population control policies, but these measures are often controversial and are distorted from their point of creation at the legislative level to their implementation at the local level by several factors. Scholar T.J. Samuel defines a policy of population control as “a policy deliberately formulated and implemented by a government, with the primary intention of reducing the rate of population growth through a reduction in the rate of fertility” (Samuel 1966). The African continent presents a complex case study of this demographic phenomenon because it lacks effective population control policy implementation despite its status as the second most populous region in the world with around 1.3 billion people and an average fertility rate of 4.66 births per woman (Worldometers 2018). However, the problem of overpopulation is most drastically felt in sub-Saharan Africa where fertility rates are still incredibly high. Therefore, Sub-Saharan African nations must position themselves towards a demographic dividend through population control policies in order to achieve sustainable development for their people. To explore this argument, this paper will first trace the background of overpopulation in sub-Saharan Africa. Next, there will be an analysis of the status quo demographic challenges, followed by the case study of the Asian Tigers. Lastly, this paper will offer policy recommendations on how to overcome the obstacles currently plaguing sub-Saharan Africa’s management of its population and then conclude with remarks on whether Africa can achieve a demographic dividend.

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II. Background: Demographic Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa
The central challenge of demographic structures, namely sub-Saharan Africa’s high fertility rates, is their ability to hamper development and stall growth. In fact, the Berlin Institute found that in a study of 103 current and former developing countries, no single country developed socioeconomically without a parallel decrease in the fertility rate of their population (Sippel 2011). This makes it clear that development is closely linked to population and the demographic structure of country. The most predominant and severe development policy problems today are in sub-Saharan Africa, with 33 out of the 48 least developed countries in the world being located in this part of Africa (Sippel 2011). Simultaneously, this region stands out with the highest fertility rates in the world, with around 4.66 births per woman, which is nearly double that of India (2.43), the second most populous country in the world (World Bank 2015). Additionally, this trend shows little to no trace of slowing down dramatically: current estimates show that by 2050, the number of people living in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to double, and then quadruple, by the end of the century (Sippel 2011). The size of sub-Saharan Africa’s population and the scope of its current fertility rates, outpacing every other region in the world, can be clearly viewed in Figure A in the Appendix. This image truly shows how severe this problem of exponential population growth is in Africa, making it incredibly important for the continent to address this challenge before it spirals out of control. Moreover, one of the most unique features of this region’s demographic problem is the high proportion of the population that is between 15 and 24 years old, which is estimated to be over 200 million people or 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa (Aribisala 2013). In certain nations, like Niger and Uganda, this issue is particularly striking with half of their population being under the age of 15 (Sippel 2011). This young population is projected to more than double by 2050, when as many as 800 million Africans are expected to be between the ages of 25 and 59 (Sippel 2011). As this current mega-generation of young Africans age, the continent will see a huge shift in its working force over the next decade. This impending change in the demographic structure of the continent presents an interesting economic opportunity for countries in Africa seeking to get ahead of the challenges presented by their high fertility rates. With a young African labor force that would be relatively cheap, nations and multinational companies could utilize this new generation to foster production, development, and sustainable growth across the continent.

III. Status Quo: Causes of Demographic Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa
Explanations for the demographic challenges in sub-Saharan Africa take many forms, but central drivers of this problem are local preferences, ethno-cultural customs, and ineffective policymaking. Scholar John May posits that defeatist attitudes toward reproduction, such as notions like “God will provide” or that children are “up to God,” have impacted traditional high child-rearing behavior
by African couples. Another driver is the pragmatic economic advantages of having many children in rural farming settings, which continue to encourage high fertility preferences in sub-Saharan Africa where agrarian communities are widespread (May and Growth 2017). Giving birth to many children is a practical insurance policy, both as a source of free labor and as an old age pension later when the children take care of the elderly, for the 80% of people in sub-Saharan Africa who are subsistence farmers with no little to no state support (Perkins 2010). Furthermore, religious norms have the same impact as Islamic and Catholic practices often promote large families and condemn contraceptive use. With religion often playing a large role in the lives of African families, especially rural communities, the spread of myths and harmful perceptions about family planning techniques can sabotage effective population control policies. These factors have contributed to the reality that only 26% of couples in sub-Saharan Africa use modern contraceptive methods, such as condoms, birth control, and intrauterine devices and systems (May and Growth 2017). On the other hand, African leaders and policymakers have historically shown little interest in curbing fertility rates and often share in the traditional social norms and customs of their constituencies (May and Growth 2017). The most common arguments African policymakers make to defend their lackluster policies call upon their fear of encountering aging population issues facing developed economies like Japan, their suspicion towards the motivations of Western countries seeking to curb rapid population growth in Africa, and their perception that large populations will be socially, economically, and politically advantageous for their countries (May and Growth 2017). There are also several African leaders who mistakenly argue that Africa is underpopulated, pointing to the fact that Africa has a population density of only 33%, as compared with 87% for Asia and 70% for Europe (Aribisala 2013). However, this misleading statistic ignores the incredibly high fertility rate for the continent as compared to these other regions in addition to the compounded reality that there is a lack of development, universal family planning education, and accessible health services in Africa, which all contribute to the uniquely problematic demographic challenges of Africa. There is also little evidence to suggest that Africa’s development is being held back by a simple lack of manpower, as suggested by proponents of this under population theory. Instead, the reality is that there is ample need for investment in the economy to create stable job markets, sustainable growth in industries, and long-term economic prosperity. Ultimately, leading research shows that persistent preferences for high fertility rates and limited implementation capacity by policymakers have impeded population policies from considerably lowering fertility rates (Robinson 2017).

IV. Case Studies: The Asian Tigers
This incremental and unpresented growth, if remained unchecked, can either divide Africa into nations stuck in cycles of lackluster development or function as a dividend for growth. Countless case studies exist to serve as role models for sub-Saharan Africa for the best practices in utilizing its demographic situation to its advantage.
History has shown us that countries with the greatest demographic opportunity for development are those that begin to have a sizeable and healthy working-age population and a smaller number of youth dependents (UNPF). Thus, the key to restructuring a population’s age demographics so that there are proportionally fewer children and more people of working age is to decrease fertility rates. Fewer children per household often means there are much “larger investments per child, more freedom for women to enter the formal workforce, and more household savings for old age,” which can create large national economic payoffs (UNPF). The United Nations Population Fund refers to this phenomenon as the “demographic dividend” (UNPF). The success stories of the Asian Tigers (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong) demonstrate that massive leaps in development are possible when nations are able to translate large youth population booms into an effective working class to fuel economic growth (Population Reference Bureau 2012). The experiences of the Asian Tigers are comparable to the current status of many sub-Saharan African countries that find themselves in the similarly underdeveloped circumstances that the Asian Tigers faced before their economic industrializations. The important lesson to learn from the successes of the Asian Tigers that grew out of their demographic challenges, however, is that considerable investments into family planning, education, and the job market are crucial. Research shows that an estimated one-third of all economic growth in East and Southeast Asia was due to investments in addressing these demographic challenges, which is lasting proof of the power of wielding the demographic dividend in your favor (Population Reference Bureau 2012). If Africa can harness this favorable age structure, the continent can effectively boost development in nations struggling to catch up to modern economies across the globe.

V. Policy Recommendations
One of the most powerful targeted reforms that also works to improve the implementation of population control policies is education. The clearest roadblock to the existing cultural norms across Africa is a lack of education about contraceptives and family planning techniques. For illiterate rural couples, their lack of knowledge about the availability of family planning services and government health programs to assist them in maintaining small family sizes inhibits the success of implementation. In fact, a study of the correlation between education and fertility in India found an unmistakable pattern: “all of the high fertility states had distressingly low literacy rates; all of the low fertility states were well above the national average in literacy” (Suri, 1991). Therefore, allocating funds to ensuring maternal health, family planning, and birth control education are provided at the local level across African states is crucial, especially given that many of these developing African states have low literacy rates. This should be done by developing programming in health clinics across Africa to offer family planning curriculum by trained professionals in town hall meetings, perhaps offering a free meal to improve attendance in communities that are less likely to be interested in attending these meetings. Critics will argue that the education solution fails to resolve
problems such as frequent absenteeism by local teachers, who share the same cultural norms as their students, in addition to poor school and health center infrastructures. Transparency International, which released The Global Corruption Report: Education in 2013, revealed that 8 of the top 20 countries around the world that are the most severely affected by teacher absenteeism are in sub-Saharan Africa (See Figure B in the Appendix) (Transparency International 2013). If politicians can encourage a system of accountability by fining teachers that miss family planning lessons in local schools then young couples might have a chance at receiving the proper education. It is worth noting that since teachers are also a valuable voting population, a fine for absenteeism is unlikely to be implemented or enforced, even if passed by the government. A specific measure to combat this concern is the creation of direct public-private partnerships with nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that are already doing the work in Africa of teaching women about prenatal health and birth control practices. By offering these NGOs specific contracts through the government, their effective campaigns can be expanded to reach across Africa on a larger scale, while ensuring the staffers sent to do the job are people passionate about their work and less likely to be absent from their educational role. Outsourcing the job to these NGO workers could be a potentially powerful method for cutting training and program creation costs for the government while providing much needed reliable education to African families. To address the demographic challenges in Africa, there must also be a widespread movement to empower women and achieve gender equity across Africa. It is undeniable that there is a direct correlation between the level of education and the number of children a woman has, making it crucial to educate women and ensure the same level of educational access as men. Increasing girls’ education not only improves their access to knowledge, but also empowers them to make better decisions and lead their lives with confidence (Perkins 2010). Better educated and empowered women are more likely to have better control over their bodies and have less children. Securing equal education for women also allows for greater economic opportunity and jobs for women. Furthermore, the female empowerment that comes with liberalized access to women's health products and services, from birth control to abortions, can help overcome the stigma in cultural practices that inhibit women from taking greater control over their bodies and having a greater say in their family affairs, including how many children to have. This side effect is one that will be incredibly beneficial in the long run in propelling a seismic shift in Africa’s social hierarchies and cultural norms, particularly those surrounding gender. Once Africa is able to educate, empower, and offer women access to health facilities and family planning support, then there can be a reduced fertility rate across the continent. Another method to spread family planning, outside of education and female empowerment, is expanding access to high-quality health services to all people. The proliferation of health clinics across African can have sweeping impacts on the use of contraceptives simply by making them readily available to couples. If we could empower more regions with these health services, then more newly-weds could get access to family
planning support and understand the financial disincentives of having many children and not using birth control. In a McKinsey report on strengthening sub-Saharan Africa’s health systems, they found that improving access to health care and increasing its performance “requires action on several fronts simultaneously—including new delivery models to increase access, a greater role for nonprofit and private organizations in service delivery, and the introduction of performance incentives to improve it” (Bryan 2010). Thus, nations across Africa must implement these reforms to revamp the health care industry on the continent and secure access to crucial health services. Additional facilities and investment in proper health clinic infrastructure will also be necessary to create long lasting change in this sector. With stable infrastructure and improved access to health care services, families all across Africa can receive the proper medical support needed to create meaningful change in family planning patterns across the continent. Hardline critics will say education and improved health services aren’t enough, relying on a comparative look at how China, the world’s most populated country, has responded to the same problem of overpopulation with the one-child policy. China’s one-child policy (instituted between 1979-2015), however, a coercive and draconian measure that limited households to one child in order to sharply curb the unstable growth of the country’s population, is unlikely to be implemented in Africa. Instituting a one-child policy would be political suicide in many African nations, especially considering the voting bloc of farmers and rural citizens that rely on and perpetuate high fertility rates because of the value they see in their children's labor in addition to the cultural norm of having large families. Furthermore, this policy would likely heighten sex-selective abortions since limiting an African family to one child would cause a skew towards men because of the heightened value that agrarian, traditional African families place on male children, leading to a whole new potential, population-wide demographic crisis in bride shortages. Finally, there must be a greater effort at expanding Africa’s economy to provide ample economic opportunity for Africa’s youth to participate in the push for achieving a demographic dividend. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), between 18 million and 20 million new jobs, which is roughly equal to the entire population of Mali or Niger, will be needed annually over the next 25 years on the continent to match the rapid population growth (May and Growth 2017). If ignored, this approaching demand for mass employment can drag development and growth in sub-Saharan Africa’s least developed nations. However, if this ballooning workforce is harnessed correctly by investing in industry growth and job creation in preparation of the relatively large cheap labor force, then Africa can create sustainable economic development. Large population booms, like the current demographic structure on the African continent, can be engines for prosperity with proper coordination between government policies and private sector growth. Alongside economic policy solutions in the job market, however, there must be careful consideration of growing concerns on the horizon, such as the management of urban populations and urbanization problems like housing. For example, the rise of slums in Lagos, Nigeria and Johannes-
burg, South Africa have led to the expansion of substandard living conditions, health hazards, and rampant crime across these overpopulated hubs (Population Reference Bureau 2012). These interrelated issues are not currently being addressed and only stand to get worse if Africa’s overpopulation is not addressed with policy changes.

VI. Conclusion

Despite the opportunity to reach a demographic dividend, Africa will be unable to realize sustainable development in the absence of policies seeking to accelerate the decline in fertility rates. In a study on the pace of early stage fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa, demographic researchers found that fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa has been considerably slower in other, comparable regions that were once at similarly early stages of the transition across Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Northern Africa (Shapiro and Hinde 2017). This means that sub-Saharan Africa will continue to be plagued by rapid population growth and constrained development due to the high fertility levels, absence of population control policies, and the slower pace of fertility decline. To address the obstacles preventing sub-Saharan Africa from achieving a demographic dividend, African nations must invest in creating ample employment opportunities in the job market to accommodating the ballooning youth population that will soon reach working age. Only then can African nations harness their human capital effectively to boost productivity and grow economically. Moreover, universal family planning education must be provided to address ethno-cultural challenges in reducing fertility rates, such as parental prestige in having a large family or the disfavor and suspicion that local leaders have regarding birth control measures, which only further spread misinformation to local communities in sub-Saharan Africa (Aribisala 2013). Education is not only the best “contraceptive” for better family planning, but also the best instrument to achieve gender equality and empower all people. These two solutions alone, however, would not be enough to address the demographic challenges if the region does not secure access to proper health facilities for distribution of contraceptives and other health resources, such as pre-natal care, that can make a difference in population control policy initiatives. Empirically, the effectiveness of these solutions is demonstrated in the well-organized family planning program in Ethiopia, which has seen a decrease its total fertility rate by almost two children between 1990 and 2010 (May 2017). If Sub-Saharan African nations can successfully overcome potential pitfalls in implementing these policies over the next decades, comprehensive programs can help the region reach a future with a stable population. Demographic stability will then allow sub-Saharan African nations to distribute their resources efficiently, provide much needed services to its populations, and develop modern societies capable of achieving social liberalization and gender equality.
**Figure A: Fertility Rates Around the World, 2017**

**Figure B: Teacher Absenteeism Rates Around the World, 2013**
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Interview with Dr. Peter DeShazo ’69: Colombia and the FARC

Peter DeShazo ’69 is a Visiting Professor at Dartmouth who teaches courses relating to politics and economics in Latin America. A former, U.S. government official, Professor DeShazo spent three decades in the foreign service with postings in both Washington D.C. and embassies abroad. In addition to his academic and government positions, Professor DeShazo has served as the Director of the Americas program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Executive Director of LASPAU, the Harvard-affiliated non-profit organization called the Academic and Professional Programs for the Americas.

World Outlook: To start, could you tell us about your experience in Latin America generally, and specifically in Colombia?

Peter DeShazo: I maybe lived 20 years in Latin America. My experiences span the gamut...after Dartmouth I had a one-year scholarship to attend a Chilean University on a Dartmouth scholarship, the Reynolds Scholarship. I spent time there doing graduate work for my PhD, research, and other short term projects. Then, I [spent] 27 years in the Foreign Service with five postings in Latin America, including Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. So I lived three years in Medellín; I was the last American diplomat to reside in Medellín. I was there in the early 1980s, and then I visited the region many times after retiring from the Foreign Service, and often went back to Colombia then. I [spent] four years directing a not-for-profit organization affiliated with Harvard that promotes higher education in Latin America so I went many times back to Colombia after that. So, I lived in Colombia but I have periodically visited Colombia since retiring from the Foreign Service. So I worked on Colombia a lot.

WO: A lot of people think of the TV show Narcos when they mention Colombia today. Have you seen it, and if so, what are your thoughts on it given your experience down there?

PD: I am probably the only person around who hasn’t seen the program. I should. The whole phenomenon of drugs in Colombia has been something that has been central to my work there, and central to the U.S. relationship with Colombia for a long time. [There is] clear fascination that people have with the Medellín Cartel, the figure of Pablo Escobar, and everything else, and there is almost a sort of weird tourism in Medellín related to Pablo Escobar. I was stationed in Medellín when Pablo Escobar was elected to the Colombian Congress as an alternate delegate representative in the lower house in 1982, and could see first-hand the effects of the rising...
power and influence of the Medellín Cartel. Those were years when they were really ramping up their ability to ship industrial quantities of cocaine to the United States. So the money was pouring in, and it was very clear that they were increasingly more powerful. You could see the damage that they were causing the city of Medellín, to its local economy but also the fabric of Colombian society that was starting to become really strained, and years later would sort of almost become unglued.

**WO:** In terms of the drug trade, how would you say it has affected the development of Colombia over the past few decades in relation to its Latin American neighbors?

**PD:** The cocaine commodity chain, if you want to call it that, was a regional deal. It linked Peru and Bolivia to Colombia. There was an illegal commodity chain that was preceded in the past century, in the nineteenth century, by a legal chain in cocaine, which Peru was the main supplier of coca leaf and cocaine. But cocaine was a widely used and distributed product in the United States and Europe in the 19th century, until in the early 20th century, it increasingly was made illegal and banned. It affected the whole region, but Colombia became the sort of centerpiece of the narcotics business, especially beginning in the 1990s. The cartels were vertically organized, so that cocaine or coca leaf was grown in Colombia rather than bringing in coca base from Peru and Bolivia. The leaf was planted on a massive scale in Colombia, and the cartels began to control the entire commodity chain, from the leaf to cocaine hydrochloride that was then smuggled into the United States. This concentrated, billion-dollar business in Colombia had an obviously large effect on all aspects of Colombian society; it affected the economy, it affected politics, and it had an effect on security. It had a hugely negative consequence in putting Colombia on the road towards being a very flawed and very weakened state by the end of the 1990s.

**WO:** The drug trade is still a central problem in Colombia. What do you think, if anything, the U.S. can do on the demand side to try to mitigate this issue?

**PD:** Well, this has always been a question: how the U.S. deals with the issue of drugs and drug addiction. The Colombians and others have pointed out that the United States has a deep responsibility in the overall drug issue because it’s a country that has been a major consumer of drugs from Latin America. Increasingly now more and more cocaine is going to Europe. So, it’s not just a U.S.-driven demand, but larger international demand and there’s more demand in Latin America than there used to be. But still, U.S. demand is still a key factor. The U.S. needs to combat drugs on a broad scale, but the past focus on criminalization of all aspects of drugs, of mass incarceration, hasn’t worked. There has to be a more open-minded approach. I think President Obama was moving in that direction of treating the drug problem as a medical problem, as a social problem, as an economic problem and
not just as a law enforcement issue and I think the U.S. has to continue that kind of a balanced approach. Drugs aren’t going to go away but the point is how to reduce the harm that it causes to individuals, to society, and try to limit that damage.

**WO:** With the current [American presidential] administration threatening to decertify Colombia as a partner in fighting the drug trade, do you think this points to an intention to have a more unilateral approach? And if so, is that appropriate or do you think there should be a much more connected effort between us and the Colombian government?

**PD:** Drugs are a multinational problem and the approach has to be multilateral. To decertify Colombia serves no purpose. Clearly the United States is displeased with and worried about the spike in coca production in Colombia that’s taken place since about 2014 and 2015, and the Colombians are too, and they ought to be. But, the United States has always been more effective in its support for Colombia when that cooperation with the Colombian government has been active and has been channelled toward productive ends. The United States needs Colombia as a partner and needs other countries in the region as partners. We do much better if we are working in tandem and not acting unilaterally to sanction Colombia. We need to be able to cooperate and to elicit more cooperation, and that should be our goal.

**WO:** Now turning to the peace deal that was reached with the FARC rebels: originally it was posed as a referendum to the Colombian population, which narrowly rejected it. Do you have any insight as to what the main reasons for public opposition were?

**PD:** Well, there’s very little public support for the FARC and that’s been the case for the entire history of the FARC. If you look at the FARC record in the last elections with the candidates, they were getting less than 1% support. So, the people have no sympathy for the FARC; the vast majority of Colombians believe that the FARC was a deeply negative force in the country and were displeased with aspects of the peace plan. But it’s a kind of no-win situation for Colombia: you want to get the FARC off the books, you want them to come to terms, you want to reach an agreement that they will agree to, and you get them demobilized. But it’s not going to be a clean or neat deal; it’s going to be messy. The paramilitary demobilization in 2005, the Justice of the Peace Law, was deeply criticized and, yet, in that agreement, major paramilitary leaders went to jail. None of the FARC leaders are going to jail. There’s a lot to criticize in the deal. But, what’s the alternative? And so, you have to say that it’s not going to be an agreement that will please everyone, it’s going to have some unfortunate or less than desirable terms in it. But, the effect of demobilizing the bulk of the FARC, getting them back into society, reincorporating them, is an important goal. It’s a really difficult for us, the real difficulty now is implementing the agreement. It’s
understandable why the Colombians didn’t like it, it’s also understandable that most of them are in favour of actually supporting it and getting the FARC demobilized.

**WO:** The new [Colombian] president [Iván Duque] has been openly vocal about the agreement and has even said he would revisit it and possibly revise it. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the plan’s implementation?

**PD:** I think the plan will be implemented and I think President Duque will not walk it back—I don’t think he should, and I hope he doesn’t. But, implementing the plan will be difficult for any administration. It requires substantial investment on the part of the Colombian government, a lot of cooperation that could come from other sources; the private sector has to be involved, the NGO community, the Colombian people have to be open to the idea of the former FARC guerrillas and their sympathisers reintegrating into society. There has to be major investments in the judicial sector to try to bring justice and compensation to the victims of the civil conflict while the FARC was in the field. There has to be an assurance that the FARC is going to carry out their obligations in terms of turning over its weapons, of fully demobilizing, of not engaging in direct trafficking, and of turning over the illicit gains that it has accumulated. So that will be very difficult. Beyond that, there are elements of the FARC that had no intention of demobilizing, especially those linked to drug trafficking. Just like the paramilitaries, there were...mid-grade leaders in the FARC who are going to be continuing to carry out their illegal activities—crime, drugs—and have basically moved into the criminal sector full time. And dealing with them will be also a challenge for the Colombian state.

**WO:** And what role, if any, should the United States play in this process?

**PD:** The United States needs to be supportive and open-minded about the process. Its support for Colombia has been long standing. Colombia has been the largest recipient of U.S. economic support, bilateral assistance, in Latin America for a long time. Increasingly, that support has been oriented more towards the economic development side and towards promoting a stronger judiciary, human rights, that kind of thing. U.S. support for the Colombian judiciary is really important. Strengthening the rule of law in Colombia and strengthening the capability of the Colombian government to administer justice is really key. The Colombian government needs to build up the quality of the police and the police presence to take over from the military in areas where the FARC and the other illegal armed groups were operating. There has to be a major effort at establishing effective state presence in different areas of the country. That requires not just the military or the police. It’s not just a security issue, although that’s the first important step, but it’s got to be followed up with effective government, meaning judicial authorities, educational resources, teachers, schools, healthcare, infrastructure; there needs to be more tertiary road building and economic support. If you’re going to wean farmers and others, rural dwellers, from
growing coca leaf you’ve got to have an alternative to that. So, there’s a huge challenge involved in especially the areas where the FARC used to operate in breaking down the gulf between urban Colombia and rural Colombia and reaching out to these sectors of the country and integrating more fully urban areas with rural parts of Colombia.

**WO:** In terms of armed groups that have not yet demobilized, what kind of threat do they pose?

**PD:** Fortunately, their threat is no longer a [larger] threat to the Colombian state as it was at the end of the 1990s. What was a vital national security issue has become more of a law enforcement issue. Colombia has to be careful that it doesn’t go beyond law enforcement. But again, the problems that led to the rise of the FARC in the first place back in the 1960s... those problems are still present today. The Colombians are going to have to devote a whole lot more attention and a whole lot more money to rural areas than they have in the past.

**WO:** How have other Latin American countries been involved in the peace process thus far and to what extent?

**PD:** The Cubans hosted the talks and there were other countries in Latin America that worked in the support group. Clearly, Colombia’s neighbors have a big role; Brazil as a leading regional power in Latin America, and as one of the largest economies in the world, could play an important and helpful role. Other regional countries that border on Colombia [like] Ecuador can play a helpful role. Venezuela’s role has varied from being extremely unhelpful at one point during the Chavez administration to now being a situation where the key issue between Venezuela and Colombia is the large number of Venezuelans who are migrating into Colombia. Hundreds of thousands are putting a great deal of pressure on Colombia’s resources. And Venezuela’s political, social, and economic meltdown has been, for Colombia, an additional cause of concern, but that’s another issue.

**WO:** Since the FARC is losing political popularity, do you think that this will make other armed groups who still have not demobilized less likely to so if they’re seeking political representation?

**PD:** It’s not a question of them losing their support because they never really had much. The fact that the FARC has no real political support is sort of a wake up call for others. These last elections one would hope the ELN would look at and say—I mean the ELN has probably deluded itself into thinking it does have political support. The FARC for a long time thought it was popular. That’s why it was really important that the FARC participate in free and fair elections to be able to test its popularity, and it came up pretty short.
The FARC got a really good deal in terms of its representation in Congress—10 set aside seats. They could not have won under any circumstances in an election. In essence, the FARC is way over-represented. But you know, that was part of the deal. Whether or not the Colombians will again offer that kind of deal to the ELN—which is still a much smaller group than the FARC and has even less political support than the FARC did—that will be more difficult to do now that it’s very clear that the FARC’s political support was very slight. It remains to be seen what kind of deal the ELN will get or accept. Maybe the Colombian government is going to change course, who knows.

Still, the solution for the ELN is going to be a political solution, unlikely to be a military solution. It was very clear always that the demobilization of the FARC would come from not some dramatic final military victory on the part of the government of Colombia. The FARC had to be neutralized militarily but the end result would be some sort of a political solution and I assume that will be the case for the ELN.

**WO: Several other Latin American countries have suffered through similar internal conflict like Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, just to name a few. Are there lessons learned from other peace processes that you think apply to Colombia as well?**

**PD:** The difference between, for example, El Salvador and Colombia was large because El Salvador more resembled a civil war in which there were large sectors of the population that supported the FLMN [Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front]. That was not the case in Colombia; Colombia was not a civil war. It was a conflict of an insurgency that had gotten substantial control over largely depopulated areas and enjoyed enormous economic resources from drug trafficking. It was never a question of large numbers of Colombians who were supporting the regime. Also, the FLMN in the conflict in El Salvador was oftentimes a very right-wing military dominated government against a left-wing insurgency. Colombia was an elected government that was widely legitimate against the FARC. So those processes were different.

The bottom line is there has got to be a basic consensus in society on the rules of the game, on democracy. There has got to be a commitment to support for democracy, for respect for human and civil rights, for the rule of law. That is the same in any country. If there are deep ethnic, political divides, if there is lack of consensus, then there is going to be strife. Colombia needs to work really hard on the rural-urban divide, as I said before. It has got to make sure that legitimate state authority is in place throughout the country; that legitimate state authority has to be from a state that seems supportive of the citizenry, a state that is promoting rights and economic development, a state that has deep legitimacy. That is a key factor.
WO: What one or two things have we learned from Plan Colombia that we can apply to the implementation of the peace accords?

DS: I think the lessons from Plan Colombia were, one, that U.S. support for a foreign country can be effective even if it is in relatively moderate terms in terms of numbers. If it is very well applied, if it is a program of support that is well-conceived, if it has bipartisan consensus which support for Colombia did in the United States. One of the reasons for success—and I view U.S. support for Colombia as being successful—was that it was supported over three administrations, Republican and Democratic. It was supported in Congress on a bipartisan basis. That was really important. In terms of actual expenditures, we're talking about 10 billion dollars over 10 or more years. This is a drop in the bucket compared to what we spend on Iraq or Afghanistan. It’s important money but it was well spent because it was well targeted and very effectively implemented.

But the real success of Colombia did not come from what the US put into it. It came from what the Colombians did. That required a broad degree of consensus in Colombia, a political will on the part of the Colombian government and the Colombian people to deal with the problems that were affecting their country. It required the elites and the people who had money in Colombia to contribute a lot more in [luxury] taxes to build up the armed forces. The sacrifice that the Colombians were willing to make...if they had not done that, none of the U.S. investments would have paid off at all. So there has to be political will, desire to improve the situation on the part of the receiving country, in this case Colombia. The success of Colombia has been the success of Colombians. The US has been able to support it, U.S. support has been valuable and useful, but it has not been the deciding factor or element and that’s really the key factor and the key lesson learned from the case of Colombia.