In the course of the nineteenth century Friedrich Schiller emerged as Germany’s most highly revered dramatist. Schiller’s popularity reached its peak in 1859 with the “exuberant festivities” for the hundredth anniversary of his birth (Koepke 271). Yet the pathos and moral values of his dramas that appealed to liberal, middle-class audiences in 1848 and 1859 became suspect to modernist writers at the turn of the nineteenth century. Frank Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen (1891), for example, is a scathing critique of the idealization and hypocrisy of the bourgeois code of honor that Schiller upheld. Likewise, Arthur Schnitzler’s Liebelei (1895) can be read, perhaps even should be read, as a direct response to Schiller’s Kabale und Liebe (1784). The allusions to Schiller’s bourgeois tragedy are too numerous to be regarded as ancillary. In view of the many correspondences to Schiller’s play, it is surprising that scholarship has given only cursory attention to these affinities. Taken as a whole, the constellation of characters in Schnitzler’s play, the status-induced conflict, the values at stake, and the references to canonical figures such as Schubert, Hauff, and Schiller take aim at a humanist cultural tradition that advocated individual autonomy and the supremacy of the mind over the body. This idealist mind-body dualism, which emerged during the emancipation of the German middle class at the end of the eighteenth century, became the standard of bourgeois morality and informed the code of honor at the end of the nineteenth century. As a vehicle for an idealist image of man endowed with superior intellectual powers and representing the alleged hegemony of the spirit over the body, Schiller’s pathos became a target of derision for fin-de-siècle authors.
This essay reads Schnitzler’s Liebelei and Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen as examples of fin-de-siècle responses to the Schillerian concept of pathos and shows how these responses expressed a changing attitude toward love and the mind-body dichotomy. More specifically, it discusses how the spiritualization and glorification of youth and romantic love became untenable at the end of the nineteenth century, a period in which sexuality was starting to be recognized as an instinctual force and bourgeois morality was unmasked as a smokescreen that served to conceal sexual instincts. Reading the late-nineteenth-century dramas as a response to some of Schiller’s aesthetic assumptions about the representation of human nature reveals that Wedekind’s and Schnitzler’s modernist rebellion against the idealization of youth and nature was also accompanied by a melancholy over the loss of ideals. To illustrate Schiller’s dualistic construct of culture and nature, the analysis will use his essays “Über das Pathetische” (1801), “Über naive und sentimentale Dichtung” (1800), and his play Kabale und Liebe as points of reference. To be sure, traditional Schiller scholarship generally draws a sharp distinction between the pre-Kantian Schiller and the idealist Schiller and therefore might consider it inappropriate to refer to his essays of his later, idealist period to explain his domestic tragedy, which was written during his Sturm und Drang years. Yet some Schiller scholars have recently made the argument that Schiller revealed himself as a “Kantianer ante litteram” (Macor 99).

Schiller’s notion of pathos expresses the spiritual expansion of the human. In his tragedies, human nature is elevated by its capacity to maintain dignity in suffering, even in the face of death. It is ironic that the realization of the ideal can be achieved only in a spiritual realm either at the expense of sensual desires or at the sacrifice of human life. And because of this capacity to relinquish the desire to stay alive in order to preserve one’s dignity in the face of death, human nature assumes sublime (erhaben) or tragic standing. Pathos served as a rhetorical device to intensify empathy for the suffering of the tragic heroes. As an aesthetic means of ennobling human nature to a level of dignity that contradicted the lived reality in an increasingly mundane civil society, it was gradually perceived as overblown and became the target of irony and ridicule. Even in Schiller’s time it was implausible that a musician’s sixteen-year-old daughter, like Luise Miller of Kabale und Liebe, would, unlike her father, keep her composure in the most taxing situations and forsake the love of her life to preserve “die Fugen der Bürgerwelt . . . und die allgemeine ewige Ordnung” with a heroic gesture (Sämtliche Werke 1:809).
Mathäus: The End of Pathos and Youthful Innocence

Even though it is fairly obvious that Schiller’s heroine serves as little more than a vessel for the author’s lofty ideals, their embodiment in this youthful character has nevertheless been effective in evoking the sympathies of many an audience. And it is precisely Luise’s heroic attitude in suffering through numerous injustices and, finally, death that ennobles not only her but also the particular virtues that she represents. Thus Schiller’s play and its youthful heroine contributed to disseminating middle-class ethics, which manifest themselves in Luise’s integrity as she resists Ferdinand’s suggestion to elope with her (sw 1:808–9). Luise preserves her moral sovereignty and hope for eternal love in a world beyond by renouncing her desire to be with the love of her life in the real world: “Wenn nur ein Frevel dich mir erhalten kann, so hab ich noch die Stärke, dich zu verlieren [...] Mein Anspruch war Kirchenraub, schaudernd geb ich ihn auf” (sw 1:809). Like many of Schiller’s heroes and heroines, Luise has to lead a dual existence in the material and spiritual spheres. As in Kant’s philosophy, the gap between the real and the ideal cannot be bridged in this world. Luise’s steadfast adherence to her moral ideals becomes more credible because it is religiously motivated. Her belief in divine justice and eternal love is both naive and sublime. What made these moral ideals appealing is the fact that they were embodied in Luise’s childlike personality, a personality that appears innocent and naturally free of deception.

The heroic postures of Schiller’s tragic figures no longer seemed plausible at the end of the nineteenth century, when the suppression of the senses was deemed deceptive and constraining. What prompted the recognition of the falseness of idealist values at the beginning of the industrial age? The rapid transition from a rural to an urban society proved unsettling to many members of the middle class. City dwellers’ feelings of isolation, insignificance, and powerlessness tempered the humanist promise of personal self-fulfillment and made the belief in the uniqueness of the individual more doubtful than ever (Ossar 31–32). The pathos of the tragic hero/heroine and his/her idealist aspirations had become unsuitable to express the condition of the urban middle-class individual in a society whose romantic ideals had degenerated merely into a concern for propriety and reputation. The bourgeois code of conduct, which initially advocated self-control as a political tool toward individual autonomy, was now felt to be restrictive (Schorske 282). Reading Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen and Schnitzler’s Liebelei as responses to Schiller’s idealization of youth, embodied in the heroine of Kabale and Liebe, will shed
light on the eroticization of adolescence, which became pervasive in both the literary and visual arts at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁷

Looking at late-nineteenth-century modernist drama through the lens of Schiller’s aesthetic views provides a dual perspective on the aesthetic means by which these dramas undermine the pretensions and false pathos of bourgeois ethics. The modernist emphasis on exposing traditional humanism’s euphemistic, prohibitive, prudish discourse should not distract from the fact that Schiller and many of his contemporaries were conscious of the power of affective, instinctual forces and used them to manipulate their audiences. One of the conundrums of Schiller’s dramatic pathos is that it claims to be in control of the very emotions that it provokes, to the point of overwhelming the spectator. It is precisely this duplicity that late-nineteenth-century authors like Wedekind and Schnitzler sought to expose.

A challenge that Schiller faced with his heroine, Luise Miller, was to endow her with tragic poise and at the same time make her appear natural and innocent. Pathos and the human qualities that accompany it, such as dignity [Würde] and sublimity [Erhabenheit], do not seem to mix very well with naiveté. And yet, it is precisely this quality that Schiller’s heroine must possess in order to disclose the pretentious politeness of courtly society through her “natural” childlike honesty. Still, she also reveals a level of poise worthy of a tragic figure (Hinderer 276). The incongruity between childlike naiveté and the mature self-assurance required of a tragedy also comes across in Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen. Wedekind called his play “eine Kindertragödie,” an oxymoron according to the premises of classical tragedy. Tragedy in the traditional sense does not refer to a collective group, nor can children be regarded as autonomous individuals who have ideals and convictions for which they choose to die a heroic death. And yet Wedekind’s adolescents share with Schiller’s heroine an intellectual maturity beyond their years. Both Schnitzler’s and Wedekind’s youthful protagonists have ideals that the adult world has replaced with complacent adherence to convention. The plays are tragic in that the young protagonists are victims of obsolete middle-class values, the values of a time that still believed in chastity, self-sacrifice, and the suppression of desires and instincts.

In his essay “Über naïve und sentimentale Dichtung,” Schiller reveals his insights into the human psyche by explaining why humans take such pleasure in unadorned nature and by extension in childlike innocence. Accordingly, the enjoyment of nature is based on a moral idea rather than on sensual
pleasure in the aesthetic beauty of form (sw 5:696, 699–700). We humans, so Schiller’s argument goes, take delight in nature because nature has an innocent honesty that we once possessed when we were children and that we have lost due to our education and experience. We take joy in the idea of an infinite potential, “die Vorstellung von einer reinen und freien Kraft, seiner Integrität, seiner Unendlichkeit,” which nature and children still possess and which is bound to be disciplined through reason during the course of our lives (sw 5:697). In Schiller’s thinking, Luise’s appeal is the voice of unspoiled nature, and we admire in her nature’s perfection: “Was [den] Charakter [von Objekten der Natur] ausmacht, ist gerade das, was dem unsrigen zu seiner Vollendung mangelt; was uns von ihnen unterscheidet, ist gerade das, was ihnen zur Göttlichkeit fehlt. Wir sind frei, und sie sind notwendig: wir wechseln, sie bleiben eins” (sw 5:695). Children and animals are still part of nature and possess qualities that we lost during the process of becoming civilized but still desire (sw 5:696). Schiller compares the feeling for nature to the feeling of a sick person for health. In other words, the admiration for the innocence of nature is perceived from a sentimental point of view.

Christine’s suicide in Liebelei is one of those cases in which it is hard to determine whether it is childlike or childish. According to Schiller, it is not easy to distinguish “die kindische Unschuld von der kindlichen” and whether such childlike/childish behavior deserves to be ridiculed or to be admired, “indem es Handlungen gibt, welche auf der äussersten Grenze zwischen beyden schweben” (sw 5:702). He distinguishes between two types of naïveté: the naïveté of mental disposition [Naive der Gesinnung] and the naïveté of surprise [Naive der Überraschung]. The naïveté of surprise occurs in human beings who have been educated and are surprised about an action that they committed in a moment of forgetfulness. In other words, the naïveté of surprise is considered to be childish and occurs when intentions can no longer be described as “natural.” In this case the naïve action becomes an object of ridicule. As for children who act in accordance with their unspoiled nature and ethical innocence, Schiller speaks of naïveté of mental disposition. This type of naïveté deserves admiration when it expresses a “truth” that, because of its “natural” force, is capable of asserting the rights of nature over and against the pretensions of art (sw 5:698–99).

This ambiguity toward childlike innocence and “nature” is a central focus of Frühlings Erwachen and Liebelei. Wedekind seems to follow the Schillerian method of embarrassing the adult world, yet by debunking its moral prin-
ciples as deceitful inhibitions, he criticizes the tyranny of these bourgeois ideals that lead to the tragic fate of the drama’s main characters (Prosa, Dramen, Verse 1:245–46). For instance, Frau Bergmann withholds information about procreation from her fourteen-year-old daughter, Wendla, because she has been raised to do so and is ashamed to talk about it (PDV 1:268–71). When Frau Bergmann tries to tell her daughter that the stork delivers babies, Wendla shows through her response that she no longer believes in such fairy tales. Wendla’s verbal interactions with her mother betray a noteworthy parallel to those of Luise with Lady Milford. Like Schiller’s heroine, Wendla possesses discursive skills that make her appear mature beyond her age. While Wendla lacks Luise’s pathos and poetic imagery, she is endowed with the ability to expose her mother’s fairy tale about the stork delivering babies by responding with a tall tale of her own (PDV 1:269). Yet—and this is a major point of the play’s message that I would like to emphasize—the children are either mythologized or vilified by the adults, a process that very much conforms to Schiller’s ambiguity toward nature. On the one hand, nature is conceived as a moral and meaningful idea that reflects the human disposition toward moral perfection; on the other hand, with regard to the instincts, it is a dangerous, uncontrollable, and amoral force (SW 5:694–700).

While Wendla shares with Schiller’s heroine a combination of (pre-)maturity and naiveté, she does not reveal the angelic or saint-like qualities of Luise Miller. In contrast to Luise, Wendla is a character of flesh and blood with masochistic inclinations (PDV 1:254, 262). Ironically, she becomes a victim of precisely those “virtues”—such as selfless love, purity, and the renunciation of bodily desires—for which Luise is willing to die. The difference between Luise and Wendla is that Luise sacrifices herself for her ideals, while Wendla is sacrificed in the name of these ideals by a hypocritical society. Wendla’s upbringing according to a social etiquette prohibits women from talking about sexuality. The adherence to the Kantian tradition of favoring rigid moral principles over and against the desires of the body contributes to Wedekind’s adolescents’ “ignorance,” which eventually leads to their tragic ending. In Wendla’s case it is not her transgression of having sex unknowingly that leads to her death but rather the way her mother intends to abort her pregnancy because of the social disgrace that an illegitimate child would bring. Whereas Luise Miller can still maintain and uphold her spiritual independence in the face of death, Wendla’s death is utterly meaningless. In fact, it happens precisely
because of the tyrannical prerogative of virtue or suppression of desire that Schiller’s Luise represents.\textsuperscript{21}

While late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century tragedies still upheld heroic self-sacrifice in the name of abstract ethical ideals, late-nineteenth-century modernist dramas focused on debunking the false pretensions of these ideals, which suppress the bourgeois subject’s vital needs and desires.\textsuperscript{22} Schiller’s pathos is an aesthetic means to promote the human spirit’s independence from “base” physical needs and passions. Accordingly, those who are capable of preserving their dignity under duress deserve admiration. Pathos is the expression of the struggle between the sublime human spirit that is capable of asserting its freedom over and against the forces of nature. For Schiller pathos is an essential constituent of tragedy because it affirms the autonomy of the individual, an autonomy that makes us human and distinguishes us from other species: “Aus aller Freiheit des Gemüts muß immer der leidende Mensch, aus allem Leiden der Menschheit muß immer der selbständige oder der Selbständigkeit fähige Geist durchscheinen” (sw 5:527). Contesting Schiller’s claim that true freedom has to be acquired through suffering, the hedonistic Häschen Rilow of Frühlings Erwachen exclaims during his sexual encounter with Ernst Roebel:

Ich denke mir halbgeschlossene Wimperm, halbgeöffnete Lippen und türkische Draperien.—Ich glaube nicht an das Pathos. Sieh, unsere Alten zeigen uns lange Gesichter, um ihre Dummheiten zu bemühen. Untereinander nennen sie sich Schafköpfe wie wir. Ich kenne das. (PDV 1:302–3)

Häschen views pathos as a smokescreen with which “unsere Alten” cover up their profanities. In this respect he represents the point of view of Wedekind and other modernist artists who consider pathos a pretentious scheme to conceal human shortcomings. As an example of this concealment of allegedly base egotistical motivations in the name of higher ethical goals, Wedekind uses Häschen in an earlier scene to expose the conceitedness of bourgeois ethics. Häschen reenacts the killing of Desdemona in melodramatic fashion and symbolically discards the reproduction of a painting of Venus by Palma Vecchio that he has used for the purpose of masturbation (PDV 1:272–73). He prefaces the symbolic killing with Othello’s question: “Hast du zu Nacht gebetet, Desdemona?” (PDV 1:272). Othello’s question is, of course, hypocritical, as he is asking with the intention to murder Desdemona. It functions as
a facade and presents the perpetrator as a pious authority figure who interrogates the moral purity of his victim. Hänschen's satirical reenactment of the scene thus exposes the sanctimony of the moral authorities that condemn his sexual acts. He demonstratively takes on the role of the moral authority himself and accuses the objects of his desire of seducing him, depriving him of his vital forces and wearing him out physically: "Aber du saugst mir das Mark aus den Knochen, du krümmst mir den Rücken, du raubst meinen Augen den letzten Glanz" (PDV 1:272). Hänschen then openly confesses that the object of his desire must die because of his sins rather than because of hers: "Du stirbst nicht um deiner, du stirbst um meiner Sünden willen!" (PDV 1:273). His confession underlines that moral guardians such as Othello are the true perpetrators, and their ethics are a means to conceal their own sexual desires and to portray themselves as victims.

The dialectics of suppression and desire are also apparent in the depiction of nature. Wedekind's drama juxtaposes the assumed freedom of nature with the senseless disciplinary constraints and punishments that the school system exerts on students. Children are brought up to be ashamed of their bodies, and transgressions are often met with corporal punishment (PDV 1:253–54). Students are subjected to a rigid curriculum that values submission to mindless discipline over the stimulation of individual abilities (PDV 1:251). In contrast, nature as a concrete place is where adolescents can escape the supervision of their adult tormentors and where they can talk openly to their peers about their secret erotic dreams, desires, and troubles concerning their awakening sexuality (PDV 1:249–51). Melchior, the main protagonist, would like to escape the constraints of his daily existence by becoming transformed into a dryad and thus becoming a part of nature (PDV 1:247). Martha, the girl whose parents use corporal punishment on her, would like to raise her children as freely "wie das Unkraut in unserem Blumengarten" (PDV 1:254). And Moritz, who, like most of the girls, is ignorant about the facts of life, would like to raise his prospective children without any inhibitions whatsoever and let girls and boys sleep in the same bed (PDV 1:248).

Yet Wedekind's drama does not advocate a one-sided back-to-nature ideology. While the adolescents seem to blossom when they are in nature, wild nature is by no means portrayed as a liberating and benevolent force. Melchior's longing to become a dryad, for instance, indicates that human aspirations to merge with wild nature belong to the world of myth. Already in scene 2, Melchior, intellectually the most mature character among the adolescents,
points out that letting nature run its course could have undesirable consequences, such as children conceived in incestuous relationships (PDV 1:248). Although he is intellectually aware of the power of the instincts, he cannot control his own sexual and aggressive impulses. That he has to succumb to his drives, first when he beats Wendla and later when he rapes her against his will and knowledge (PDV 1:262), shows that education does not necessarily keep the instincts in check. Melchior’s questioning of Wendla’s motivation to help the poor also underlines Wedekind’s Nietzschean skepticism toward the humanist ideal of Bildung (PDV 1:260). Whether Melchior believes that charity is a form of egotism (PDV 1:260) or Martha suspects that her corporal punishment is motivated by her parents’ sadistic inclinations (PDV 1:253), Wedekind’s play exposes bourgeois ethics as a tool to conceal instinctual desires.

The debunking of bourgeois values is also one of Schnitzler’s pursuits in Liebelei. While Liebelei can be considered an adaptation of Schiller’s Kabale und Liebe, Schnitzler made changes that allowed him to criticize Schiller’s idealist views. For instance, he added the figure of Katharina, who represents herself as guardian of bourgeois propriety. Katharina acts as if she serves the best interests of the main character Christine by trying to match her with a suitor of her own social class. It becomes obvious, however, that her true motivation is envy. She is characterized as the unhappy wife who, having married for financial reasons rather than love, is now jealous of all younger women (Liebelei 20, 50–52, 55–57). While in Schiller’s play Luise’s willingness to sacrifice her true love for bourgeois ideals because of ethical considerations and respect for “die Fugen der Bürgerwelt … und die allgemeine ewige Ordnung” (sw 1:809) is to be considered venerable, Katharina’s pragmatic decision to repress her erotic desires and marry a man with a stable income is portrayed as opportunistic, dishonest, and deplorable. Katharina figures as an example of the degeneration of bourgeois ethics (Fritz 304). While Schiller’s Luise is presented as an independent, self-determined individual who makes moral decisions that resist a corrupted social environment, Katharina is completely determined by social conventions and the opinion of others. In this respect Schnitzler’s sympathies still favor Christine, who, like Schiller’s Luise, refuses to let herself be corrupted by marrying a man for opportunistic reasons, as Katharina does (Liebelei 51–52). Christine is a heroine in the Schillerian mold who holds on to a romantic ideal against the corrupted social conventions of her day. She does not accept the liberal attitude toward sexual relationships of her best friend Mizi, nor is she willing to trade “true love” for financial security.
Yet the same uncompromising faith in “eternal love” that renders Schiller’s Luise heroic makes Schnitzler’s Christine appear self-delusional, inflexible, and childish. The difference is that Schiller’s treatment of romantic ideals, which once emphasized individual autonomy, are not compatible with the lived reality of fin-de-siècle Vienna.24 Dagmar Lorenz’s point that Christine’s suicide, because of her disappointment over “an insincere young man without distinction” whom she barely knows, is “uncalled-for” is certainly well taken (133).25 Yet Christine’s actions become more understandable if one does not consider her as the autonomous, self-determined heroine that Schiller’s Luise Miller represents but as someone who has become beholden to the illusion of eternal love. All of the characters are aware that a lasting romantic relationship between her and the officer Fritz is unsustainable.26 It is out of reach, not because of overwhelming external pressures and intrigues, as in Schiller’s play, but because of the characters’ desires and social conventions. The other characters make it perfectly clear that Christine’s hopes are unrealistic because love relationships between upper-class officers and lower-middle-class girls are usually short-lived and do not end in marriage (Liebelei 63). Even Christine herself is partially aware that her relationship with Fritz cannot last forever (24, 64). Yet she stubbornly clings to the illusion that Fritz must love her, even though Fritz could not be more evasive whenever she tries to find out about his feelings and treats her disrespectfully. Mizi, her friend, cannot understand Christine’s humiliating infatuation and criticizes her:

“Er [Fritz] kommt zu spät zu den Rendezvous, er begleit’ dich nicht nach Haus, er setzt sich zu fremden Leuten in die Log’ hinein, er laßt dich einfach aufsitzen—das laßt du dir alles ruhig gefallen und schaust ihn noch dazu […] mit so verliebten Augen an.” (Liebelei 62)

Whereas Schiller’s Luise remains “victorious” in her defense of an idealized nature’s “plain truth” over and against the false pretentions of social status, Schnitzler’s Christine obviously does not speak in the name of “truth” but rather in the name of her wishful thinking. Even though Christine represents the same values as Luise—eternal love and faithfulness—it is obvious that she loves a fantasy, as her father attempts to convey: “Hast denn noch nicht gedacht […], dass das Ganze ein Irrtum sein könnt” (Liebelei 81). Christine’s error is not only that she loves the wrong person. Weirig’s wording, “das Ganze” suggests that the entire notion of “wholeness” and eternal love may be mistaken.
This assumption receives further support in the last meeting between Luise and Fritz. Fritz, who in contrast to Christine does not want to talk about eternal love and who seems to live for the enjoyment of the moment, tells her that there may be “Augenblicke, die einen Duft von Ewigkeit um sich sprühen” (Liebelei 71) and that this is the only eternity that humans can comprehend. Fritz’s statement markedly sets him apart from Christine’s belief in eternal love (Liebelei 23–24, 72), which is based on the notion that human beings can transcend the limits of their biological existence and meet at a “dritten Ort” (sw 1:835–36), as Luise in Kabale und Liebe believes. Even though Fritz is also tempted to fall for the seductive “Duft von Ewigkeit,” he resists the temptation and pulls himself abruptly away from Christine with the words: “Ich hab dich lieb!—Aber jetzt laß mich fort” (Liebelei 71). Fritz’s fleeting inclination to give in to the promise of eternal love emphasizes, however, the seductive power of romantic feelings and makes Christine’s outlook more plausible. Fritz’s momentary relishing in the “atmosphere of eternity” is interrupted by the appearance of his friend Theodor, who in Mephistophelian fashion makes Fritz aware of the constraints of time and brings him back to the here and now.27 In contrast to Christine, who in analogy to Schiller’s Luise clings to the promise of eternal love, Fritz is enough of a realist to call the romantic moments a lie (Liebelei 74). Yet Fritz also bears some significant similarities to Christine, regardless of his more experienced, jaded outlook and his privileged social background that allows his semi-bohemian lifestyle. Like Christine, he is easily consumed by passionate love relationships. His obligation to an anachronistic code of honor, one that induces him to participate in a duel and die for his unethical behavior of having an affair with a married woman, derives from the same idealist belief as Schiller’s pathos: namely, that his ethos is more valuable than human life. Despite dying an honorable death, Fritz cannot be regarded as heroic, as his willingness to engage in the duel happens neither out of conviction nor for a worthy cause or ideal that he attempts to defend. In this regard, Fritz’s reluctant willingness to engage in the duel also discloses the anachronism of the idealist code of honor. By presenting the moral views and actions of Fritz and the other characters as time-dependent derivatives of an anachronistic idealism, Schnitzler undermines Schiller’s transcendental truth claim.

Connected to the historicity of moral behavior is also the loss of a unique and “whole” individuality. Fritz shares with Christine a tendency to take everything too seriously. He is unable to find enjoyment in the superficial re-
relationship that Theodor has arranged in order to rescue his friend from his obsession with a married femme fatale (*Liebelei* 13). Yet whereas Christine’s fixation on Fritz is presented as spiritual, Fritz’s passion for the married woman is purely erotic. Romantic love worship, which according to Karl Guthke and others had already taken on a quasi-religious character during the period of *Empfindsamkeit*, nourished such obsessive behavior and the expectation of complete self-fulfillment in love throughout the nineteenth century.  

This obsessive, unconditional love has a strong appeal because it promises liberation from social constraints. The romantic idea that true love relationships are made in heaven was, of course, compromised by the constraints of a class-based late-nineteenth-century morality. Fritz’s and Christine’s desire for exclusive, unconditional love can be viewed as resistance to attempts at controlling human nature. Even Theodore and Mizi share this longing for spontaneous, romantic love. Their playful arrangement of a coincidental romantic encounter with roses falling accidentally from “heaven” reveals their secret desire for unrestrained, “natural,” adventure (*Liebelei* 24, 28, 32). The various characters’ desire to resist the domestication of human nature can be interpreted as a reaction to the loss of an uncompromised fulfillment as an expression of their unique individuality, which is at odds with a class-based morality.

All the characters are to varying degrees aware of the cultural constraints that prevent them from living according to their desires. Fritz is intellectually aware of the self-destructive nature of his illicit affair and eventually accepts his friend Theodor’s suggestion to engage in a flirtatious relationship with Christine to distract himself from the passionate but dangerous liaison with a married woman: “Und du hast ja gar keine Ahnung, wie ich mich nach so einer Zärtlichkeit ohne Pathos gesehn habe, nach so was Süßem, Stillem, das mich umschmeichelt, an dem ich mich von den ewigen Aufregungen und Martern erholen kann” (12). Fritz’s wording betrays that he is not interested in Christine as an individual but simply views her as an object of distraction that allows him to recover from his stressful love life. The realization that she did not matter as a person for Fritz leads Christine to commit suicide: “Und ich . . . was bin denn ich? was bin ich ihm denn gewesen . . .?” (86).

Christine’s traumatic reaction is symptomatic of the challenges that the loss of individuality at the beginning of modernity posed. One could say that the real tragedy of Schnitzler’s play is the loss of the humanist illusion of a spiritual and deeper meaning of human existence.  

Christine’s obstinate attempts to maintain the illusion of personal fulfillment in an exclusive love
relationship can be explained by the fact that she has grown up in a relatively sheltered Biedermeier atmosphere, despite Weiring's attempts to give his daughter more freedom. The mention of cultural icons, such as Schubert, Hauff, and Schiller, that grace the shelves of Christine's petit-bourgeois home, explain her romantic view of love. After all, Gustav Klimt, for instance, depicted Schubert as the symbol of the simplicity of a bygone era. Hauff can be read as an allusion to Christine's longing for the fairy tales of her childhood. Schiller as an icon of idealism holds the promise of transcending the constraints of her sordid reality in a love relationship and contributes at least in part to Christine's anachronistic insistence on the fulfillment of her dream.

Christine's sheltered upbringing in the privacy of the modest home is contrasted to Fritz's aimless and fragmented everyday life: "Ich geh in Vorlesungen—zuweilen—dann geh ich ins Kaffeehaus . . . dann les ich . . . zuweilen spiel ich auch Klavier—dann plauder ich mit dem oder jenem—dann mach ich Besuche . . . das ist doch alles ganz belanglos" (Liebelei 69). Even though Fritz has an ulterior motive to depict his everyday life as "ganz belanglos" and "langweilig," these terms are characteristic of the aimless daily lives of officers in turn-of-the-century Vienna. Both Fritz's and Christine's obsessive relationships provide them with an emotional intensity that compensates for the loss of meaning to their lives and allows them to escape the ennui of modern existence. As controlled forms of aggression and sexuality, Fritz's dueling and Christine's worship of eternal love reveal the clandestine connection between instinct and morality. While Fritz and Christine appear morally more sincere than Theodor and Mizi, as they are bound by social conventions, they are at the same time more dependent on their instincts.

As in Wedekind's Frühlings Erwachen, the ambiguous relationship toward nature also figures prominently in Liebelei. For instance the "süße Mädel!" who provides "Erholung" as the idealized and domesticated version of nature is contrasted with the demonic, "interessantes Weib" or the wild and uncontrollable force of nature (12–13). When Fritz visits Christine in a scene reminiscent of Faust's secret visit to Gretchen's living quarters, he is fascinated by her home and explains his "spontaneous" appearance with his longing for "diesem lieben Gesichtel" (Liebelei 65). Fritz's choice of the demonstrative pronoun diesen rather than deinem is, of course, another indication for his objectification of Christine. Fritz's fascination with Christine's living quarters is obviously a yearning not for Christine but for the aura of naïveté and purity. Fritz can be compared to a tourist visiting a less civilized culture.
Christine's idyllic home evokes in him sentiments that allow him to yearn for a bygone, more natural world from the point of view of the decadent yet superior observer. While the pictures in Christine's home, entitled "Abschied—und Heimkehr" and "Verlassen" (Liebelei 66–67), reveal the kitschy reification of romantic sentiments, Fritz's perspective can be described as an ironic duplication of this reification. For Fritz these pictures do not have an aesthetic appeal. When Christine apologizes for the pictures' ugliness, he does not contradict her (Liebelei 67). While Christine still indulges in the mood that the pictures exhibit, Fritz relishes in observing Christine's naive yearning from a superior point of view. Yet, for a moment, Fritz yields to the appeal of sentimentality even though he is partially aware of its artificiality. Sentiment takes precedent over reason as it connects the characters with the illusory belief of their individual uniqueness by letting them physically experience that they are alive. Schnitzler reveals how the narcissistic self-indulgence in sentimentality has become part of the psyche. Fritz's empty promise to replace Christine's dusty artificial flowers with fresh and fragrant ones shows that he does not completely comprehend the reification of sentiments in bourgeois conventions (Liebelei 68). The freshly cut flowers are just another attempt to nourish the illusion of romantic love. Freshly cut flowers are neither natural nor alive, no matter how natural and alive they appear to be. In this regard, the dusty artificial flowers are more truthful because they at least exhibit the artificiality and anachronism of social conventions. Weiring's consoling words, with which he tries to suggest to Christine that Fritz does not know the difference between "echt und unecht," could be directed at the other characters as well, as they also either pretend or deceive themselves (Liebelei 83).

Whereas Theodor and Mizi seem much more capable of coping with the illusory nature of "true love," they carefully arrange the romantic get-together that takes up the first part of the play. Theodor as the "geborene Festarrangeur" sees to it that the roses do not look like an arrangement, and Mizi helps him to make them appear as if they had accidentally fallen from the sky (Liebelei 20, 24, 28). Theodor then drinks to the "glücklichen Zufall" even though he meticulously planned their get-together (Liebelei 32). While Theodor criticizes Fritz for his risky affair with the married woman, he also entertains the illusion of adventure that a romantic love affair promises. Mizi surprises him by disheveling his hair, and he responds by calling her, "Du Katz, du!" (Liebelei 27), hinting at her unpredictability as a domesticated version of a cat of prey. Theodor and Mizi play with the idea of romantic adventure in a controlled
way. The characters are able to maintain the illusion of freedom as long as they can control the game of love in the confined space of a carefully arranged candlelight atmosphere. Yet the illusion of an unproblematic love relationship comes to an abrupt end with the ring of the doorbell and the entrance of the husband of Fritz’s lover (Liebelei 35). Even though the tragedy is exclusively motivated by the characters’ actions, their actions are determined by beliefs and desires that influence their behavior beyond their control. These beliefs are often expressed in seemingly superficial conversations (see, for example, Liebelei 21–35). Schnitzler’s use of restricted perspective presents social criticism filtered through the psyche of the characters.

Schnitzler’s and Wedekind’s dramas take it upon themselves to debunk the characters’ false illusions, which become conventionalized and lead to obsessive, erroneous, and pretentious behavior. Yet both plays evoke a melancholy feeling over the loss of humanistic ideals that are embodied by Melchior’s mother, Frau Gabor, in Frühlings Erwachen and Christine’s father, Weiring, in Liebelei. The realization that modern existence is incompatible with humanism’s metaphysical assumptions, such as freedom of will, the ability to control life through reason and to transcend existence as biologically determined beings through a commitment to universal and eternal moral values, including notions of eternal love, is hardly acceptable to individuals who have been steeped in and brought up with them. Christine is such a character who cannot accept a reality that has abandoned the idea of eternal love: “Und wann kommt dann der nächste Liebhaber?” (Liebelei 90). While Schnitzler’s play makes it clear that her stubborn belief in this ideal is selfish and unrealistic, it does not present any alternatives to the sincerity and hope that Christine’s romantic ideals provide. After all, the other characters are perplexed when they find out how seriously Christine took the fling with Fritz. The lives of Fritz, Theodor, and Mizi seem aimless and shallow. While Christine’s suicide seems to be based on unrealistic expectations, it embarrasses her more experienced friends and guardians, almost like Schiller’s Luise embarrasses Lady Milford by asserting nature’s rights over and against a corrupted reality. Yet by underlining that Christine’s expectations are illusory, Schnitzler shows that her behavior is not asserting nature’s rights but is replicating bourgeois conventions and concealing uncontrollable desires.

Both Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen and Schnitzler’s Liebelei present protagonists of the younger generation as victims of a humanist ethics that degenerated into a repressive ideology. During the bourgeois emancipation
at the turn of the nineteenth century, these humanist values were meant to promote a more egalitarian society and to provide an opportunity for self-improvement for all citizens regardless of their social rank. A critique of the anachronistic humanist ideology had to confront the repression of the instincts and therefore required a different aesthetics, an aesthetics that could no longer portray the bourgeois individual as rational, autonomous, and whole. Traditional tragedy is unsuitable for portraying fragmented and ideologically mediated modern existence because it is based on the notion of individual autonomy. The protagonists of Schnitzler’s and Wedekind’s plays cannot be considered heroic as they are dependent on and conditioned by the social constraints of a modern but class-based society. While it is possible to feel sympathy for the victimized protagonists—Melchior and Wendla of Frühlings Erwachen as well as Fritz and Christine of Liebelei—their youthful naiveté is not glorified as pure, good, and true, as that of Schiller’s Luise Miller is. Their language is not endowed with pathos, and their deaths do not serve a higher purpose or eternally true values. To the contrary, their sufferings and deaths are caused by the belief in abstract values that denigrate everyday reality. Liebelei and Frühlings Erwachen, therefore, oppose theatrical conventions of tragedy while reworking them to challenge the ideals that they once promulgated.

Notes

1. Schiller was particularly suitable as a national icon of German culture for both conservative liberals of the Biedermeier era and the progressive liberals of the Vormärz period. He could be claimed, on the one hand, for the national cause as founder of a “native tradition of drama” and as proponent of the ideas of the French Revolution, on the other (Pugh 25). While the idealist tradition of the early 1800s had been regarded as outdated and empty by the mid-nineteenth century, it nevertheless prevailed and even became canonized in the years after 1850: “Die idealistische Ästhetik, die nach 1850 zum Bildungsgut aufstilisiert, ja geradezu kanonisiert wird, ist argumentativ immer gegenwärtig. [...] So sind zwar die idealistischen Formen als hohl durchschaute, vergangen zudem; aber überall bewiesen sie ihre Macht” (Schanze 377).

3. Max Ophüls' film adaptation of Schnitzler's play also emphasizes the similarities to Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe* by foregrounding Christine's father in his professional environment, which underlines the parallel to Luise's father, Miller. Ophüls also adds a scene with a rival suitor, who, regardless of his minor role, bears some resemblance to Luise's rejected and conspiring suitor, Sekretär Wurm.

4. Axel Fritz situates Schnitzler's *Liebelei* in the tradition of the *burgerliches Trauerspiel* and notes numerous correspondences to Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe* (306–13).

5. While Schnitzler mentioned *Kabale und Liebe* in his letters and diaries only in passing, there are indications that he knew the play very well and was impressed by it (*Briefe* 154, 859). For instance, he attended three performances between 1887 and 1890 (*Tagebuch* 222, 230, 290). His girlfriend, the actress Marie Glümer, was featured in one of these performances.

6. See, for instance, Matthias Konzett: "In *Liebelei* the paths of a *Liebestod* in the manner of *Tristan and Isolde* or *Romeo and Juliet* is deflated and shown to be the consequence of repetition rather than unique love" (354). See also Alewyn. For Schiller suffering in tragedy is only justified if it serves an ethical purpose. Yet "the young lovers Fritz and Christine die futile deaths for petty and outmoded bourgeois ideals of culture and respectability" (354).

In contrast to this trivialization of pathos, Schiller emphasizes the hero's ability to preserve his composure in view of his suffering and thus emphasizes his freedom over and against the physical inclination to give expression to pain: "Zum Pathetischerhaben werden also zwei Hauptbedingungen erfordert. Erstlich eine lebhafte Vorstellung des Leidens, um den mitleidenden Effekt in der gehörigen Stärke zu erregen. Zweitens eine Vorstellung des Widerstandes gegen das Leiden, um die innere Gemütsfreiheit ins Bewußtsein zu rufen" (SW 5:512; see also 517, 521). These and all future references to the German version of Schiller's works are taken from *Sämtliche Werke*.

7. Karl Heinz Bohrer contradicts Hegelian and post-Hegelian assertions of Peter Szondi and George Steiner that declare the end of tragedy in the modern age by claiming that tragic pathos is not only subject to dramatic action but can also be an expression of a "frenetische Stil der Darstellung des Schreckens und des leidenden Subjekts" (386). Accordingly, tragedy is not limited to the genre of drama and can be detected in existentialist prose, such as in Camus' *L'Étranger* (1942) or Sartre's *Les mouches* (1943) or in Baudelaire's poetry. Tragedy has taken on a different quality rather than disappeared. In Bohrer's view, modern tragedy expresses and radiates an intensity of emptiness. While the tragic hero still exists in the greatness of his loneliness, he has lost his heroism (388).

8. Schiller began to work on the play in 1782 and originally gave it the title *Luise Millerin* (SW 1:976). While he did not start writing his theoretical essays until the 1790s, his aesthetic theory borrowed important concepts with regard to the nature/spirit division from his earlier anthropological writings, such as his dissertation "Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen" (1780) (Riedel, SW 5:1193).

9. Macor suggests that Schiller, "during his so called Kantian break beginning in 1791 eschewed literary and poetic work and studied Kant's *Critiques* but accepted only those Kantian arguments that supported revised solutions to problems addressed in his earlier works. In this sense Schiller is not a Kantian but a 'Kantian ante litteram'" (99). Macor comes to the conclusion that Schiller "weit davon entfernt, sich die Kritische Philosophie bloß aus
Mode anzueignen, für Kants Moralbegründung nur deswegen" eintritt, "weil sie sich mit seinen eigenen Überzeugungen deckt" (112). Other sources that emphasize the continuity of Schiller's pre- and post-Kantian phase are Wolfgang Riedel and Frederick Beiser (42–43).

10. In his essay "Über das Pathetische," Schiller invokes Winckelmann's description of _Laokoon_ to explain his definition of pathos as an assertion of the human mind's freedom over and against the instincts: "Laokoon," sagt uns Winckelmann [. . .] ist eine Natur im höchsten Schmerze, nach dem Bilde eines Mannes gemacht, der die bewußte Stärke des Geistes gegen denselben zu sammeln sucht" (sw 5:521–22). Schiller concurs with Winckelmann and admires Laokoon's successful suppression of the natural inclination to escape death in order to protect his sons. The depiction of the suppression of the instincts becomes the aesthetic expression for the strength of the human will that can withstand the strongest assault of physical nature (sw 5:526).

11. Luise Miller, Marquis von Posa, and Maria Stuart are examples of this tragic grandeur.

12. Schiller is, of course, aware that language is a medium that reveals the contestation between the free will and affect: "Die Sprache ist, was unter der Herrschaft des Willens steht, und doch kann auch der Instinkt sogar über dieses Werkzeug und Werk des Verständes nach seinem Gutdünken disponieren, ohne erst bei dem Willen anzufragen, sobald ein großer Schmerz oder nur ein starker Affekt uns überrascht" (sw 5:519). Those human beings who are capable of keeping their composure and resisting the inclination to express their physical suffering deserve our admiration. The pathos arises from the tension between their suffering and their heroic effort to preserve their moral independence by resisting the urge to give in to their suffering (sw 5:521).

13. As mentioned before, Karl-Philipp Moritz and other reviewers criticized Schiller's play for Luise's implausibly grandiose rhetoric (Henning 184; see also 186, 234). Schiller was aware of the improbably high level of abstraction of which his youthful heroine was capable. This is why he has her rival, Lady Milford, marvel at the astonishing _maturity_ and _wisdom_ that emanates from the youngest: "Unerhört! Unbegreiflich! Nein Mädchen! Nein! Diese Größe hast du nicht auf die Welt gebracht, und für einen Vater ist sie zu jugendlich." (sw 1:829).

14. As mentioned earlier, I will use Schiller's _Kabale und Liebe_ only as a starting point. For interpretations of Schiller's play and Luise Miller's function as a tragic heroine, see, for instance, Hinderer, who points out that Schiller's heroines do not conform to gender expectations as they are characterized as sublime rather than beautiful (271–97). See also Guthke.

15. Even characters like Karl Moor and his beloved Amalia, or Fiesco, all of whom Schiller created before his encounter with Kantian philosophy, lead a divided existence: "As character after character is aware that he or she is not fully in the real world but inhabiting also an imaginary theatrical world shared with others" (Guthrie 445).

16. In this context Axel Fritz has pointed out that "die bürgerliche Familienmoral immer weniger idealistisch und immer mehr ideologisch wird, immer weniger mit wirklicher Moral und immer mehr mit 'Reputation', bürglichem Ansehen, zu tun hat wie in Hebbels Maria Magdalene" (304).

17. The focus on sexuality and loss of innocence during adolescence is also apparent in Schnitzler's _Reigen_ (1900), in Hofmannsthal's _Der Tod des Tizian_ (1892), _Das Märchen der 672. Nacht_ (1895), and _Knabengeschichte_ (1906). I would like to thank art historian Sherwin
Simmons, who has made me aware of parallels to the visual arts, especially in the paintings of Erich Heckel and Ernst Kirchner.

18. Schiller emphasizes that the naiveté of mental disposition is only possible if we forget that children are incapable of simulation as naiveté: “Die Handlungen und Reden der Kinder geben uns daher auch nur so lange den reinen Eindruck des Naiven, als wir uns ihres Unvermögens zur Kunst nicht erinnern und überhaupt nur auf den Kontrast ihrer Natürlichkeit mit der Künstlichkeit in uns Rücksicht nehmen. Das Naive ist eine Kindlichkeit, wo sie nicht mehr erwartet wird, und kann ebendeswegen der wirklichen Kindheit in strengster Bedeutung nicht zugeschrieben werden” (SW 5:699).

19. Sibylle Schönborn has made a similar point: “Intuitiv hat Wendla bereits diese Regeln des Diskurses erlernt. Sie weiß um das Verbot, Sexualität offen zu thematisieren, beherrscht die Formen metaphorischen Sprechens perfekt, ja kann sie sogar subversiv verwenden. Dies wird deutlich, wenn sie das Storchen-Märchen entlarvt, indem sie es zum einen wörtlich nimmt, ‘soll ich den Schornsteinfeuer fragen’, zum anderen dessen Fiktionalität offenlegt” (566). The subversion of her mother’s story through a fictional analogy—“Ein Mann, , dreimal so groß wie ein Ochse—mit Füßen wie Dampfschiffe . . . !”—reveals a self-assurance and rhetorical skill that seem to contradict the childlike behavior with which she is introduced at the beginning of the play (PDV 1:243-46).

20. This becomes obvious in Frau Bergmann’s attempt to keep her daughter in a childlike state of ignorance and in the harsh punishment that some of the adolescents face if they do not conform to the conventions of modesty (PDV 1:253-54; 271).

21. After all, Schiller’s Luise suppresses her feelings for Ferdinand in the name of a bourgeois virtue that respects the god-given patriarchal order (SW 1:809; 1:827). Wendla’s disgrace becomes manifest with the birth of the illegitimate child, as it is visible proof of Wendla’s inability to control her desire.

22. While the idealization of love at the beginning of the nineteenth century was to show the moral superiority of a love governed by “natural” emotions over the “arranged” aristocratic marriage of convenience, the bourgeoisie of the late nineteenth century tended to downplay that many bourgeois marriages were also arranged. In Schnitzler’s Liebelei, for instance, Katharina Binder’s admonition that Christina should date someone of her own class reveals the bourgeoisie’s status-based, discriminatory marriage practices. At the same time Katharina is offended by Weiring’s implication that her marriage was calculated and therefore neither virtuous nor based on true love (Liebelei 56-57).

23. Liebelei’s indebtedness to the genre of bourgeois tragedy has been recognized in secondary literature, especially by Axel Fritz. Yet the affinities between Schiller’s Kabale und Liebe and Schnitzler’s Liebelei have been noted only in passing. Michael Ossar noted that “there is indeed disproportionately little scholarly literature on Schnitzler and nearly none on Liebelei” (19).

24. Even Luise’s infatuation with Ferdinand may have been spurred by her reading of romantic novels. Luise’s father, Miller, is concerned that his daughter has come under the bad influence of the writers of romantic fiction. Karl Guthke points out that already in the second half of the eighteenth century one could detect the “enthusiastische’ Überhöhung des Eros zum quasi-religiösen Erlebnis” and that Miller criticizes the “Scheinlogik der Säkularen
Frömmigkeit" with his condemnation of the "überhimmliche Alanzereien" of the "Bellatristen" (211; SW 1:758).

25. Lorenz also stresses that "in light of the relaxed sexual mores of her environment and her father's liberal views, there is no need to become a tragic heroine" (133). She emphasizes with good reason that Christine's suicide "would seem grotesque were it not in keeping with [the Victorian moral code], a code alive on Vienna's stages" (133). In other words, Christine's obsession with Fritz, whom she barely knows, becomes understandable only if one considers her cultural conditioning by an outdated repressive bourgeois code of honor that for many of her peers is no longer binding.

26. While Axel Fritz's statement is true that Christine is aware from the start that "die Beziehung zu Fritz nicht von Dauer sein kann" (315), Christine's later reaction to Mizi's suggestion that Fritz will sooner or later leave her shows her reluctance to accept this possibility (79).

27. Axel Fritz also points out the play's numerous allusions and similarities to the Gretchen scenes in Goethe's Faust (311).

28. As mentioned earlier, Guthke analyzes Schiller's Kabale und Liebe in the context of secularization. He shows very convincingly that Ferdinand and Luise view their love as a form of religious worship. Ferdinand's attempts to convince Luise of his theology of love are contrasted with Luise's doubts of committing blasphemy by violating the God-given social order (220–23).

29. In this respect Schnitzler's play resembles Karl Heinz Bohrer's description of the altered form of a modern tragedy with its "Pathos der entfremdeten Existenz. [...] Es gibt noch den tragischen Helden, der, obwohl sein Heroismus verschwunden ist, dennoch existiert in der Größe seiner Einsamkeit" (388).

30. Schubert's songs, in typical Biedermeier fashion, would be played in the privacy of the bourgeois home: "For Klimt and his bourgeois contemporaries, the once hated age of Metternich was recalled now as the gracious-simple age of Schubert—a Biedermeier Paradise Lost" (Schorske 221).

31. Schnitzler's depiction of Willi Kasda's everyday life in Spiel im Morgengrauen is another example of the boredom and aimlessness of officers in turn-of-the-century Vienna.

32. Meyer identifies the pressures with which Schnitzler's male protagonists had to struggle in late nineteenth-century Habsburg society. Accordingly, the alienating loss of social coherence and recognition compelled many of Schnitzler's male protagonists to compensate for their insecurities by representing themselves as victims (177–79). Fritz's sentimental longing for an all-consuming love relationship can be seen as another expression of the wish to cling to an imagined male identity.

33. The reification of emotions is, however, not limited to the male characters. For instance, it is also apparent in Mizi's fascination with uniforms and the picture of Fritz in uniform (17, 25).

34. In Schnitzler's Liebelei, all that is left of nature is a sentimental yearning for it, for example the freshly cut flowers used for decorative purposes (28, 68) and the branch of the lilac bush that Weiring has picked in a public park (53). The characters have internalized bourgeois norms and values to such an extent that "nature" is always culturally mediated. Schnitzler's Liebelei exposes the dangerous nature of obsessive disorders. While these dis-
orders are anything but natural, they can be regarded as failed attempts to control human instincts: Theodor's envy of Mizzi's memories of male relationships, Katharina's envy of Christine's and Mizzi's relationships to young gentlemen, Fritz's obsession with the unobtainable married woman, Christine's obsession with Fritz. These obsessions reveal the unsolvable tensions arising from the attempt to control unfulfilled desires.

35. This may be one of the reasons why the play did not receive much scholarly attention.

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