Narrative Structure and Emotional Mobilization in Humanitarian Representations: The Case of the Congo Reform Movement, 1903-1912

Matthew Norton

a Department of Sociology, Yale University

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MATTHEW NORTON

The concept of empathy has played an important role in theorizing how humanitarian representations influence people. This article suggests that this focus on empathy in human rights theory is too limited and proposes “emotional mobilization” as a more flexible and satisfactory alternative to the empathy thesis. An analysis of the Congo reform movement in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century showcases the utility of this more inclusive concept. The Congo reform movement developed a narrative structure for representing the situation in the Congo, its history, and the possibilities for improvement that appealed to various emotions including empathy, guilt, and fear of pollution. It linked these emotionally-laden interpretations to a call for action through a clear definition of options and the manipulation of genres. The narrative structure of the Congo reform movement significantly exceeds the analytical limits of the empathy thesis, further demonstrated in the article through an analysis of a 60 Minutes segment on the Congo from 2009 that appeals only to empathy, closing off other emotional registers through limiting narrative techniques. The article concludes by proposing that the combination of the concepts of emotional mobilization and narrative structure provide a powerful and flexible theoretical framework for the analysis of humanitarian representations of various kinds and their impacts.

It is generally accepted that suffering does not speak for itself, and certainly not at a distance. The representation of suffering requires a series of choices about issues like subject, tone, method, and audience in addition to the basic narrative decision of what to leave in and what to leave out (Wilson 2009). These choices, in turn, play an important role in determining the significance of images of suffering for audiences trying to understand what a given representation means for them, and what if anything they should do about it. This link between representations of suffering and action has been a long-standing preoccupation of the human rights literature, in part because it is so central to the practice of human rights. As

Matthew Norton is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Yale University and a junior fellow at the Center for Cultural Sociology. His dissertation analyzes the cultural infrastructure of state power during the consolidation of the early-modern English maritime empire. Prior to beginning the PhD, he was a lecturer at the University for Peace. He has an MA from the University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies.

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Address correspondence to Matthew Norton, Department of Sociology, Yale University, P. O. Box 208265, New Haven, CT 06520-8265. E-mail: matthew.norton@yale.edu
Dawes’ ICRC delegate explains, “Really, what is at the heart of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is to make representations” (Dawes 2007: 87). This concisely captures the fact that representations are one of the principal tools that human rights agents of all sorts use to leverage transformational power in the form of money, public outcry, governmental attention, research, legal sanction, or some other social process or outcome. Despite its importance, only a few theoretical models of this representation-action nexus exist. Why do representations of suffering under certain conditions have the power to motivate action? Realism provides one account. In it, human rights representations are influential because they interact with (usually state or perhaps corporate) interests. Nye’s concept of “soft power” (2005; see also Schulz 2001; Thornton 2000) adequately characterizes this model: The visible display of commitment to human rights creates an important form of power in the pursuit of national interests. In this model, human rights representations influence action insofar as they affect rational and strategic calculations, and thus only as they are articulated with other forms of power. Legalism offers a second theoretical model of the representation-action nexus. It generally understands the repercussions of human rights representations in terms of legal institutions and procedures and is thus limited to contexts where such institutions and procedures exist and can be brought to bear. Legalism suggests a particular logic of response because, as Meckled-García and Çali have shown, human rights law “is not . . . a value free medium, but contributes its own features and internal constraints to the subject matter it governs” (Meckled-García and Çali 2006: 11). This article focuses on a third important model linking human rights representations with action on the level of sociological meaning and emotion. This model draws its explanatory power from individuals’ capacity to experience empathy when presented with the plight of their suffering fellow humans. The “empathy thesis” as I will call it, was espoused most succinctly and influentially by Richard Rorty in his essay “Human rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality.” Rorty argues that over the last two hundred years there has been a “progress of sentiments” that has made it “much easier for us to be moved to action by sad and sentimental stories” (Rorty 1993: 134) because such stories have a unique capacity to expand our moral horizons to include suffering others. According to the empathy thesis, human rights representations lead to action on the part of the audience because they successfully evoke an empathetic emotional response.

The empathy thesis occupies an important place in human rights theory because it offers the only significant individual-level account of how human rights representations can move distant civilian audiences to some form of action. This article argues, however, that the empathy thesis suffers from two linked problems. First, empirical work in this area has been insufficiently grounded in close analysis of the narrative structure of human rights representations. Second, because appeals to empathy usually play some role in these narratives, in the absence of more detailed structural analysis, the operation of other emotional and symbolic mechanisms has been overlooked. By focusing on empathy as its exclusive emotional mechanism, the empathy thesis underestimates the emotional range of the narrative manipulations used to construct human rights representations. Through an analysis of the Congo reform movement in Britain in the first decade of the twentieth century, this article argues that in its current state the empathy thesis is too limited in what it seeks to explain (empathy for suffering others) and too unidimensional in how it explains it (sad stories). I propose that the empathy thesis needs to be expanded into a more general emotional mobilization model that flexibly accounts for the construction of human rights representations that simultaneously operate in multiple emotional registers and through a variety of narrative techniques. The first section critically reconstructs the empathy thesis. The second analyzes the most prominent narrative rhetorical features of
the Congo reform movement in terms of emotional mobilization and narrative techniques. Sad stories of suffering natives were but one of the movement’s rhetorical claims; just as important was the construction of the Congo Free State and its sovereign Leopold II as the main perpetrators of abuses, and the manipulation of emotions including guilt and fear as well as empathy. These elements operated together to make the story told by reform advocates compelling and effective in mobilizing participation and resources. The third section compares the multiple emotions mobilized by the narrative structure of the Congo reform movement to the purely sentimental and empathetic rhetorical structure of a turn of the twenty-first-century 60 Minutes segment on the Congo. This comparison shows the value of an emotional mobilization approach that goes beyond empathy to understand how effective representations work on the level of narrative structure rather than just how they make us sad.

Expanding on the Empathy Thesis

One way to think about human rights representations is as small machines of meaning. By constructing a representation and deploying it at some time and place, the authors of the image, report, legal complaint, or other form of representation hope to do something. As machines, human rights representations may or may not operate as intended. Some of their parts may not function or may interact in ways other than expected, or perhaps their environment—the intended audience or political constituencies—has changed or was never what it was expected to be. As Seu has noted, it is hard to predict which representations will succeed in galvanizing a response and which will fail (Seu 2003: 187). Nevertheless, it is striking how often these machines of meaning do succeed in performing transformational work on the social and material world. Donations are inspired, representatives are petitioned, funds are divested, laws are changed, and new structures are put into place. Just because one builds a machine does not mean that it will work, but it is nevertheless the case that things like human rights reports or images of suffering can leverage extraordinary effects that would be impossible without them.

How do these representations work? As suggested above, a number of potentially overlapping mechanisms have been proposed. The empathy thesis has become the dominant sociological and psychological account of how representations work on the individual level and among nonstate, nonhuman-rights-professional publics. According to the empathy thesis, broadly understood, representations of suffering lead to action in a two-step process. First, the kinds of “sad and sentimental stories” that Rorty proposes (Rorty 1993: 119) encourage people to “imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and oppressed” (Rorty 1993: 127). This works particularly well when stories represent familiar details that erode the distance between the suffering other and the audience. “Because her mother would grieve for her,” Rorty (1992: 133) suggests, makes a powerful opening for a human rights story not because it appeals to universal nature but because it shows that “they” are in fact like “us.” This extension of empathy entails an expansion of our moral horizons, our “universe of obligation” as Fein (1979) calls it, to include despised and oppressed others. The second step builds on this expansion of our universe of obligation to link that potential for action to a concrete program. At least in the theoretical terms of this thesis, an audience moved by a sad, sentimental story now feels some sense of obligation to ameliorate the suffering that has been represented to them. By constructing a program of action that provides a plausible response to this felt obligation—for example, through donations, or military intervention—some significant proportion of the audience will respond by opening their wallets or going to a meeting. In summary, sentimental representations create humanitarian
One of the most striking things about the empathy thesis is its dominance. There is no other equivalently influential theory explaining why people are moved to action by representations of suffering, to the point that empathy becomes common sense rather than a thesis demanding explicit empirical support or critique. Wilson and Brown’s (2009) collection *Humanitarianism and Suffering* captures this theoretical state of affairs. They devote their volume to exploring the question, “[w]hy have individuals been concerned with the suffering of others, especially distant others... with whom they share no apparent social connections or moral obligation?” (Wilson and Brown 2009: 1). The overarching answer they provide is that the response to the suffering of distant others relies on “the mobilization of empathy” often through “the emotive power of humanitarian narratives that generates indignation at the suffering of others and channels it towards a wide array of humanitarian acts” (Wilson and Brown 2009: 19). For all the breadth of their animating question, it is indicative of the influence and limitation of the empathy thesis that Wilson and Brown propose only empathy as an emotional mechanism motivating concern for distant others. It is striking that in an introduction presumably articulating where they see the state of the art the authors identify no strong alternative motivational theories to the empathy thesis.

The prominence of empathy in Wilson and Brown’s collection echoes the human rights literature more generally, in which empathy has been invoked from numerous angles and in support of various arguments, but alternative mechanisms are thin on the ground. Literary studies, for example, have played an important role in establishing and supporting the empathy thesis by identifying the role of the novel either in promoting a capacity for empathy or as a correlated indicator with human rights receptivity of the rising capacity of certain populations to empathize with the suffering of others (Cohen 1999; Hagan 2006; Dawes 2007, 2009; Slaughter 2007). Hunt writes that in the eighteenth century, “reading novels created a sense of equality and empathy through passionate involvement in the narrative” (Hunt 2008: 39). Empathy has a likewise prominent position in the human rights non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) and other practitioner’s self-understanding of what it is that they do (Chandler 2001; Schulz 2001; Dawes 2009). It figures similarly in the analysis of that practice by both supporters and critics (Scarry 1998; Moeller 1999; Rieff 2002; Kennedy 2002). Rieff’s understanding of empathy as the core of humanitarianism is typical: “The tragedy of humanitarianism may be that for all its failings and limitations, it represents what is decent in an indecent world. Its core assumptions-solidarity, a fundamental sympathy for victims, and an antipathy for oppressors and exploiters-represent those rare moments of grace when we are at our best” (Rieff 2002: 121). Empathy likewise guides more psychologically attuned research programs into the reasons for acting or not acting in response to representations of suffering (Staub 1992; Scarry 1998; Cohen 2001; Cohen and Seu 2002; Seu 2003; Laplante 2007). Cohen summarizes the literature well when he writes that the “emotional constellation of... empathy... is central to all discussions of the bystander effect and altruism. ... All humanitarian messages rely on arousing these feelings” (Cohen 2001: 216–217).

Nothing in this article denies the importance of empathy in “humanitarian messages” as suggested throughout this arm of the human rights literature. It does, however, offer two extensions of the empathy thesis focused on both parts of the two-word Rortian phrase “sad stories.” First, consider “stories.” There is a risk that the movement from a sad story to empathy becomes a simple, naturalized process rather than a sociological fact produced by the construction and manipulation of meanings. Sad stories do not always or necessarily lead to empathy. Suffering can also be narrated for the promotion of different emotional
and political ends such as hatred or dehumanization. As Laqueur rightly points out, “narratives, sentimental or otherwise, do not come with built-in moral gyroscopes . . . sad and sentimental narratives can raise just as readily as lower the alterity threshold. The divide between who is in and who is out . . . is secured by exactly the same means as it is breached” (Laqueur 2009: 35; also see Sontag 2003: 10). In order to develop a more explicit understanding of the connection between stories and empathy, humanitarian representations need to be treated more seriously as stories, or in more theoretically suggestive language, as narratives. The claim that sad stories can produce empathy is limited because the significance of even the simplest narrative—whether it produces empathy or a desire for revenge for example—depends on an entire system of meanings embedded in narrative structure (Boltanski 1999). To refer to a “sad story” is shorthand for this system of interconnected meanings and constructions that operating together tends to produce the effect of sadness in a given audience. Macbeth is without a doubt a sad story, but likewise without a doubt its power does not derive from episodes like Macbeth’s murder of Duncan alone. It relies on a whole system of narrative elements such as plot, character, motivation, sequence, causality, etc. Smith defines the operation of narratives as follows:

[Narratives allocate causal responsibility for action, define actors and give them motivation, indicate the trajectory of past episodes and predict consequences of future choices, suggest courses of action, confer and withdraw legitimacy, and provide social approval by aligning events with normative cultural codes.]

(Smith 2005: 18)

Humanitarian narratives are a particular genre (Orentlicher 1990; Cohen 1996; Hafner-Burton and Ron 2007; Hagan 2006; Dudai 2009; Wilson 2009), constructed according to their own conventions in ways that seek to promote humanitarian action. But they do these things through the genre-specific manipulations of general narrative structures like those suggested by Smith. These are the mechanisms that humanitarian narratives—as machines of meaning—use to “make us understand” (Sontag 2003: 89); a situation in a way that demands a humanitarian response. In order to better understand what Wilson and Brown call “humanitarianism’s capacity to generate compassion” (2009: 26), we need to pay close empirical attention to how the elements of narrative structure are manipulated in humanitarian representations.

Second, consider “sad.” To reframe the central insight of the empathy thesis in light of this focus on narrative structure, one of the distinctive—though certainly not unique (see Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001)—narrative manipulations of humanitarian representations is the regular appeal to emotional significance, more broadly understood. If the focus is on sad stories, then empathy is the obviously appropriate emotional register. But there is no reason, obvious or otherwise, to limit the focus of analysis to empathy when dealing with the more inclusive and complex object of the narrative structures of humanitarian representations. Humanitarian narratives can be sad or they can be outraged, triumphant, guilty, or frightening. They can also evoke several or all of these emotions simultaneously or sequentially. Empathy plays an important role in the emotional architecture of humanitarian representations but it does not necessarily and usually does not in practice play an exclusive role. It is instead part of a broader narrative structure, the humanitarian narrative, that brings a number of techniques to bear on its distinctive rhetorical focus: the mobilization of emotions in support of humanitarian programs. While this sense of the potential breadth of emotional mobilization has not had a sufficient impact on human rights theory, it has figured prominently in the recent focus on dramaturgy, framing, and emotions in the social
movements literature (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). This literature argues that one of the most important contributors to the power of social movements is their production of cultural forms that can move participants and audiences (Isaac 2008) through framing (Benford and Snow 2000) and dramaturgy (Benford and Hunt 1992; Alexander 2004) that intersect with deeply held values (Gillan 2008) in ways that can generate a full palette of emotional responses. Expanded in this way, the question for analyzing humanitarian representations changes from how a given representation generates compassion and how compassion leads to action, to how a given representation mobilizes emotions in general and links them to action through the manipulation of narrative structures.

In empirical terms there are two main consequences to this extension of the empathy thesis. First, the researcher’s focus must expand from sad stories to other emotional modalities such as the obligation narrative. In this form of narration, the audience is not encouraged to act out of empathetic fellowship with a suffering other but is linked through the logic of responsibility to the suffering of the other. The obligation narrative constructs its audience as complicit in the suffering of the other and, thus, promotes a very different emotional mechanism for linking representation to action. Where the dominant emotional register of the humanitarian narrative is empathy, the dominant register of the obligation narrative is guilt. In addition to the empathy narrative, this article uses the concept of the obligation narrative but also of the pollution narrative and its emotional register of fear in its analysis of the narrative structure of the Congo reform movement. Second, because narratives are the form, or one of the most common forms, that the broader strategies of emotional mobilization take in humanitarian representations, then an analysis of these strategies requires structural narrative analysis.

This approach, in turn, opens the fruits of the analysis to general human rights theory and cases beyond a hundred-year-old European debate about the government of the Congo. What is identified in structural narrative analysis—or what Alexander and Smith call “structural hermeneutics” (2003)—are not just sui generis arguments but narrative structures such as the obligation narrative that that recur in various combinations in many or all humanitarian representations. This theory then poses an alternative to Orentlicher’s (1990) practical analysis, Dudai’s (2009) stylistic analysis, and Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers’s (2005) analysis of “information politics” focusing instead on narrative structures and how they are manipulated to mobilize emotions and humanitarian action.

I set out to write this article as a straightforward use of the empathy thesis as a way to analyze how the Congo reform movement in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century told sad stories, created empathy, and generated a mass movement. The historical details of the case, however, quickly showed that the Congo reform movement was doing much more than telling sad stories and generating much more than empathy. The object of the Congo reform movement was expansion of the moral universe of the English public to include the native peoples of the Congo basin. But the “cultural labor” (Dawes 2009: 397) involved in pursuit of this explicit objective of the movement (e.g., Morel 1907: foreword) was not limited to the construction of a humanitarian narrative based on empathy. Rather, its narrative structure combined (1) the construction of a demonic humanitarian antagonist in the person of Leopold II and his Congo Free State regime with (2) appeals to empathy through atrocity stories and other accounts of suffering, (3) an obligation narrative based on the unique responsibility of the British public and its unique capacity to act, (4) a pollution narrative emphasizing the threat that the Congo Free State posed to the sacrality of the European civilizing mission in Africa by the monstrous brutality of Leopold II’s governmental regime, and (5) an emotional release valve through a proposed course of
humanitarian action addressing the (narratively constructed) causes of the potent emotional brew that the Congo reform movement narration mobilized.

“[T]o Pollute the Map of Africa . . .”

The General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 created an entity called the Congo Free State (CFS) that sprawled over a million square miles of central Africa. The state was not a colony of some other European polity but was instead under the direct, personal sovereignty of Leopold II of Belgium. The political machinations that led to this outcome (see Siochain and O’Sullivan 2003; Hochschild 1999) are beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. What is important for this argument is that Leopold’s success in achieving his ambition to enter the ranks of European empires was due largely to two factors: First, he convinced the delegates at the Berlin Conference that his objectives in the Congo were purely philanthropic, aimed at rehabilitating and civilizing the savage lives of the native people; second, he agreed that the CFS would be a free trade zone, where all Europeans could freely engage in commerce, subject, of course, to restrictions and minimal taxation to enable the proper administrative function of the state. The operations of the state following 1885 show that Leopold took neither of these commitments seriously. Freedom of trade was gradually curtailed until it ceased to meaningfully exist. And under the guise of philanthropic intent Leopold’s agents erected a system of harsh taxation, forced labor, and violence. The goal of this coercive system was to leverage the native population of the Congo as a means to achieving Leopold’s real ambition with the CFS: the creation of a colony as profitable as possible, as quickly as possible. The story of the CFS also hinges on trends in the world economy in the late nineteenth century that saw a huge rise in demand for rubber with the invention of the pneumatic bicycle tire and various industrial applications (Harms 1975). The confluence of the vast territorial expanse of the CFS, its large native population, the prevalence of wild rubber vines throughout it, and the willingness of its colonial administration to condone extreme brutality in support of the extractive ambitions of its absolute personal sovereign set the stage for a nightmarish regime that strongly incentivized lawlessness, exploitation, mutilation, and murder.

By the turn of the twentieth century, whispers and rumors of the state of affairs in the CFS had made their way back to Europe. It was only in 1903, however, that these rumors and accusations were substantiated in an authoritative form. The British government ordered their Consul in the Congo, Roger Casement, to prepare an investigative report into the claims of mismanagement of the CFS. His report deserves a prominent place in the history of human rights. In it, through the relentless layering of specific, empirical observations, he made the case that Leopold’s administration in the CFS engaged in systematic abuse of the native population. Casement’s report galvanized what would become the Congo Reform Association (CRA), and particularly its driven leader, E. D. Morel. As Louis writes, “In 1903 Roger Casement fired the smouldering Congo dispute into a controversy that blazed high and hot” (Louis 1964: 99). The report and the CRA came to play a critical role in mobilizing British popular opinion against Leopold’s regime in the CFS, and ultimately in pressuring Leopold and the Belgian Parliament to remove the colony from the king’s personal, absolute rule and to place it instead under the presumably more responsive authority of the Belgian state. The specific history of this achievement is both convoluted and beyond the scope of this article. The important point from this brief account is that representations of suffering—in the form of Casement’s report and the extensive writings, speeches, etc. of the CRA and especially of Morel—led in this case rather directly to action.
on the part of the British public despite the alternative narratives that Leopold and others put in its way. In terms of a theoretical account of the representation-action nexus, what matters is how these representations constructed and narrated a story about the Congo that moved first the British and then American, French, and even Belgian publics to agitate for reform. How did these representations structure the case for action? An analysis of the narrative structure of Casement’s report and of Morel’s CRA publications is the best method to answer this question.

The Casement Report: Constructing the Perpetrator

Roger Casement’s 1904 Congo Report played a pivotal role in shifting the debate on “the Congo question” from the realm of diffuse speculation and allegation to a distinct movement based on credibly ascertained and documented facts. Its style is strikingly modern, adhering closely to standards of fact-finding and reporting that continue to characterize convincing human rights reports today (Orentlicher 1990; Dudai 2009). It is only part of the story, of course, to focus on the report’s findings and reporting of facts. As Orentlicher writes, “because . . . reports aspire to describe broad patterns, the finder of fact must attempt not only to verify individual incidents of abuse, but also to reach more sweeping judgments about the extent of the violations . . . and the significance of apparent trends” (Orentlicher 1990: 95). An analysis of its narrative structure suggests that the power of the Casement report lies less in the atrocity stories it relates (and which it was famous and infamous for) and more in its carefully constructed interpretation of the significance of the patterns of abuse that Casement witnessed. Casement’s narrative strategy in the report is to build up through relentless repetition a pattern of connections between sad facts of human suffering and the administrative regime of Leopold II in the Congo. To put a finer point on it, the report relates atrocity stories as part of a narrative aimed at the construction of the CFS itself and Leopold as a humanitarian perpetrator. One of Leopold’s constant strategies for diffusing criticism was to employ some version of the bad apples defense, insisting that any abuses were due to rogue agents,14 deviance, or simple criminality and could be remedied through incremental reform and better enforcement of the existing regime. What Casement’s report does is show how the various forms of abuse that he reports are the inevitable result not of bad actors but of the exploitative governmental system in the CFS. Rather than encompassing marginal violations of agreements with other European powers or the dignity of the native people, Casement persuasively argues that the CFS administration was predicated on the logic of profit extraction and systematically encouraged gross violence and oppression to achieve that end. In Casement’s report, the stories the reader is meant to feel sad about are inexorably explained as products of the CFS as a governmental system. The main objective of Casement’s report, in this sense, was not the relation of stories of atrocity but the construction of powerful linkages between Leopold and his administration in the Congo and the cultural and narrative category of perpetrators. Categorization of this kind can be powerful, as Brown writes, “[b]ecause categories are used not as mere labels but as methods for organizing perceptions, knowledge, and moral relationships . . . modification of the category in which a person is placed alters the meaning of his or her behavior” (Brown 1993). Casement’s report provided the foundation for the work of CRA because it connected authoritative findings of violations with Leopold in a way that began to shift him from the category of sympathetic bystander to perpetrator. This categorization was to become a key part of the cultural foundation for the CRA’s powerfully motivating narrative logics of obligation and pollution.
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Casement’s report is structured around the geographical progression of his fact finding mission up the Congo River and back from June to September of 1903. It is also built around a narrative theme of discovery and increasingly authoritative interpretation. At the beginning of the report Casement notes that all along the river, “[a]dmirably built and admirably kept stations greet the traveler. . . . Regular means of communication are thus afforded to some of the most inaccessible parts of Central Africa” (Casement 2003: 50).15 By the same token, he notes that between the coast and the administrative capital at Stanley Pool there now runs an “excellently constructed” railway that “works most efficiently” (Casement 2003: 50). These observations are in keeping with one of the features of Casement’s report that is difficult to understand from the perspective of the construction of humanitarian empathy: At this point in his career and certainly in his official writing, Casement accepts the logic of European empire as not merely legitimate but a moral and noble endeavor.16 At the very outset of his report, he makes clear his views on the proper relation between Europeans and Africans:

[In 1887] I had visited most of the places I now revisited, and I was thus able to institute a comparison between a state of affairs I had myself seen when the natives lived their own savage lives in anarchic and disorderly communities, uncontrolled by Europeans, and that created by more than a decade of very energetic European intervention. That very much of this intervention has been called for no one who formerly knew the Upper Congo could doubt, and there are today widespread proofs of the great energy displayed by Belgian officials in introducing their methods of rule over one of the most savage regions of Africa. (Casement 2003: 49)

In its opening lines, Casement locates all that is to come in his report squarely in the early twentieth-century logic of “enlightened imperialism” and Europe’s civilizing mission—perhaps best known through Kipling’s evocative call to pick up the “white man’s burden” published only four years before. Casement never frames the stories of abuse that follow in a way that casts doubt on that broader European narration of the meaning of their presence in Africa: the civilization of the savage. This opening position raises a real problem for the straightforward application of the empathy thesis to explain the Casement report’s important role in catalyzing the Congo reform movement. The characteristic rhetorical structure of the empathetic humanitarian narrative, according to Rorty, is sentimental education. “That sort of education sufficiently acquaints people of different kinds with one another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The goal of this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’” (Rorty 1993: 122–123). If this is so, then Casement’s report is up to some other rhetorical manipulation than the construction of empathy based on similarity. As we can see from his explicit efforts to reinforce the boundaries of the concept “people like us,” Casement does not challenge the need for European governance to civilize the “savages” of the Congo basin. His claim, rather, is that Leopold’s administration not only failed to achieve this outcome but had become the perpetrator of its own brand of extractive savagery.

Casement’s narration of that failure has three main parts: depopulation, taxation and forced labor, and atrocities. First, he focuses on the dramatic decline in the native population of the CFS. The phenomenon of depopulation was well known at the time, but there were different explanations for it. The CFS administration claimed that the decline was due only to the results of sleeping sickness, which was indeed a deadly epidemic. Casement argued
that other mechanisms for population decline were also in play. His report on the town of Lukolela is typical:

[O]n the 25th of July [1903, we] reached Lukolela, where I spent two days. This district had, when I visited it in 1887, numbered fully 5,000 people; today the population is given, after a careful enumeration, at less than 600. The reasons given me for their decline in numbers were similar to those furnished elsewhere, viz., sleeping-sickness, general ill-health, insufficiency of food and the methods employed to obtain labour from them by local officials and the exactions levied on them by State soldiers. (Casement 2003: 63)

This story of decline stood in stark contrast to the philanthropic rationale given for the recognition of Leopold II as sovereign of the CFS at the Berlin Conference. Later in his report, Casement becomes even more explicit in linking his story of the decline of the native population to the government of the Congo. He writes of the Lake Mantumba region, “the great decrease in population, the dirty and ill-kept towns, and the complete absence of goats, sheep, or fowls [sic]—once very plentiful in this country—were to be attributed above all else to the continued effort made during many years to compel the natives to work India-rubber” (Casement 2003: 71). Through these kinds of claims, the report advances a strong causal theory of population decline resulting from deleterious state labor requirements and fear-induced population flight.

Through this logic, Casement connects the issue of population decline to his second main criticism of the CFS administration: its taxation and forced labor practices. Throughout the CFS, the native population was required to pay taxes in the form of food, forest products such as gum copal and rubber, and labor. This was a standard, settled colonial practice unchallenged in principle by the Casement report. In the CFS, however, according to the report, taxation and labor demands had swollen to unsustainable and unjustifiable levels. Casement gives numerous examples of the taxes and fines imposed on various towns, which in some cases were essentially impossible to meet. When required amounts were not met, government officials would impose fines of either money or additional tax requirements as well as punishments from whipping to incarceration. He reports several cases where people desperate to meet a fine or tax “pawned” or sold relatives (Rorty 1993: 122–123). These powers of taxation and “rights of police” (Casement 2003: 88) were extended from the CFS to the concession and nonconcession companies it licensed to engage in the rubber trade. In addition to noting how great a burden and a source of suffering these taxes were to the native population, Casement goes to great lengths in his report to show how arbitrary, irrational, and lawless they were in practice. With regard to the imposition of rubber levies, taxes, and forced labor by companies, for example, Casement cites a finding of the Court of Appeal at Boma in the Congo:

[T]he chiefs of the Concession Society have . . . induced their agents to take no account whatever of the rights, property, and lives of the natives; to use the arms and the soldiers which should have served for their defence and the maintenance of order to force the natives to furnish them with produce and to work for the society. . . . That, above all, the fact that the arrest of women and their detention, to compel the villages to furnish both produce and workmen, was tolerated and admitted even by certain of the administrative authorities of the region. (Casement 2003: 105–106)
Despite purported remedial steps ordered by the court, Casement finds that “the action taken by the authorities nearly three years ago could not have produced the results undoubtedly then desired” (Casement 2003: 106).

But Casement’s argument goes beyond sad stories about abusive companies, focusing instead on weaknesses in the overall system of taxation. The taxes required of the native population were levied by royal decrees of Leopold II in 1891, 1892, 1893, and 1897 (Casement 2003: 77). In authorizing these taxes, however, Casement notes that numerous additional requirements were also stipulated, crucially including an enumeration of villagers to calculate the tax burden. These enumerations were years out of date, and given the phenomenon of depopulation the effective per capita tax had risen, often precipitously. Many of these “taxes” took the form of remuneration for rubber, food, and other products at a state-mandated rate vastly lower than what the same goods could command at market prices. He calculated, for example, that a village chief named Botolo was personally responsible for delivering £80 3s. 4d. worth of goods at market prices per year, and received for this £9 15s. “He therefore contributed,” Casement writes, “on his household of two wives, his mother, and dependents, inhabiting three grass and cane huts, an amount equal to a £70 8s. 4d. per annum net” (Casement 2003: 79). This practice, Casement notes, was notionally regulated by the Official Bulletin of 1896, requiring that state agents, “must remunerate the natives in a manner consistent with the cost of the necessary labour needed to collect the raw-material” (Casement 1903: 69), a standard clearly not applied in the cases he reports. Beyond remuneration, Casement raised more serious doubts about the legal basis for the punitive implementation of these taxes. Regarding the imprisonment of men from a village that failed to meet its quotas he writes, “I could not find that a failure to meet the weekly tax is punishable by law and no law was cited to me as a warrant for this summary imprisonment” (Casement 2003: 74). Likewise, of the fines imposed by state and company agents, he writes:

> These fines, it should be borne in mind, are illegally imposed: they are not “fines of Court”; are not pronounced after any judicial hearing or for any proved offense against the law, but are quite arbitrarily levied according to the whim or ill-will of the executive officers of the district, and their collection as well as their imposition involves continuous breaches of the Congolese laws. (Casement 2003: 84)

The cumulative effect of the arguments and cases that Casement relates shows not only the negative effects of the CFS administrative system on the native people but also that the operational reality of the CFS system was governed by extra-legal practices and motives. Reasonable laws and decrees regarding taxes and labor did not suggest a reasonable system because in practice the CFS was governed by the unlawful demands of local and regional officials backed up by overwhelming coercive force that they routinely used.

This led to the third element of Casement’s critique—the raw violence and atrocities he claimed were visited on the native populations by various company and state entities. Early in his report he relates an episode where the arrival of his steam ship caused an entire village to flee into the forest, only returning when they realized that he was not a government operative. He asked a group of women, “why they had run away at [his] approach”, and they replied, “[w]e thought you were . . . ‘Men of the Government’” (Casement 2003: 72), suggesting that the supposedly philanthropic CFS had become an object of fear. The most egregious offenses documented by Casement, however, were perpetrated by the so-called
“forest guards,” the native police force trained and deployed by the CFS military. These guards were given weapons and often assumed arbitrary powers of taxation and punishment in the towns where they were stationed. It was these guards, armed and authorized by the state, that were largely responsible for the atrocities that Casement reported, most graphically amputation, but also the murder of civilian villagers, usually in connection with rubber deliveries. In the most prominent case, Casement writes that “a boy of about 15 years of age appeared, whose left arm was wrapped up in a dirty rag. Removing this, I found the left hand had been hacked off by the wrist, and that a shot hole appeared in the fleshy part of the forearm. The boy, who gave his name as Epondo, in answer to my inquiry, said that a sentry of the La Lulanga Company now in the town had cut off his hand” (Casement 2003: 110). Casement then takes the boy to confront the sentry, who denied the charges but was eventually arrested on Casement’s request. Casement peppers his report with similarly suggestive stories of brutality, incarceration, threats, gunshot wounds, amputation, and general terror on the part of both government agents and the forest guards they empowered.

Atrocities in the Casement report are not free-floating machines of empathy. They are in service of his larger causal interpretation centered on the structure of the CFS. “The ramifications of the system of taxation,” in the CFS, according to Casement, required that “a more or less constant pressure has to be exercised to keep the taxpayers up to the mark” (Casement 2003: 115). This pressure regularly took the form of violence, thus linking the numerous atrocities he describes to the CFS as an intentional structure and ultimately to Leopold as its personal sovereign. According to Casement, the abuses of the CFS were not independent episodes but were part of a system that was predicated on abuse. Casement’s comment in his diary on witnessing a group of men arbitrarily imprisoned in Mboyo shows his personal belief in the construction of the causal link between unjust events and the CFS system: “Infamous! Infamous shameful system” (Casement 2003: 263), he writes. In support of this conviction and contention, Casement notes an extraordinary circular issued by the Governor-General of the CFS in 1901. In it, the Governor-General goes to great lengths to encourage his commissioners to improve the quality of the rubber produced by greater discipline. “[A]s soon as the native notices that the supervision is becoming lax he will try to lessen his work by taking latex of a bad quality … or by adding foreign matter” (Casement 2003: 177). This single-minded focus of the CFS administration on the extraction of rubber, according to Casement, had led to a regime of unique brutality and disorder. He writes:

The instructions this Circular conveys would be excellent if coming from the head of a trading house to his subordinates, but addressed, as they are, by a Governor-General to the principal officers of his administration, they reveal a somewhat limited conception of public duty. Instead of their energies being directed to the government of their districts, the officers therein addressed could not but feel themselves bound to consider the profitable exploitation of india-rubber as one of the principal functions of Government … and succeeding in this, the means whereby he brought about … that yield would not, it may be believed, be too closely scrutinized. (Casement 2003: 115–116)

While Casement’s report certainly appeals in important ways to empathetic understandings of the plight to which the CFS administration had subjected many of the natives under its jurisdiction, the narrative structure of his report reveals a different purpose: the construction of the CFS as such, and by extension Leopold II, as perpetrators of humanitarian abuse. In that sense the report demonstrates what Boltanski describes as the “limit” of empathetic (in his terms, sentimental) appeals:
The description of the unfortunate’s suffering... is cut short if it is not en-
riched by presenting not just a display of the objects which are causes of
suffering—rats, jailers, cellars, etc.—but also of the investigation undertaken
to accuse and unmask the persecutor. The logic of investigation takes us be-
yond the universe of sentiments [empathy] to a link with systemic connections
beyond interiority... which causes emotional investment to swing towards in-
dignant denunciation. (Boltanski 1999: 98)

In a fascinating editorial preference, Casement revealed the construction and denunciation
of the state system and its leadership as humanitarian perpetrators in the Congo as the ulti-
mate intention of his report: Casement wanted the names of the officials directly responsible
for many of the situations he relates omitted from his report so that they might not be cast
as rogue agents by Leopold and made scapegoats for what he saw as a systemic problem.18
By establishing the complicity of the CFS as a governmental system in the abuses related
in his report, Casement laid the crucial foundation for constructing the central antagonistic
character in the Congo narrative that the CRA could then set itself and the British public
against as humanitarian heroes.

**Rhetoric of the CRA: Empathy, Responsibility, Pollution, and Action**

Morel built strongly on Casement’s strategy of constructing the CFS system as the cause of
suffering in the Congo and used it as the principal antagonist of his humanitarian narrative.
He writes:

> I felt intimately assured that it was impossible to rouse anything in the nature
> of an agitation which would be more than ephemeral, by concentrating solely
> upon the scattered reports of atrocities perpetrated upon the native population.
> Moreover these were merely incidental. The central wrong was the reduction
> of millions of men to a condition of absolute slavery, by a system of legalised
> robbery enforced by violence. (Morel 1968: 58)

To place Morel’s comment here in the context of human rights theory, what he is suggesting
is an *explicit* consideration and rejection of a strategy based on sad stories and empathy
alone. He continues in this vein, writing of

> the impracticability of leading a crusade against the Congo Free State by
> invoking humanitarian sentiment alone. After all, the atrocities were merely
> the effect of a root cause. While that root cause continued to exist, they would
> continue fatally, inexorably. It was the policy itself, the whole infernal system,
> its legal bases, its monstrous claims, its fraudulent accounts and fraudulent
> statistics, its gross and enormous profits, which required to be dragged into the
daylight and pilloried. (Morel 1968: 62–63)

A focus on manipulating humanitarian sentiment through telling sad stories, to put Morel’s
argument in the Rortian theoretical vocabulary, would produce only an ephemeral outrage
at abuses while leaving the outrageous system he views as the root cause of all abuses
in the Congo intact. Morel thus determines to follow a more elaborate strategy to attack
the system that he retrospectively characterizes as having four parts. Morel describes his
interpretive and narrative strategy as follows:
Such, then, was the plan of campaign which commended itself to my judgement if Public Opinion as a whole was to be captured and the emancipation of the Congo natives secured. As the main object of assault and exposure, the “Congo Free State” itself: not its officials in Africa and their actions, but its constitution, its claims, its laws and its Sovereign. That attack to be driven home by an appeal addressed to four principles: human pity the world over; British honour; British Imperial responsibilities in Africa; international commercial rights.

(Morel 1968: 68; emphasis in original)

In the following analysis, I reorganize these categories somewhat, focusing on the mobilization of empathy, responsibility, and pollution, or, alternatively, stories that mobilize not just sadness but also guilt and fear. The final element of the narrative structure of the movement that I identify here was its plan of action, offering those moved by its account a way to respond to the distressing emotions mobilized by its account of the situation in the Congo.

**Mobilizing Empathy Narratives**

As Casement had done before him, Morel relates numerous stories of abuse to generate empathy with the native peoples of the Congo. In one of his most influential works, *Red Rubber*, Morel devotes 40 pages (of some 240) to what he calls “The Deeds.” What he presents is a parade of horror stories and descriptions of human suffering. He relates, for example, a missionary’s account of murder and mutilation:

> The sentry who had to oversee the gathering of the rubber told me they had killed the men because they had not brought in the rubber. When I crossed the stream I saw some dead bodies hanging down from the branches in the water. As I turned away my face at the horrible sight one of the native corporals who was following us down said, “Oh, that is nothing, a few days ago I returned from a fight, and I brought the white man 160 hands and they were thrown into the river.” (Morel 1907: 48)

Morel often sought to make the case for empathy by invoking powerful cultural tropes. Representations of the suffering of groups his audience would presumably see as vulnerable such as women and children was one such technique. Others included accounts of the desecration of bodies and the deployment of the polluted cultural category of slavery. The following account of a missionary provides a good example of how Morel used these techniques to create an empathetic narrative:

> The crowds were fired into promiscuously, and fifteen were killed including four women and a babe on its mother’s breast. The heads were cut off and brought to the officer in charge, who then sent men to cut off the hands also, and these were pierced, strung, and dried over the camp fire. The heads... I saw myself... Crowds of people were caught, mostly old women and young women, and three fresh rope gangs were added. These poor “prisoner” gangs were mere skeletons of skin and bone, and their bodies cut frightfully with the chicotte [a hippopotamus hide whip] when I saw them... Shortly after the State caravans, with flags flying and bugles blowing, entered the mission.
The suffering of groups like elderly women or babies at the breast heightens the raw injustice of the CFS regime. Even those who might think that some force is justified for forcing men to work would presumably experience empathy with the plight of such vulnerable others. It is worth noting the recurrence of another trope common in both the Casement report and the CRA rhetoric in this excerpt: the effort to link abuses and horror stories to the state. In another example, Morel a missionary’s account of how “the hands of men, women, and children—were placed in rows before the Commissary, who counted them to see that the soldiers had not wasted cartridges” (Morel 1904: 110–111; emphasis in original). It is striking, in this quotation, that the connection of brutality to the state is visually signified as the most notable part of this story through italics, as opposed to the severed hands.

The regularity of the narrative element connecting abuse to the state system should be read as an indicator of a certain weakness of empathetic appeals alone for generating social forces for reform of the CFS. There were a number of problems Morel faced that limited these sad stories as effective motivators of action, four of which seem most significant. First was the problem addressed above that abuses could be attributed to rogue agents of the state, suggesting that the implication of atrocity stories was that the CFS needed to be better implemented rather than radically reformed. It was in order to refute this interpretation that CRA publications relentlessly seek to link abuses to the state system—as Morel later hyperbolized, “the Congo system of government [was] organised down to the minutest rivet at Brussels” (Morel 1968: 32)—and to Leopold II personally. Second was the sense that the majority of abuses were committed by native soldiers of the CFS, and that they were the product of native rather than CFS savagery. European prejudices against African savagery made this a potentially powerful alternative interpretation that threatened to diffuse the narrative’s capacity to mobilize empathy. Morel often attempts to address this, arguing, for example, “that the practice of mutilation in war is an exotic so far as the Congo natives are concerned” (Morel 1904: 117). Third, the CRA needed to overcome the sense that some violence was inevitable in the noble but occasionally dirty business of colony building. “The hands of no colonising Power are clean,” Morel writes, “But here is no question of the occasional back-slidings which have marked and ever will mark . . . the relationship of the forward and backward races of mankind. Here is a policy cynically and ruthlessly elaborated and pursued by one man for his own personal ends, and for the enrichment of a handful of individuals at the cost of untold human suffering” (Morel 1904: 199). Fourth, many of the atrocity stories that Morel relied on for this part of his books and reporting came from missionaries. This meant that it was always second hand, creating a gap between Morel’s writing and the suffering he represents. These sections always follow the form “it is reported that,” or “X missionary states” before moving into the typographically separate quotation from whatever source. This lack of immediacy and firsthand knowledge was exacerbated by the fact that it was missionaries who were the source. Osborne shows persuasively that missionary accounts were considered dubious by many, including America’s ambassador to Belgium who thought that “the statements of missionaries . . . must be accepted with the greatest reserve” (Osborne 1999: 61). Likewise, the British ambassador to Belgium at a crucial time in 1906, Arthur Hardinge, thought that missionaries were prone to believe whatever the natives told them, making them unreliable both as witnesses and as advocates (Osborne 1999).

Morel argued vociferously against all of these points to buttress the credibility of the atrocity stories he related and to heighten the empathetic connection with suffering others.
that they had the potential to create. The effectiveness of empathetic appeals, however, can be significantly inhibited by such potential doubts, even if they are never proven, or indeed are significantly disproven (Cohen 2001; Cohen and Seu 2002; Seu 2003). For a wavering reader, they may provide an out from the uncomfortable empathy created by the narrative. Morel manages this dilemma by, in addition to defending the veracity and significance of the CRA’s empathy appeals, deploying other narrative techniques aimed at mobilizing different emotions based on different arguments and sources of evidence.

**Mobilizing Responsibility Narratives**

In CRA publications, Morel regularly reiterates Britain’s unique role in establishing the CFS, and thus its unique responsibility in bringing an end to the abuses perpetrated by the CFS. Britain originally supported an agreement granting Portugal sovereignty over the Congo basin in part to forestall a French claim. Leopold, through the device of the International African Association that he had established as a nominally philanthropic and scientific organization, had been courting British public opinion for some time. Through promises of commercial and religious freedom and a state devoted to philanthropic goals, he succeeded in winning over the opinion of the British Chambers of Commerce, the Protestant Missionary Societies, and the Aborigines Protection Society and turned those organizations against the Anglo-Portuguese arrangement. In the midst of the “scramble for Africa,” this division within Britain provided an opening for the French and Germans to undermine the Anglo-Portuguese arrangement. Given the threat of France obtaining the Congo basin and thus a large swath of central Africa, the British government decided to support Leopold’s bid to turn his International African Association into a “philanthropic” state (Morel 1907: 12–15). This, anyway, is Morel’s narrative of the origins of the CFS. In assessing British responsibility for the creation of the CFS under Leopold II’s personal sovereignty, Morel writes, “To a greater extent than is the case with any one of the other signatory Powers is it possible to affirm, that but for British acquiescence there would have been no ‘Congo Free State’” (Morel 1907: 196). He goes further than a statement of governmental responsibility, however, making the case for a unique complicity of the British public in the creation of the CFS. In outline format Morel argues:

A. King Leopold’s “International Association” would have dissolved into thin air but for the... action of the Powers in allowing it to blossom from a private undertaking into a great free area under the trusteeship of the Sovereign...
B. Without British sanction, co-operation, and assistance, no such arrangement could possibly have been arrived at.
C. But for the influence exercised by King Leopold and his agents upon British public opinion, the British Government would never have given its sanction to the arrangement. (Morel 1907: 23)

By making the argument that the British government and public played a critical role in enabling the rise of the CFS, Morel creates a narrative justification for acting in what might otherwise seem a geographically and morally remote situation. By describing the rise of the CFS in this way, Morel created a narrative structure designed to complement his account of atrocities and abuse in the state by linking it to a sense of moral responsibility and guilt. For those affected by this technique, it raised the stakes by challenging the equilibrium of positive self- and national identity. Unlike the mechanism of empathy, guilt relies less on, as Rorty puts it, “softening the self-satisfied hearts of a leisure class” (Rorty 1993: 130)
with all its overtones of voluntarism and, instead (at least potentially), threatens to replace an important source of that self-satisfaction (providing the gifts of civilization to savage Africa) with tacit complicity in atrocity.

*Mobilizing Pollution Narratives*

The notion of a “civilizing mission” was enormously important to English imperial ideology of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. In order to understand the CRA’s deployment of the concept of pollution, this fact needs to be combined with the great hopes originally held by philanthropists for the CFS. It was not just another state, but a state, “with ‘freedom’ as its watchword... where the native would benefit by the blessings of even-handed justice, and good government” (Morel 1907: 13). Leopold was not just another leader seeking material gain but a philanthropic hero, who was “repudiated with scorn the very notion of pursuing material ends, either for himself, or for Belgium” (Morel 1907: 13). In the words of Sir Harry Johnston, an explorer and British colonial official with long African experience, “The King of the Belgians stood forward as the champion of what was best in European civilisation, and all that was to regenerate this vast region of potential wealth... devoid of any indigenous government which could establish law and order” (in Johnston 1907: xiii). What these constructions of the meaning of King Leopold II and the CFS in its early days do is to establish the contiguity between the government of the Congo and European philanthropic and imperial ideals. It is because of this contiguity, and what Leopold is meant to represent, that the CRA argued that its allegations of systemic abuse and raw motivations of expropriation and enrichment in the CFS threatened to pollute the sacrality of the entire notion of Europe’s civilizing mission in Africa.

The rhetoric of pollution and contamination recurs in various forms throughout the writing of the CRA. “The ‘Congo Free State’ has long ceased to exist,” Morel writes. “It has given place to a political monster and international outlaw... The reek of its abominations mounts to Heaven in fumes of shame. It pollutes the earth. Its speedy disappearance is imperative for Africa, and for the world” (Morel 1907: 213). Morel returns to the exact same formulation later, writing that the CFS threatened to “pollute the map of Africa” (Morel 1968: 136) and to “contaminate the whole tropical region of Africa” (Morel 1968: 63). This same trope of pollution and contamination recurs in various forms throughout the CRA literature. The issue of the CFS was not just about the suffering of the native people there but posed a threat to the meaning of empire, European civilization, whiteness, and even Christianity. The perpetuation of the CFS regime, Morel argues, “would lead Christianity to the abyss of self-destruction” (Morel 1907: 200) so corrosive was its evil. “I often wonder,” writes Morel at greater length, “that the White Powers can continue their supine contemplation, while deeds are done in the Congo Basin which brand with indelible infamy the white race in the eyes of the black, deeds which... make civilisation ashamed of its name,’ deeds which cry to Heaven for vengeance” (Morel 1907: 210). This rhetorical play between white and black, civilized Europe and “the Dark continent” recurs throughout these sections, emphasizing the *general* nature of the threat posed by the CFS. It did not just threaten Leopold’s, or Belgium’s or even Britain’s honor and standing, but Europe’s: “[T]he conception of tropical African development upon which [the CFS] rested was one that ought to be struggled against without pause or abatement of energy in the interests of humanity, of European honour, and European statesmanship in the Dark Continent” (Morel 1904: x). A few pages later in the same volume, Morel extends this logic to claim allegorically that the only way to prevent this contamination is for legitimate European civilization itself to act: “The only remedy lies in the reversal by civilisation of
the...system set up in the Congo territories, a system...disastrous to European prestige in its ultimate effects” (Morel 1904: xii). A series of phrases used regularly in CRA literature reinforces this threat of pollution without making the argument explicitly. Morel writes, for example of Leopold II’s “civilised barbarism” (Morel 1907: 210), capturing in a phrase his contention that the CFS regime polluted the former by conjoining it with the latter. Similarly the title of his book, *Red Rubber*, which has become a catchphrase for the history of controversy surrounding the CFS, rhetorically attaches the blood of the CFS’s Congolese victims to the rubber that had become so important to European industry, and so prevalent in society. Metaphorically, the blood threatens to seep out of the Congo and into one’s life in the form of pneumatic tires and other daily objects. Another phrase that Morel regularly employs, “the rubber slave-trade” (Morel 1907: 165), works in a different manner to the same end by connecting contemporary CFS practices to the polluted and shameful category of slavery. By relentlessly equating forced labor in the CFS with slavery, Morel employs a double polluting metaphor. By the early twentieth century, the history of English/British involvement in the slave-trade was generally viewed as uncivilized and the abolition of the trade in 1807 as a heroic cleansing moment in British history. In this light Morel writes, “[o]ur forefathers smashed the over-sea slave-trade, and we shall root out the modern inland slave-trade on the Congo. The difference between the two evils is that the latter is more destructive of human life...and more demoralising in its cumulative effects than the former was, even at the height of its power” (Morel 1904: xvii). The second connection made by equating the CFS with the slave trade is to the so-called “Arab slave trade” that was of great preoccupation among the European powers during the Berlin conference. Indeed, combating the “Arab” slave trade in central Africa was one of the justifications provided at the conference for creating a strong European colonial presence. But Morel makes a strong case that not only had the installation of the supposedly civilized CFS created a more destructive system of slavery than that of the “Arabs” but because it was a Christian and European regime that it threatened with the pollution of those sacred institutions with the evil of slavery. Morel knits many of these tropes together in a long passage:

The Congo Administration extirpated the Arab slave dealers. It did. The policy pursued by these semi-barbarians was atrocious. But was it so atrocious as the civilised barbarism which has replaced it?...[T]he “Congo Free State” in its basic claims, practices, and methods is primarily a huge slave-owning and slave-raiding corporation...compared with the cold diabolicism of its policy, Arab excesses extending over an infinitely smaller area were tame. The slave-raiding, slave-dealing Arab was, at least, constructive....For the preservation of the races of Central Africa it would have been better if Islam...had thrown deep and abiding roots among the Bantu races of the eastern section of the Congo Basin. It would have given them that co-operation and adhesion by which alone they could have withstood the ravages of slavery and “regeneration” patented by King Leopold in the name of Christianity. Civilisation went frantic over the cruelty of the uncultured Arab half-caste. It has allowed the cultured European to impose upon an infinitely greater number of human beings a yoke more unbearable than the Arab laid. And that yoke remains. (Morel 1907: 88)

In this striking excerpt, Morel captures the essence of the narrative structure of pollution. Because he had been empowered to act in the name of civilization, Christianity, and European ideas, the pollution represented by Leopold’s CFS threatened to spread and infect these sacred symbols. According to the narrative structure that Morel has erected,
escaping this threat required European, Christian civilization to radically distance itself, to transform its contiguity with the CFS into antagonism, and to answer the threat of pollution by turning on its source, the CFS, and cleansing it.

This meant that the CRA’s pollution narrative involved the mobilization of anger as well as fear. Behind the rhetoric of the corruption of the sacred lies the hated perpetrator, Leopold. Morel’s narrative rage at Leopold could of course be counterproductive if it were seen to undermine the objectivity of his account, but it often surfaces in the text in a limited way. “Once more has King Leopold with impunity said in effect to civilisation, ‘the Congo is my property; its people are my slaves; its products belong to me’” (Morel 1904: 295; emphasis in original). And elsewhere: “In God’s name, how long is the most powerful Empire in the world [Britain] to wait while, with its cognisance, the rubber slave-trade flourishes on the Congo, and men, women, and children whom the British people did more than any other to place under the trusteeship of King Leopold, fall in heaps—victims to unbridled and inexcusable wickedness” (Morel 1907: 240)? What these kinds of *ad hominem* attacks do is to maintain alongside the more abstract CFS a personal perpetrator as the ultimate object of humanitarian rage. By invoking at regular intervals the enemy with a human face, Morel stokes a potentially deeper, and more personal anger at the pollution of civilization by the perpetrator Leopold. Responsibility for this threat is in these instances focused onto one man and thus creates the potential for a more intense hate, and a potentially more intense impetus to act.

**Mobilizing Narratives for Action**

The manipulation of sentiments in the rhetoric of the CRA went beyond empathy to construct a complex structure of feeling including guilt and fear as well as sadness at the suffering of the natives of the Congo, all prevented from dissipation by the claim that the perpetrator of the deplorable situation in the CFS was the state system as such, and the personal responsibility of Leopold II himself. This narrative structure, however, itself did not provide a clear direction for action to relieve the pressure of the uncomfortable emotions it mustered. The final element of CRA narrative structure that I will deal with here is its linkage of the unpleasant emotions it mobilized with a series of actions to resolve the situation in the Congo, thus providing a plausible, constructive humanitarian mechanism for emotional relief. What I am suggesting is that in addition to generating pressure to act through sentimental mobilization, the CRA also provided a script for how to effectively act.

Morel opened the first edition of *Red Rubber* in October of 1906 with a question: “Will the British Public, which in the ultimate resort has compelled exposure of a crime unparalleled in the annals of the world, compel the cessation of that crime? It has the driving force to do so if it will” (Morel 1907: xxx). By the third edition of the volume in May of 1907, he could write, “More than ever do I venture to reassert...that the fate of the Congo races depends upon the reply made by the British people to the question with which I concluded the preface to the first edition. And the British people are certainly responding in a magnificent manner to the appeal which has been made to them...The British public seems roused at last” (Morel 1907: xix–xx). To what ends did Morel argue they should be roused? In the first place, he warns against the easy solution proposed by Leopold and his agents of making incremental reforms to an essentially sound system. “In the last three chapters”, Morel writes, “I have endeavoured to establish that from King Leopold no alteration in the existing state of affairs on the Congo is to be looked for; that to expect ‘reform’ from that quarter would be puerile; that ‘reform’ can only come with a sweeping removal of the cause
of the evil by cauterising the evil at its roots” (Morel 1907: 178–179). Morel exhorts his readers, “[n]ot reform but revolution. Not the apothecary but the surgeon. Not poulticing but removal” (Morel 1907: 164). What then can be done to promote fundamental change? Morel soothingly assures his readers that “[n]othing impracticable, nothing unrealisable is being demanded on behalf of the Congo natives” (Morel 1907: 212). The alternatives he proposes are specific and systemic. Morel proposes that the general systemic source of the abuses in the Congo stem from the fact that land and property rights have been stripped from the natives and the raising of revenue had become the State’s raison d’être. Leopold had instituted a system where, “Everything in the country belonged to the ‘State’; the land and the produce thereof. The natives were tenants upon the ‘State’s’ property” (Morel 1907: 31). With absent ownership and the ability to trade the products of their labor with European merchants, the natives of the Congo were reduced to essential slavery. The restoration of property and land rights as well as rights over their labor was thus the ultimate revolution that Morel thought would resolve the problem. Morel writes, “[t]rade spells freedom for the inhabitant of the African tropics. Its suppression spells his enslavement by those who deny him the right to own the produce of his country, deprive him of his right to buy and to sell, strangle forever his economic development, force him at the end of the lash . . . to harvest what was once his wealth before they stole it from him, and lay it at the feet of the despoiler” (Morel 1907: 205).

In order to pressure Leopold to restore land, property, and labor rights, Morel proposed a series of possibilities including introducing British consular jurisdiction as permitted under the Berlin Act, providing Britain with the opportunity to put judges on the ground in the Congo with the power to collect evidence in cases involving subjects of the British empire to provide a strong alternative to official CFS accounts of incidents, procedures, and regulations (e.g., Morel 1907: xxii, 184–187); pressuring the CFS to remove restrictions on missionaries, enhancing their capacity to collect data and report on abuses (e.g., Morel 1907: 189–193); withdrawing sovereign recognition of the CFS for abrogation of its responsibilities under the Berlin Act (Morel 1907: 182); declining admittance of CFS steamers to British territory (Morel 1907: 183); posting a man-of-war at the mouth of the Congo to prevent CFS shipping (Morel 1907: 193–194); invoking the Navigation Commission contemplated by the Berlin Act but never used taking control of navigation on the Congo river from the CFS (Morel 1907: 210); and finally, “the possible but unlikely solution of Belgian annexation” (Morel 1907: 211). It was the last of these, Belgian annexation, that took place in November of 1908 and ultimately resolved the Congo crisis, with the CRA officially disbanding in 1912. What this menu of alternatives did, however, was to construct a plausible path forward studded with multiple possibilities, some more realistic than others, towards which those moved by the sentimental manipulations of CRA rhetoric could apply themselves, and around which they could organize.

The narrative structure of the CRA did not simply link emotional mobilization to action through a menu of options, however. The possible actions that Morel proposes in his various works are better understood in the broader context of CRA narrative structure, where they are not an addendum so much as the final act. The best way to make sense of this is through the concept of genre. In his discussion of the concept of genre as a tool for interpreting cultural narratives, Smith distinguishes between tragedy and romance. Tragedy involves “themes of descent . . . the futility of human striving, the fall from grace, the missed opportunity and the horror of suffering . . . In effect things go horribly wrong” (Smith 2005: 25). Romance, on the other hand, “sees an upward movement of the hero . . . [t]here is an emphasis on the transformative power of the human agent and on ‘themes of ascent’ that lead to social improvement . . . to a better world or the recovery of a lost Eden” (Smith 2005: 25).
As described here, the narrative structure of CRA documents up until the sections calling for action are obviously and deliberately tragic. They speak of the despoliation and enslavement of a native society, the duplicity of Leopold’s philanthropic rhetoric, the unwitting complicity of the British state and public in unleashing this devastation, and the pollution of the sacred. In terms of genre, however, one of the distinctive features of humanitarian representations in general that the CRA narrative structure reveals very clearly is a distinctive suspension of the story somewhere between tragedy and romance. The story is always the story so far, and the purpose is always to rally the forces of good by showing that the last act is not yet written, redemption for us and the other may still be possible, and the descent into antihumanitarianism that has been described can be reversed or at least stopped. Humanitarian narratives typically narrate a tragedy and propose how it can yet be turned at least partially into a romance of successful action. This is the real function of Morel’s proposals. Their inclusion in the narrative of the Congo holds out the hope that emotional distress can be turned to the good fight, and that Leopold as perpetrator might yet be matched by the British public and government as the humanitarian hero.

“Congo Gold”

A comparison between the narrative structure of the Congo reform movement and a story about abuses connected to gold mined in the Congo that aired on the American news-magazine television program 60 Minutes in 2009 helps to make the case for the theoretical and practical importance of the more inclusive and complex concept of emotional mobilization in humanitarian representations.

The 60 Minutes piece, entitled “Congo Gold,” has several superficial similarities with early twentieth-century Congo reform documents: Its geographical focus, for one, as well as its focus on a connection between resource extraction and suffering. “Congo Gold,” however, follows a much more straightforward pattern of telling a sad, sentimental story without additional emotional appeals. It constructs a vague and remote perpetrator and goes out of its way to limit the possibility of significant pollution or personal responsibility on the part of the audience. The piece begins with presenter Scott Pelley informing the viewer that “gold and other minerals are funding the deadliest war since WWII. More than 5 million people have died in the Democratic Republic of Congo. . . . In the heart of Central Africa we found a campaign of rape and murder being funded largely by gold that’s exported to the world.” Depictions of the mine focus on men and boys working in obviously dangerous conditions, informing the viewer that they are barely paid, and showing the fumes as the mercury used to extract the gold burns off while informing the viewer that neurological damage from the fumes can take years to show up. The piece then connects the gold mines to an even more extreme story of suffering. Pelley interviews John Prendergast of the Enough Project who explains that various armed groups attack the civilian population because it “terrorizes them into compliance” generating social “chaos that is organized in order to exploit the gold and other minerals for the enrichment of these armed groups.” With the link made from gold to conflict, the piece then launches a series of vignettes that together construct a representation of severe suffering. One million displaced individuals live in “desperate” camps with little food and less protection. The narrative then moves from this abstract level to the personal. Pelley says, “The story of one woman captures Congo.” A woman who does not want to be named explains that her three children were shot to death, and her parents were burned alive along with 280 others. Pelley interjects to broaden the significance of this woman’s story to the Congo generally. While foraging for food, he tells us that “she fell victim to the other atrocity of Congo – rape. . . . It’s estimated...
that 200,000 women have been raped in eastern Congo. Rape is a weapon here, often a lethal one.” The woman explains that it was “hard to tell if [the men who raped her] were soldiers or rebels.” These various representations of suffering are then linked again in the next part of the program to gold and the international gold trade. “Because of the suffering the UN has tried to stop the trafficking in Congo’s illicit gold, but we found that the gold from these mines is being smuggled into world trade.” Pelley reports the gold is smuggled across the border to Uganda, and then “[a]fter Kampala it heads to refiners in Dubai, and then out into the world.”

The sad stories of the “Congo Gold” report are similar to those of the Congo reform movement in their depiction of suffering, but they differ quite significantly with regard to narrative structure. While the Congo reformers of the early twentieth century expended considerable rhetorical effort in constructing the CFS and its sovereign Leopold II as clear and distinct perpetrators, in “Congo Gold” the perpetrators are named in shifting ways. Sometimes they are “armed groups,” sometimes they are “rebels,” sometimes it is hard to tell, but in all cases they are of the “rogue agents” type so vigorously refuted by Casement and Morel because attributing atrocities to such rogue agents dissipated all responsibility on the part of entities susceptible to political and moral pressure. In its final section, “Congo Gold” focuses on the potentially polluting movement of gold from the Congo into the world market. In structural terms, this story could have been framed in exactly the same way as Morel’s “Red Rubber” campaign, generating links of accountability between companies and the public to the brutality of rubber/gold extraction in the Congo. “Congo Gold,” however, cuts this connection off in two ways. First, at the outset of this part of the show, Pelley gives viewers a reassuring interpretive frame for the Congolese horror stories they have just heard and seen and the images of jewelry companies and executives they are about to watch. “No one can say how much of the world market is fed by Congo gold.” Pelley reports, “The best estimates are around 1%. So it’s not likely any particular watch or wedding ring contributed to rape or murder.” There is nothing necessarily right or wrong about this presentation of the case, but in terms of narrative structure it dissipates feelings of discomfort and potential complicity on the part of the viewer, exactly the opposite of what the Congo reform movement attempted. The second way that “Congo Gold” limits the significance of the links between familiar retailers and precious personal items on the one hand and atrocities in the Congo on the other is by constructing the problem as a lack of information. The report accepts the assurance of industry representative Matt Runci that “There is absolutely no place and no need for debate around the question of whether any illegally sourced mineral ought to be part of the industry’s supply chain. It should not be.” Based on this premise, however, the dynamics of pollution and responsibility that the Congo reform movement mobilized are cut off. The construction of the problem ends up focusing not on greedy complicity in atrocity but on the much more mundane issue of a failure of information practices. Accurate or not, this is a poor technique for emotional mobilization. Pelley tells the audience that “jewelers know about the tragedy in Congo but it’s never been standard industry practice to trace gold to its source. Jewelers buy gold from middle men, they don’t ask where it comes from.” The emotions mobilized by the terrible stories at the beginning of the piece are focused by the end onto the abstraction “standard industry practice” and on diffuse “armed groups”; neither of which can effectively channel that energy. What does one do about armed groups in the Congo? Why should one feel responsible for their actions? How can anyone be blamed for following standard practice? The report dissipates emotional energy still further by assuring viewers that action on the lack of information that the report constructs as the issue connecting jewelers to atrocity is already underway. Pelley concludes the piece telling viewers that the Responsible Jewelry
Council is “developing a system for the industry that will one day trace gold to its source,” suggesting that problem most clearly defined in terms of potential action is already being addressed. “Congo Gold” provides a useful example of the representation of suffering focused almost exclusively on sad stories, with other potential emotional manipulations such as guilt or fear of pollution and possibilities for action often explicitly limited in the narrative structure of the piece. This analysis in no way seeks to undermine what “Congo Gold” was doing. In some ways, it is far more sensitive to the nuances of interconnection and the complexity of its object analysis than, for example, Morel’s at times stridently self-confident denunciations. There are no clear enemies in “Congo Gold.” But its lack of capacity to mobilize more than sorrow points to the need to go beyond the empathy thesis to a more complex analysis of how narrative structure contributes to emotional mobilization in humanitarian representations.

**Conclusion**

The CRA became the organizational hub of a movement that held mass gatherings throughout England, and eventually in America as well. It played that role in part by creating a highly structured nexus of representation and action, where the stories that they told about the suffering of distant others inspired huge audiences to come to meetings, to communicate with Parliament, to write, and to continue reading and following the issue. It generated significant and sustained public pressure for British involvement in transforming the CFS. The argument advanced here does not deal with how the narrative structure created by Casement and Morel worked on the level of the audience, but rather how it sought to mobilize emotions through various narrative techniques.

This narrative structure exceeds the theoretical model of the empathy thesis in a number of important ways. First, it devoted significant attention to the construction of a human rights perpetrator. If rogue agents were to blame, then the force of the demands for justice would be turned away from radical change and toward incremental reforms. Second, it engaged heavily in the kind of sentimental manipulation that Rorty calls for, but in more varied ways than he contemplates. While Rorty and the theoretical human rights work in the same tradition focus on empathy through sad stories emphasizing commonalities, the Congo reformers used multiple manipulations in various registers. The empirical case here exceeds the theoretical model in a variety of directions. What the Congo reform movement constructed was in fact a complex emotional appeal involving various modalities of meaning, each supported by their own sets of arguments and each subject to various counterarguments. For the persuadable audience, this complex appeal provided various options and ways that individuals could be moved to feel and potentially to act.

One of the notable features of this disjuncture between human rights theory and Congo reform movement practice is how much the movement relied on the mobilization of powerful negative emotions such as fear and hatred. While Rorty’s vision focuses on solidaristic bonds and the expansion of the universe of obligation, the narrative structures deployed by the Congo reform movement are often motivated by the need to construct a humanitarian enemy as an object of rage. This humanitarian narrative seeks to expand the universe of obligation but also to restrict it by sharply delimiting the interpretive space available to Leopold and the CFS. Morel and Casement both concluded that empathy without enemies is a weak appeal, destined to be short-lived. “Congo Gold” certainly supports this view. Smith notes that salvation narratives rely on the deployment of a binary good/evil narrative structure to construct a convincing interpretation of the world (Smith 2000). As described here, the literature on humanitarian representations has been
far too focused on the construction of the good—the suffering, the human, the pitiable. What the Congo reform movement shows is the importance in the success of humanitarian representations of the construction of evil—the perpetrator, the pollutive threat, the inhuman system—and their attendant emotions of hatred, rage, fear, and a desire for vengeance.

The concept of emotional mobilization provides the theoretical range to accommodate all of these potential appeals in humanitarian representations and, thus, is a significant improvement on the empathy thesis. Likewise, the concept of narrative structure provides a framework for analyzing the construction of humanitarian meanings in terms of a wide range of techniques and the specific ways that those techniques are combined to construct meanings and to make appeals. Taking the two concepts together provides a powerful theoretical vocabulary for making sense of how representations like those of the CRA—or of 60 Minutes for that matter—work or fail to work as constructions of humanitarian meaning. Humanitarian narratives, like all narratives, work on the level of meaning to propose interpretations of events and situations that provide arguments about causality, agency, trajectory, relationships, and possibilities for positive engagement. With the concepts of narrative structure and emotional mobilization, we can sharpen our analysis of how humanitarian narratives in particular work. “Sad stories” and empathy are useful as a start, but, to understand the connection between emotions, actions, and representations across a wider range of humanitarian endeavor, more flexible theoretical tools are needed. This approach creates a theoretical framework for the deployment of secondary analytical concepts like character, genre, and the pollution of the sacred. In any given empirical case, they may or may not play a prominent role, but there is sufficient space within the two main theoretical categories of narrative structure and emotional mobilization to develop comparable but specific concepts for understanding how any given humanitarian narrative constructs the tragic in light of both suffering and possibility.

Notes

1. I mean realism here in the very broad contemporary sense that Legro and Moravcsik critically identify as “minimal realism,” that is, a realism hollowed of its original theoretical content leaving in place only the assumption of international anarchy and rationality. This minimal realism is “consistent with any influence on rational state behavior, including those once uniformly disparaged by realists as ‘legalist,’ ‘liberal,’ ‘moralist,’ or ‘idealist’” (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 7).

2. Laqueur identifies this as the “sentimentalist thesis,” but this is a theoretically revelatory misnomer. Sentiment refers to an entire range of emotions, but the Rortian school of thought in question strongly tends to focus on empathy. By referring to this theory as the “empathy thesis,” I mean to accentuate the limited focus that work in this area usually exhibits. See Laqueur (2009: 32).

3. For the purposes of this argument, the differences between sympathy, empathy, and identification are irrelevant. They all refer to some form of sadness caused by the suffering of another that either maintains or imaginatively erodes the distance between self and that other (see Cohen 2001: 216 and Morrell 2010).

4. Morrell’s “process model of empathy” is helpful here in identifying empathy as a range of affective outcomes potentially produced by a range of processes extending from the simple and autonomic to the cognitively complex (2010: 62).

5. An important limitation of my approach here is that it focuses on the construction of representations and not on their reception. For a helpful theoretical approach to the question of the success or failure of performances of meaning such as humanitarian representations, see Alexander (2004).

6. The claim here is not that human rights theory has ignored a more inclusive range of emotions entirely. Cohen, for example, identifies “three emotional constellations” at work in humanitarian
appeals: “anger, guilt and empathy” (2001). Rather, it is that this broader agenda hasn’t been followed up empirically. In theory, most would agree that multiple emotional registers are involved in humanitarian representations, but in practice actual representations have not been analyzed in this way.

7. Boltanski (1999) offers an alternative but largely complementary analysis of techniques in his discussion of “topics” or genres as the constituent modes for the effective representation of distant suffering.

8. The most important exposition of this view is Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2001). Both in the authors’ introduction and in various essays throughout, a wide range of emotions are considered for their role in mobilizing and organizing social movement actors and shaping outcomes.

9. “Obligation narrative” and later “pollution narrative” should be taken here as analytical categories that focus on part of an interconnected and complicated narrative structure. It is empirically useful to identify the different emotional and cultural work that these modes perform, and thus to distinguish them analytically. Cohen includes “responsibility” in his summary of the possible emotional modalities for human rights appeals but does not apply the concept empirically or specify its connection with other modes through narrative (Cohen 2001: 214).


11. Throughout, I use the generic term “Congo reform movement” to refer to the broader social movement in England, including the work of Casement and others not formally affiliated with the CRA. The CRA refers only to the organization led by E. D. Morel and its official publications.

12. Beyond his report, Casement had a lengthy meeting with Morel where he encouraged him to launch the CRA and even donated £100 to the cause.


14. On this point see Orentlicher (1990: 123): “government officials frequently deny that state actors are responsible for reported abuses, or insist that violations happen only occasionally and do not reflect official policy.”

15. Siochain and O’Sullivan (2003) have produced a meticulously reconstructed and annotated version of the Casement report. All references are to their version.

16. On a personal level, Casement was beginning to have doubts about this question, and ultimately was hung for supporting the Irish independence movement in 1916 (see Siochain 2008).

17. Casement routinely references laws, court findings, and decrees of the CFS as what Orentlicher calls “admissions against interest” officially issued by the state, and thus of presumably high probative value in support of his broader argument (see Orentlicher 1990: 122–125).

18. The issue of names became a subject of controversy, however, and the original version of the report had almost all proper names removed, negatively impacting its credibility in Casement’s view (see Siochain and O’Sullivan 2003: 38–40).

19. E. D. Morel founded and ran the Congo Reform Association, was its nearly exclusive public voice and, in his books, newspaper, and pamphlets created and routinely reinforced the argumentative structure of the reform movement in England. I thus use Morel’s writing in this section to represent the “narrative structure of the CRA.” His texts tended to be highly repetitive, in terms of both argument and evidence, making the notion of a singular narrative structure for the CRA justifiable.

20. While Morel mentions the issue of international commercial rights, and certainly could have mounted a strong sentimental appeal on the basis of the self-interest of England’s merchants, he rarely and then only halfheartedly does so.

21. He himself never went to the Congo, despite making its reform his obsession for over a decade.

22. By then renamed the International Congo Association.

23. Seu writes that her participants erect defense mechanisms to protect themselves from the threat of “responsibility for their country’s involvement or at least acquiescence in human rights abuses. This could be understood as a threat involved in the potential loss of narcissistic supplies when our
ideal self is shuttered by comparison with the real self who turns a blind eye to this knowledge” (Seu 2003: 184).

24. Pomeranz (2005) shows that the “civilizing mission” trope was widespread both in geography and time and was of important general significance to European imperial projects (see also Bayly 1989 and Hall 2002).

25. This notion of a constructive humanitarian mechanism can be contrasted with the more familiar notion of a defense mechanism that Seu and Cohen have written about at length (e.g., Cohen 2001; Seu 2003).


References


