

## Recovering Status Quo Locations in State Legislatures

Michael Peress  
Univ. of Rochester

Jesse Richman  
Old Dominion Univ.

Jim Battista  
Univ. at Buffalo, SUNY

### Abstract:

Building on Richman's recent advances in estimating the location of policy-specific status quos in the US Congress, we use NPAT responses and estimated ideal points in a common space to estimate the locations of several policy-specific status quos across 27 state legislatures. We discuss details of the estimation procedure, interpretation of recovered status quo locations, and some applications for recovered status quo including comparative tests of the pivotal-politics and party cartel models.

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The recent literature on legislatures, and in particular the US House, has offered a new focus on how legislators' preferences move forward into enacted policy changes, or more commonly fail to move policy from the status quo. Most prominently, both Krehbiel (1998) and Cox and McCubbins (2005) offer different models of this process, in which they argue that the location of the status quo or reversion point relative to key political actors determines whether policy will be changed, and if so what change will occur. While they differ strongly in their predictions, and especially in the role (if any) played by party leadership, one factor that even these quite distinct models share is that their primary predictions require the researcher to have solid estimates of the status quo on a given issue. However, while the technology for estimating legislators' ideal points has advanced rapidly and become a normal tool in the study of legislative politics (see Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE variants (1991, 1997), or Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) IDEAL, Shor and McCarty's linear-mapped common space scores (2011), or our own "big matrix" common-space ideal point estimates (forthcoming), finding the location of the status quo has proved more difficult. Even algorithms that can quite handily find the separating hyperplane dividing yea from nay votes face the problem that an infinite number of pairs of status quo and alternative are consistent with the same separating hyperplane.

In this paper, we extend Richman's (2011) technique for estimating status quo locations from the US Congress to the state legislatures. Richman's technique exploits Project Vote Smart's National Political Awareness Test or NPAT. The NPAT contains a battery of questions on taxing and spending priorities, many items of which are common across many or all states. Each of these items asks the legislator to state whether he or she prefers an increase in spending, decrease in spending, or, critically for Richman's technique, to maintain spending at the current level – that is, to maintain the status quo. By analyzing which legislators are most likely to most

prefer the status quo, it becomes possible to estimate where among the legislators the status quo should be located. We discuss how locating the status quo is critical to several theories of legislative action and some existing techniques for estimating the status quo. We describe Richman's technique, its data requirements, and the data we bring to bear. We then present some preliminary estimated status quos for several issues across 27 state legislatures. Finally, we discuss where this project is headed and offer some necessarily very preliminary conclusions.

We hope that this paper will eventually contribute as well to the literature on policy representation in the U.S. states. Arguably the state of the art in the state representation literature is represented by the recent paper by Lax and Phillips (2011) which examined the degree to which state policy outcomes reflect citizen preferences on a range of dichotomous issue choices. This work, while extremely impressive, cannot be readily extended to evaluate the degree of representation (and the nature of representation) for continuous policy issues like education spending or cigarette tax rates. This limitation is potentially important given the scope and reach of these issues in state government. After developing status quo and outcome location estimates we use them to test several models of the representation and policy making process.

### *Theoretical Models and the Location of the Status Quo*

Legislative politics scholars have recently developed competing models of the overall legislative process. These highly abstracted models attempt to explain when changes from the status quo are infeasible, when they are feasible, and what change is likely to occur when changes can take place. The first of these comprehensive models Krehbiel's (1998) pivotal politics model, which argues that the only central factor in legislative policymaking is the relative locations of certain central or pivotal actors such as the House median, the 40<sup>th</sup> and 60<sup>th</sup> Senators who function as "filibuster pivots," and the MCs necessary to override a presidential

veto. For example, if the House median favors the status quo over some bill, then the bill will not pass the House and the bill will fail. Likewise, bills that the Senate filibuster pivot opposes will die in the Senate, and bills the President opposes will die on his desk unless the veto pivot favors it. This creates a wide area, the gridlock interval, between the veto pivot on one side and the filibuster pivot on the other, where any status quo is unassailable because at least one of these key actors will oppose any movement from it.

Following his earlier critiques of conditional party government (Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 2000) and other theories of parties as powerful and relevant actors, Krehbiel's model is explicitly party-less and functions on "preferenceship" rather than partisanship. Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) and Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) have developed otherwise similar counter-models that integrate party power and leadership into a pivotal-politics style framework. In particular, Cox and McCubbins's (2005) cartel theory of parties describes a party leadership with dual roles as agenda setters. First, parties can exercise negative agenda control by refusing to bring to a vote bills that a majority of the party opposes, but that would nonetheless pass on the floor (majority rolls). In this model, the majority leadership can decide whether to allow a free vote (moving the policy to the chamber median's ideal point) or disallow it (leaving the policy at the status quo). Additionally, party leaders may be able to exercise positive agenda control, in which they actively foster majority-party-favored alternatives against the centrist pressure of the median voter. For example, the party leadership may be able to force consideration under a closed rule, presenting the median voter with a take it or leave it offer. Doing so can potentially induce a bill to pass at some distance from the median's ideal point. Taken together, these models create a wide partisan blackout zone – bills that are opposed by the

floor median or filibuster pivot cannot pass, and bills that are opposed by the majority party median die before receiving a vote.

In both pivotal politics and partisan models of legislation, the location of the status quo is critical. In the pivotal politics model, if the status quo is inside the gridlock interval, no change is possible. Only those policies whose status quos are located towards either extreme, outside of the gridlock interval, can be moved to a new policy within the current gridlock interval. In a partisan model, the majority leadership will not allow votes on any policy where a party majority prefers the status quo to the median voter's ideal point. Further, if parties are able to exercise positive agenda control, it is the location of the status quo that describes how closely to the party median the leadership will be able to drag the outcome.

However, the theoretical importance of a variable has never been a sufficient condition for it being remotely easy to operationalize, and the location of the status quo has proven difficult to estimate for reasons the next section will detail. Instead of testing the predictions of pivotal-politics and party cartel models directly, by examining which status quos are moved and to where they are moved, researchers have relied on less direct tests. Krehbiel (1998), for example, analyzes who the President is able to bring on board with his proposals, and who he is able to retain when he vetoes a bill. Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) examine legislative productivity and gridlock. Cox and McCubbins (2005) examine the direction of policy change. Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Woon (2005), Clinton (2007), and Stiglitz and Weingast (2010) all study the distribution of cutpoints (sometimes using other measures as well). While many would argue that examining secondary or tertiary predictions is an important step in establishing the utility of a causal theory, an ability to directly test the primary implications of these models as well would surely be welcome. It is here that Richman's algorithm for estimating status quo

locations using both roll-call based ideal point estimates and responses to the NPAT comes into play.

### *Estimating Status Quo Locations*

The core problem with estimating the location of the status quo is that the standard sources for estimating preferences, roll call votes, are silent on the matter. By analyzing the patterns of yeas and nays, and the patterns of who a given legislator tends to vote with and against, tools like NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1990), IDEAL (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004), or our own common-space estimator (Battista, Peress, and Richman forthcoming) can relatively easily find the set of ideal points and separating hyperplanes that are most consistent with the observed data. The problem is that while cutpoints (in a 1-space) or cutlines (in a 2-space) that separate predicted yeas from predicted nays can be recovered, any given cutline is consistent with an infinite array of status quo locations. This is so because the cutline divides legislators who are closer to one alternative from legislators who are closer to the other, and in a 2-space this is the perpendicular bisector of a segment drawn between the status quo location and the bill's location. But the same line is not just the perpendicular bisector of one segment, but rather of infinitely many. NOMINATE attempts to exploit patterns of error within the data to locate the bill and status quo locations, but Poole and Rosenthal (2007) themselves note that these estimates are unreliable.

Other methods of recovering status quo locations have been employed. Clinton and Meirowitz (2001, 2003, 2004) demonstrated that by employing estimators that take better account of legislative agendas, it is possible to recover usable bill locations (and with that fix the status quo location) for those bills on which there is a string of amendment votes whose

directions are clear. However, this is only useful for votes meeting that demanding criterion, and the necessary assumptions about alternatives, utility functions, and legislative agendas may be less tenable in a comparative state setting. Woon (2008) argues that bill locations can be found using cosponsorship data. If legislators' propensity to cosponsor a bill is determined by the distance between the bill and their ideal point, then patterns of cosponsorship can indicate where the original bill is located. One potential problem is that the recovered locations will be inaccurate if legislators are more likely to cosponsor a bill from a friend, or from someone from their state, or from a party leader, or for any other reason not related to the location of the bill. These problems are only magnified in a comparative state setting, where rules on introduction and cosponsorship vary and where the substantive "meaning" of cosponsorship can potentially vary even within the same formal rules.

Richman's (2011) method combines traditionally estimated ideal points with survey information on spending and taxing preferences across an array of issue areas. The key insight is that locating the status quo is relatively easy if we know the preferences of the legislators *and* we know the direction of change, if any, favored by a given legislator. Armed with these data, we can ask how liberal or conservative are the legislators who favor increasing spending, how liberal or conservative are the legislators who favor no change, and how liberal or conservative are the legislators who favor reducing spending in that area.

Figure 1 provides an illustration. It displays legislator ideal points and their preferences on health care spending on the NPAT's scale, in the lower chambers<sup>1</sup> of Montana and Texas. The ideal points are estimated in a common unidimensional space and can be compared between chambers. In Montana, legislators who favor maintaining the status quo have ideal points ranging between -0.522 and 0.234 with a mean of -0.084, while in Texas such legislators have

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<sup>1</sup> A figure with responding legislators from both upper and lower chambers is similar but more cluttered.

ideal points ranging from -0.111 to 0.349 with a mean of 0.198. Even a casual to-the-eye analysis using only those status-quo legislators would suggest that the status quo in Texas is therefore to the right of that status quo in Montana, and this turns out to be the case. While we go into further detail later in the paper, the core logic of Richman's technique for estimating status quo locations is to find the estimated ideal point that has the highest predicted probability of favoring the status quo, using an ordered probit to run the estimation.

### *Recovering Status Quo Locations: Data Requirements*

Recovering status quo locations require two primary sources of data: NPAT responses on taxing and spending issues and a measure of ideology to compare them to. Of these, the NPAT responses are the most straightforward. We use the NPAT responses from the election preceding 2000 to predict status quo locations in that election year. The obvious problem with any study using NPAT responses is that response is voluntary. We restrict our present discussion to 27 states where we have established in other work (Battista and Richman 2011) that there are "enough" NPAT responses – at least ten, or one-third, of each party in the lower chamber. Within these states, NPAT response is not connected to standard vote-only NOMINATE scores, and apart from a tendency to respond to the NPAT if your opponent did, NPAT respondents resemble their co-partisans.

To estimate ideology, we estimated unidimensional ideal points in a common ideological space so that we can confidently state that a legislator in Alabama is to the left or right of some other legislator in Alaska, and we can compare the status quo locations across states. Placing legislators from different states, who do not share any roll call votes, into the same ideological



space requires some method of joining or glueing them across states – some observable behavior that legislators from all states engaged in. Here, we again rely on NPAT responses. A short description of our method is that using a set of questions common to nearly all states, we coded NPAT responses as if they were roll-call votes. We then placed these “votes,” with voters from all 99 chambers, into a very large matrix of votes along with all roll-call votes from all state legislators in 1999-2000 (using Wright’s (CITE) data). So an NPAT respondent in the Texas House has votes in the NPAT “chamber,” whatever votes he or she cast in the Texas House, and is counted as abstaining in votes in all other legislative chambers. This “big matrix” approach differs from the linear-mapping approach taken by Shor (CITE) and Shor and McCarty (CITE), which also use NPAT data to bridge chambers. Like NOMINATE scores, our common-space ideal points are bounded between -1 and 1, with positive numbers denoting more conservative legislators. Battista, Peress, and Richman (forthcoming) describes the estimator in more detail, and the ideal point dataset is available from the authors. In this instance, we use a modified version of the data.

### *Recovering Status Quo Locations: The Algorithm*

As noted above, the status quo estimation is based upon finding the ideal point in the common space with the highest probability of supporting no change in the current policy status quo. We begin by estimating an ordered probit model for the NPAT survey responses, with common space ideology as the independent variable. Post-estimation we find the ideological location with the highest probability of a “maintain status quo” response. Bootstrapping of this estimation process allows us to estimate standard errors for each status quo location estimate as well.

The estimation process has limits that circumscribe the set of recoverable status quo locations. For one thing, NPAT survey responses on specific questions are not always closely linked to the common space ideological scale. Some issues, particularly in some states, simply are not ideological enough for ordered probit model to be estimated with much confidence. In order to winnow out these imprecisely estimated status quo locations we exclude from our analysis issues for which the Chi-square test for the ordered probit model was not statistically significant. Transportation, agriculture, and law enforcement policies tend not to sharply divide on the left-right common space, and as a result the status quo locations for these issues tend not to be recoverable. Richman (2011) reports similar problems for specific issues. When the relevant preference dimension(s) for a policy are not closely linked to the common space, status quo locations estimated on the common space are unlikely to be informative.

In other instances extreme status quo cannot be estimated with any precision. If almost all legislators in a state want to increase spending on K-12 education, this implies that the status quo is outside of the range of legislators' preferences, but it provides no information about how far outside their preferences the status quo is, since a status quo just outside the range of preferences and a status quo far outside the range of preferences could both produce the same response pattern. Estimation of status quo locations would have to be on the basis of the ordered probit functional form. We exclude from the analysis any status quo location outside of the range from -1 to 1 on the common space.

We have not yet done extensive validation of the status quo location measures at the state level, but Richman (2011) does report a number of validation tests. He found that status quo location estimates were unbiased by non-random ideologically biased non-response to the NPAT survey.

### *Recovering Status Quo Locations: Preliminary Results*

Tables 1 and 2 display our recovered status quo locations for those state-issues where we were able to recover usable estimates. Table 1 displays status quo locations for spending in the areas of the environment, health care, higher education, K-12 education, law enforcement, transportation, and welfare. In each case, the reported number is the common-space score with the highest probability of favoring the status quo. Legislators to the left of that point can be reasonably assumed to favor increases in spending, and legislators to the right reductions.

The finding that emerges immediately is one of surprise at which states have the most liberal and conservative status quos on each issue. States with heavy mining and resource-extraction industries like Montana, Alaska, and Texas have the most liberal (firmly identified) status quo locations on environmental spending. In health care, Hawaii arguably had the leftmost health care policy in the US in 1999, having mandated employer-paid health insurance for half-time workers since the 1970s. Yet several states that we would normally think of as far more conservative than Hawaii, such as Georgia and Missouri, have health care spending status quos to the left of Hawaii's. Indeed, looking beyond the sample of 27 states, the state whose health care status quo was farthest to the right – and by a substantial margin – was Massachusetts. Looking at welfare spending, Georgia's status quo is located to the left of New York's, but New York's TANF benefit for a single-parent family of three was more than double that of Georgia's.

The key to making sense of these results is that the status quos are located not in a *policy* space of millions of dollars or thousands of dollars per capita, but rather in a *political* space of liberalism and conservatism. And, as students of state politics have long been aware, how a

given issue maps into liberalism and conservatism in a given state can vary. Environmental policy in Montana, Alaska, and Texas is not leftist in the sense that those states necessarily have especially strong environmental protections. Rather, the status quos in those states are to the left because in those states, support for increasing spending is concentrated in the most leftward legislators. In part this pattern might reflect the intersection of Federal environmental mandates on state status quo location estimates. Absent pressure, one can imagine that Texas, Montana, and Alaska might have considerably less environmental spending than they do. Similarly, the health care status quo in Massachusetts is farthest right not because Massachusetts had the most conservative health care policies, but rather because support for health care spending was so widespread and strong that *no* legislator supported a cut in spending and only the most conservative did not advocate at least a small increase. That the MA healthcare status quo was truly far from center is arguably validated by the subsequent action by MA to pass universal health insurance requirements under governor Mitt Romney several years after our status quo location estimate. A status quo far to the right means that spending in that area is likely outside the gridlock interval or party blockout zone because most legislators agree it should be moved in a liberal direction, and a prime candidate to be moved towards the position of the median voter or majority median. Likewise, a status quo far to the left indicates a policy area where support for reducing spending is strong and support for increasing it is weak.

Still, a left status quo does not necessarily imply high spending, only that there might be more support for reducing it than increasing it. Figure 2 demonstrates this difference. Status quo locations for welfare are arrayed along the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis displays the TANF benefits accruing to a single-parent family of three in 2000. (Center on Budget and Policy

Priorities 2011) The two are uncorrelated.<sup>2</sup> Providing more or less generous TANF benefits provides no leverage in trying to predict a state's status quo location on welfare spending. Figure 3 illustrates this in more detail by examining Colorado, which had a TANF benefit of \$356 and the leftmost status quo of -0.481, and Wyoming, which had a nearly identical TANF benefit of \$340 but a status quo of -0.081. Like Figure 1, Figure 3 displays the patterns of common-space ideal point and spending preferences in each state. Even though they provide similar benefit levels, Colorado's status quo is placed to the left of Wyoming's because in Colorado, not even the leftmost responding legislator prefers a large increase in spending and several legislators prefer a large decrease, while in Wyoming at least one leftward legislator prefers a large increase and not even the rightmost respondent favors a large decrease.

Table 2 displays the taxation status quos for each state. A similar pattern occurs with taxation as with spending – status quo locations do not correspond to simple ideas of liberalism or conservatism, or to tax rates. The simplest way to consider this is to examine the column for income taxes for families earning \$75,000 or less. New Mexico and New York share the same estimated status quo location for this issue, but New York's income taxes are substantially higher. In 1999, New York collected \$1131 per capita in income taxes, while New Mexico collected \$466. Relative to each state's per capita income, these amounts were 2.72% in New York and 1.59% in New Mexico. As with spending, the location of the status quo is not policy-based but political. New York's and New Mexico's income-tax status quo are in the same position not because their tax rates or policies are similar but because the pattern of legislators' sentiments about their current tax rates are similar.

### **Preliminary Model Tests**

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<sup>2</sup> This remains true if the obvious outlier of Alaska is dropped.

In this section we offer preliminary tests of some representational theories using the status quo locations discussed above. To do this, we estimated status quo locations in 2000 as well as 1998. Having both initial status quos and final-outcome status quos allows us to measure how policy shifts from one year to the next.

With initial status quo measures and final outcome measures, we are in a position to evaluate several theories: the state electorate median voter, the state legislative median legislator, and the party cartel model (Cox and McCubbins 2005). While we ultimately hope to add a consideration of pivotal-politics (Krehbiel 1998), we do not have the necessary gubernatorial preference data at this time.

**Median Citizen Model.** In the median citizen model, state policy outcomes mirror the will of the majority in the state. Thus, policy outcomes are those that the median citizen of the state would select and are at the ideological location of the median citizen. We measure the preference of the median citizen by scaling citizen responses to the Annenberg National Election Study in a common space with the state legislators. At present, we simply use the median of the Annenberg sample, though shifting to a multilevel regression and poststratification approach is of course possible. Arguably the median voter theory sets a desirable representational standard.

**Median Legislator Model:** The median legislator model is less a normative representational standard than it is an attempt to encapsulate state legislative politics. State policy outcomes are shaped by majoritarian legislative decision-making. A long research tradition beginning with Black (1958) suggests that the median voter in the state legislature will shape policy.

In fact our median voter model is not quite so simple as the unicameral median model of Black. Following the approach taken by Richman (2011) the median legislator prediction is that

the policy outcome will be that most preferred by the closest (upper or lower chamber) median legislator to the initial policy status quo, with policy remaining unchanged when the medians do not agree.

**Party Cartel Model:** The party cartel model (Cox and McCubbins 2005) predicts that the majority party in each legislative chamber will block legislation that would roll the party. Therefore, any policy outcomes predicted by the Legislative Median Voter Model that would make the majority party median of either chamber worse off will not occur. We identified the state majority party using data provided by Carl Klarner (2007) through the State Politics and Policy Quarterly Data Resource.

Whether this model applies to all of the states is in some doubt. There is considerable evidence (Anzia and Cohn 2011, Spiegelman 2010) that the party cartel model does not apply to all states as some states evidence substantial deviations from its prediction that the majority party will not experience ‘rolls’. Later analyses may use state legislative ‘roll’ rates as a predictor of whether the party cartel model (or the legislative median model) does a better job of explaining outcomes.

### **Empirical Test**

At present we have only one empirical test of the models. Each model predicts a particular policy outcome (the status quo estimate in 2000) as a function of preferences and the status quo estimate in 1998. We test those predictions in regression equations with the independent variable the expected outcome, and the dependent variable the 2000 estimated outcome.

The data we analyze has some characteristics of panel data – multiple measures of different status quo locations in each state, multiple states for each status quo. To capture the

effect this likely has on the error structure, we report the results of Random Effects GLS analyses with grouping by issue and with grouping by state.

The results presented in Table 4 are not kind to the median citizen model. The preference of the median citizen appear to have a negligible effect on policy outcomes across the 27 states we examine. This may reflect a simple lack of representation, though that seems unlikely given the robust findings of Wright and McIver (1993) or Lax and Phillips (2011). Other possibilities are that party is intervening and blunting the relationship, or that more advanced methods of finding the state median may be required.

The median legislator model performs substantially better. It explains nearly 20 percent of the variance in outcome locations as compared with two percent of the variation for the median citizen model. This is substantially better than the median legislator model performed in the tests presented by Richman (2011) for the US Congress. This may reflect the relative paucity of super-majoritarian thresholds in the states, and the relative weakness of some state parties (Richman and Battista 2011).

The party cartel model performs marginally better than the median legislator model, explaining 24 percent of the variance. This is suggestive evidence that in at least some of the states the party cartel model does a better job of explaining policy outcomes than the median legislator model. The predictive fit of the party cartel model in state legislatures is comparable with the predictive fit of the party cartel model in the U.S. Congress (see [http://www.odu.edu/~jrichman/Additional\\_Data\\_Analyses.htm](http://www.odu.edu/~jrichman/Additional_Data_Analyses.htm)).

### *Conclusions*



At present, our work in this area remains at a proof of concept level. At least for some issues, we can recover usable estimates of the status quo location in most states. Other issues, however, remain resistant. Given the preliminary nature of the data and paper, only very limited conclusions can be drawn. Of these, the most obvious is that states matter. The pattern of general and specific preferences interact to render what would be a conservative status quo in one state a liberal status quo in another. Stated differently, this is perhaps less surprising: the status quo locations we have found tell us that even if two states have similar policies, the overall pressure in their legislatures can act in opposite dimensions. Similarly, even though two states might have similar status quos such that only very conservative legislators favor any decrease in spending, they can nonetheless have this upward pressure applied to very different policies.

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Fig. 1: Health Care Spending Preferences and Legislator Ideal Points In Two Chambers




Figure 2: Welfare Status Quo Locations and TANF Benefits




Figure 3: Welfare Spending Preferences and Ideology




Table 1: Recovered Status Quo Locations for Spending, 1998

State	Environment	Health Care	Higher Ed.	K-12 Ed.	Law Enforcement	Transportation	Welfare
AK	-0.068	0.338	Far R	Far R		Far L	-0.320
AL			Far R			Far R	
AR	-0.004	0.206	0.414	Far R			Far L
CO		0.311		0.621	-0.542		-0.481
CT		Far R	Far R	Far R			
FL	0.366	0.491	0.408	Far R			
GA	0.192	0.174	0.470	0.735	-0.685		-0.301
HI	Far R	0.302					-0.108
IN	0.261	Far R	Far R	Far R			-0.223
KY		Far R	0.579				-0.090
ME	0.098	0.467	Far R	0.855			-0.110
MI	0.840	0.582	0.820	Far R			-0.429
MN	0.257	0.387	Far R	Far R			-0.290
MO	-0.057	0.180	0.391	0.367			-0.276
MT	-0.105	0.044	0.099	0.414	0.645		-0.301
NH	0.077	0.257	0.315	0.459		0.399	-0.078
NM	0.058	0.176	0.568	0.422			Far L
NY	Far R	Far R	Far R	Far R			-0.233
OH	0.021	0.261	0.526	Far R			-0.388
OK		Far R	0.479	Far R			Far L
OR	0.274	0.352	Far R	Far R	Far L	Far R	-0.016
PA	0.338	0.647	0.550	Far R			-0.277
SD	0.162	0.376	0.389	Far R			-0.199
TX	-0.005	0.327	0.665	Far R		-0.648	-0.075
VA	0.493	0.616	0.729	0.730			-0.164
WA	0.272	Far R	Far R	Far R	Far L		Far L
WY	0.121	Far R	0.382	0.428		-0.610	-0.081

Table 2: Recovered Status Quo Locations for Taxation, 1998

State	Alcohol	Cap. Gains	Cigarette	Corporate	Gasoline	Income (>\$75K)	Income (<\$75K)	Property	Sales
AK	-0.320		0.045	-0.063					
AL		-0.438			-0.118				
AR	0.545	Far L	0.446	-0.019		0.019		Far L	
CO		-0.424	0.322	-0.107		-0.345	Far L		
CT	0.218	-0.194	0.366	-0.363		-0.145	-0.627		
FL		-0.220		-0.132	0.253				
GA	0.487	-0.372	0.454	-0.161	0.226	-0.200	-0.392	Far L	
HI	Far R	-0.413	0.132			-0.264	Far L		
IN		-0.363	Far R	-0.122		0.220		0.422	
KY		Far L				-0.130		Far L	-0.976
ME	0.541	-0.233	0.395	-0.099	0.345	-0.084	-0.549		-0.810
MI		-0.495	0.805	-0.245		-0.304	Far L	Far L	
MN	0.169	-0.345	0.308	-0.262	0.294	-0.365	Far L		Far L
MO		-0.360	0.297	-0.223		-0.227	Far L	Far L	
MT	0.329	-0.379	0.418	-0.159	Far L	-0.106	Far L	-0.830	
NH	0.508	-0.118	0.292	-0.050	0.174				
NM	Far R	-0.520	Far R	-0.104		-0.223	Far L		
NY	0.560	-0.436	0.640	-0.300	-0.491	-0.223			
OH		-0.332	Far R	-0.063		-0.077			
OK	0.215	Far L		-0.287		-0.394	Far L		
OR	0.366	-0.265	0.570	0.098	0.550	-0.030			
PA	0.447	-0.393	0.460	-0.365		-0.119			
SD		-0.371		0.248		-0.032	-0.294		0.093
TX		-0.229	0.491	-0.201					
VA		-0.544	0.266	-0.167	Far R	-0.269			
WA	0.121	-0.343	0.161	-0.124	0.209			Far L	
WY		-0.235						0.268	



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**Table 3. Testing Model Policy Predictions**

	1	2	3
Median Citizen	0.26 (0.33)		
Median Legislator		0.52 (0.18)*	
Party Cartel			0.53 (0.15)*
Constant	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
N-Obs	89	93	93
Overall R2	0.02	0.19	0.24

\* p<.005

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