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The Geopolitics of Tourism: Mobilities, Territory, and Protest in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

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This article analyzes outbound tourism from mainland China to Hong Kong and Taiwan, two territories claimed by the People’s Republic of China, to unpack the geopolitics of the state and the everyday, to theorize the mutual constitution of the tourist and the nation-state, and to explore the role of tourism in new forms of protest and resistance. Based on ethnographies of tourism practices and spaces of resistance conducted between 2012 and 2015 and supported by ethnographic content analysis, this article demonstrates that tourism mobilities are entangled with shifting forms of sovereignty, territoriality, and bordering. The case of China, the world’s fastest growing tourism market, is exemplary. Tourism is profoundly affecting spatial, social, political, and economic order throughout the wider region, reconfiguring leisure spaces and economies, transportation infrastructure, popular political discourse, and geopolitical imaginaries. At the same time that tourism is being used to project Chinese state authority over Taiwan and consolidate control over Tibet and Xinjiang, it has also triggered popular protest in Hong Kong (including the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement and its aftermath), and international protest over the territorially contested South China Sea. This article argues that embodied, everyday practices such as tourism cannot be divorced from state-scale geopolitics and that future research should pay closer attention to its unpredictable political instrumentalities and chaotic effects. In dialogue with both mobilities research and borders studies, it sheds light not only on the vivid particularities of the region but on the cultural politics and geopolitics of tourism in general. Key Words: borders, China, geopolitics, mobilities, tourism.

Este artículo analiza el turismo de orientación externa desde la China continental a Hong Kong y Taiwán, dos territorios reclamados por la República Popular China, para descargar la geopolítica del estado y de lo cotidiano, para teorizar la constitución mutua del turista y del estado-nación, y para explorar el papel del turismo en las nuevas formas de protesta y resistencia. Con base en etnografías de las prácticas turísticas y espacios de resistencia conducidas entre 2012 y 2015 y con el apoyo de análisis del contenido etnográfico, este artículo demuestra que las movilidades del turismo se hallan enredadas con formas cambiantes de soberanía, territorialidad y demarcación fronteriza. El caso de China, mercado turístico de más rápido crecimiento en el mundo, es un buen ejemplo al respecto. El turismo está afectando profundamente el orden espacial, social, político y económico a través de la región de mayor amplitud, reconfigurando los espacios y economías del ocio, la infraestructura del transporte, el discurso político popular y los imaginarios geopolíticos. Al propio tiempo que el turismo se utiliza para proyectar la autoridad estatal china sobre Taiwán y consolidar su poder sobre el Tibet y Xinjiang, eso también ha desencadenado la protesta popular en Hong Kong (incluso el prodemocrático Movimiento Sombrilla y sus secuelas) y la protesta internacional en relación con el Mar Meridional de la China, objeto de disputa territorial. Este artículo sostiene que las prácticas personificadas y cotidianas, como el turismo, no pueden divorciarse de las geopolíticas a escala de estado, y que la investigación futura debería poner mayor atención a sus impredecibles instrumentalidades políticas y caóticos efectos. Alternando con la investigación de movilidades y estudios fronterizos, el artículo arroja luz no solo sobre las vividas particularidades de la región sino sobre la política cultural y sobre la geopolítica del turismo en general. Palabras clave: fronteras, China, geopolítica, movilidades, turismo.
Tourism is no mere leisure activity, as the case of "Greater China" makes clear. In the complicated sovereign and territorial topology of this "contingent state" (Callahan 2004), tourism is political instrument, provocation to protest, and stage of high-stakes struggle over ethnic identity, national borders, and state territory. This article analyzes outbound tourism from mainland China to Hong Kong and Taiwan, two territories claimed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), to unpack such geopolitics of the state and the everyday, to theorize the mutual constitution of the national tourist and the nation-state, and to explore the role of tourism in new forms of dissent and resistance. Examination of this case sheds light not only on the vivid particularities of the region but on the cultural politics and geopolitics of tourism in general.

Mobilities and borders are increasingly recognized as inseparable domains (Cresswell 2010; Richardson 2013; Salter 2013). Indeed, "to theorize mobilities and networks is at the same time to theorize borders" (Rumford 2006, 155). Cultural and political geographers have conducted insightful studies on the role of tourism in domestic nation-building and modernization projects (Oakes 1998; Johnson 1999; Light 2001). The political implications and instrumentality of tourism mobilities between and at the edges of national territory demand deeper attention, however. Tourists, a particular kind of mobile subject, traverse a bordered world, and their movements affect and are affected by the construction and performance of those borders.

Although much recent mobilities literature relates migration to state sovereignty and the performance of borders and state territory (Parsley 2003; Dauvergne 2004; Salter 2006, 2008; Wonders 2006), tourism has received insufficient analysis. There have indeed been some examinations of the role of borders in encouraging or restricting tourism (Timothy 1995, 2004; Sofield 2006), the potential instrumentality of tourism for achieving world peace or for reconciliation or unification between nation-states (D’Amore 1988; Jafari 1989; Guo et al. 2006; Seongseop, Timothy, and Han 2007), and the use of tourism as an instrument of foreign policy (Richter 1983; Arlt 2006), but tourism has rarely been treated as a bordering or territorializing process in its own right.

Within the subfield of tourism geography and the broader interdisciplinary realm of tourism studies, recent themes of embodiment (Gibson 2009), physicality and performance (Edensor 2001), and performativity have led researchers in interesting regional and methodological directions (Gibson 2008) but have also tended to shift the discussion farther away from state-scale politics. This article responds by arguing that the geopolitics and the everyday embodied encounters of tourism articulate together and should be researched in tandem.

The case of China, the world’s fastest growing tourism market, is exemplary. Tourism is profoundly affecting spatial, social, political, and economic order throughout the region, reconfiguring leisure spaces and economies, transportation infrastructure, popular political discourse, and geopolitical imaginaries. Outbound tourism from the PRC has been used as an economic lever for extracting political concessions not only in nearby Taiwan but as far away as Canada. At the same time that tourism is being used to consolidate state authority in Tibet and Xinjiang, it has also triggered wide popular protest in semiautonomous Hong Kong and international criticism over the territorially contested South China Sea, where the PRC began cruise ship tourism in 2013, and for which the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department declared explicitly that “tourism will have an important function” to “pledge and protect our nation’s sovereignty” (United Front Work Department 2015; author’s translation). This wide range of reactions underscores the political stakes and sites of tourism, which touch on territorial extent and definition, bordering technologies, sovereign claims, and the rights and lived experiences of mobile subjects.

China is remarkable for not only its rapidly growing outbound tourism but also its rise in global geopolitical prominence and its experiments in new forms of sovereignty. Ong (2004) argued that the PRC uses “variegated sovereignty” as a “technology of governance” designed to exert influence and integrate its territorial claims over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and elsewhere by flexibly allowing for different techniques of rule. By variegated sovereignty, Ong was referring to “differential powers of autonomy and social orders that are allowed by the Chinese state” in different but connected economic and political zones, designed instrumentally for “incremental but eventual political integration” (83). Here, I highlight how tourism mobilities are a fragile component of this fraught project.

The background section briefly introduces theoretical concepts and empirical cases useful for analyzing tourism in general and Chinese tourism in particular. Hong Kong and Taiwan are the foci of the empirical
section. These two territories on China's historical periphery have two different and complicated sovereign regimes, but they are both territories where tourism has been deployed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for similar geopolitical aims of greater political, economic, and cultural integration with mainland China as directed from Beijing. An examination of these cases will demonstrate how tourism produces national subjects and national borders—or, in other words, functions as a technology of state territorialization (Rowen 2014). I further suggest that embodiment, both in practice and in representation, is key to this process.

The following discussion is based on multisited, mobile ethnography (Marcus 1995; Buscher and Urry 2009) and ethnographic content analysis (Altheide 1987) conducted between 2012 and 2015 in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC. This fieldwork included fourteen months of participant observation of Chinese tourism within Taiwan, two months of participant observation within both the Taiwan Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong Umbrella Movement occupations, sixty interviews with Chinese tourists in Taiwan, thirty-six interviews with political activists or protest-site visitors (including both Hong Kong and Taiwan), and twenty interviews with Taiwanese tourist site staff and vendors. Based on respondent availability, interviews ranged from ten to seventy-five minutes. Most interviews were conducted on site, and others took place in nearby parks or cafes. Concurrent and later research included extensive analysis of regional print, radio, TV, and online popular and social media.

The Geopolitics and Cultural Politics of Tourism

Tourism is more than the aggregate of human flows through a world traced by package tours and guidebooks. Rather, tourist bodies, sites, the state apparatus that manages them, and regulatory devices such as visas or passports constitute a "hybrid assemblage" with a wide range of effects (Franklin 2004; Salter 2013). In this ontology, tourism can be treated as an "active ordering of modernity" that produces nationalized subjects and spaces through ideological regimes, site management and design, and mobility regulation. These effects extend beyond bodies and spaces nominally recognized as touristic.

The tourist moves as a stage on which national or racial values are not only inscribed but performed domestically and abroad. State actors project, inscribe, and proscribe moral values onto the bodies and representations of mobile subjects (Sun 2002; Nyíri 2010). For example, in China, even if tourism is usually portrayed as a recreational activity, tourists' behavior has affected the perception of the nation more widely. Chio (2010) observed that "negative] stories of the Chinese tourist abroad have put a damper on this upbeat association between travel, individual character, and national character" (14). In response, China's leadership has launched multiple campaigns to promote "civilized tourism," portraying its tourists as ambassadors both at home and abroad, enrolling tourists into this national project.

Such moral values and national education campaigns are inscribed not only on bodies but on sites designated and bounded specifically for tourist experience. The cultural authority exerted via the construction and management of such sites is an important component of national self-definition, as demonstrated by an insightful analysis of nation-building narratives at a Vietnamese war museum (Gillen 2014). Such tactics are also well documented in the case of China, where the state "sponsors a discursive regime in which scenic spots and their state-endorsed hierarchy are tools of patriotic education and modernization, and in which the state has the ultimate authority to determine the meaning of the landscape" (Nyíri 2006, 75). The organizational conditions that enable this regime include deep institutional and personal overlaps among state regulatory agencies, tour operators, and site developers and management.

Normative conceptions of national territory are also inscribed in mobility regulation devices such as passports and visas. In the case of transnational or border-crossing tourism, use of these devices enrolls not only tourists, but other actors in the "global mobility regime" (Salter 2006) of mobility regulation, including embassies, consulates, and customs and immigration officials. These devices rely on consistent citation of the extent and division of sovereign territory. Their instrumentality can also make them subject to contestation.

China's so-called Passport War of 2012 is illustrative. In May 2012, the PRC released a new passport that not only includes images of Taiwan but also includes maps that cover disputed territories including parts of Kashmir (administered by India), most of the South China Sea (claimed by several countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines), and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (claimed by Japan; Tharoor 2012). The passport quickly drew objections from India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, whose foreign ministries directed their immigration officers to not
stamp the new passports for fear of legitimizing the PRC's territorial claims. Their solution was the creation of another device: entry stamps on specially issued, separate forms. Indian authorities even began issuing visas to PRC nationals that include a map of India claiming the disputed territories.

Caught in the act of border crossing, tourist bodies collide with contradictory ethno-national and territorial claims. Between liminal spaces of contested sovereignty and identity, as in Taiwan or Hong Kong, such encounters are punctuated with “material moments” that reveal the complexity and fluidity of national identity (Zhang 2013). Tourism's wide range of political instrumentality can also produce “retrrenchment of identity in a territory” (Park 2005, 110), however, and fuel territorial conflict (Rowen 2014).

China's construction and deployment of Approved Destination Status (ADS) is another example of tourism's political instrumentality. Outbound tourism has, since 1995, been regulated by a system that confers ADS on countries that have signed bilateral agreements with China. ADS allows outbound group tourists to apply for visas through travel agencies, saving them a trip to the consulate. It also encourages greater marketing of group tours. ADS is therefore a highly desirable designation for countries that are eager to boost inbound tourism revenue.

The initial purpose of the ADS system was to limit Chinese nationals from bringing hard currency abroad (Arlt 2006). ADS later became a tool to exert other forms of political pressure. A primary criterion is that “the country should have a favorable political relationship with China” (Kim, Guo, and Agrusa 2005, 212). This includes not maintaining official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taiwan and Hong Kong are involved in several other promotional schemes in addition to ADS, and they coordinate with PRC agencies accustomed to using the economic benefits of tourism as political tools. However, as I will argue below, these political programs can be subverted by the actual practices and effects of tourism.

**Chinese Tourists as “Locusts” Raiding a Restive Hong Kong**

The cultural and political integration of Hong Kong and Taiwan is a fraught and complicated project of the CCP leadership. Taiwan floats in a kind of liminal space between state and nonstate and Chinese and non-Chinese (Corcuff 2012), as does Hong Kong. The unusual legal and administrative status of these territories has required both polities to employ various regimes and devices for regulating mobility, not all of which can be negotiated on an equal basis with Beijing.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was created in 1997 following the British colonial “handover” of the territory to China. The SAR ostensibly functions on a one country, two systems (OCTS) principle, in which both Hong Kong and mainland China belong to the same country but are meant to operate according to two different systems of governance until 2047. The OCTS scheme was initially formulated as a model for the annexation and integration of Taiwan, and its implementation has been watched closely by Taiwanese observers (Cooney 1997). Some vestiges of the British system remain, including an independent judiciary and partially elected legislature, but the territory's chief executive is appointed by the PRC.

Hong Kong's cultural integration has been challenging for the PRC. Anson Chan, former chief secretary for administration, observed that “the real transition is about identity and not sovereignty” (Chan 1998), and the CCP position is generally represented as one that knows that it has won the territory but not the “hearts” of the people. Tourism has further problematized this project.

In 2003, Hong Kong’s economy appeared imperiled following the outbreak of the infectious disease SARS. Ostensibly to improve the financial outlook, China raised its caps on outbound tourists by implementing the Individual Visit Scheme. In just over ten years, the annual number of mainland Chinese tourist arrivals rose from 8.5 million to 40 million (Chiu, Ho, and Osawa 2014) in a territory of just 7 million people. Their spending has been significant but so has the corresponding rise in commodity prices. This is due not only to spending by leisure tourists but also to the rise of the “water goods” (shu huo) trade, in which day visitors cross from China to purchase essentials that are either cheaper due to Hong Kong’s lower taxes or perceived to be of higher quality due to China’s relatively lax food safety enforcement. This trade has precipitated a backlash from Hong Kong people who fear rising prices and food shortages.

Tourism from mainland China has accelerated the development of a distinct Hong Kong subjectivity defined in part by difference from China. Popular and social media long reflected widespread discontent with the behavior of Chinese tourists, which reached
a boiling point with the “anti-locust” (fan huang-chong) protests in early 2014. These widely publicized demonstrations actually drew only a few hundred activists but reflected an incipient nativism that has been aggravated no less by widely reported damages and social ruptures of tourism than by Beijing’s policy interventions and public statements (Garrett and Ho 2014).

The animality of the terms used to deride Chinese tourists conflates the physical with the geopolitical. Locust has been in common use at least since 2012, when a full-page ad, paid for via crowd-sourced funds, appeared in the popular daily newspaper Apple Daily, featuring an image of Chinese tourists as locusts flying over Lion Rock, an iconic Hong Kong site. The term is particularly directed at tourists who visit primarily to buy goods to bring back for use or sale in China—they are said to scour the shops and leave nothing affordable for local people. Another term, pigs (zhu), has likewise been directed at tourists and recalls the same epithet used by Taiwanese to insult unwelcome arrivals from China in the 1940s (Kerr 1965).

Driving much of the tension have been depictions of the supposedly uncouth and unhygienic practices of Chinese tourists. Blogs that document public urination and defecation, spitting, shoving, and other forms of behavior unacceptable in Hong Kong have proliferated rapidly. Public urination in Hong Kong and Taiwan is presented by area netizens not only as an annoyance but as an act of geopolitical provocation. Perhaps the most spectacular example is the viral YouTube video, “Locust World,” released in 2011 and since seen by more than 1.4 million viewers, which includes the following lyrics (translated from Cantonese by Bad Canto 2011):

Locust come out from nowhere, overwhelm everywhere
Shouting, screaming, yelling like no one could hear
Ever feel shame to yourself?
Smoke like breathing in hell
And your fucking son who shit right in the mall
See this country? Countrymen expert in stealing, cheating, deceiving, lying
“I’m Chinese!” scares the piss out of everyone
Locust nation named “Cina”—disgusted by the whole of East Asia
Everyday trying to naturalise us with Mandarin
Invading across the Hong Kong border and taking over our land—that’s your speciality
Parasitic until your citizenship is recognised
Big-belly locust like aliens; pregnant and not stopped by immigration . . .

. . . Locust eggs hatch in hospitals—taking over beds and not paying bills
We thought we’ve seen the worst, but . . . doing your toilet business on the streets?
There’s no shame—jumping queues, spitting in public . . .
. . . we witness and condemn these acts everyday
Inch by inch, Hong Kong is now being taken over by these pests
Those glittering days are now long gone
While our citizens are bleeding, the locusts buy out all our food
How can we retake our homeland?

The imagery accompanying the song is a carefully crafted pastiche of real-life scenes from Chinese tourist sites, including crowded shopping centers, queue jumping, shoving, and of course, public urination.

Tensions between Hong Kong and mainland China rose spectacularly during the Umbrella Movement of late 2014, in which hundreds of thousands of young people flooded the streets to protest Beijing’s policies. Although the rallying cry of this movement was for “genuine universal suffrage,” the long-promised right for Hong Kong people to elect a leader of their own choosing, in fact the zones around the several occupation sites presented a panoply of identity politics and civic passions, some of which was anti-China and anti-Chinese.

For one month during the Umbrella Movement, I regularly conducted participant observation, in-depth interviews, and ad hoc focus groups with both Hong Kong demonstrators and Chinese visitors to the site. Although many were careful to articulate their demands in the terms of demands for electoral reforms, cultural and embodied difference was still a persistent theme. “It’s nice to be here with each other with just Hong Kong people. I don’t think I’ve heard so much pure Cantonese in weeks,” said a twenty-six-year-old journalist. “This is like the Hong Kong of my youth,” said a forty-five-year-old salon worker. She clarified that she was referring not only to the high proportion of “locals” but also to the general everyday qualities of civility, order, and hygiene that she did not associate with China.

Attention to such qualities of embodiment helps illuminate the origins and the bordering effects of Hong Kong protest and discontent. Both the small anti-locust protests, as well as the mass mobilizations of the Umbrella Movement, were driven by ambivalence about Hong Kong’s integration with China and the perceived disappearance of Hong Kong’s
autonomy. The large influx of Chinese tourist “ambassadors” increased such tension. In this already tense mix, a child’s public urination—something I frequently witnessed within walking distance from the protest encampments in which I resided—became tantamount to geopolitical provocation. The political potency of the act—in itself banal, particularly in China—could not be understood without reference to Hong Kong’s incomplete social, cultural, and geopolitical reterritorialization as a part of China. Put another way, the affective characteristics of the protests were inexorably inflected by the relational difference in the embodied behavior of locals and mainland tourists, augmenting widespread discontent about deferred democratization and subverted local identities.

Yet, Chinese tourists were frequently evident on site during the Movement and were in fact often cited by activists as the strategic target of the smaller Causeway Bay commercial district occupation (see Figure 1). “It’s important that we stay here to sway their hearts and minds, since they’ll go back to China afterwards,” said a twenty-four-year-old philosophy graduate student. Tourism, in this case, was doubly problematic for the CCP’s territorial program—not only did it spark protest, but it threatened and sometimes even succeeded in incorporating tourists into those very protests.

Chinese Tourists and the “Taiwan Question”

Taiwan’s sovereign regime is dramatically different from that of Hong Kong. Although only officially recognized by twenty-two other states, Taiwan functions as a de facto independent democratic state with its own military and directly elected president. Taiwan’s state administration includes its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Immigration, as well as a Mainland Affairs Council, an agency under the executive branch tasked with conducting official coordination with its counterpart in the PRC, the Taiwan Affairs Office. Although the PRC claims both Hong Kong and Taiwan as its sovereign territory and officially groups them together as outbound destinations with the same nominal status, Taiwan’s leadership has far greater capacity to control its own borders and conduct negotiations than does Hong Kong.

An agreement to receive direct tourist arrivals from China was not made until 2008, after the election of President Ma Ying-jeou of the pro-unification Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Eager to trumpet political breakthroughs and economic gains, the Ma administration acceded to the PRC’s demand that it accept “entry/exit permits” for Chinese tourists, as does Hong Kong, instead of requiring passports and visas, which would imply that Taiwan was a formally independent country. By 2014, annual tourist arrivals had risen to nearly 3 million and were often presented as a showcase example of Ma’s “successful” cross-strait policies (see Figure 2). Yet, Ma’s China policies were panned by the electorate, later earning him approval ratings as low as 9 percent and sparking the March 2014 Sunflower Movement, when thousands of student and civic activists occupied the area inside and around the Legislative Yuan (parliament) to protest a trade deal that included provisions that would liberalize the tourism industry (Rowen 2015). The KMT’s landslide defeat in the November 2014 local elections was widely portrayed as a referendum on Ma’s China’s policies (Harrison 2014).
Although it would be unjustifiable to draw a direct causal arrow between the parallel growth in inbound tourism from China and popular protest against China policy, their tandem acceleration deserves analysis. Tourism has frequently been presented by the ruling KMT as a boon to the economy. This has stoked opposition from a variety of actors: independence advocates eager to reduce Taiwan’s reliance on China, populists who complain that the benefits of cross-strait trade have been felt only by people with KMT or PRC connections, and activists who claim that the costs are therefore displaced onto the Taiwanese public. A characteristic example follows:

They [Chinese] create their own market—they fly their own airlines, they hire their own buses, eat and live at their own hotels—but they are using our land and our scenery, to make money. Our scenic hotspots such as Sun Moon Lake and Kenting are now filled with Chinese. We are left with their trash. Allowing Chinese tourists into the country costs more than we gain. (“Bohmann von Formosa” quoted in Tsai and Chung 2014)

There are few reliable data about Taiwan’s actual economic gains from tourism. Tourism Bureau figures, both published online and reconfirmed to me in my interviews with officials, are an estimate based on tourist self-reported guesses of per day spending multiplied by total arrivals, instead of analysis of actual revenues. Although economic benefits are therefore unclear, unseen, and immaterial for the vast majority of Taiwanese, analysis of my interview and media data suggests that it is precisely the representations of tourist embodiment that imbue them with geopolitical salience.

As in Hong Kong, Chinese tourists are frequently depicted as rude, loutish, noisy, smelly, and unhygienic. Reports both on social media and in the popular press include tourists defacing plants on the east coast (Fauna 2012), tourists bathing in their underwear in the popular southern beach town of Kenting (Tsai and Chung 2014), and public urination (Ramzy 2014). Similar sentiment was expressed by a colleague: “I don’t go to the beach at Kenting anymore. There are too many mainlanders there now. It’s like going to China.”

Although there is an element of “othering” at play here, arguably with racist or discriminatory overtones, this reaction is situated in an uncomfortable historical context. For many in Taiwan, tourism from China recapitulates a kind of geopolitical invasion: its occupation by the KMT in the late 1940s, when the same word now used for today’s mainland Chinese tourists, “mainland guest” (luke), referred to incoming waves of
KMT soldiers. Like tourists, they were also widely perceived by local residents as uncouth, unhygienic, and abusive (Kerr 1965). Tourism in Taiwan is therefore part of an ongoing, highly politicized saga of mobility, identity, bordering, and territorialization.

**Conclusion**

Tourism mobilities constitute national subjects and nation-states and reproduce and undermine borders and territories. As a political technology, tourism is part and parcel of state geopolitical programs. These effects articulate not just via state-scale visa and passport regimes but through the messy outcomes of everyday embodied behavior. Far from being a reliable tool of peacemaking, rapprochement, or even territorial claim-making, tourism can also aggravate alienation and precipitate protest.

In China, authorities have used tourism as a tool of foreign policy and a tactic of territorial projects. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese tourists have become issues in electoral and protest politics. This has produced contradictions between the territorial and cultural programs of the different state administrations in all three territories. These contradictions emerge through changing mobility regimes and conflicting sovereign programs, as well as through representations of tourists and tourist spaces that proliferate beyond the bounds of state control.

The practices of individual mobile subjects, or of aggregated tourist flows, are only partially determined by state policy and programs. State projects themselves might be impacted by the unexpected outcomes of tourist practice. This is due to tourism’s imbrication with wider issues of national identity, territory, and geopolitical order. Future mobilities and borders research, whether in this region or beyond, would be well served by closer attention to such unpredictable political instrumentalities and chaotic effects of tourist practice.

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