Methodological Problems in the Study of Nation-Building: Behaviorism and Historicist Solutions in Political Science*

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Objective. The goal of this article is to highlight the methodological problems involved in the study of nation-building and propose solutions. I identify three categories of methodological problems that flow from respective practices in social science research: (i) inferring intentions from observed behavior or outcomes; (ii) relying on census data to infer a country’s ethnic diversity; and (iii) arbitrary periodization and anachronism, that is, attributing certain actions to concepts and/or phenomena that were not politically salient or even understood by the actors under study. Methods. I conduct a meta-analysis of the body of evidence I used in my recent work, which systematically documents nation-building policies toward noncore groups in the post World War I Balkans. Results. In each section, I use empirical examples to illustrate the methodological pitfalls that may result from these practices and suggest strategies to overcome these difficulties. Conclusion. Certain applications of behaviorism can lead to wrongheaded theories and introduce bias in our analysis. Needless to say, these problems are not unique to the study of nation-building. Scholars are invited to adopt historicist solutions to these problems.

The study of every social phenomenon is fraught with methodological problems but certain phenomena are more difficult to study than others. This article discusses the methodological problems that flow from practices in social science research that I confronted in my attempt to, first, systematically document nation-building policies toward noncore groups in the post World War I Balkans, and then use both archival evidence and political science methods to analyze these policies. The most common methodological problems that I encountered were:

1. Inferring intentions from observed behavior or outcomes. The practice of inferring an actor’s intentions by taking statements at face value or just observing the outcomes on the ground leads to either deceptive empirical support for or unfounded falsification of theories. Relatedly, sometimes a government will pursue a transitional nation-building policy before it pursues its terminal one.

2. The politics of “counting people” refers to the difficulties and politics involved in three interrelated choices: identifying a group as an “ethnic group” or a “minority,” deciding on an estimate of its population, and studying it as a relatively unitary and homogeneous entity. The most common methodological problems resulting from this practice are selection bias and overaggregated actors.

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3. **Periodization.** The coding timespan we select affects our hypotheses testing and the results we get. Relatedly, *anachronism*—attributing certain actions to concepts and/or phenomena that were not politically salient or even understood by the actors under study—leads to misunderstanding the ontology of the phenomenon under study and to functionalist arguments.

My understanding of these methodological challenges is shaped by my research while writing *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Mylonas, 2012). Before I proceed, I need to clarify the research question that motivated my inquiry and briefly describe my argument. This is necessary since some of the methodological problems I will elaborate depend on the nature of the research question at hand. In *The Politics of Nation-Building*, I focused on the policies that national states pursue in their effort to make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide (Gellner, 1983). My research question was: Under what conditions are nation-state elites likely to target a noncore group—any ethnic group perceived as unassimilated by the governing elites—with assimilation, grant it minority rights, or exclude it from the state? In *The Politics of Nation-Building*, I offer a geostrategic explanation for why states pursue distinct policies for different ethnic groups. Specifically, I argue that a state’s nation-building policies toward noncore groups are driven by its own foreign policy goals and its interstate relations with the external patrons of these noncore groups. Through a detailed study of the Balkans, I show that the way a state treats a noncore group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state’s foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group’s external patron(s). If the noncore group is perceived as mobilized by a rival external power, the government is more likely to adopt policies of internal colonization and displacement (if it is status quo) or exclusion (if it is revisionist), while groups backed by allied states are more likely to be accommodated. Noncore groups without external links are more likely to be targeted with assimilationist policies (see Table 1).^1

**Intentions, Policy Choices, Implementation, and Political Outcomes**

In my effort to account for variation in state-planned nation-building policies toward noncore groups, I discuss at length the importance of disentangling the relationship between intentions, policies, implementation, and outcomes. In the nation-building process, intentions, policy choices, and policy outcomes are definitely linked, yet intentions are not always translated into policy choices, nor do those choices always produce the desired outcome. Moreover, policy choices are sometimes a function of capabilities and not of intentions. Other times, intentions are purposefully veiled to avoid external intervention by an international organization or a hegemonic power. Moreover, private interests and biases of state officials, especially at lower levels of the administration, interfere in the planning and implementation of state policies. As a result, many theories are developed and tested on “events” that were unintended consequences produced by principal-agent problems or forced outcomes rather than accurate reflections of an administration’s intentions.

There are plenty of examples of this practice in the literature. One just needs to look at data sets on mass atrocities or ethnic cleansings to see how aggregate numbers of fatalities are

^1 In the book I make three novel conceptual moves: from the uncritical use of the term “minority” to “noncore group”; from the restrictive “homeland” to more analytically accurate “external power”; and, from the dichotomous conceptualization of nation-building policies as “inclusion/exclusion” or “violent/nonviolent” to “assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion.”
TABLE 1
Theory Predictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Power Support</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host State’s Foreign Policy Goals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionist (Lost Territory and/or Rose in Power Relative to Competitors)</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo (Gained Territory and/or Declined in Power Relative to Competitors)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assimilation(^1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Sometimes takes the form of assimilation through accommodation.

\(^2\)Takes the form of internal colonization or displacement.

often unproblematically attributed to the political or racial targeting by the perpetrator—be it the state or an armed group (Harff, 2003). These fatalities are obviously dreadful regardless of the logic of targeting, but we should avoid inferring particular intentions from the observed outcomes alone. Otherwise, we can easily conflate distinctive phenomena and run our regression models on unjustifiably pooled samples.

An archival approach can help us address this problem.\(^3\) Studying the decision-making process that led to nation-building policies helps differentiate between the intentions of the administration toward a particular noncore group and the actual policy that it eventually adopts. One might argue that this is not necessary because what actually matters in politics is the policy that is implemented. However, if we want to understand why state officials choose particular nation-building policies and not others, studying only the observed outcomes will not suffice.

For example, two different noncore groups might be granted the same minority rights, but with a different reasoning behind each case. In practical terms, the reasoning matters because it will most likely inform the policy implementation. In theoretical terms, understanding elites’ reasons can help distinguish between rival explanations. For instance, a hypothesis might predict the granting of minority rights to a noncore group, but for completely different reasons than the ones that were behind the actual decision. In this case, although the hypothesis makes the “correct” prediction, it does not accurately capture the logic behind the policy.

To drive this point home, I turn to an example from early 20th-century Greece, where the contrasting cases of “Romanian-leaning” Vlachs\(^4\) and Muslims in Greek Macedonia demonstrate the importance of studying elites’ reasoning when choosing policies. A Romanian minority was recognized by the Greek administration because Romania was an

\(^2\)Table 2.2 in Mylonas (2012:37)

\(^3\)It is not a perfect solution of course. Even in the presence of archival evidence issues of interpretation, private agendas of the officials, and fabrication persist.

\(^4\)This is the term that Ioannis Eliakis, Governor General of Western Greek Macedonia 1916–1920, used in his confidential reports. For more, see Mylonas (2012:Ch. 6).
allied power at the time and Greece needed its support in the diplomatic arena to secure its territorial gains from the Balkan wars; this reasoning is consistent with my argument. The Romanian minority was never thought of as something permanent and it was treated from the beginning as an instrumental concession to be countered on the ground. This case, however, was different from the initial accommodation of the Muslims in Western Greek Macedonia that served a different strategic goal, namely, to facilitate the ultimate assimilation of this enemy-backed group—Governor Eliakis was primarily worried about the links of the Koniareoi with the Ottoman Empire. Both groups were accommodated, but there were different rationales behind each decision.

Now, if we were to follow a conventional approach, we would code both cases as accommodation since with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, Romania achieved the recognition of Romanian minorities in the Balkans, and international treaties also protected the linguistic and educational rights of the Muslims. We would miss, however, the logic behind the compliance in each case as well as the differences in the spirit of the implementation. Moreover, we would be neglecting the important distinctions that the Greek administration drew between “Greek-leaning” and “Romanian-leaning” Vlachs and Eliakis’s disaggregation of the “Muslim” category into three main noncore groups: Koniareoi, Valaades, and Albanians.

Another occasion where intentions should not be inferred from policy choices concerns six groups in my analysis that should have been targeted with assimilationist policies according to my theory, but were accommodated instead. In these cases a “divide-and-rule” dynamic appears to be operative. With this term, I refer to the counterintuitive “minority proliferation” policy that aims to either fragment a large group or reverse a subnational assimilation pattern. For example, Seton-Watson (1962) points out that the Romanians granted minority rights to the Germans in order to reverse the process of Magyarization (i.e., assimilation to the Magyar or Hungarian culture and identity) that had taken root within the German community of Romania.

This “divide-and-rule” policy was a systematic pattern in the 20th-century Balkans with respect to Muslims in Christian-dominated countries. Scholars have discussed the accommodation of Roma and Pomaks—Muslims speaking a Bulgarian dialect—in Greece and Bulgaria at specific periods during the 20th century as an attempt to weaken the Muslim communities in both countries and prevent the subnational assimilation of these groups into their respective Turkish minority (Kostopoulos, 2009; Tsitselikis, 2012). This pattern was not special to the interwar period. For example, in 1962 after a trend of Turkification of Roma had emerged, the Bulgarian Politburo decided to intensify its assimilation policies. The first step it took was to stop the Turkification trend by ensuring that Roma, Tatars, and Bulgarian-speaking Muslims were “registered with their real nationality”; prohibiting Turkish-language instruction of non-Turkish children, banning their internal migration to Turkish-dominated villages, and so on. Following this Politburo decision, around 100,000 Roma who had identified themselves as Turks in the census were forced to change their names to Bulgarian ones (Eminov, 1997).

Similarly, during the 1990s and after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Greek government once again recognized the presence of Pomaks in Western Thrace as a noncore group separate from the rest of the “Muslims.” For most of the Cold War, the Pomaks were submerged into the larger “Muslim” minority of Western Thrace. This submersion was a way to prevent the Pomaks from being used by the Bulgarian government (member of the Soviet bloc) in order to interfere in Greece’s (member of NATO) internal affairs. After the

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5Koniareoi were the Turkish-speaking conquerors of Macedonia who came from Anatolia and, according to Eliakis, felt closer to the Ottoman Empire.
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Greek government was no longer considering Bulgaria as an enemy power and could thus recognize the Pomaks as a distinct Muslim group, thus fragmenting the Turkish-dominated Muslim minority of Western Thrace (Kostopoulos, 2009). More empirical work is necessary to study this pattern through the archives in Bulgaria, Greece, Russia, and the United States (Aarbakke, 2000; Anagnostou, 2005, 2007; Troumbeta, 2001).

In addition to the important difference between intentions and actual policy choices, a distinction must be made between these policy choices and policy implementation. The importance of this distinction is captured in the case of what Ioannis Eliakis, Governor General of Western Greek Macedonia, referred to as “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs. Around 1919, General Mazarakis had recommended the deportation of this group—describing this as a more “radical” measure for nationalizing the territory. Eliakis dismissed this idea albeit not because he deemed it immoral or unfeasible, but rather because the Greek government had to act as “a civilized liberal polity in the eyes of the international community.” A more practical concern of his had to do with the ability of the Greek administration to repopulate these lands. A mass deportation of all the Bulgarian speakers would have led to a severe depopulation of Macedonia and resulted in economic loss for the state. Instead, in a confidential report to the Ministry of Interior, the governor ended up proposing the “hard and rough way of proselytizing, through good and expensive administration.”

Eliakis’s position again points to the distinction between intentions and policy choices. A few years later, however, Eliakis admitted that the policy of assimilation had been inefficient because it was poorly implemented. From this example, we see how the initial suggestion of deporting a noncore group was transformed into a policy recommendation of targeting the group with assimilationist policies, and how later, the leader responsible for the policy decision admitted its relative failure due to poor implementation.

Conflating intentions, policy choices, implementation, and outcomes hinders the study of state-planned nation-building policies. My ambition was to rely, as much as was feasible, on archival material and sources that allowed me to get as close as possible to elite perceptions of and intentions toward noncore groups. This focus on elite perceptions and intentions was a conscious attempt to incorporate constructivist principles about ethnicity into my data-collection process and to bring intentions back to political science. To be sure, the realities on the ground are messy and nonlinear; moreover, information on state policies toward noncore groups is often twisted and ambiguous. However, what is at stake is an important choice: infer the intentions from the observation of behavior or attempt to get as close as possible to an understanding of the intentions themselves. Whenever possible, I chose the latter path.

A related insight that arises from a careful study of nation-building policies is distinguishing between terminal and transitional policies. We should always try to discern when long-term goals and short-term policies coincide and when they do not. This distinction between terminal and transitional policies is linked to a broader debate concerning the impact of the international standard of minority rights protection in each era. For example, following World War I, Britain was a proponent of the League of Nations and the protection of minority rights, but its ultimate goal at the time was not the creation of multinational states. The British government’s rationale was that such guarantees for national minorities would facilitate the initial coexistence of core and noncore groups and would pave the way for future assimilation to the dominant culture.

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6Quoted in Mylonas (2012:133).
Ruling political elites in the Balkans were attuned to these realities and international norms surrounding nation-building. Given this context, in some cases Balkan states chose to follow a policy of accommodation for a certain period before they applied assimilationist policies. Cases of this sort include the Jews in Turkey, who were initially accommodated, but toward the end of the 1920s were targeted with assimilationist policies, as well as the Muslims in Greek Macedonia, who were initially accommodated but with an intention to ultimately assimilate them as Greek officials indicated in their confidential reports (Mylonas, 2012:Ch. 6). The important point to note here is that in both cases the host state’s intention was assimilationist from the beginning.

According to my theory, the Muslims in Greece should have been targeted with assimilationist policies after World War I since they were members of an enemy-supported group living in a state that favored the international status quo. In the five-year period before the obligatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey occurred, we observe a policy of accommodation and only a few selectively targeted exclusionary measures. Without archival material it would have been impossible to discern whether the ultimate goal was their assimilation or not. However, from the evidence that I have presented in The Politics of Nation-Building, we conclude that accommodation in this case was in fact mainly a transitional policy.

A closer look at one of the Jewish communities in the Balkans—that of Thessaloniki, Greece—can prove instructive in this connection. Thessaloniki was the center of Jewish life in the Balkans. Up to the annexation of Thessaloniki to the Greek state, the Greek authorities perceived the Jews as Turcophiles, “anti-Greek, disloyal, and untrustworthy” (Fleming, 2008:57) and plans for the internationalization of the city were popular among the Jewish community (Mazower, 2004). Following the annexation, three camps emerged within the Jewish community of Thessaloniki: Zionists, Socialists (later Communists), and supporters of assimilation (Mavrogordatos, 1983:263). The first two camps constituted the overwhelming majority and opposed assimilation.

According to my argument, the Jewish community of Thessaloniki should have been targeted with assimilationist policies since it had no external state supporting it and the Greek state was dominated by ruling political elites with a clear national character in mind motivated by a homogenization imperative. However, immediately after Greece annexed Thessaloniki the Jews were accommodated, although the terminal policy was assimilation (Molho, n.d.).

Although at first glance it seems counterintuitive that the Greek government did not pursue assimilationist policies, upon consideration of the international context described above, the case becomes less puzzling. Greece was an ally of the Entente powers and its territorial expansion had been supported and legitimized by Britain and France. Britain was arguably the most important external supporter of Venizelos and by extension of Greece at the time. A principle emerges from this case: your ally’s ally is your friend.

According to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Jews were promised their own national home in Palestine and therefore had been officially discussed as a national minority. Greece did not want to jeopardize its alliance with Britain. Thus, Greece had to recognize minority rights for the Jews in order to retain support from its allies. Moreover, the Greek government could not say one thing and do another because the Jewish community lived in an urban center with many consuls and much international attention. Moreover, the Chief Rabbi had important international connections himself—aside from the international Zionist

7For the reasons behind the Balfour declaration, see Friedman (1973), Sanders (1984), and Stein (1961).
Regardless, despite the fact that Governor General of Macedonia Adosidis gave assurances to the Chief Rabbi concerning the community’s minority rights, the Greek administration had a clear view at the time, which was described in the Governor’s confidential report: its ultimate goal was assimilation.

Finally, we have to further distinguish transitional policies from policy changes resulting from a learning process. Ruling political elites might consciously pursue one policy toward a group with the ultimate intention of another, like the case described right above. However, there are cases where the ruling political elites have tried assimilation, decided at some point that it cannot work, and, as a result, changed their policy to exclusion or even accommodation. It is very difficult to discern which of these different paths is at play without detailed archival records. Such an effort is nonetheless worthwhile, as it is the only way to resolve these instances of observational equivalence. A failure to address this problem could lead to policies predicted correctly, but for the wrong reasons, which in turn would keep us from falsifying incorrect hypotheses and consequently improving our understanding of the process of nation-building.

The Unit of Analysis: The Politics of “Counting People” and Coding Cases

The most daunting problem in the study of nation-building policies is that of deciding which groups should be included in the analysis. The necessary historical research has not progressed enough in this highly politicized field to allow for a clear picture of the situation on the ground. The politics surrounding census statistics on “national minorities” or “ethnic groups” is an extremely problematic aspect in the study of nation-building.

First, whoever is doing the counting often predetermines the results. Second, even if we assume that existing statistics on ethnic composition are accurate, we can never be sure that the categories used in a census were the most salient ones for the people on the ground. For example, depending on which dimension the state census committee chooses to highlight—religious affiliation, mother tongue, regional identity, racial categories, or ethnic origin—it can produce a very different “ethnic structure.”

An aggregate approach to issues related to nation-building is precarious and cannot serve as the final word. Using census data to explain nation-building policies is, to an extent, confusing the outcome for the cause. Census data on “ethnicity” are part and parcel of nation-building policies and so are maps and atlases (Black, 2002; Wilkinson, 1951; Wood, 1992). The obvious case is that of groups that are not represented in census categories and are thus muted.

Take the Ottoman Empire, for example, which granted official status only to religious communities (millets). The Ottoman censuses record Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Gregorian Christians, Jews, and, later, Catholics and Protestants. Ottoman statistics provide no information about language, cultural difference, or national consciousness. In the Balkan Peninsula in particular, this meant that Muslim Albanian speakers, Turkish speakers, Ladino speakers (Donmehs, i.e., Jewish converts to Islam), and other Muslim

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8For more information on the important activities of the Zionist movement on behalf of the Jews of Thessaloniki, see Gelber et al. (1955).
9For example, see the report written by Governor General of Macedonia Adosidis describing a meeting he had with the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community of Thessaloniki, AYE, 1921, 41/2, Governor General of Macedonia to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29, 1919, Thessaloniki.
10In the article, I refer to “groups” as singular entities and subsume members’ motives for action in terms of that group identity. I end up reifying groups (Brubaker, 2004). In the context of this article, however there is no real way around this problem without adopting various cumbersome writing conventions.
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groups were all under the broad “Muslim” category. Similarly, all Christian Orthodox people—Slavic speakers with various national affiliations, Albanian speakers, Vlach speakers, and so forth—were considered members of the Rum millet, represented by the Greek-dominated Patriarchate in Istanbul. The transition from empire to nation-state in the Balkans occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries, and with it a transition in the relevant recorded categories also occurred. The same inhabitants of these territories were now aggregated with respect to language or a notion of national consciousness that was, at least initially, vague. This was the face of modernity in the region.

There is also the politics of who wants to be counted that is important to census and identity outcomes. For example, some semi-nomadic tribes residing in the more peripheral areas of several Arabian Gulf states, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, were not counted prior to independence and were rendered stateless or bidun jansiyya (literally without citizenship) since. Azoulay and Wells (2014) explain that over 100,000 bidun in Kuwait today stem partially from “residents who did not apply for nationality or lacked documentation at independence.” Many of those who were not initially counted were rendered stateless accidentally as a result of illiteracy and undereducation such that they could not physically sign up or did not understand potential social benefits that would accrue to them as a result of citizenship. Others, however, chose not to join voluntarily because they did not understand and/or trust the new nation-state entity and were afraid to give their information to the authorities who came around for the 1958 census. For some of these tribes it may have been more important to remain loyal to a Shaykh, tribe, or other kinship group as opposed to a new state authority. In this case, the very act of census taking illuminates the problem of transnational populations who initially did not recognize the authority of a Western-style nation-state. The Kuwaiti bidun were initially given social benefits but have increasingly been depicted as foreign and excluded from services and/or citizenship. Thus, early noncore group decisions about whether or not to literally sign on and count themselves as citizens in the newly created census categories often justified future exclusionary nation-building policies.

Modern states in Western Europe, such as Germany and Great Britain, recorded language use and national origin in their censuses, and the Balkan states followed suit in order to be on equal footing and to try to prove their historical rights on disputed territories. In the hands of the ruling political elites of the Balkan states, the census was part of a broader war for the hearts and minds of the newly incorporated rural populations.

Scholars of nationalism and ethnic conflict have relied on various indices, such as the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964), the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (Posner, 2004), Fearon (2003), Alesina et al. (2003), and so forth, to capture ethnic diversity. Most studies rely either on census categories or on material produced by the elites of “oppressed” groups. Both sources are inadequate if our research question has to do with state-planned nation-building policies. For example, when we use census data, we are likely to get deflated population estimates of certain noncore groups and no estimates for the ones that are targeted with assimilationist policies. Similarly, if we try to discern the ethnic makeup of a country or a region using material produced by the elites of noncore groups, we often encounter propaganda that inflates their numbers. In this latter case, however, what is more disconcerting is that we are not capturing any of the noncore groups whose elites have been successfully co-opted, or any noncore groups with

11 The other groups include “foreign Arabs recruited to Kuwait’s nascent military and police in the 1960s who settled permanently, children of Kuwaiti mothers and stateless or foreign fathers, and Arabs of Iraqi and other origin who falsified or destroyed their identity documents upon immigration” (Azoulay and Wells, 2014).
Selection bias is therefore almost unavoidable if we are studying ethnic diversity since the factors that generate the “mistakes” are the very nation-building policies that aspire to affect ethnic diversity in the first place.

Another caveat in the study of nation-building policies is that all of these data-collection projects that I cited above ignore small groupings of people; this occurs in multiple ways. First, the cut-off point for inclusion in a study of ethnic politics or conflict is often 1 percent of a country’s population. This means that groups that are relatively small are rarely, if ever, included in existing models. If a scholar is genuinely interested in including small groups (or even potential groups), he or she is quickly discouraged by the lack of data. Even if we assume that someone has all the censuses of the world for the past 100 years down to the individual questionnaire and an army of research assistants to help with coding, the biases would still persist since the categories used are the ones strategically selected by political elites rather than disinterested academics.

The seriousness of this problem depends on the research question of interest. A straightforward way in which ignoring small groups is problematic is to think of the possibility that a country has 30 groups smaller than 1 percent, which cumulatively total 15 to 20 percent of the total population, as compared with a country that has two such groups. The seriousness of such neglect becomes even more apparent when we consider the possibility that this very fragmentation is an outcome of state policy, as the “divide-and-rule” pattern that I described above suggests (e.g., the accommodation of Roma and Pomaks to prevent the subnational assimilation of these groups into their respective Turkish minority), rather than a mere fact of the ethnic landscape.

Finally, comparability across countries is further hindered by the fact that statistical bureaus collect data on identity categories that are arrayed around different cleavage dimensions in each country and over time. And, as we know from the empirical record, once the decision concerning the cleavage dimension and the relevant identity categories has been taken, a particular incentive structure is created for individuals on the ground. The result is usually overreporting in favor of the core group.

How can we overcome this situation where available statistics are capturing host states’ nation-building policies instead of realities on the ground? One way to avoid this bias is to shun data from conflict-ridden territories until a fair amount of time has passed. Biased estimates and census manipulation are much more likely in contested areas. Focusing on such cases only exacerbates the problem. Detached historical research can put things into perspective. For example, Yugoslavia and Austria both claimed Carinthia for the first half of the 20th century. According to the Austrian census of 1951, there were only 7,000 Slovenes in the Klagenfurt area of Carinthia, while the Yugoslavs claimed that there were more than 35,000. What accounts for this discrepancy? The Austrian census grouped people by “language used daily” into nine identity categories: “German, Slovene, Windish (a Slovenian dialect), and six combinations of the three” (Kostanick, [1963] 1974:27). Scholars had no way to tell how many “Slovenes” were living there. Moreover, the population inhabiting Carinthia could be grouped in various different ways depending on the census question. In general, data from contested territories are unreliable, and scholars studying such areas should be upfront about the various sources of bias.

Another solution involves looking at census data that were produced prior to significant political changes in a region. In the case of the Balkans, I overcame several problems with the help of the Ottoman censuses from the 19th century—which were not yet using

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12I should note that the Ethnic Power Relations data set is an attempt to solve this problem (Cederman Wimmer, and Min, 2010) and the Minorities at Risk project is also working on improving its data set in this direction (Birnir et al., 2015).
nationalist categories—as well as confidential diplomatic reports prior to World War I. The ideal solution—at least when studying state-planned nation-building policies—however, is to move our attention to state policymakers and take their perceptions seriously. The ruling political elites, who are central to the planning of nation-building policies, know that they cannot ignore politically relevant noncore groups. These governmental officials, ministers, and governors write reports and confidential documents concerning groups of people that rarely come up in censuses or newspapers. These public omissions are purposeful. By looking at confidential documents—when they are available—we can at least reconstruct the perceptions of the government under study. Such documents are treasures for both building and testing hypotheses.

To construct the data set for the post World War I Balkans, I initially looked at available censuses (here we find the groups that the state recognized as “minorities”), then I moved on to secondary sources (here we find some excellent books but also a lot of the propaganda posing as scholarly work), and then to consular reports, and other materials such as memoranda, petitions, and telegrams from the region (here we get a complex but also more comprehensive picture). Once I put together a list of noncore groups, I then coded the nation-building policies pursued toward them by their respective host states.

Publishing the list of the secondary sources used in an appendix and conducting coding reliability tests consulting academics, human rights activists, and journalists from the region was one way to ameliorate this situation. This external perspective forces the researcher to engage alternative interpretations of the historical events under study.

But the problem of “counting people” is not solved even when a researcher settles on the groups that should be included in her analysis. Ruling political elites do not always apply policies uniformly to all the members of a noncore group. Although nonuniform application of nation-building policies was unusual in my study, it did occur. In some cases, the application consisted of a strategy of “divide and rule.” In other cases, variation in application was merely a function of capabilities and military expedience. Let us take a closer look.

The “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs, as governor of Western Greek Macedonia Eliakis called them, are a case of nonuniform application of nation-building policies by the ruling political elites. The policies toward this noncore group were harsher for those living close to the borders with Bulgaria, many of whom were internally displaced (see Ron, 2003). Moreover, young people were targeted with intensive assimilationist policies, while older ones were not. According to my theory, “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs in Greece should have been targeted with assimilation policies—in the form of internal colonization and displacement—and indeed they were for a couple of years before the Treaty of Neuilly was signed (1919) stipulating the voluntary population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria began.

Archival research allowed me to study this case in depth. My theory correctly predicts the intentions of the Greek administration. “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs were supported by a revisionist enemy power, while the Greek administration wanted to preserve the international status quo in Greek Macedonia. Consequently, assimilationist policies, taking the form of colonization and internal displacement of the noncore group, were the preferred choice. After World War I, however, the governments in Greece and Bulgaria decided upon a voluntary population exchange under the Treaty of Neuilly. As a result, about 56,000 Bulgarians left Greece for Bulgaria, “in many cases being forced to emigrate by the Greek authorities” (Michailidis, 2005:94). However, the picture is complicated by the Internal

13To be sure, if what one is trying to capture is ethnic diversity in a country, this approach may be superior to just looking at the census, but it still does not necessarily capture the full range of diversity. State officials have their own political agendas and focus on politically relevant groups.
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’s efforts to discourage “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs from leaving in order to preserve Bulgarian territorial claims in Greek Macedonia, as well as by some voluntary departures to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the members of the group who remained in Greece continued to be targeted with assimilationist policies and were not granted minority status. Thus, the case has elements of both exclusion and assimilation.

This case highlights an important caveat. Most scholars in the process of coding cases use some type of threshold in order to decide how to categorize each case. Governments, however, may intentionally follow mixed policies toward certain noncore groups. How often this occurs is an empirical question. In most analyses, researchers necessarily simplify the picture and focus on the “dominant” strategy. However, as the case of the “Bulgarian-leaning” Slavs in Greece shows, the ruling political elites might choose to follow a mixed strategy of assimilation toward one part of a noncore group and exclusion toward another part of the same group. In this case, the conventional approach would have coded this observation based on the available evidence, using the relevant secondary literature on the period or looking at contemporary newspaper reports. The archival alternative allows us not only to distinguish between intentions and outcomes, but also to understand the very logic of the mixed policy that was pursued.

Turning to another of the outliers in my statistical analysis, the Hungarians in Romania, we see a similar pattern. Coding this case was challenging, as the initial intentions of the Romanian elites seemed to be rather assimilationist—if not exclusionary—in an effort to “Romanize” Transylvania, but their consequent policies were accommodationist. Romanians granted minimal minority rights to the Hungarian population that remained in Romanian Transylvania. Nevertheless, around 200,000 Hungarians from Transylvania fled to Hungary between 1918 and 1922, followed by another 170,000 over the remainder of the interwar period (Kovrig, 2000:34). However, the majority of Hungarians stayed in Romania and their differences were perpetuated through separate schools, associations, and their own political party.

The case of Hungarians in Romania again raises the issue of coding nation-building policies based on an arbitrarily chosen threshold. The threshold one sets in coding is crucial in such cases. In this particular context, almost 23 percent of the total population of Hungarians left Romanian Transylvania for Hungary during the interwar period. Thus, 77 percent of the Hungarians stayed in Romania, but 23 percent fled the nationalizing policies of the Romanian state. If we set a coding threshold of 20 percent (i.e., at least 20 percent of a noncore group should be targeted with a policy in order to consider it a case of either assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion), we could conclude that the Hungarians were targeted with exclusionary policies. I set a higher threshold (80 percent) and thus code this as a case of accommodation. In other words, I decided to code for the “dominant” strategy but other scholars may have coded this as a mixed case or a case of exclusion depending on their theoretical framework. Actually, the intentions of the Romanian administration were—at least initially—assimilationist, but the policies granted minority rights to the Hungarians. Hungarians were discriminated against and targeted with some exclusionary policies, but ultimately they were accommodated. This was the result of the treaties that Romania had signed after World War I that required accommodation as a policy toward the Hungarians. This international constraint definitely mattered, but at the same time—as I showed in the previous section—accommodation was a transitional policy, not a terminal one.

14For more, see Mylonas and Shelef (2014:777–83).
Moving from Romania to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, we find another community of Hungarians. Again in this case we have a relatively large group supported by an enemy state\textsuperscript{15} living in a host state that wanted to preserve the international status quo. As Sajti puts it, “Hungarian governments never gave up hopes of securing a revision of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, although they were all too aware that the international climate for attaining that was unfavourable” (2006:116). Given that the newly founded Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was on the side of the winners and wanted to preserve the status quo, my argument predicts that the Hungarians should have been targeted with assimilationist policies in the form of internal colonization and displacement.

Indeed, after the annexation of Vojvodina to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, primary- and secondary-level Hungarian-language schools were all closed down (Ramet, 2006:51). The extensive land reform implemented in the new Kingdom was very much felt in Vojvodina as well. As Sajti notes, “the avowed goal of such resettlements was to populate the territories lying along the northern borders of Yugoslavia with ‘reliable Slavs’ to offset the majority, the ‘unreliable Magyars’” (2006:112). Nevertheless, the Hungarians of Vojvodina had their own party and cultural associations, and some Hungarian-speaking schools reopened in the region. Sajti provides an explanation of the public accommodation of Hungarians in the interwar period:

The League of Nations mechanism for the protection of minorities may have offered some safeguards of minority rights (elementary education in the mother tongue, etc.) and, as a creation of the post-1918 European order, Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{16} was in no position to reject the basic principles of the international regime for the protection of minorities that the victorious Allies had established. (Sajti, 2006:117)

But the Hungarian population living in Vojvodina was also targeted with an extensive colonization campaign as well as some measures aiming at the nationalization of the economy and of the administration of the region. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, however, did not try to eradicate the cultural differences and way of life of this noncore group. A mixed policy was pursued.

The case of the Greeks in southern Albania also deserves treatment here. The Albanian government’s policies toward the Greeks (a noncore group supported by a hostile state and residing in a revisionist host state) during the Greek-Albanian dispute over the delimitation of the territorial borders of Albania were exclusionary. As soon as the interstate relations between the two countries changed, however, the policy shifted to one of accommodation. But this policy of accommodation was not applied uniformly toward the Greeks in Albania. Notably, when Fan Noli referred to the Greek population and its accommodation he meant only the Greeks inhabiting a specific region in southern Albania. The Albanian government tried to assimilate Greeks living outside the designated area and accommodated only the ones concentrated within that area.


The Albanian government allowed the operation of Greek schools only in the areas where the presence of a Greek population was officially recognized and prohibited Greek language

\textsuperscript{15} “In order to provide support for Hungarian communities outside the country’s borders, Bethlen [Prime Minister of Hungary from 1921 to 1931] in 1921, established a supposedly secret ministry to exercise political influence on those communities through an openly operating blanket organization called the Federation of Social Associations (TESZK), through which fairly generous financial support was given to Hungarian political and cultural organizations in Slovakia, Transylvania and the Voivodina” (Sajti, 2006:117).

\textsuperscript{16} King Aleksandar changed the name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1929. In an effort to avoid anachronisms, I use the appropriate name for the period I am discussing.
instruction in all other Albanian-speaking areas ... Concerning education, the goal of the Albanians was to ban private education and to impose an absolute state monopoly.

These efforts were not limited to the educational establishments of the Greek community, but extended to its religious organization as well. Albanian nationalists tried to establish an Autocephalous Christian Orthodox Church of Albania in order to prevent either the Greek-dominated Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul or the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece from interfering in the domestic politics of Albania (Kontis, 1994:157–58). The attempts to assimilate the Greek population, though largely unsuccessful, were indicative of the Albanian government’s intentions.

But the Albanian government had also undertaken certain obligations under the supervision of the League of Nations in order to achieve international recognition of its independence in the early 1920s; it had to respect the minority rights of the Greek noncore group, among other things. As a result of this commitment, the Albanian government did recognize a Greek minority in Albania, but only in designated parts of the country. The members of this noncore group who resided outside of those parts were targeted with assimilationist policies that potentially aimed at forcing them to return to Greece. This latter point brings us to the issue discussed in the next section.

Periodization: Coding Timespan, Anachronism, and Hypotheses Testing

The coding timespan of an analysis affects the conclusions we draw from it. Many existing works in political science evade this important issue. Hypotheses are tested in specific places and historical instances, but sometimes processes take time to unfold. How can one decide the appropriate timespan for testing certain hypotheses? Is it a year, decade, or generation? These are difficult but pertinent questions in the social sciences.

The short answer is that the appropriate timespan for testing hypotheses depends on the phenomenon under study. If we want to test a theory about the rate of assimilation, then the appropriate timespan is probably a generation or more. If our research question concerns the rate of acculturation—the acquisition of certain traits by a specific group—then a decade might be enough. Similarly, in the study of state-planned nation-building policies, the timespan depends on the aspect of the process on which we focus. If our aim is to understand policy choices by the ruling political elites of a state, our efforts should focus on the period of policy planning immediately after a critical event, such as annexation, war, or regime change. But if our aim is to evaluate which nation-building policies are successful and under what circumstances, then we would have to allow for several decades to pass.

In The Politics of Nation-Building, I sought to identify the logic of state-planned nation-building policies toward noncore groups across states and over time. The research strategy I followed was to look at state policies immediately after World War I, an event that affected all societies in the region. This research strategy works well in cases where the initial conditions that propelled the policy do not change during the period of study. However, there are cases in my analysis where the initial conditions change profoundly during the first five years after the end of World War I.

The coding timespan of our analysis, affects the coding of the cases under study. For example, the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922 and the subsequent Turkish victory had a significant effect on the nation-building policies of the two states involved. In particular, whereas the Muslims in Northern Greece—foremost candidates for agitation by Turkey—were more or less accommodated until 1923, they became part of an obligatory population exchange thereafter (Clark, 2006; Hirschon, 2003; Ladas, 1932; Pentzopoulos, 1962;
Yıldırım, 2006). This shift was not because the Greek government just changed its mind, but rather because the values of important independent variables changed after Greece’s defeat in the Greek-Turkish War.\textsuperscript{17}

Another example is that of the Jews in Turkey. According to my argument, the Jews in Turkey should have been targeted with assimilationist policies since they did not enjoy the external support of any state and resided in a status quo state. However, the Jews were initially accommodated by the Turkish government. As a result, this case is one of the outliers in my statistical analysis. The first systematic effort for assimilation of the Jews in Turkey did not begin until late into the 1920s. In this example, if I had chosen a 10-year period for coding, I would have coded the Jews in Turkey as being targeted with assimilationist policies—which is consistent with my prediction—but having chosen a five-year period I coded it as a case of accommodation.

Although I extensively discussed the case of the Greeks in southern Albania in the previous section, it also deserves treatment here. The Greeks in Albania should have been targeted with exclusionary policies according to my argument, but they were ultimately accommodated instead. Albania was a new state whose existence was not guaranteed after the end of World War I. Italy had been promised significant portions of Albania in order to enter the war, Greece claimed the southern provinces, and the Serbs were occupying territories bordering Kosovo. The Allies—with the exception of the United States—were sympathetic to these plans. The Albanian reaction to these partitioning plans was decisive.

Early in 1920, the pro-Italian government was overthrown and replaced by a new government determined to secure the independence of Albania. At this point, the Albanian authorities put pressure on the Greek community to declare that they preferred Albanian to Greek rule. According to the Greek General Governor of Epirus, Achilleas Kalevras,

\begin{center}
being in a helpless situation these Christians are obliged, in order not to be subjugated by force, to flee their homes; thus the first significant exodus to the villages on our side of the border.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{center}

However, Albania—or, better, the ruling elites in the south of the country—shifted from an enemy to an ally of Greece within a couple of days. In late May 1920, Prime Minister Venizelos was waiting for the final approval from Britain before he ordered the Greek military to annex southern Albanian territories—promised to Greece by the Allies during the January talks of the same year. Southern Albania had been under French administration up to that point. On May 27, 1920 the British government advised Venizelos not to occupy these territories because such an occupation would enrage the Albanians (Kontis, 1994:136). According to Kontis, the discovery of oil was the reason behind the British change of policy over Albania (1994:137). Considering that Venizelos was at that time negotiating for the Dodecanese Islands and Thrace as well as fighting in Asia Minor, it is understandable that Greece was not in a position to occupy southern Albania without British approval. Once again, your ally’s ally is your friend.

The main concern of the Albanians at the time was ousting the Italian troops from Albanian soil. Albanians knew that Greece had military superiority and the Greek government did use its leverage to secure rights for the Greek community. In the absence of the British mediation and the consequent accord between Greece and Albania, the enemy-supported Greek population would have been left unprotected against the revisionist

\textsuperscript{17}This discussion echoes some of the concerns and proposed solutions of historical institutionalists (Slater and Simmons, 2010; Capoccia and Kellemen, 2007; Thelen, 1999).

Albanian authorities and may have been targeted with exclusionary measures (Kontis, 1994:139).

As a result of Greek diplomatic maneuvering, however, a protocol was indeed signed on May 28, 1920, declaring friendly relations between Albania and Greece along with obligations on the Albanian side to respect the Greek population in Albania and allow the unobstructed operation of schools and churches (Kontis, 1994:143). This sudden change in diplomatic relations between the two countries surprised the Italian consul in Ioannina, who wrote to the Greek Governor General of Epirus: “We Italians are surprised by the Albanian pro-Greek demonstration at a moment when Greece has not given up her claims on Northern Epirus and has no interest in following a bunch of foolish Albanians in their anti-Italian policy.”

On June 5, 1920, a few days after the Albanians began their fight against the Italians, the Albanian government sent “a confidential circular announcing to the local Albanian authorities that the relations with Greece were cordial and that the Greek government was friendly.” The British intervention in favor of Albania and Venizelos’s compliance prevented a military confrontation between the two states. Acting as a Great Power, Britain was trying to include the new Albanian state in its sphere of influence; thus, by extension, its allies became Albania’s allies.

To be sure, the balance of power between Greece and Albania also affected their interstate relations. For example, as soon as the Albanians managed to successfully contain the Italians they also altered their diplomatic approach toward Greece. The emerging international context undermined Greek claims in Albania. By August 1920, the Albanians signed a protocol with the Italians that resulted in the latter withdrawing their troops from Albania and recognizing its independence. As a result of this Italian-Albanian reconciliation, the Albanians ended up refusing the validity of the Greek-Albanian protocol signed in May 1920. By December 1920, Albania had become a member of the League of Nations and in October 1921 its representative, Fan Noli, declared that his country would respect the rights of the Greek population. As I mentioned in the previous section, the Albanian government recognized a Greek minority only in the province of Argyrokastro (Gjirokastër) and not outside of that area.

From the discussion of the above cases, it becomes clear that the values of crucial independent variables do not all change at the same time or with the same pace for every observation. This problem can be addressed in the context of a case study through meticulous process tracing; however, it is much harder to resolve when we conduct a cross-national analysis that often forces arbitrary timespans for coding variables. Often, important explanatory variables are not held constant over arbitrarily chosen periods of time. Five- or 10-year period intervals are commonly used for testing hypotheses, but they are open to such problems. Asynchronous comparisons could mitigate this problem, namely, inductively deriving historically meaningful cut-off points per country or region depending on the type of analysis and the research question.

Another methodological problem related to periodization is that of anachronism. Scholars studying nationalist mobilization or nation-building policies often attribute certain actions to concepts and/or phenomena that were not politically salient or even understood by the actors under study. This practice leads to misunderstanding the ontology of the phenomenon under study and to functionalist/teleological arguments. As Lawrence put it: “Hindsight can thus produce biased explanations. Knowledge of the outcome can lead one

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to erroneously believe that preferences for the outcome caused it to happen, even when the
existence of such preferences has to be assumed” (2013:7). This practice is omnipresent
in national historiographies of the Balkan States. Here, I focus on the teleological manner
in which the obligatory Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923 has been narrated.
From the contemporary vantage point, this population exchange is seen as inevitable and
is often understood as an expected byproduct of the exclusionary Greek and/or Turkish
understandings of nationhood.

But what was the dominant understanding of nationhood in Greece at the time? The
standard view on this matter is that in order to be Greek, one had to be born in Greece
or be of Greek ancestry, typically speak Greek, and be an Orthodox Christian. During the
Balkan Wars, however, and faced with the heterogeneity of the “New Lands” they were
incorporating, Venizelist ruling political elites strategically emphasized the importance of
national consciousness over language or religion. The views of the Greek elites around
Venizelos concerning the matter nearly echoed Ernest Renan’s ideas as expressed in his
1882 lecture at the Sorbonne (Renan, 1996). Venizelos clearly stated his understanding of
nationhood both before and after he became the Greek prime minister. As we will see below,
there is no aspect of his understanding of “Greekness” suggesting that he would pursue
exclusionary policies toward the Muslim population of Greece. Moreover, the political
elites surrounding Venizelos shared this understanding of nationhood and contradict a
teleological reading of the population exchange.21

The first record of this understanding of nationhood goes back to an address he gave
to the Second Constituent Assembly of Cretans in October 1906, when he argued “it
is of great interest for Hellenism to propagate that its understanding [of nationhood] is
so broad and so foreign to religious doctrines so that within Hellenism can fit not only
Christian believers, but also the believers in any other known or unknown religion.”
Venizelos remained on message following World War I, when at the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference he stated, “religion, race, language cannot be considered as reliable indications
of nationality. The only unmistaken indicator is national consciousness, the purposeful
desire of individuals to self determine their luck and to decide which national family
they desire to belong to.” Finally, even after the Greek defeat in the Greco-Turkish War
following World War I, Venizelos insisted that an important element of the foundations
of a society is “respect of all religious doctrines, even those that oppose all religious
doctrines.”22 From the discussion above, it is clear that for Venizelos and his close
associates, the population exchange was not a natural extension of their national ideology,
but rather a pragmatic choice given the adverse circumstances. Anachronism can lead us
to “explain” certain events using concepts that emerged following these events.

Conclusion

In The Politics of Nation-Building, I have shown that whether a noncore group enjoys
external support as well as the interstate relations between host states and external powers

21 Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos was surrounded at the time by a like-minded political elite, in-
cluding Governor General of Western Macedonia Ioannis Eliakis, Governor General of Epirus Aristeidis
Stergiadis, Governor General of Eastern Thrace Harisios Vamvakas, Minister of Interior and Deputy Prime
Minister Emmanuel Repoulis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolaos Politis, member of the Greek-Bulgarian
Mixed Commission Alexandros Pallis, Governor General of Macedonia Adosidis, and many more (Mylonas,
2012:114).
22 All the quotes mentioned above can be found in Mylonas (2012:119–22).
account for the variation in nation-building policies in the interwar Balkans. In this article, I conducted a meta-analysis of the body of evidence I used in my recent work identifying important methodological problems in the study of nation-building policies and focusing on historicist solutions to these problems.

To sum up, the periodization we choose affects the results we get; policies are not always mutually exclusive; a mix of policies can be pursued in some cases toward the same noncore group; often the initial policy pursued by governments is merely a transitional strategy aimed at achieving a distinct long-term objective. Furthermore, from my analysis a counterintuitive “divide-and-rule” strategy also emerges. Balkan ruling elites often chose to strategically accommodate certain noncore groups in order to prevent their subnational assimilation to larger and more threatening noncore groups. Finally, there are a few cases where change of policy is the result of learning through failure of a previous policy, but a longue durée approach is necessary to explore such patterns (Braudel, 1980).

Turning to the proposed solutions to these methodological problems, in the first part of the article I suggested that an archival approach could help us address the problem of inferring intentions from observed outcomes. The archival alternative to observational research is not a perfect solution since issues of interpretation, private agendas of the officials, and fabrication persist. Studying the decision-making process behind actions, however, can help scholars differentiate between the intentions of an actor and the actual action that she eventually adopts. Such an approach also allows us to distinguish between terminal and transitional policies or actions as well as transitional policies from changes resulting from a learning process. It is very difficult to discern which of these different paths is at play and go beyond these instances of observational equivalence without detailed archival research.

In terms of identifying the unit of analysis and deciding which groups should be included in our analysis, several lessons can be drawn from the discussion in the section entitled “The Unit of Analysis: The Politics of ‘Counting People’ and Coding Cases”: (1) do not treat census data as an objective reality of ethnic diversity in a country; (2) avoid using data from conflict-ridden territories and if you decide to study such cases try to locate data produced prior to significant political changes in a region; (3) ensure that your data-collection project does not consciously ignore small groupings of people; and (4) when possible, enrich your data-collection process using archival materials—from private or public archives. It is in such confidential reports that purposeful public omissions may be reported and even explained. Finally, listing all of the sources used to code your cases in an appendix and conducting coding reliability tests consulting academics, human rights activists, and journalists from the region is not only highly recommended but also is a rewarding experience.

To conclude, when it comes to the problems flowing from periodization, the short answer is that the choice of the appropriate timespan for testing hypotheses depends on the phenomenon under study. Carefully choosing a period and a region of the world where the phenomenon has been active, should be coupled with archival checks to avoid anachronistic theorizing. When we conduct cross-national analysis asynchronous comparisons could mitigate periodization problems. Conducting research is challenging but rewarding. I provided some historicist solutions to behaviorism’s bottlenecks, but there is no silver bullet. Ultimately researchers must rely on their specialized knowledge, intuition and critical judgment.

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