Brethren, Burden or Both? Discrepancies in Arab “Frontline” Government Rhetoric and Policy Towards Syrian Refugees

Brody I. Blankenship & Alex Shanahan

May 2020
Acknowledgments

We would like to thank our advisor, Scott Williamson, visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University, for his guidance and feedback as we grappled with this project. His expertise and experience were invaluable to the success of our work. Additionally, our program director Dr. Nathan Brown and the Middle East Studies Program faculty and staff deserve our appreciation for their steady guidance and mentorship throughout the past year. We are also grateful to all the interview subjects and survey respondents in Jordan and Lebanon who provided their time and opinions to support our research. Finally, we owe a multitude of thanks to our families and loved ones who patiently supported us during the many hours spent on this project.
Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

WHY DO STATES SAY ONE THING AND DO ANOTHER?

Do Domestic Pressures Influence State Policy? 7
The Weight of the International Refugee Regime 10
Theoretical Basis 12

METHODOLOGY 13

BACKGROUND 15

Jordan 17
Lebanon 18

FINDINGS 19

Chronology of Syrian Refugee Policies: Jordan 22
Emergency Response: 2011-2013 22
Sustainment and Development: 2016-2018 26

Chronology of Syrian Refugee Policies: Lebanon 30
Humanitarian Duty: 2011-2012 30
Restrictions: 2013-2015 33
Encouraged Repatriation: 2016-2018 38

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 40

APPENDICES 44

Chronologies of Jordan and Syrian Refugee Events 2011-2018 44
Visual Supplement: Government Rhetoric Themes By Phase 84

BIBLIOGRAPHY 87
Introduction

“There is no decision preventing Palestinian refugees in Syria from entering Lebanon and passing through the country,” stated Lebanese Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk in 2014 as the Syrian crisis continued to spiral out of control. However, in the months leading up to this statement and others like it, Lebanon’s leaders had made it nearly impossible for Palestinian refugees from Syria to pass through its borders, and the government had been forcibly deporting high numbers of Palestinians who had escaped Syria’s carnage to this already crowded country.

This is one instance of many rhetoric-policy mismatches toward Syrian refugees that occurred regularly from 2011 to 2018 in the Arab frontline states, reflecting a prevalent practice in their migration policies more broadly. What explains why governments might say one thing but do another in these contexts? We study this question by exploring rhetoric and policy regarding Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. Based on fieldwork, a survey, an extensive collection of government texts, and complementary interviews, we argue that international factors drive declaratory policy; domestic public attitudes and internal economic factors drive what governments actually do. Divergence between these factors is what explains why governments say one thing and do another. Host-nation governments practice this political hypocrisy to meet the demands of competing pressures from the international community, their domestic populations, and regional political sensitivities tied to relations with Syria, Palestine, and others.

Our findings reveal that both Lebanon and Jordan demonstrated policy-rhetoric contrarieties at similar times during similar three-phased responses. These inconsistencies took

---

place primarily during periods of positive humanitarian-focused rhetoric, as the realities of a near-instant absorption of over one million persons into the populations led to policies that could be considered anti-humanitarian but pro-national interest. In addition to the domestic demographic and security concerns of the states, the international community’s responsiveness also played a major role in determining the host-nations' policy-rhetoric mismatches. Regional political sensitivities, such as relations with a likely-remaining Assad regime and with the aspiring Middle East hegemon Saudi Arabia, certainly factored into Jordan and Lebanon’s calculus as well. Surprisingly, we found that the two states produced quite different themes in rhetoric during the final phase 2016-2018 even though Lebanon had adopted Jordan’s economic compact framework, which promised to bolster host-country economies. Instead, Lebanon’s government continued in its negative speech and insistence of an immediate Syrian return, while adding additional statements about the poor conditions the Syrians faced inside its borders. The differences in Lebanon in the final phase were due to Lebanon’s worsening economic situation, which made it more responsive to its constituents and less responsive to international actors. Jordan felt more optimistic about the economic benefits of its international agreements much more strongly than did Lebanon. These various pressures on the host states laid the groundwork for policy-rhetoric mismatches throughout much of the period of this research.

The remainder of the paper will further demonstrate these findings and their importance, first delving into the existing literature to review some of the past scholarship that helped to inform and guide our research. From this work, we adopted a classification system of refugee and migrant policies in North African states as “liberal,” “repressive,” or “indifferent” for a Levantine application, and we relied on the concept of organizational hypocrisy to inform the basis of our theory for pressures that shape refugee policies. Then the paper will move on to
describe how we collected, coded, and analyzed more than 500 government statements to derive rhetoric themes and compared them with Jordan and Lebanon’s Syrian refugee response policies between 2011 and 2018. We then used these results to find out the potential motivators for any noted discrepancies, which we compared with findings and arguments of past literature. This will lead to the background section, where we demonstrate the importance of Jordan and Lebanon’s political relationships with both Syria and with refugee populations, primarily Palestinians, which will lay the groundwork for understanding these states’ negative policies specifically towards Palestinian refugees fleeing the dangers of Syria. It will also accurately convey both states’ broad refugee policies throughout their recent histories, which contributed to their policy-rhetoric gaps during the Syrian crisis. After this, the remainder of the paper will be dedicated to our findings and arguments as we describe the evidence of both states participating in asylum-seeker rejections and border closures, forced deportations, and other acts that contradict typical rhetoric of exceptional humanitarian and brotherly duty to meet the expectations of competing audiences and stakeholders.

Why Do States Say One Thing and Do Another?

Governments often say and do different things. Contradictions in political rhetoric are fairly standard, as is indicated by the body of work that revolves around these contradictions and their consequences. According to Billig, contradictions are not only regular, but they are a prerequisite to any two-sided rhetorical debate in a society, and his claim was demonstrated

---

through a number of case studies which illustrated contradictions within liberal ideology throughout everyday discussions.  

If contradictions are the norm in liberal ideology and in multi-party democratic governments like Lebanon where many different actors speak with the authority of the government, what about in a one-sided dialogue such as those in autocratic governments? Should this contradiction appear in places like the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, where the monarch is the *de facto* supreme ruler? There is limited examination of the discrepancies such as these among Middle Eastern governments.

These contradictions are present in both Jordan and Lebanon, specifically in refugee scenarios and migration policy more broadly. But we could find little analysis that has examined why these contradictions play out, whether in the Levant or elsewhere. We argue that a combination of domestic and international competing pressures is the primary cause of this host-country policy-rhetoric mismatch towards Syrian refugees.

*Do Domestic Pressures Influence State Policy?*

While the literature may be lacking in specific rhetoric-policy contradiction studies, it is more abundant in examinations of potential domestic pressure on states. Recently, research examining the Arab host-nation populations’ attitudes towards Syrians has grown in quantity, with some studies touching on the potential of a citizenry to influence its government in Middle Eastern states.

This research on public attitudes toward refugees and immigrants in a variety of contexts is relevant to government policy formation. A group of researchers in 2015 studied seven European countries to determine the reason for disconnect in public opinion about immigration.

---

and immigration policies. Their findings suggest that increased politicization of immigration in the form of media attention, public debate, and anti-immigration movements can turn public opinion against liberal immigration policies and compel governments to narrow the “opinion-policy gap” and maintain the support of their constituents. A 2019 article examined the debate surrounding the issue of Syrians’ return, which postulated that domestic populations’ opinions can influence government rhetoric, basing this assessment on frontline state population attitudes towards Syrian refugees in recent years. Another 2015 study argued that competition for jobs, water, healthcare, housing, and education contributed to a negative Jordanian perception of Syrian refugees, which subsequently pressured the government to reduce its support to them.

After the kingdom refused to open its borders to tens of thousands of Syrians fleeing intensified violence, the Jordanian public organized protests, produced a Twitter hashtag campaign (#OpenTheBorders), and even organized private relief drives to pressure the government to reverse its decision, which it eventually did. While our findings indicate that this may be true, there are contextual requirements for it to be so. For example, our findings indicate that the domestic population’s opinion typically takes a backseat to the international community’s favor, likely due to funding in the case of Lebanon and Jordan.

Additionally, a group of researchers conducted the first large-scale representative survey of public attitudes toward immigration in Jordan in 2018, finding that Jordanians generally hold

---

positive attitudes towards Syrians in their midst, while also acknowledging the economic hardships they have exacerbated. This is consistent with the government’s positive rhetoric that we found during the same time period. According to our own survey, with corroboration of additional research, many of Lebanon’s citizens think that Syrians in their country have negative effects on their personal and national economic situation. These economic concerns and fears about security and sectarian balance among Lebanese were present in 2013 as well, even when most sympathized with the Syrians. According to the American University of Beirut, in April 2018 most Lebanese feel that Syrians are straining Lebanon’s resources and about half think relations with refugees have gotten worse since 2014. When placed against the backdrop of the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent popular mobilizations in Arab states that left multiple heads of states deposed, it is understandable that the region’s governments would prioritize the pressures from the people. We argue that domestic pressures are a factor in government rhetoric and policy decisions, but this is highly dependent on international community responsiveness to calls for support. The government only reacts to internal pressures when it is forced to do so.

---

The Weight of the International Refugee Regime

Policymakers tend to focus on refugees as a group and their macro-level effects from the perspective of their countries. Ullah sums up the differences succinctly, “Millions of refugees in camps continue to be defined based on their statistical significance (i.e., numbers) rather than based on their identities.”\textsuperscript{13} This perception is easy to adopt as state leaders must calculate economic costs of hosting refugees, political risks and potential gains, and adhering to their own national goals that existed prior to whatever humanitarian issue drove the refugees into their country. Thus, host-country governments must consider the International Refugee Regime (IRR), which is the body of international laws and regulations that outlines the responsibilities of host and sending states with regard to refugees.

Almost all scholars of refugees take seriously the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. These documents broadly set out the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of states toward refugees and are thus the basis from which any discussion of refugee rights, treatment, and international norms stems. Although they are not legally binding and there is no enforcement mechanism, the existence of these documents means that even states that are not signatories to the documents are under international pressure to abide by them and protect the rights of refugees. One scholar argues that the UNHCR itself, while not an enforcement agency but rather a neutral conduit of international assistance, does maintain influence by way of its representation of the IRR on the ground.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, there is some political


weight in a state’s reception or dismissal of this emissary of the international community’s humanitarian position.

But more important than the UNHCR are the wealthy states who provide various funds for developing countries like Jordan and Lebanon regularly and who typically set aside considerable amounts of money to assist in humanitarian crises such as this one. The need for that funding, or “burden-sharing,” places immense amounts of pressure on developing frontline states as they wrestle with already struggling economies further hindered by the influx of hundreds of thousands of people who drive up prices in various markets and present a potential threat of employment competition domestically. The poor amount of contributions from the international community, typically coming in at around 30-40% of obliged annual funds during our target period, is likely a key factor in the states’ behaviors, both rhetoric and policy, towards the Syrian refugees.

Additionally, pressure can come in the form of interstate relationships and their pursuit, which are often an important factor in state identity. This desired identity may be one wrapped in progression and ethics, leading the state to risk considerable amounts of its own resources to provide humanitarian aid in various scenarios. These “global citizen states,” as Alison Brisk has dubbed them, “are often small to medium sized and highly dependent on interaction,” providing the basis for a theory of international dependence and refugee policy as political credit.15 Both Jordan and Lebanon, to different extents, have been pursuing this type of good will state identity in response to the Syrian crisis, though according to their rhetoric this pursuit has been intermittent.

Theoretical Basis

The concept of organizational hypocrisy provides a useful framework for understanding why governments might say one thing and do another, including on refugee-related policies. This theory was originally developed by Brunsson for understanding business administration. Its basic premise is that all organizations are subcomponents of a system that have subunits of their own. All organizations require support from their parent system and are thus constrained by regulations and expectations associated with that system. Brunsson claims that “inconsistent environments, structures, processes and outputs interact and reinforce one another, thereby politicizing organizations, making them less apt to act but more apt to survive.”\(^{16}\) We have transferred the basic principles of organizational hypocrisy to host-state governments, in this case Jordan and Lebanon, to help explain the pressures that drive the policy-rhetoric hypocrisy of their refugee policies.

Additionally, Kelsey P. Norman, who has completed extensive work examining refugee and migrant policies in North Africa, has developed a simple but helpful way to categorize these policies as one of three types.\(^{17}\) Liberal policies are those that seek to support the refugees even as they are in the host country. This may include something like access to the labor market or health care. The opposite of that would be repressive policy, which aims to reduce freedoms or quality of life of the refugee to prevent a sense of permanence or belonging. Policies such as extended detention at the border after entry or no access to education would fall into this category. The scholar also developed the concept of indifferent policies that ignore the presence


of refugees and migrants, as she noted during a recent examination of Egypt’s policies. We take these three policy labels and use them to develop a more standardized comparison of Jordan and Lebanon’s rhetoric and policy towards Syrian refugees.

Both Jordan and Lebanon fit into the framework of organizational hypocrisy for the purposes of our research, answering to various supranational “parent” organizations that maintain varying levels of influence, such as the European Union, the United Nations and its member states, and regional bodies like the Arab League. However, these host governments must also answer to their populations to some extent, especially following the strong show of power that was the Arab Spring. As these states seek to balance these oft-competing pressures, they undertake policies that do not match their rhetoric. This can be examined by labeling these policies as either repressive, liberal, or indifferent before comparing them against rhetorical themes that have been coded in similar fashion. The following section will explain this process more in depth.

Methodology

To determine why states say one thing and do another, we compared policy and rhetoric towards Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon by collecting statements and policy documents before coding their contents using a qualitative software that allowed us to visualize the resulting themes of each. We logged notable discrepancies and compared them against national timelines of events to determine when, how, and why rhetoric-policy discrepancies occurred, and we supported our work with an online survey and expert interviews.

This project is based on three key streams of data: transcripts of a number of statements, interviews, and speeches involving the topic of Syrian refugees given by government officials of Jordan and Lebanon, primary and secondary policies in those states associated with Syrian
refugees, and reports from various outlets about the enforcement or lack of enforcement of those policies. Additionally, the research team was able to complete interviews with relevant government officials and experts in Amman, Jordan while also conducting a non-scientific online survey to gauge some of the Lebanese and Jordanian attitudes towards Syrian refugees in comparison with their governments’ rhetoric in recent times.

The project relies on transcripts from official statements that were available online in a variety of forms from several outlets. Both countries’ data included full statements of heads of state and various ministers and spokespersons, all of which was found in news articles, government-maintained archives, and videos in both English and Arabic. The diversity of sources provided a comprehensive dataset of official rhetoric aimed at varying audiences, and we used these statements to determine the themes of government rhetoric surrounding Syrian refugees.

The research team collected primary and secondary policy documents where available to establish the “official” policies in both Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan’s various state-owned and state-favoring media, especially Petra and the Jordan Times, are a regular means of policy “announcements” in the country by way of high-level interviews or other statements. For Lebanon, the state-owned National News Agency, the Daily Star, An-Nahar, Naharnet, and the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar are frequent channels for new policy announcements and statements from senior government officials. We used these informal policy announcements to determine their nature, either liberal, repressive, or indifferent, for later comparison with rhetoric themes.

After collecting the government rhetoric transcripts and translating them to English where necessary, the research team coded pertinent statements using a two-tiered approach.
the qualitative software NVivo. First, the statements were coded as positive, neutral, or negative based on the tone and language of the statement. The second stage of coding was simply classifying the primary theme of the statement, which led to the creation of six distinct, but at times overlapping, sectors: data, economy, politics, security, society, and humanitarianism. The official rhetoric coding provided themes that could be quantified to produce trends, which could then be examined in comparison with concurrent refugee policies and relevant events, yielding a better understanding of the possible key indicators and motivations of rhetoric-policy discrepancy. The research team also created chronologies of key refugee-related events in both Jordan and Lebanon between March 1, 2011 and December 31, 2018 that could be cross-examined with rhetoric and policy discrepancies in an effort to discover any potential correlation between regional events and the apparent contradictions. The following section explains how Jordan and Lebanon’s histories with refugees set them up for policies and rhetoric during the Syrian refugee crisis.

**Background**

The Syrian civil war has produced one of the most protracted humanitarian crises in recent history. Syrian refugees are now spread out in more than forty countries around the world on six continents, and progress towards a safe return to their homeland has been dismally sedate. While this crisis has become a global phenomenon, the neighboring “frontline” states have undoubtedly experienced the most direct effects of the mass displacement at their borders. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey host nearly four million Syrians between them, as their geographic proximity to Syria has made them the most accessible destinations for those fleeing the violence. Of those three host countries, Lebanon and Jordan contain the highest and second-highest
number of Syrians per capita, as Syrian refugees are estimated to account for one out of every 4.6 and 7.7 people, respectively.  

Both of these “frontline” Arab states have been under intense international pressure to manage these influxes of asylum-seekers in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring while also struggling to grow already challenged economies, maintain fragile national unity, and fend off regional threats to security. Each of these states’ responses to the Syrian refugee crisis have been affected by a number of unique factors. Thus, each of the two states have undergone major policy shifts during certain distinguishable phases since 2011, when the Syrians began seeking refuge outside of their borders.

Neither Lebanon nor Jordan are party to the two primary UN Conventions that stipulate international treatment of refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, Jordan’s own constitution prohibits the extradition of political refugees, and both states are constrained by the generally-accepted international norms relating to the concept of nonrefoulement.  

Both Lebanon and Jordan have received international pressure to maintain an open-border policy for all asylum seekers in coordination with the UN, which has contributed to these frontline states’ related rhetoric and policy choices.

---

Jordan

Jordan is no stranger to dealing with refugees, and it has been praised as a model state of humanitarianism in the Middle East. The current Syrian refugee crisis was preceded by refugee influxes to Jordan consisting of other nationalities, including Chechens, Palestinians, Iraqis, Sudanese, and Ethiopians, which laid the groundwork for refugee processing in Jordan. Its long history with Palestinians, who are estimated to compose more than half of the country’s population, has given it a unique experience with the risks of refugee permanence. Despite this experience, Jordan maintains only a few codified obligations when dealing with refugees.

In addition to its related constitutional article, Jordan holds a memorandum of understanding with the UN that was first signed in 1998 and slightly modified in 2014. This document stipulates the protocol for coordinating with the UN to support refugees inside Jordan. The original memorandum allowed the UN up to thirty days to determine an asylum-seeker's status, after which point the applicant was permitted a six-month stay in the country in hopes of finding a more durable solution. The 2014 update, though not available for public viewing, reportedly increased the UN’s determination period to ninety days. This has been the basis for Jordan’s reaction to the influx of Syrian refugees, and it has allowed the government considerable legal flexibility in its handling of the matter.

Jordan’s response between 2011 and 2018 can be categorized into three phases over the course of its dealings with Syrian refugees. In the initial phase of Jordan’s response between 2011 and 2013, the government took an optimistic approach of short-term humanitarian


emergency response. This was succeeded by a phase dominated by the concept of “resilience” between 2014 and 2015.\(^{27}\) As the optimism faded and Jordan recognized the reality of a protracted humanitarian situation, it began formalizing its response and calculating costs to present to international donors in what is called the Jordan Response Plan. The third phase between 2016 and 2018 is the sustainment and development period, wherein Jordan launched a first-of-its-kind experiment in modern era refugee hosting and simultaneous development.

**Lebanon**

Even before Syrian refugees began arriving in Lebanon in 2011, the country has hosted several waves of refugees from Palestine, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Sudan. Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees are barred from many jobs, cannot own property, and do not have the same rights as other foreigners in Lebanon.\(^{28}\) Already before 2011, Palestinians living in Syria had special restrictions on their entry into the country that did not apply to other Syrians.\(^{29}\)

Syrians also had an extensive presence in Lebanon before 2011 as voluntary migrants. Syrian cyclical migration to Lebanon and vice versa was governed by the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic and the 1993 Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination. These two agreements granted Syrians and Lebanese freedom of movement between each other’s countries and rights of property ownership and residence.\(^{30}\) As a result of

---

\(^{27}\) Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Interview by Brody Blankenship, Amman, February 2020.


“Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination Between the Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic,” Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, September 16, 1993,
these agreements, Syrian agricultural and construction workers were a familiar sight in Lebanon and became integrated into the Lebanese economy.\textsuperscript{31} Owing to this arrangement, before 2011 there were approximately 300,000 to 400,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon who periodically returned to Syria and came back to Lebanon.\textsuperscript{32}

Lebanon’s policy response can be divided into three sections from 2011 to 2018. In the first years, from 2011-2012, many in Lebanon predicted the war in Syria and the refugees that came with it would be short-lived. This hope, combined with gridlock in Lebanon’s complex confessional national politics, meant that the country did not really start developing a unified and coherent response policy until the end of 2013. From 2013-2015, with the number of arrivals overwhelming Lebanon’s capacity, the government adopted concrete policies to limit the number of Syrians entering the country and prevent them from resettling long-term. Finally, from 2016 onward, these policies have remained in place, while Lebanon tries to encourage Syrians to return home.

**Findings**

We found that international and domestic pressures led to different policy and rhetorical responses. International factors have more influence on stated policy, while domestic public attitudes and internal economic factors play a larger role in how policies are actually implemented. The differing intensity of these pressures at a given time explains the divergence between how policies are presented to the public and how they are implemented. Rhetoric in the

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
two countries shifted based on whether international pressure to uphold refugees’ rights or domestic pressures against integrative policies were more prominent. The economic situation in each country also played an important part in determining when rhetoric and policy diverged, as differing economic outlooks for Jordan and Lebanon contributed to their different rhetoric in the third phase of policy response.

Both Jordan and Lebanon have carried out operations and enforced policies that contradicted their public statements and narratives with regards to refugee response at various times during the Syrian disaster due to sensitivities of international and regional political relations, and domestic concerns about demographics, economics, and security. While the inconsistencies appear at different points in time and in varying contexts, the study of Jordan and Lebanon revealed some important similarities between the two that can further our understanding of government organizational hypocrisy during crises. The most prominent areas of rhetoric-policy discord are border closure, refoulement or deportation, encampment, and public services. The political turmoil and focus on domestic politics in the wake of the “Arab Spring” likely contributed to the rhetorical mismatch in the early phases of the crisis, while initial optimism for a brief political crisis produced an incohesive policy and rhetoric pair. Additionally, security concerns stemming from the rise of the Islamic State, as well as regional political issues that involved Arab Gulf state and EU support, influenced Jordan and Lebanon’s rhetoric and policies between 2014 and 2018.

Looking to rhetoric in depth, each country shifted its dominant narrative as it moved into new phases of response, which share some similarities in rhetoric themes and chronologies. For example, both countries’ governments used language during the initial phase of response that painted a picture of humanitarian duty that was tempered with realities of economic hardships as
the number of Syrians entering their borders grew. Both states’ leaders anticipated a brief war in Syria with a solution to follow shortly afterward, while Lebanon’s fractured and decentralized government struggled to develop a coherent policy response. International actors were also determined and focused on Syria and its refugees. Rhetoric and policy mostly aligned when such international pressure complemented domestic willingness to help refugees. Both countries, however, carried out detentions and deportations of Syrians during this time despite the positive humanitarian rhetoric.

As the conflict in Syria lingered into late 2013 and 2014, both governments shifted to new strategies that included key themes of economic struggle and international burden-sharing with other less prominent negative themes about social, economic, political, and security challenges. Both governments were apparently developing more durable response strategies during this phase as well, as both Lebanon and Jordan announced response plans in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Both governments’ coded themes supported these plans, but in slightly different ways. Jordan’s rhetoric revolved around its positive humanitarian work, disappointment in the international community’s lack of burden-sharing, and its economic woes. Similarly, Lebanon focused mainly on its economic troubles and dismay with the international community. Additionally, Lebanon chose to highlight the poor living conditions of Syrians in the country, blaming such conditions and insufficient international support. With international funding slowing down during this period and domestic public opinion turning against the refugees, both governments were influenced more by self-interest and domestic concerns than with international norms. The restrictive new policies in both countries during this period largely matched with the negative turn in rhetoric. In the third phase, while Jordan rolled back some of its negative rhetoric and restrictive policies as it began to feel the economic benefits of its
international agreements, it did continue to detain and deport refugees. In Lebanon, the economic situation continued to decline despite its international agreements and Lebanon maintained its negative rhetoric and restrictive policies. It continued to detain and deport refugees as well. The next section will provide more details of each country’s rhetoric-policy disconnect.

**Chronology of Syrian Refugee Policies: Jordan**

**Emergency Response: 2011-2013**

Government policy in the first phase of Jordan’s response can best be characterized as a form of optimistic humanitarianism towards Syrian refugees, as the government was quick to offer free healthcare and education to all registered refugees. But although it allowed most Syrians an “open-border” policy during the majority of this phase, it began refusing entry to any Palestinians, Iraqis, lone adult males, or undocumented arrivals, while reportedly deporting hundreds. This stressful time of relative domestic instability exacerbated long-held concerns over a perceived threat of high numbers of Palestinian and Muslim Brotherhood members, which heavily influenced border policy towards asylum-seekers. The international community’s growing calls for Syrian President Assad’s removal also placed Jordan in a risky political predicament as it balanced between competing pressures of political fallout with a potentially enduring Assad regime and those of the international community’s calls to take in more refugees as the Syrian leadership was labeled a criminal regime.

Jordan’s statements surrounding refugees during its first phase of response focused on four primary subjects: border status, refugee camps, government and NGO services, and political settlement in Syria. Additionally, data suggests that official rhetoric from 2011-2013 consists primarily of negative economic discussion (18%) with a good amount of self-praise for humanitarianism (15%). But Jordan does occasionally admit to its humanitarian limits (9%) with
supporting data to back up its claims (9%). Overall, Jordan carried out some policies that were in line with its rhetoric during this phase, especially early on, but border closures, rejection of certain asylum-seekers, and deportations partly undercut the humanitarian theme.

By the end of 2011, hints of a protracted situation arose, and both King Abdullah and Prime Minister Judeh upgraded the Syrians from simply “guests” to “refugees” in terminology, acknowledging that the government had made preparations to receive “an influx of more refugees.” The government made it clear that it would enact liberal policies to support its Syrian brothers. However, one month later, a government spokesman clarified that the border was closed to any Palestinian refugees with Syrian residency. The government quickly began enforcing a policy of admission denial to Palestinians in 2012, along with adult males without family, Iraqis, and any who could not produce documentation.

The integration of Palestinians into Jordan has been one of the most salient sensitive domestic topics in Jordan for decades as the monarch’s key support base is comprised of “native” East Bank Jordanians whose presence in the land predated that of the Palestinians who arrived in waves following Israel’s establishment in 1948 and subsequent expansions in 1967 and beyond. In fact, the government specifically limited its 1998 UN refugee memorandum to

non-Palestinians only, demonstrating the willingness of Jordan to quietly defy international norms of global human rights due to its demographic concerns that are linked to regime security. The government’s policies during this time reiterated that will to mitigate domestic political concerns at the potential expense of international favor, and they undermined its humanitarian rhetoric in doing so. But Jordan was able to carry out these repressive policies because it was still accepting a large number of Syrian refugees, which appeased the IRR and international expectations.


This era saw growing anxiety among the Jordanian population as the government worked to find a solution for the protracted hosting of the Syrian population, but paired with dismal international support, the domestic pressure pushed Jordan to withdraw several initial liberal policies and increase repressive ones in defiance of international norms. The international community itself began to see the number of asylum seekers at the European gates rise significantly, which may have led Jordan to double down on its negative rhetoric in hopes of attracting increased funding from worrisome European donors. At the same time, the region was faced with the rise of the Islamic State, exacerbating security concerns already tied to the Syrian refugees.

The government developed the Jordan Response Plan in 2015, shifting its strategy from short-term optimism to a more realistic mid-term hosting model in hopes of combining development with humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, the funding for this plan came in at only 36% of the requested amount that year, resulting in government rhetoric that reflected a sense of frustration. Humanitarian duty only comprised ten percent of the dialogue, having been

---

overtaken by both expressions of disappointment in a lack of external support (13%) paired with threats to reduce its humanitarian efforts (13%). Meanwhile, the discussion of an economy in distress skyrocketed to constitute twenty-two percent of the total dialogue. This downturn in rhetoric was a continuation of Jordan signaling its increasing needs to continue supporting the Syrian refugees, which would in turn prevent the impending spillover into Europe.

The government’s policies in this phase were largely consistent with actions that would reflect a rhetoric of economic challenges and a lack of international support. As international funding continued to fail to meet requirements, Jordan announced its National Resiliency Plan, requesting an additional $4.3 billion over three years as the country expected to host one million Syrians by the end of the year. Additionally, Jordan was under pressure from its Gulf neighbors and the United States to back the Syrian rebels, which would compromise the kingdom’s neutral position.

This funding shortage continued, and Jordan eventually agreed to support the Gulf and US coalition in exchange for various types of funding. The subsequent measures taken by the border force resulted in a sudden plunge of incoming Syrians from 6,000 in September 2014 to only 250 the entire month of November. Security concerns had led to an initial wave of 5,000 Syrians being refused entry at the border, resulting in the establishment of a new kind of camp for internally-displaced persons rather than refugees named Rukban. This camp, with its

---


Ibid.

placement in the demilitarized zone between Jordan and the Syrian border, would grow as the Jordanian border guards continued citing security to deny entry to Syrians. In this way, the government hoped to demonstrate to the international community that it was not solely responsible for the victims of the Syrian regime.

Also in November, the free healthcare that had been announced early in the crisis was abruptly withdrawn, leaving thousands without access to medical care, and deportations became a fairly regular occurrence, indicating the government’s desire to reduce the number of hosted Syrians. Government officials flatly denied any wrongdoing in the deportations, simply citing reasons of national interest. These measures were in line with the phase’s themes found in the statements of government officials, and they provided increased incentive for the newly-concerned European states to up their funding for Jordan’s efforts.

**Sustainment and Development: 2016-2018**

Jordan made an abrupt turn in its strategy going in to 2016, as it presented the Jordan Compact in February, building on its first Jordan Response Plan from 2015 and signaling a new phase that centered around converting the crisis into a development opportunity. The thrust of this period’s government rhetoric makes the upturn clear, as the positive humanitarian theme

---


elevates to twenty-seven percent of the discussion while disappointment in both the international community’s participation and the Jordanian economy each share twelve percent of the dialogue. These themes reflect the kingdom’s new tack as they sought to maximize international community participation in a progressive way, and the international community seemingly responded, especially European states as they sought to essentially buy their way out of taking in significant numbers of refugees.

Multiple western governments developed resettlement plans to host Syrian refugees while also negotiating other issues with Jordan in exchange for billions of dollars in loans, grants, and other support. Among the primary components of the final agreement were a work permit quota and increased access to education for Syrians, and, most importantly for Jordan, better trade access to the European Union markets and an interest-free loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This format of refugee host-country development has since been adopted by several other countries, including Lebanon.

With the number of displaced Syrians stranded in Rukban reaching 26,000 in March 2016, some of the international community was increasing is pressure on the kingdom, concerned for the well-being of those in no-man's-land. But Jordan’s King Abdullah rebuffed any accusations of inhumane treatment, saying “If you want to take the moral high ground on this issue, we'll get them all to an airbase and we're more than happy to relocate them to your country.” This was happening while large portions of Jordan’s established refugee camps were empty, indicating that the de facto creation of the IDP camp was possibly linked to the

---

47 Ibid.
government’s efforts of convincing the international community that they shared in the Syrian responsibility and needed to contribute accordingly. Jordan had sought to escape international pressure by claiming that the IDPs were Syria’s problem and that their hands were bound due to the Jordanian public’s opinion. Interestingly, domestic pressure in this case eventually led to Jordan providing relief to those at Rukban and allowing more refugees into the country in 2018. This demonstrates how domestic pressure can quickly affect refugee policy, as it was second to international pressure until the public made its voice known.

This phase also contained a rise in discussions regarding the potential for return to Syria. In 2017, King Abdullah made it clear during a press conference with President Trump that the Jordan Response Plan was not about integrating the Syrians into Jordan, but rather that he wanted to equip them to return to Syria, whenever that would be, prepared to have a positive impact on the reconstruction. The Jordanian government has never explicitly called for Syrians to return to their country outside of a peaceful and safe scenario, with a number of officials repeating the king’s aforementioned intent. However, the deportations that Jordan had begun conducting early in the crisis continued even as Jordan set out in a more positive direction than the previous phases, constrained by its own demographic fragilities. In summary, while the sustainment and development phase of Jordan’s response was characterized as a period of relative success and hope by the government, subtle practices like security-based deportation and asylum-seeker rejection quietly poked holes in the government’s rhetoric in this period.

49 Alrababa’h and Williamson, “Jordan Shut Out 60,000 Syrian Refugees.”
Overall, between 2011 and 2018, the government’s key theme was its humanitarian duty, appearing in public statements far more often than any other topic code in this research. It would be difficult to claim that Jordan has not done its part in absorbing and attempting to provide for 1.3 million neighbors, as the government continued its traditional practice of welcoming refugees. However, this section has demonstrated that the government sought to relieve some of that burden’s pressure by saying one thing and doing another in policy and its enforcement. The most inconsistencies appeared in the two phases when the government was most optimistic, while the resiliency phase hosted a largely negative rhetoric that matched many of the expected negative policies.

The international community’s initial political support for Jordan’s humanitarianism combined with supportive domestic opinion facilitated mostly liberal policies in 2011 and 2012 before the situation deteriorated due to overwhelming numbers of arriving Syrians. The government began to quietly enact repressive policies to relieve some of the stress on the country but tried to continue highlighting its positive reception of the Syrians. By 2014, the positive rhetoric had followed the lead of the policies as international material support faltered, the Jordanian public’s hospitality wore thin, and Jordan agreed to support the Syrian rebels, exchanging its political neutrality for security funding. Jordan also used the negativity to leverage Europe’s increasing concerns for its own borders as it made a public demonstration out of its suffering in hopes of securing European economic concessions. This strategy paid off, leading to a return of liberal policies and positive humanitarian rhetoric as Jordan secured a landmark economic package with the European Union. However, domestic demographic and security concerns prompted the kingdom to continue its subtle repressive policies even in a time of relative positivity and progression.
Chronology of Syrian Refugee Policies: Lebanon

Humanitarian Duty: 2011-2012

Lebanese government rhetoric had a few main themes during this period: the desire and willingness to help Syrian refugees, the services the government was providing, policy decisions approving billions in refugee aid, and pleas for more assistance from other countries and INGOs. During this period, official rhetoric from the Lebanese government primarily took the tone of positive humanitarian (26%) and negative economic (13%). This contradiction suggests the Lebanese government’s early struggle between the desire to help refugees and the significant financial, economic, and opportunity costs such aid required to do so. Before the length of the conflict and the burdens of hosting the refugees became clear, the Lebanese population was supportive of helping the refugees and there was international pressure to do so. These factors lead us to expect consistent positive humanitarian rhetoric and polices early in the crisis.

When protests in Syria began in 2011 and then turned into a bloody civil war, Syrian migration to Lebanon was still governed by the 1991 and 1993 agreements. Hoping to stay neutral and avoid spillover, the National Dialogue Commission adopted a policy of “dissociation” to the war in Syria in the Baabda Declaration. This document declares that “The right to humanitarian solidarity... is guaranteed under the Constitution and the law.”

---

also maintained an “open-border” policy toward Syrian refugees and a policy of non-encampment.54

In May 2011, the first refugees began to arrive from Syria, settling in northeast Lebanon.55 Soon after, there were reports of the General Directorate of General Security, the intelligence agency that grants visas and monitors foreigners, detaining a number of Syrian refugees for illegally crossing the border.56 Despite such reports, Lebanon officially maintained its open-border policy for Syrians and provided them with some health and educational services.57 When the number of refugees was small, the burden of hosting them was also small and thus we see consistent positive humanitarian rhetoric and assistance from the Lebanese government. A little more than a year later, however, he was imploring the international community for assistance in caring for the refugees, as “Lebanon cannot support their burden alone.”58 By the end of 2012, there were 175,000 Syrian refugees in the country, up from only 5,000 at the close of 2011.59 As the number of refugees grew, there were more statements about the negative economic impact of refugees mixed in with positive humanitarian statements.

Lebanon also did not have a designated bureaucratic system to handle refugee affairs.60 Refugee and asylum cases are therefore handled through the immigration system.61 Furthermore,
Lebanon had three governments from 2011 to 2015, which did not allow for consistent decisionmakers and ideas concerning refugee policy. Therefore, the authority for refugee registration and aid fell to the UNHCR as a result of its 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Lebanon. The MoU includes Lebanon’s insistence that it is not a country of resettlement. The Lebanese government also does not recognize the UNHCR’s determination of refugee status for Syrians, as Syrians were not covered in the 2003 MoU. The term refugee still has association with rights for the refugee and responsibilities for Lebanon, as evidenced by the government’s systematic use of the term displaced instead of refugee. The inability to form a consensus on refugee policy delayed the government’s response and meant the existing policies for Syrian entry continued. Some ministries predicted a short-lived Syrian conflict and thus did not develop plans, leaving the response to the UNHCR and ad hoc aid. Consequently, Lebanon did not develop a coherent policy toward Syria refugees until 2014.

This gap in the early years and Lebanon’s decentralized government empowered local actors and different government agencies to make their own policies and led to a patchwork of unclear and often confusing policies. For instance, by October 2014 Human Rights Watch reported that at least 45 local governments had imposed curfews only on Syrians. The General Directorate of General Security was also given much autonomy to decide how and if to allow Syrians into Lebanon. Human Rights Watch accused the General Directorate of General Security of...

---

62 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 84.  
63 Janmyr, “Precarity in Exile,” 62-64.  
64 Ibid., 61.  

Lebanon, pressured by other countries, international organizations, and NGOs, with a supportive population, maintained its open border with Syria and provided services to refugees. Its rhetoric during this period was characterized by a sympathy for the refugees and a willingness to help them. Gaps between policy and rhetoric occurred because individual ministries and municipalities were acting autonomously. Although there were some sporadic instances of restrictions on Syrians, detentions, and deportations not informed by a national-level policy, Lebanon denied it was carrying out these actions.

Restrictions: 2013-2015

In line with the massive increase in refugees from 2013 to 2015, as well as the growing economic and financial difficulties intensified by the refugees’ presence, official Lebanese rhetoric shifted drastically compared to the previous period. In these years, government communications mainly included the negative economic consequences of the refugees and a lack of international support for Lebanon (21%), frustration with international actors (15%), the dire humanitarian situation in Lebanon (13%), fears of social and sectarian instability (12%), and security concerns (10%).

From January 2013 until September 2014, the UNHCR was registering an average of more than 48,000 new Syrian refugees in Lebanon each month. By the end of 2013, the number of Syrians refugees in Lebanon had increased to over 800,000. Conditions became more dire

69 “Lebanon: Stop Detaining Syrian Refugees.”
71 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 85.
72 Ibid.
for both Syrians and Lebanese in terms of housing, garbage, water, electricity, and medical visits.\textsuperscript{73} At Lebanon’s 2013 UNGA address, President Sleiman was already calling for displaced Syrians to be housed in Syria rather than in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{74}

As the number of refugees entering the country overwhelmed government services, exhausted aid budgets, and exacerbated Lebanon’s economic and unemployment crises, the Lebanese government finally developed a series of unified policies. The enormous burden on a small country, economic problems, fears of a protracted Syrian refugee population like the Palestinians, issues of governance, and fears of disrupting the country’s sectarian balance all contributed to Lebanon’s policy development beginning in 2013.\textsuperscript{75} The policies aimed to ensure that Syrians in Lebanon were there temporarily and would eventually return to Syria.

Prime Minister Mikati encapsulated the tension between humanitarian duty and difficult realities on the ground in October 2013 when he explained new Lebanese policy developments. He acknowledged “our brotherly and humanitarian obligations with regard to our Syrian brethren,”\textsuperscript{76} but explained that, “we have initiated a series of procedures aimed at alleviating the increasing number of Syrian refugees by setting some specific conditions: we will re-examine the situation of every Syrian refugee on Lebanese territory that fails to fulfill the legal conditions of a ‘refugee’.\textsuperscript{77} This divergent rhetoric in the same sentence is a microcosm of the contradictions of this period. Shifting pressures meant that negative rhetoric informed by

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 85-86.
\textsuperscript{75} Yahya, Kassir, and El-Hariri, “Policy Framework.”
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
domestic opinions had more influence than international rhetoric, even though Lebanon maintained humanitarian rhetoric aimed at international actors.

Once the Lebanese government began to develop a coherent and unified policy at the national level, it started with increased restrictions on Palestinians living in Syria. In August 2013, the government implemented unpublished additional restrictions on the entry of Palestinians from Syria. On May 4, 2014, Lebanon forcibly deported almost 40 Palestinians to Syria. Shortly after, Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk announced stricter requirements for Palestinians in Syria entering Lebanon. Despite these restrictive policies, Interior Minister Machnouk said, “There is no decision preventing Palestinian refugees in Syria from entering Lebanon and passing through the country,” but that the policies were to “organize the entry process.” This statement masks the fact that Lebanese policies made it almost impossible for Palestinians in Syria to enter Lebanon at all, let alone as refugees. In this instance of rhetoric-policy mismatch, the increased restrictions on Palestinians from Syria were a continuation of longstanding Lebanese policy. Yet, the Interior Ministry tried to downplay such restrictions. This contradiction may be due to dual pressures from Lebanese citizens and other Arab countries. Many in the Lebanese government are still wary of Palestinians because of their protracted displacement in Lebanon and their involvement in Lebanon’s civil war. Many Lebanese citizens also have negative feelings about Palestinians as a result of the civil war. The plight of the Palestinians is still very important to many Arabs, however, and so states feel pressure from their constituencies to “symbolically sanction” those states seen as going against the Palestinians.

---

78 “Denied Refuge.”
81 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
83 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 83.
States therefore feel regional pressure to advocate for the rights of Palestinians and not appear to be violating them.\textsuperscript{84}

After Palestinians, the government turned to all other Syrian refugees. In April 2014, Lebanon closed eighteen unofficial border crossings with Syria.\textsuperscript{85} On June 1, 2014, the Interior Ministry announced that any Syrians who return to Syria, even temporarily, would lose their refugee status in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{86} In October, the Council of Ministers adopted the “Policy on Syrian Displacement.” It called for an end to the mass displacement of Syrians in Lebanon except for special humanitarian cases and those who fall into specific categories of reasons for entry.\textsuperscript{87} The policy had three goals: reduce the number of Syrians in the country through entry restrictions and encouraged repatriation, increase policing of Syrians, and reduce the stress on infrastructure.\textsuperscript{88} This would effectively end the free movement of Syrians into Lebanon in place since 1993.

Entering as a refugee was not one of the acceptable categories of reasons for entering Lebanon.\textsuperscript{89}

Other restrictions focused on employment and aid benefits. In December 2014, the Ministry of Labor issued Decree 197 which restricted the sectors in which Syrians are allowed to work to agriculture, construction, and cleaning.\textsuperscript{90} Also, beginning in February 2015, Syrian refugees wishing to renew their residency visas on the basis of being a UNHCR-registered

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{84} Michael Barnett, \textit{Dialogues in Arab Politics} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
\item\textsuperscript{88} Janmyr, “Precarity in Exile,” 62.
\end{itemize}
refugee would have to sign a pledge not to work and only live off humanitarian assistance from the Lebanese government and international donors. If Syrians got Lebanese sponsorship and a work permit for a job, their status would be changed from refugee to migrant worker. On May 6, 2015, Lebanon told the UNHCR to stop registering new refugees.

To counter the negative economic effects of hosting the refugees, in December 2014 Lebanon and the UN released the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which would subsequently be updated every year. The plan’s goal was to direct international aid money to poor Lebanese as well as Syrian refugees and also develop Lebanon’s public service delivery systems. In the first year of its existence, Lebanon’s aid appeal was funded at 63 percent. Meanwhile, aid poured in as the rest of the world realized the seriousness of the crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon received $1 billion in 2013 after receiving $44 million in 2011 and $163 million in 2012.

Lebanon finally had a unified policy on the entry of Syrians, albeit one that discriminated against Syrians and closed the border to refugees. While officials still spoke about their desire to aid Syrian refugees, and most insisted they did not want to force Syrians out of the country, the development of Lebanese policy from 2013 to 2015 suggests otherwise. Despite the billions of dollars in aid Lebanon received during this period, GDP growth declined from 3.8 percent in 2013 to 0.2 percent in 2015 and the country suffered $7.5 billion in “economic losses” since 2011.

---

91 Errighi and Griesse, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis.”
93 Janmyr, “Precarity in Exile,” 62.
With international actors not fully meeting Lebanon’s economic and aid requirements, officials felt more pressure from a domestic population increasingly unsupportive of the refugees to implement restrictive policies than from foreign donors. Rhetoric was largely consistent with policy during this period, as international aid failed to improve Lebanon’s flagging economy. These developments signal how shifting pressures can lead to rhetoric and policy changes.

**Encouraged Repatriation: 2016-2018**

As the number of refugees in Lebanon has stayed the same during this period of response, and the ongoing problems associated with their presence in Lebanon were only getting worse, Lebanese rhetoric continued its themes of negative economic impact (10%), the poor living conditions for Syrians in Lebanon (9%), and criticism of the dearth of support from other countries and INGOs (9%).

During this period, Lebanon drafted policies with the EU and UN to receive development assistance for struggling Lebanese host communities. In September 2016, the EU and Lebanon adopted the EU-Lebanon Compact 2016-2020 as an annex to the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities. The Compact promises financial aid from the EU as well as lists commitments from each side to jointly work together to improve the situation in Lebanon for refugees and Lebanese.98 The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan also continued during this period.99 These plans both include significant aid and development for Lebanese citizens, which suggests international actors were trying to incorporate Lebanese concerns in their aid planning.

---


In the meantime, the restrictive policies from the previous period remained in effect. The implicit and sometimes explicit goal of the restrictive policies on Syrian entry and life in Lebanon was to keep them from becoming a protracted refugee community. By February 2016, these restrictions caused the number of refugees entering the country to drop off dramatically. Lebanon has also been accused of singling out Syrians for eviction from their homes and violating principles of nonrefoulement by continuing to deport Syrian refugees. In January 2016, Lebanon forcibly deported 407 Syrian refugees from Beirut’s airport. Lebanese officials, however, routinely deny forcibly deporting Syrians. “My government’s position is very clear. Nobody’s going to force anyone to go back if they don’t want to go back,” Prime Minister Saad Hariri said in February 2018. In July, however, Hariri along with President Michel Aoun met with a Russian delegation to discuss Russian initiatives to repatriate Syrians. The central gap between rhetoric and policy in this period is the series of denials from Lebanese government officials that Lebanon is evicting, detaining, or deporting Syrian refugees despite a steady stream of accusations and evidence otherwise. The Lebanese government feels pressure from international human rights law and norms as well as their agreements with the EU and UN to uphold refugee rights. Therefore, they deny engaging in practices that would violate these laws, norms, and agreements.

100 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 83.
Another factor in this divergence may be that Lebanon’s economic situation continues to worsen despite the influx of international aid. Pledges from foreign donors also continued to be underfunded. Although UN agencies and NGOs in Lebanon have received $5 billion since the start of the Crisis Response Plan in 2015 and $7.4 billion since 2011, the plan’s aid appeals continue to be underfunded. In this period, appeals went 45 percent funded for 2016, 45 percent for 2017, and 42 percent funded for 2018. These funding levels are down significantly from the 2015 level. 105 According to the IMF, Lebanon’s GDP growth fell to negative 1.9 percent in 2018. The IMF forecasts 2020 growth at negative 12 percent. 106

Frustrated with the negative effects of the refugees and underfunded foreign aid pledges, combined with continued domestic unhappiness, Lebanon continued its restrictions on Syrians and increased deportations. Conversely, Lebanon’s international aid agreements featured caveats that obliged Lebanon to improve the conditions for Syrian refugees. These caveats, as well as prevailing international laws and norms against refoulement contributed to the denials that Lebanon was deporting Syrian refugees.

Conclusion and Implications

This comparison of Arab frontline states’ rhetoric and policies revealed that both Jordan and Lebanon, though differing in political composition, have several instances between 2011 and 2018 in which their governments’ official rhetoric contradicts policy due to competing pressures from above and below. We found that international factors have greater influence over rhetorical

106 “Lebanon Country Data.”
policies, whereas domestic public attitudes and internal economic factors have a stronger effect on how governments actually implement policies. The strength of the pressure that governments experience from international and domestic factors at the same time or to varying degrees at different times explains why governments say one thing and do another. This phenomenon of political hypocrisy contributes to a better understanding of frontline humanitarian crisis response decision-making by allowing stakeholders in the international community, non-government organizations, domestic populations, and other frontline states themselves to properly evaluate and respond to government rhetoric during crisis response scenarios while better understanding international and domestic motivators of that rhetoric and associated policy.

The international community as a whole may have shown some interest in supporting the host-communities initially, and with domestic populations generally welcoming the Syrians, the governments had little reason not to host their neighbors, expecting a brief stay. But a lack of funding drove both Lebanon and Jordan to take on a much more negative rhetoric than the initial talk of benevolence and duty, demonstrating a combination of inward-looking rhetoric and policy matching with increased disdain towards the international community. For Jordan, the positive humanitarian rhetoric made a powerful return after Europe, partly motivated by its own refugee “crisis,” agreed to significant new funding. Lebanon, on the other hand, chose a different strategy as it maintained its negative tone even as it adopted a similar economic package framework as Jordan. Although Lebanon’s rhetoric continued to be mostly negative, pressure from its international agreements to uphold refugee rights led it to continue to deny that it was detaining and deporting refugees. While the negative rhetoric matched the negative policies, denials of harmful actions and policies contrasted with the policies themselves.
Both states shared a similar timeline in terms of significant rhetoric changes that were largely driven by myopic initial crisis responses, a continued dearth of international support paired with domestic disapproval, and demographic and domestic security concerns. We witness significant shifts in rhetoric for both at key points. First, as initial optimism turned to ominous reality, both governments’ rhetoric gradually followed the trend as international support waned. Lebanon’s rhetoric has maintained this general negative trajectory and insistence that Syrians repatriate while Jordan’s proposal of a promising new economic plan accompanied a resurgence in government discussion of humanitarian duty. However, despite either positive or negative rhetoric, both governments continued negative practices such as forced deportation and asylum-seeker rejection at the border, as these practices do not lend themselves to external oversight due to concerns of state sovereignty and security, thus presenting a loophole that host-states may use to relieve hosting stress without losing face.

The most consistent restrictive policies for both countries were border and entry restrictions. These externally-facing policies were more consistent than internally-focused policies like aid provision and work permits, at least in Jordan. Lebanon maintained consistently restrictive internally-focused policies. Jordan cited security concerns in limiting Syrian arrivals, especially after the 2016-2017 Rukban bombings. Lebanon mostly cited economic concerns, but security concerns were also prevalent, especially after the 2014 Nusra and ISIS takeover of Arsal, a town where refugees outnumbered locals. Both countries initially focused their efforts on restricting Palestinian entry from Syria before expanding to other Syrians. This consistency in restrictive border policies may be due to the difficulty of overseeing the borders, as large numbers of people move in and out of the country. It is also easier for the governments to claim
security and economic concerns to reject people at the border and deport them than it is to justify restrictive internal policies such as depriving refugees of aid and services.

These findings provide some important implications for policymakers and academics alike in the refugee policy enterprise. First, domestic pressures should receive serious consideration in addition to international pressures when considering which policies a host government may develop towards refugees in a crisis response. Secondly, while many host states may enact liberal policies that are most visible, subtle policy areas like border control and deportations or other security-based actions provide a loophole for governments to escape oversight and/or international condemnation. Finally, we have seen that international laws and norms are powerful motivators that can influence host-state policy, especially when tied to material assistance. Jordan and Lebanon’s rhetoric-policy gaps and their drivers demonstrate that host-state governments will shape policy and rhetoric to meet the demands of varying and sometimes competing pressures from outside their borders and from within.
Appendices

Chronologies of Jordan and Syrian Refugee Events 2011-2018

Lebanon

2011

May 2011: First refugees begin to arrive from Syria, settling in northeast Lebanon.107

May 2011: General Directorate for General Security begins detaining some Syrian refugees.108

2011: The existing arrangement for Palestinians in Syria coming to Lebanon was that they had to get permission from the Syrian Ministry of Immigration and Passports to leave the country. Those who had this approval were eligible for a three-month residency visa, renewable up to one year and an additional year after that for fees. Syrian Palestinians could also pay a fee to obtain the proper status if they crossed into Lebanon irregularly.109

2011: Lebanon maintains its open-border policy for Syrians and provided them with some health and educational services.110 Only 5,000 registered Syrian refugees were in the country by the end of the year.111

2012

May 22, 2012: Syrian rebels kidnap eleven Lebanese Shia near Aleppo, claiming they were members of Hezbollah.112

June 13, 2012: Hoping to avoid spillover, the National Dialogue Committee adopts a policy of “dissociation” toward the regional wars, including in Syria, in the Baabda Declaration. The country will try to stay out of the war and prevent itself from being used as a base for fighters and weapons.113

---

112 Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive?”
June 2012: 8,300 Syrian refugees were in Lebanon.114

August 4, 2012: Lebanon deports 14 Syrian refugees, despite concerns from the EU about repoulement.115

Mid-August 2012: Another Lebanese Shia kidnapped in Syria. His clan kidnaps thirty Syrians in Lebanon and threatens citizens for the countries supporting the Syrian rebels.116

August 2012: Former Minister of Information Michel Samaha is arrested after smuggling explosives into Lebanon from Syrian intelligence to be used for attacks in Sunni northern Lebanon.117

October 2012: Reports of small numbers of Hezbollah members fighting in Syria alongside Assad’s forces.118

November 2012: UNHCR officially providing assistance to over 120,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon.119

End of 2012: Number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon increases to 175,000.120

2013

August 2013: Unpublished additional restrictions on the entry of Palestinians from Syria. They only allowed those with: a visa with a Lebanese sponsor, paperwork to leave Lebanon for a third country, a medical or embassy appointment, or family in Lebanon.121

September 2013: Then-Energy Minister Gebran Bassil calls for halting the arrival of Syrians in Lebanon and deporting those already in the country.122

114 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 92.
116 Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive?”
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 85.
121 “Denied Refugee.” 11.
End of 2013: Number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon increases to more than 800,000.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{2014}

April 2014: Lebanon closes 18 unofficial border crossings on the Syrian border.\textsuperscript{124}

May 3, 2014: Document from the General Directorate for General Security leaks from Beirut’s Rafic Hariri Airport. It directs airlines, under penalty of fine, not to carry any Palestinian refugees in Syria to Lebanon for any reason regardless of the paperwork they hold.\textsuperscript{125}

May 4, 2014: Almost 40 Palestinians forcibly deported to Syria.\textsuperscript{126}

May 9, 2014: Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk announced stricter requirements for Palestinians in Syria entering Lebanon. They must have an entry permit, a residency visa between one to three years, an exit and return permit, or paperwork for transit to a third country.\textsuperscript{127}

June 1, 2014: Lebanese Interior Ministry announces any Syrian who returns to Syria will lose their refugee status.\textsuperscript{128}

Early August 2014: Following the arrest of a Syrian Islamist rebel commander by the Lebanese Army, Syrian rebels, some affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda, attacked the Lebanese Army and took over the town of Arsal. They pulled out after five days. 17 Lebanese soldiers and dozens of civilians and militants were killed. Several Lebanese soldiers were taken hostage.\textsuperscript{129}

October 23, 2014: Lebanese Cabinet adopts “Policy on Syrian Displacement” which calls for an end to the mass displacement of Syrians in Lebanon except for special humanitarian cases and

\textsuperscript{123} Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 85.
those who fall into specific categories of reasons for entry. This ends the free movement of Syrians into Lebanon in place since 1993.130

October 2014: As many Syrian refugees were living in Arsal, many Lebanese blame them for attack against it in August. Lebanese towns and villages place curfews on Syrians.131

December 15, 2014: Lebanon, in coordination with the UN, released the first Lebanese Crisis Response Plan. The goal of this plan was to direct international aid to vulnerable Lebanese as well as Syrians and develop Lebanon’s public service delivery systems. The plan was subsequently updated annually.132

December 31, 2014: General Directorate of General Security issues restrictions on Syrian entering Lebanon. They must be sponsored by a Lebanese citizen, own property in Lebanon, or their visit must fall into select categories.133

December 2014: Ministry of Labour issues Decree 197 which restricts the sectors in which Syrians are allowed to work to agriculture, construction, and cleaning. These sectors have a reduced work permit fee, while other sectors have a much higher fee and the employer must prove he/she is unable to find a Lebanese worker.134

2015

January 13, 2015: General Directorate of General Security issues updated restrictions, including more categories of visit acceptable for Syrians to enter Lebanon. Syrians meeting the requirements were eligible for short-term, temporary residency as opposed to the blanket six-month residency previously given to Syrians. No Syrian is allowed to enter Lebanon as “displaced.”135

February 23, 2015: Syrian refugees wishing to renew their residency visas on the basis of being a UNHCR-registered refugee would have to sign a pledge not to work and only live off humanitarian assistance from the Lebanese government and international donors. If Syrians get

135 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places.”
Lebanese sponsorship and a work permit for a job, their status is changed from refugee to migrant worker.136

February 2015: As a result of entry restrictions, Syrian refugees entering Lebanon fall dramatically.137

May 6, 2015: Lebanon tells the UNHCR to stop registering new Syrian refugees.138

June 2015: Social Affairs Minister Rashid Derbas says Lebanon and Jordan should cooperate to establish safe zones in Syria so that refugees can return.139

2016

January 13, 2016: 407 Syrians forcibly deported from Beirut’s airport.140

June 2016: Several suicide bombings across the country, including eight simultaneous attacks in the village of Qaa near the Syrian border. Evidence points to ISIS members from inside Syria, not Syrian refugees in Qaa. 700 Syrians were arrested in a week for expired residency papers or being in the country without legal authorization. Curfews continue and there are multiple attacks by Lebanese against Syrians.141

September 19, 2016: Lebanon and the EU adopt the EU-Lebanon Compact for 2016-2020.142

2017

March 6, 2017: Labour Minister Mohammad Kabbara agrees with the UNHCR to give Syrians work permits in the environment, construction, and agricultural sectors. Those who obtain work permits, however, will no longer be eligible to receive refugee aid.143

137 Kelley, “Responding to a Refugee Influx,” 83.
2017: Joint UN-Lebanon release of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020.144

2018

February 1, 2018: PM Saad Hariri says Lebanon is not going to force Syrians to return to Syria.145

June 2018: FM Gebran Bassil orders a freeze on the renewal of residency permits for UNHCR workers in retaliation for the UNHCR interviewing Syrians wishing to repatriate to ensure Lebanon was not violating nonrefoulement.146

July 26, 2018: PM Saad Hariri, President Michel Aoun, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri meet with a Russian delegation to discuss Russian initiatives to repatriate Syrians.147

Jordan

2011

Syria first closed its borders with Jordan at the Ramtha-Dar'a checkpoint as the domestic political turmoil intensified in late April 2011. The Jordanian government did not comment on this abrupt unannounced border closure, as anonymous security officials cited a desire to convey a position of non-interference to the Syrian regime, stating that Syrian stability was a key component of Jordanian security. Syrian border guards were reportedly searching every car and passenger coming from Jordan with a specific interest in mobile devices and other data storage equipment. This could have caused some political pressure on the Jordanian government as the tribal ties in that area transcend the state borders with relationships established through blood and marriage. The daily volume of traffic dwindled from 10,000 vehicles to less than 500, subsequently reducing the usual daily trade volume of approximately $700,000 drastically as well.148

As early as May 1, 2011, Jordanian officials recognized a humanitarian duty to accept Syrians crossing the border, as then-Jordanian Minister of State for Information Tahir al-Udwan said that "dozens of Syrian brothers crossed into Jordan from Syria Thursday evening and were received by the Jordanian border authorities."149 This neutral statement is the first, as far as the research team could find, wherein the Jordanian government discusses accepting Syrians into the country on a humanitarian basis in connection with the current crisis. Jordanian civil defense teams also began preparing tents at this time, anticipating more Syrians seeking refuge from ongoing massacres across the border. However, most of them at this time were staying with relatives and did not make use of tents.150

By late July 2011, the estimated number of Syrians living in the Jordanian border town of Ramtha reached more than 2,000 families and hundreds of additional individuals.151 “With no official figures available on exactly how many Syrian families have arrived since the uprising began more than four months ago, those working to help the growing number of arrivals estimate that there are already more than 2,000 families and a few hundred individuals now living in Ramtha and the scattered communities close to the border.”

In late July 2011, the inbound traffic to Jordan witnessed a significant rise after a slight decrease following the outbreak of violence in the spring of that year. However, the majority of the incoming Syrians were simply processed as tourists or temporary residents, evidenced by one government official’s statement: “The Jabir border post has made full preparations to handle the travelers via Jordanian borders, especially at this time, which is witnessing a number of travelers who enter the kingdom for the purpose of tourism and spending the summer vacation. The personnel of all agencies are working as one team to simplify procedures to ensure that travelers reach their destinations.”152 This indicates that the government’s optimism led it to facilitate the Syrian guests’ travel under the pretense of tourism, possibly hoping for a brief crisis with a resolution just over the horizon. This is likely a key reason for remaining quiet about the growing number of Syrians seeking refuge, as well as the plans to raise tents for them, during the early stages of the crisis.

On August 11, 2011, Al-Mafraq Governor Salim al-Rawahinah said that the city of Al-Mafraq is witnessing an influx of Syrian citizens, who have crossed the Jordanian-Syrian border to the governorate in view of the security conditions prevailing in sisterly Syria. Al-Rawahinah noted that 100 families have crossed the border to Al-Mafraq.153

153 "Syrian Families Cross into Jordan to ‘Escape Shelling’," BBC, August 12, 2011,
By mid-August 2011, Jordan officially released a statement regarding the deteriorating situation in neighboring Syria as then-Prime Minister Marouf Al Bakhit urged his Syrian counterpart, Adel Safar, "to immediately halt military operations, implement speedy reform and spare the blood of the Syrian people, expressing the kingdom's rejection and regret over the continued killing and escalation in neighboring Syria." 154 This early statement was rather light, constrained to only general admonitions without direct criticism of Assad, and it likely came only after the conflict threatened to spill into Jordan. In August, a group of anti-Assad demonstrators were attacked by regime supporters outside of Syria’s embassy in Amman. 155

In early September, unofficial estimates provided to the Jordan Times still maintained that around 2,000 Syrian “guests” were staying in Jordan, conflicting with earlier reports of nearly double that number. The Jordanian government continued to label these visitors as guests while avoiding any refugee-related terminology, and the Syrians themselves seemed to anticipate a short stay until “the situation is Syria is back to normal.” 156

The Jordanian side of the border posts excelled at keeping the border open and facilitating efficient entry for anyone, but the Syrian side was making it difficult for those who wanted to cross, whether entering or departing. Additionally, the UN had early and consistent access to the Syrians crossing into Jordan, which coordinated with the government to assess their needs, such as education and basic necessities. 157 Thus, from the beginning of the crisis, the Jordanian government took a supportive stance of its Syrian “guests” based on humanitarianism, even while denying refugee status.

The Foreign Minister stated in late September: "Our position on what is happening in Syria is known. We are a neighboring country and the security and stability of Syria are important to us. We were in contact with the Syrian leadership. I think the world is now unanimous that this violence and this bloodbath must stop and the required reforms should be carried out. During the Arab League meetings, we discussed the Syrian issue in depth. The situation is tragic and the world cannot tolerate the pictures it sees. Therefore, efforts should be made to end this situation and maintain security and stability in Syria." 158

158 "Al-Arabiyyah Interviews Jordanian Foreign Minister on Palestinian UN Bid," BBC, September 30, 2011,
One report claimed that Jordan began planning its first camp for the Syrians during the first week of October 2011 in coordination with the United Nations, looking to initially set up tents for 300 families just south of the Jabir border post in the town of Ribaa Sarhan.\textsuperscript{159} However, this was quickly dismissed by an anonymous official speaking to the Jordan Times, reaffirming that the Syrians residing inside the country were doing so temporarily and primarily using their own means: “Many of them are well off and are taking care of themselves financially.”\textsuperscript{160} Yet another official did not dispute the existence of a “precautionary camp,” while stressing that the Syrians who were residing in Mafraq were not refugees, nor would Jordan register any refugees except through the UN.\textsuperscript{161}

By November, FM Nasser Judeh confirmed that the kingdom had made preparations to receive large numbers of Syrian refugees, should the situation across the border continue its decline.\textsuperscript{162} This is the first official acknowledgement of the likelihood of Syrian refugees entering Jordan.

In mid-November, King Abdullah directly acknowledged the possibility of a more protracted situation in an interview with The Times, stating that his country had made preparations to receive “an influx of more refugees,” following a statement during a visit to London that made him the first Arab leader to call for Assad’s resignation.\textsuperscript{163}

In an interview with the BBC in mid-November, King Abdullah asserted that Jordan had “refugees coming across the border in the thousands,” acknowledging an official refugee status. In the same interview, the king stated his belief that whatever happens in Syria, Jordan would be isolated from it, “except for the refugees.” He later added, “We have to [care for the refugees]. I mean whoever comes across the border will be afforded whatever support that we as Jordan can give. We've had lots of refugees come into Jordan historically, not that that makes us very comfortable, but we have to open our arms. At the moment, there are thousands that have come across, and we do have capability to God forbid take larger numbers, but we hope that that is not going to be the case.”\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{162} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
In mid-November 2011, a charity group estimated the number of Syrian asylum seekers to be around 5,000.\textsuperscript{165}

The Arab-Turkish Cooperation Forum took place on Wednesday, November 16, 2011, where the majority conclusion seemed to indicate that Assad was about to reach a “point of no return,” and Jordan was weighing the limited options in its reaction to the chaos.\textsuperscript{166}

In late November 2011, government officials’ statements were at odds with one another. FM Judeh claimed that dozens of Syrian military officers had illegally entered Jordan to defect, while he also stated that no camps were available for Syrian refugees, though the government was prepared in the event of a refugee surge. The official government spokesman, Rakan Majali, rebutted the minister’s claims regarding the defecting officers, while Judeh’s disavowing of any camps conflicted with October statements of border officials who claimed an emergency camp was prepared near the Jabir crossing.\textsuperscript{167} Another report dated November 27 stated that this same camp was scheduled to be completed by the end of the month, further contradicting FM Judeh.\textsuperscript{168}

On November 21, 2011, FM Judeh said: "The preparations for welcoming Syrian refugees are normal ones that [take place] during emergencies." However, he added, "This does not mean that we are inciting Syrian citizens to get out of their country. Jordan has not offered asylum to anyone, but its ready [for humanitarian reasons] to welcome Syrian refugees."\textsuperscript{169}

As of November 27, 2011, only 1,500 Syrians had registered as refugees with the UN in Jordan.\textsuperscript{170}

November 27, 2011: Government Spokesman Rakan Majali acknowledges the daily occurrence of Syrian forces shooting at their own citizens who are attempting to enter Jordan through Jabir. He says that while Jordan does not offer asylum to Syrians, they do provide emergency medical treatment and shelter to those who are displaced.\textsuperscript{171}


\textsuperscript{171} "Jordan Pledges Help for Syrian Fleeing Unrest," \textit{BBC}, November 28, 2011,
In late November 2011, Majali sought to distinguish military defectors from military “recruits” who were closer to ordinary citizens and should not be considered military defectors.172

Several Syrians, including at least one refugee, attacked the staff inside their country’s embassy in Amman on the morning of December 11, 2011, before they were arrested by Jordanian police. The refugee was detained by Syrian embassy security.173

December 14, 2011: Majali claims Jordan is hosting 620 Syrian refugees.174

December 15, 2011: Majali states Jordan’s position to disallow any entry to Palestinian refugees from Syria or Lebanon.175

Charity workers estimate total Syrians to be 2,169 on December 8, 2011.176

Mid-December 2011: Judeh says Jordan is prepared for all possibilities, including the establishment of a buffer zone with Syria.177

December 19, 2011: "The government does not have any plan for building a refugee camp for the Syrians and has not allocated a fils (cent) for this purpose," Majali said, adding that approximately 630 Syrians had entered the country illegally since the start of the violence in Syria.178
January 2012: Jordan still not offering asylum to Syrians but continue providing emergency medical care and shelter to them near the border. UN says 2,400 Syrians now hold refugee cards in Jordan, noting that count of Syrians coming in is not accurate because of fluid circumstances.179

January 5, 2012: UNICEF and the Ministry of Education are discussing the possibility of enrolling Syrian children in school, stating that there are an estimated 4,000 children belonging to 2,400 refugee families.180

January 16, 2012: 90 Syrian families arrived in Mafraq between November and January, bringing the total number in the city to 400.181

January 26, 2012: Education Minister announces “free” education for all Syrian primary and secondary students regardless of work permits. Interestingly, he announces that he will “exempt them of school donations and the cost of books,” without mentioning that UNICEF is paying the Jordanian government for all of it.182

January 31, 2012: Ministry of Public Works and Housing is nearing completion of the country’s first refugee camp at Ribaa Sarhan, 14km north of Mafraq, which will house 100 families. One government official says, “We have not reached emergency levels yet...but we may see refugees in the tens of thousands.”183

January 31, 2012: FM Judeh: "You have to know that we are extremely prepared for any outcome and that our contingency plans are there. We certainly have been keeping an eye on the situation up north and we have contingency plans linked to any possible development.”184

February 1, 2012: UN says 2,886 Syrians had entered Jordan by January 24. Says discussions with Jordanian government are underway regarding building camps to house a potential influx.185

February 6, 2012: Health Minister announces the government will provide free healthcare to all Syrians who have a certificate of registration with the UN, in addition to the 20,000 Libyans in Amman.186

February 7, 2012: Unofficial estimate of total Syrian refugees is 20,000, while 3,000 are registered with UNHCR. UN says they have camps ready, but there is no need for them just yet.187

February 12, 2012: Jordan completes preparations of first refugee camp in Mafraq.188

February 16, 2012: Aid agencies claim 90,000 Syrians in the country since March 2011, 15,000 registered with UN.189

February 17, 2012: A group of 100 refugees was bused into Jordan by border guards, marking the largest single group to enter the Kingdom since the violence began.190

February 19, 2012: Aid agency claims there are 10,000 Syrian refugees inside Jordan. Camp preparations are underway near the border.191

February 20, 2012: A high-ranking political official claims the current estimate of total Syrian refugees inside Jordan is 78,000.192

March 12, 2012: Jordan’s Ministry of Public Works and Housing announces completion of first refugee camp in Mafraq, capable of holding 3,000 of the 80,000 Syrians who entered the country. However, its opening is suspended citing concerns of relations with Damascus.193

April 14, 2012: More than 3,500 Syrians entered Jordan within 48 hours following a ceasefire agreement.194

May 11, 2012: Jordan opens third “holding (transit) facility” in Cyber City, Ramtha as more Syrians arrive, crowding the other facilities.195

Mid-June 2012: Jordan tightens screening process for Syrians, turning away any male Syrian with residency outside of Syria. MOI estimates 125,000 Syrians have entered the country since March 2011.196 Jordan claims the refusal of entry is based on security concerns, as FM Judeh says his country is permitted to prevent anyone from entering the country based on national interests. No reentry was allowed to registered refugees either.197

Early July 2012: PM Tarawinah says Jordan has received over 130,000 Syrian refugees in past 16 months. Italy opens first field hospital in Mafraq designated for treating Syrians. IOM was expected to take responsibility for Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria.198

Early July 2012: Daily influx of Syrians spikes from typical 80-300 to around 1,000 each night.199 UN urges Jordan to open a refugee camp (Zaatari). Government secrecy has limited information on the camp to avoid angering Damascus and dragging Jordan into the conflict. Syria is one of Jordan’s largest Arab trade partners, with bilateral trade estimated at $470 million

---

195 Ibid.
last year. Also, 60 per cent of Jordanian exports of mainly fruits and vegetables are routed through Syria for onward shipping to Turkey overland or to Europe.

July 16, 2012: Gov set to open Zaatari camp by end of the week as influx grows. Existence of camp is part of Jordan’s contingency plan that includes anticipation of up to 1 million Syrians entering the country. Gov and agencies also preparing to open second camp after Zaatari (originally meant to hold 10,000) in Ribaa Sirhan as daily influx averages 500 Syrians.

July 17, 2012: Tarawinah says that Jordan "was not a party to the creation of the Syrian crisis in any way whatsoever," and adds: "It started with the Arab Spring and escalated when a security solution rather than a reform solution was implemented, and therefore, it was imposed on us and put us in a position where we started to defend our northern borders against infiltrations. You are aware that a new problem has been imposed on Jordan; namely, the Syrian refugee problem." Cites 135,000 Syrians inside Jordan. Says that Jordan had announced that 22 camps would be established on a 5 sqkm area.

July 17, 2012: "Despite scarce resources, Jordan is receiving Syrian brothers because we separate the political track, as we believe in a political solution, from the humanitarian situation which we have to deal with to offer aid to the Syrian brothers," Judeh said. "The refugees' numbers are rising as 700 Syrian refugees crossed the Jordanian-Syrian border last night, raising the total number to more than 130,000," he said, adding that Jordan hoped the events in Syria would come to an end through political solutions that would ensure the return of the refugees to their country. The Jordanian official said that more than 7,000 Syrian children have joined Jordanian schools, noting that a number of international organizations had come to the aid of Syrians living in Jordan.

July 22, 2012: "While we appreciate all efforts made by official agencies and civil and humanitarian aid organizations, recent developments require that all necessary measures be taken in the northern border region of the kingdom to protect national security against any breach or transgression of any kind," said Samih al-Ma'ytah, the minister of media and communications. Al-Ma'ytah told reporters after a meeting that the government is "monitoring the situation very closely and will continue to work with all organizations to regulate refugee operations in the

---


northern regions and focus its efforts to protect the borders and preserve Jordan's security while taking into account the humanitarian circumstances of our Syrian brethren.”

July 22, 2012: Surge in arrivals of Syrians after several explosions in Damascus.


Late July 2012: Refugees at Ramtha move to Zaatari to create more distance from populated areas. King expressed satisfaction, “It is our duty to protect our citizens, but at the same time, we have to open our doors to our Syrian brother, and I’m very optimistic that the situation is moving in the right direction.”

August 2, 2012: Jordan closed first of three “transit centers” (Bashabsheh) and moved the temporary residents to Zaatari.

Late August 2012: Jordanian intelligence uncovered a 22-person espionage/sabotage cell operating out of Zaatari camp. However, Information Minister Ma'ytah said that such reports are totally false. The propagation of such reports is a type of childishness, he added, because the refugees coming from Syria across the border strip are referred to the Public Security Department before they are sent to the camp. The Jordanian authorities have opened a security center inside the Zaatari camp to provide security services to the Syrian refugees. He also dismissed reports that Syrian VP had defected to Jordan.

Following clashes in Zataari camp on August 29, 2012, Prime Minister Fayez Tarawinah vowed to "deport those behind the unrest back to their countries," and issued instructions "prohibiting the entry or exit of any individual to the camp without permission from the authorities.”

deported dozens of those involved in the skirmishes. At this time there were four camps open in the country: Zaatari, two in Ramtha, and one in Mafraq.

August 30, 2012: Speaking before the UN Security Council, Judeh alluded to the possibility of taking restrictive measures against the entry of Syrian refugees to Jordan, given the "serious implications for public order and security."

September 3, 2012: Ministry of Communications Affairs and Government spokesman Samih Ma’ytah said the establishment of buffer zones has international, military and political dimensions. Jordan is only concerned with how the international community can undertake its duty towards Jordan and Syrian refugees. He also said prior to the opening of the two camps there were 150,000 Syrians living in Jordan, taking advantage of the no-visa policy and good country relations. He said there were 24,000 Syrians between the Zataari camp and the two at Rathma. When discussing the possibility of border closures, he said he hopes Jordan does “not reach a stage where [they] feel incapable of performing this duty because [their] economic conditions are not strong enough to provide emergency humanitarian services.”

September 10, 2012: Information Minister Samih Ma’ytah said that Jordan has suffered socially, economically and politically from the flow of refugees, but that Jordan had no choice. He also noted that Jordan is now unable to accommodate more refugees, with more than 1,000 refugees crossing the border each day. While official data indicates that Syrians working without a permit were no more than 2,000 in August, the government admits that this number is incorrect. One official at the labor ministry confirms that these numbers "do not reflect the real figure, as the inspectors of the ministry catch hundreds of Syrian workers daily in the various regions of the kingdom, working without permits."

September 10, 2012: At least 80,000 refugees have entered Jordan illegally, while 70,000 have registered with the UNHCR.

Late September 2012: "Those refugees who wish to return to Syria can do so. We do not prevent anyone from exercising this right, but we are trying to secure their return safely," Jordan's government spokesman said. On September 24, hundreds of refugees staged a protest demanding

214 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
to be allowed to return to Syria, claiming the Jordanian government was withholding passports due to security reasons.  

September 23, 2012: The average influx of 700 Syrians per day dwindles to only 5 due to a new Syrian military campaign at the border to prohibit people trying to flee into Jordan (Damascus recaptured Tal Shihab and Naseeb). This is said to have left about 10,000 Syrians stranded at the border inside Syria.  

October 1, 2012: 65% of Jordanians want the government to refuse anymore Syrians into the country, primarily based on economic concerns. More than 80% believed the Syrians should be confined to camps. UN providing assistance to more than 100,000 refugees and anticipate 250,000 by year’s end.  

October 25, 2012: Interview with new PM Abdullah Ensour...Asked if Jordan will close its border to prevent the influx of more Syrian refugees into Jordan, he says: "The border will not be closed at all except as a last solution when things become impossible." He adds: "We have a very large camp, Zaatari, and during my visit to the camp two days ago I gave instructions to start work on building another camp about 20 to 30 km from the first camp. It will be on a level that befits human life. We are also planning for a third camp if necessary." He also discussed how Jordan is full and resources are running very thin; asks Syrian brothers to relieve the country of this burden and understand there is no more room.  

Early November 2012: Jordanian security discovers a “smuggling ring” of Zaatari camp employees who smuggle Syrian refugees and families out of the camp for JD500 each, revealing the depth of the desperation the Syrians have to leave the camp. Report claims 43,000 residents in the camp at that time. Additionally, the government is preparing to open a second camp 22 miles east of Zarqa, while they are preparing a third camp in Ramtha that is sponsored by KSA. Official reporting is 235,000 Syrian refugees in total.  

November 2, 2012: Jordan says it has received 10,000 requests for repatriation since start of war with 5,000 of them in September-October. In the final week of October, 92 Syrians returned to their country.  

---  

223 "Jordan Sees 'Spike' in Syrian Refugees Seeking to Return Home," BBC, November 2, 2012,
November 21, 2012: UN says 230,000 total Syrian refugees, 100,000 of them registered. This is up from 22,000 registered only six months prior.224

December 16, 2012: Jordan and UN announce agreement to establish a joint operations center to better coordinate the refugee crisis response.225

2013

Mid-January 2013: PM Abdullah Ensour says Jordan will close its borders should Assad’s regime fall, reassuring those on the border that special forces would be dispatched to establish "secure safe havens.”226

January 29, 2013: More than 29,000 Syrians arrived in Jordan in the past week, overwhelming the country’s services. Total Syrian refugees up to 320,000.227

February 21, 2013: Jordan prepares to open its third refugee camp near Zarqa in the coming month as daily flows increase to 2,500 Syrians entering the country each day. This happens as the soon-to-be-opened second camp at Mreijeb al Fhoud is in final stages of preparation. Total reportedly 360,000.228

March 2013: Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour announces that the government is moving to declare the northern regions an "emergency area" to draw international attention to the plight facing Jordanian host communities.229
March 23, 2013: Joint press conference with President Obama – King Abdullah cites 460,000 Syrians inside Jordan (10% of population) at $550 million per year, expected to double by end of the year.\(^\text{230}\)

April 10, 2013: Jordan opened its second Syrian refugee camp, known as Hallabat, in Mreibel al Fhoud. The camp was funded by the UAE, and officials seek to relieve the pressure in Zaatari, which houses 150,000 refugees at this time.\(^\text{231}\)

April 28, 2013: 500,000 Syrians in Jordan while only 160,000 living in camps; remainder living in cities. The Health Ministry says it spends half of its budget on medical care for Syrians alone and needs about $350 million in emergency funding to sustain the country's public-health-care system past this month.\(^\text{232}\)

May 2013: Although Jordan denies it has closed its borders, recently arrived Syrian refugees in Jordan say that Jordanian border guards blocked their and others' entry for days or weeks in May. Since late 2011, Jordan has prevented Palestinians, Iraqis, single military-aged men, and anyone without identity documents from entering Jordan.\(^\text{233}\) Daily flow dwindled to around 100 on average. Jabir was the only crossing that was left open.\(^\text{234}\) By late May, the flow was down to zero, indicating a significant occurrence across the border. Total quotes inside Syria was 474,000.\(^\text{235}\)

May 31, 2013: UN leader in Jordan, Andrew Harper, rejects possibility of resettling Syrian refugees in western countries, citing their desire to return to Syria. His words convey a continued optimism for a fast-approaching return to normalcy.\(^\text{236}\)


Early June 2013: Nearly 9,000 Syrian refugees returned to Syria, bringing the total number of returnees to around 68,000.

June 21, 2013: Jordan closes its borders after tense ambiguity with cases of armed infiltrators crossing into Jordan, who the FSA claimed to be refugees. Following the G8 summit, King Abdullah stated that Jordan would do what it needed to do to protect national interests if international funding did not come through.

September 1, 2013: Health Minister says Jordan is ready with adequate medical supplies for anticipated increase in number of Syrian refugees. Discusses first cases of measles in Jordan in nearly two decades, attributed to Syrian refugees.

Early September 2013: UN opened new registration center that reduces average registration wait times from 4-6 hours to 20-50 minutes.

September 16, 2013: Daily flow of Syrians increased nearly tenfold to 900, but Syrian returnees also increased to about 600 per day.

Early October 2013: Zaatari camp population at 120,000...total at 600,000 according to UN, Jordan gov says there are hundreds of thousands more; Jordanian society growing weary of hosting seemingly permanent Syrians. MoPIC Minister Saif discusses social discontent as worry for government, describes providing bare minimum to refugees to discourage sense of permanence; wants to isolate the Syrian population in camps, but it is a difficult challenge. Jordan has remained vague about its policy toward refugees of Palestinian origin. Mr. Saif said it was a "sensitive issue," adding, "We don't want really any additional demographic pressure on the country." Palestinians were turned away and not allowed to enter typically, while the ones who made it in were kept in an isolated transit center called Cyber City.

---


October 2013: About 423,000 of the 550,000 Syrians live in cities outside of camps. Jordan says the world needs to contribute more. Foreign aid covers only 30 per cent to 40 per cent of what Jordan spends on refugees, or $250 million in 2012, said Information Minister Mohammad Momani. "We are doing this (hosting the refugees) on behalf of the world, and the world cannot sit by and watch," he said.243

October 11, 2013: Interior Minister Hussein Majali stated that there are 560,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan at this time, while there had previously been 700,000 Syrians who commuted back and forth across the border for work prior to the eruption of the violence in Syria who remained in Jordan once it began, but are not refugees.244

November 4, 2013: Amnesty International claims Jordan has deported hundreds of Syrians against their will, and had begun this in 2012. Ministry of Labor said it planned to deport up to 5,000 for working without proper authorization. Information Minister Mohammed Momani stated all deportations were in accordance with the law, and the Syrian laborers working illegally were held to the same standards as their Egyptian counterparts. Total registered with the UN is now 550,000.245 AI claimed hundreds of Syrians of Palestinian origin had been deported this year as well.246

November 28, 2013: PM Ensour reaffirmed Jordan’s commitment to humanitarianism in response to Syrians seeking asylum, but he also stressed the importance of security to the country. Quoted the total number as 600,000.247

2014

January 7, 2014: Prince Zeid criticizes the UN Security Council for giving no response after a formal invitation in April 2013 to visit Zaatari camp and assess the Syrian refugee situation, but expresses that Jordan’s position on the Council will finally provide for a response.248


January 16, 2014: EU provides 20 million euros to support border security force, but Border Guard Commander Zyoud claims the funds will be spent on “logistics and humanitarian services for the Syrian refugees” and not on security.249

Late February 2014: Jordan provides security cards to all Syrian refugees so they can access basic public services, including legal services.250

March 18, 2014: 767 Syrians entered Jordan in the past 48 hours, pushing total to 610,000. 113,000 are inside camps.251

April 6, 2014: About 5,000 Syrian refugees rioted after many attempted to depart the Zaatari camp without authorization, prompting a skirmish between police and the rioters. This left one Syrian refugee dead and many others wounded, including Jordanian police. Police used to tear gas to disperse the crowd but did not use lethal weapons.252

April 30, 2014: Jordan opens new Azraq refugee camp/tent city, intended to sustain up to 130,000 residents as the Syrian influx expected to swell. Current flow is 600 arrivals per day.253

May 14, 2014: Finance Minister announces the end of all electricity subsidies scheduled for 2017, citing the Syrian refugees and interruptions of Egyptian gas supplies as key factors for the country’s growing debt and precarious financial situation. Minister states that hosting the refugees "has resulted in high rent and real estate prices in Jordan, pressure on the local labor market and, in general, pressure on the infrastructure [serving] all sectors, particularly health and education, and scarce resources in Jordan, most important of which are electricity and water.”


Says total Syrian refugees inside the country now totals 750,000, while the country hosts 1.3 million Syrian citizens overall.254

Mid-May 2014: Total register Syrian refugees approaches 600,000 with daily flow of about 400 entering Jordan. Arriving refugees are initially processed at one of 6 ICRC-provided “transit stations” along the border.255

Late May 2014: Jordan announces its “National Resilience Plan,” indicating it is looking to ride out the Syrian civil war. Says it expects to host between 800,000 and 1 million Syrian refugees by end of the year.256

Early June 2014: Jordan opens its borders for an “undeclared” humanitarian operation, allowing aid agencies to cross into Syria from Ramtha to deliver aid to those stranded on the border. Spokesman of the Jordanian Government, Minister Muhammad al-Momani, told Al-Hayat: "Jordan supports any international effort aimed at delivering humanitarian aid to the Syrian brothers inside their country's border. Jordan is interested in easing the Syrians' suffering and reducing the number of those who take refuge in Jordan. The refugees cause a huge burden to the kingdom, which cannot deal with it in light of the shortage of international aid." Jordan claims it hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees.257

Mid-June 2014: UAE-funded medical center for Syrian refugees opens and operates 24/7, treating up to 600 patients per day.258

August 13, 2014: Bahrain agrees to build school for Syrian refugees.

On September 15, 2014, IOM and the EU hosted a roundtable with Jordanian Armed Forces, border guards, various humanitarian border management experts, and a number of international diplomats to discuss standard operating procedures moving forward with the Syrian crisis.259

Mid-September 2014: Jordan deports 12 Syrians who are receiving medical treatment from an unlicensed rehabilitation center.260

Mid-November 2014: Jordan deports 5 Syrian refugees, all minors, after opening fire on them while riding motorbikes days earlier, wounding one.261

Late November 2014: Jordanian officials deny that they involuntarily deported any Syrian refugees, but UNRWA says it has received 106 cases of Palestinian refugees being deported to Syria this year.262

November 28, 2014: Jordan withdraws all free healthcare to Syrian refugees (1.3 million at the time). Deportations are fairly regular and often without explanation.263

Early December 2014: New Syrian refugee registrations dropped from 6,000 in September to only 250 the entire month of November, attributed to security concerns, but there are rumors that Jordan is coordinating with FSA to keep refugees off its borders. Jordanian government criticizes European governments in response to questioning its policies: "Do we have to prove our credentials?" asks Mohammed al-Momani, the government's chief spokesman. "We are doing more than any other country in the world."264

On December 3, 2014, Jordan deported 9 Syrian medical workers who were part of the Syrian War Wounded Liaison Office a week after announcing that Syrians were no longer eligible to receive free healthcare inside Jordan.265

From July until December 11, 2014, the Jordan Border Guard heavily restricted entry to Syrians, citing security concerns.266

261 Ibid.
December 13, 2014: Government spokesman Momani says Jordan has not been excluding women, elderly men or disabled men from entering. He said that all arriving refugees were "medically checked, given food, and their papers are examined to register them and make sure that none of them is affiliated with terrorist groups." Increased deportations in recent months reported.  

December 15, 2014: MoPIC cites 1.4 million Syrians inside Jordan total, with 600,000 registered as refugees with the UNHCR.

2015

Late 2014/early 2015: Reports claim that Jordan’s MOI has deported several refugees, citing security concerns.

As of January 2015, more Syrian refugees are moving from urban Jordan into the camps following the government’s cut of free medical services while the World Food Organization also cut near 30% of its services, further reducing available resources to urban-dwelling Syrians. The reasons stated for this mass move are the longevity of the Syrian conflict, and its exhaustion of many refugees’ resources, as well as a higher dependence on NGO-provided medical services.

Late January 2015: Jordanian government launches initial annual Jordan Response Plan, which lays out services and associated budget for Syrian refugees for the year ahead. The plan covers the humanitarian and development aspects of addressing the Syrian crisis and its impact on Jordan, said Minister of Planning and International Co-operation Ibrahim Saif at the launch of the plan in December. According to the minister, the national plan requires around $2.9 billion to implement, including $1.1 billion in direct support for the government's budget and $916 million to fund programs and projects that fall in line with the priorities of national development plans in sectors affected by the presence of Syrian refugees. In addition, about $889 million is needed "for the implementation of humanitarian projects and interventions for the benefit of both Jordanians and Syrian refugees", Saif said.

Mid-March 2015: Figures released by UNHCR this week shows that Turkey tops countries that host Syrian refugees with 1,698,472 people, followed by Lebanon with 1,183,109, while Jordan's

---


Syrian refugee population stands at 625,178. Jordan will host a meeting on Monday with the UN agencies and donors to discuss Jordan Response Information System for the Syrian Crisis and Jordan Response Plan for the current year. The government launched this year a plan worth $2.9 billion to respond to the needs of Syrian refugees and host communities in different sectors that include health, education and water. The planned meeting is organized by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to be headed by Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, sources said. Early this year, Ensour said international support at present only covers 19 per cent of the cost of hosting Syrian refugees, with the Kingdom covering the remaining 81 per cent.

March 16, 2015: PM and PIC Minister and others spoke at 7th JRP meeting.  
PM: "Jordan is fully committed to a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Syria and the security situation must be addressed comprehensively," Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour said in his remarks at the 7th meeting of the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis organized by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The situation Jordan is facing as a host is unprecedented, according to Ensour. "Today, Jordan is the world's third largest host of refugees and the [Syrian] crisis has had a profound impact across the entire country," he said, adding that the crisis is placing an overwhelming burden on Jordanian people, infrastructure, government services and limited resources. "It is evident that Jordan cannot meet the challenge alone," he said. Ministers from MOI, PIC, Social Development, and Water & Irrigation also spoke about the challenges and strain on their sectors stemming from the presence of Syrian refugees.

Late March 2015: Border guards again heavily restrict entry without any announcement until May, as they slowly processed about 1,500 Syrians into the country. Government spokesman Mohammed Momani said Jordan "continues to adopt an open border policy" in line with procedures worked out with the relevant international organizations.

April 2, 2015: Syrian rebels take over and close the Jabir border crossing.

April 22, 2015: The influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan threatens the kingdom's demographic opportunity, the Higher Population Council (HPC) said. The demographic opportunity refers to the stage in a country's development at which the ratio of dependents to workers is lowest. HPC Secretary-General Sawsan Majali noted that the ongoing increase in the number of young people in a way that exceeds economic growth is one of the major challenges facing Jordan now. She

added that the influx of Syrians also affects the age composition as Syrian women and children make up more than 20% of the total population in Jordan.275

Late-April 2015: Syria has begun issuing new passports at their embassy in Jordan, most of whom hope for direct flights to Turkey, from where they may try for asylum in another European country.276

May 11, 2015: PM Ensour announces development plan for Jordan 2025. When questioned about 10 cases of forced deportation, the PM rushed to deny that Jordan conducted any such deportations.277

As of mid-May 2015, the labor force participation rate for Jordanians is similar to what it was before the Syrian crisis, while the unemployment rate has increased from 14.5 to 22.1%. The rate stands at 42% among Jordanian youths and 40% among women alone, according to the report. However, these figures are higher than the "official" figures the government announced early this year. According to the government, unemployment rate in 2014 stood at 11.9%, going down by 0.7% compared with 2013, when it was 12.6%.278

Mid-June 2015: Jordanian government begins issuing magnetic-strip “Jordanian Service Cards” to refugees residing outside the camps, similar to ones provided to those inside the camps since January 1, 2014.279

August 2015: More than 229,000 Syrian refugees were told they would no longer receive food aid and many others had their assistance cut in half.280


September 2015: WFP enjoyed a funding surge and was able to reinstate food vouchers and increase cash handouts from JD10/month to JD15.281

September 22, 2015: First Syrian refugees of a 20,000 pledged total arrive in the UK.282

Syrian entries plummeted from 5,000 in September to 500 in October 2015.283

Mid-October 2015: "Many families see no other alternative than to return to a war-ravaged Syria, with the severe security risks that entails or to embark on a dangerous journey across the Mediterranean. It is not a choice but a desperate attempt to protect their families," Petr Kostohryz, the country director of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Jordan said in a statement. He said that in mid-September a total of 340 refugees returned to Syria in a single day, up from a daily average of 120 in August and 60 in July. Nearly 4,000 returned to Syria in August, compared to about 2,000 in July.284 There are also reports of hundreds of Syrians leaving Jordan every day by air, boarding flights to Istanbul and hoping to get to Europe.285

Mid-November 2015: PIC Minister describes international community’s dismal funding (36% of 2015 pledges for JRP) as “disgraceful,” saying that Jordan “has been shouldering the burdens of the Syrian refugee crisis on behalf of the region and world." He stated that Jordan is the first country in the region to develop a resiliency plan.286

November 2015: Canada opens processing center in Amman to begin resettlement operations.287

Mid-December 2015: UN says it received only 45% of its requested funding for 2015; more Syrians heading for Europe as conditions deteriorate and services are cut.288

December 2015: Community police, made up of 26 retired Jordanian police trained at the British Embassy, begin patrolling the two largest refugee camps, Zaatari and Azraq, in response to security complaints and grievances.289

December 20, 2015: First Canada-bound flight took off with 197 Syrian refugees; it would be the first of many as the Canadians hoped to settle at least 10,000 between November and the end of February.290

2016

January 2016: Jordan’s intelligence services reportedly deporting Syrian refugees.109 16,000 stranded at the border, while Jordan’s information minister claims 50 to 100 are permitted to enter Jordan each day. The minister, Mohammed Momani, cites security concerns as the reason for the bottleneck, and he states that “the Kingdom’s security is the first priority.”201 “Jordan is willing to cooperate with any country which might be able to take refugees from the border camp”, the minister stressed, adding that the Syrians in these camps are being provided with their needs of supplies, tents and medications through Jordan, provided by Jordan-based UN agencies, as well as Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) and other donors.292

Late January 2016: PM Mansour says, "We have opened our borders. We will continue to do so provided that others come and help up help the Syrians...I don't mean just sending cash or grants. I want them to help the economy at large, that's to say help the budget, help export ... our products because if these people (Syrians) have to join the industry, then the industry has to sell elsewhere."293

February 4, 2016: Government announces the Jordan Compact, which seeks to leverage international funding and coordination to turn the burden of the refugees into an opportunity for development. This deal promises a limited quantity of work permits (22,000 at first, 200,000 in

five years), free education for Syrian refugee children, and trade access to the EU, along with a $300 million interest-free loan from the World Bank.294

February 6, 2016: A report discusses the Jordanian economy and its efforts to facilitate legal Syrian work, mentioning the “schizophrenic” nature of its actual policies and its rhetoric of “Jordanization” in the labor market while enforcement is lax. Report states that only 6,000 Syrians currently have work permits.296

February 2016: London Conference yields more than $10 billion in pledges to the Syrian refugee crisis, setting a record for most funds raised in one day for a humanitarian emergency. Jordan’s King Abdullah said that his country would focus on providing a "sustainable" approach to the 1.3 million Syrian refugees it is supporting. "Our holistic approach is sustainable and focuses on self-sufficiency, not just aid and relief. Jordan was hit with the first wave of refugees in challenging times. This resilience is what has enabled Jordan to respond when we saw our neighbors were in trouble."297

Late March 2016: The government rebukes Amnesty International in a report that focused on its closing its borders to Syrians: "The report lacks accuracy and objectivity. It is clear that it relied on views of some biased activists and researchers who are supporting a certain stand," Jordan's Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communications Mohammad Momani said. "Clearly, those who drafted the report have not visited our healthcare centers that are frequented by crowds of Syrians... Jordan is giving to the Syrians more than any country in the world has done, including medical care... This is a truth that is only denied by someone who is ungrateful."298

March 2016: Figures released recently by the Jordanian Border Guards with the U.N. refugee agency indicate that the number of refugees on the border had reached 26,000. But aid agencies are reluctant to talk about the situation on the Berm, concerned that their already limited access to the refugees in the area may be curtailed. With few exceptions, journalists are refused entry to the border area, which is technically classified as a military area.

---


The government had been reluctant to discuss the situation but has become more open. "If you want to take the moral high ground on this issue, we'll get them all to an airbase and we're more than happy to relocate them to your country," King Abdullah II said in an interview with the BBC last month.299

Late April 2016: The government’s increase in Syrian access to the labor market is working, as Jordan eases paperwork requirements to attain work permits, requiring only a refugee or MOI card instead of a passport and proof of legal entry to Jordan, while also establishing a 90-day grace period to get permits for those working illegally.300

Mid-May 2016: "We want to create jobs to be offered to Jordanians and Syrians alike," says Mohammed Momani, government spokesman and minister of media affairs. "It will reduce unemployment, expand the size of the economy, and generate growth." Jordan is pushing to open five zones by the end of the year, with as many as 11 to be established to produce goods ranging from textiles to basic electronics. To speed up the zones’ creation, Jordan is offering a 0 percent income tax rate and exemption from sales tax and import duties to interested investors. Officials hope these incentives, along with the lure of free access to EU markets, will be enough to sway international companies. While Jordan is pushing for at least 30% of the zones’ workers to be Jordanian, government officials privately estimate that the bulk of workers on the factory floor will be Syrian, with Jordanians taking up administrative and managerial posts. Jordan is also working on a second track: bringing hundreds of thousands of Syrians out of the shadows to become legal, licensed, tax-paying workers and business owners. This second track could be costly for the 400,000 Egyptians and other foreign laborers in Jordan, who could be pushed out and replaced with the newly licensed Syrians.301

May 24, 2016: King Abdullah tells BBC, “The psyche of the Jordanian people, I think it's gotten to a boiling point. Sooner or later, I think the dam is going to burst and I think this week is going to be very important for Jordanians to see, is there going to be help - not only for Syrian refugees, but for their own future as well.” The day before, Jordan's prime minister, Abdullah Ensour, said his government might provide 150,000 work permits over several years in return for Jordan receiving $1.6bn over three years to fund its schools, healthcare and jobs infrastructure. The work would be distributed equally between Jordanians and Syrians.302


June 2016: A car bomb detonates near the border at Rukban, killing 6 victims and leading the Jordanian government to declare the northern and northeaster borders a “military zone,” according to government spokesman Mohammed Momani. This led to the Jordanian government working with humanitarian groups to deliver aid across the border to the 75,000 stranded Syrians via crane. "The new mechanism will be delivering aid on the berm through cranes, and the aid will be given to community leaders of groups of Syrians so they can distribute it accordingly," he told AP. Aid was previously delivered using a crane once in August 2015. 303

August 2016: Jordan eases some restrictions to encourage more Syrian children to attend school, including an easement on the banning children who have missed 3 or more years of school from enrolling, and they have issued at least 20,000 work permits to Syrians, partly in hopes of more children bearing less of the income responsibility and freeing them up to attend school more often. 304

September 2016: FM Nasser Judeh speaks at UN GA adoption of NY Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, addressing Jordan’s participation in hosting refugees - Over the last six years, Jordan had hosted 1.3 million Syrians, 20 per cent of its population, and cooperated with the United Nations to build camps that absorbed 10 per cent of Syrian refugees. It had opened and expanded schools and hospitals and provided protection. His Government had outlined a pioneering program that linked humanitarian needs with the response to the Syrian crisis. While Jordan appreciated the support it had received, it accounted for 35% of costs of hosting refugees. Jordan must be supported to shoulder its responsibility towards Syrian refugees, he said, noting that the lack of a political solution to the Syrian situation only enhanced feelings of injustice and fed extremist trends. There needed to be a two-track solution based on solidarity and cost-sharing, as well as on addressing the factors that created refugees and migrants. 305

Late September 2016: UN and Jordan nearing a deal in solution for 70,000 stranded Syrians in demilitarized zone on Syria-Jordan border as the Kingdom takes a more assertive approach to the refugee crisis with the international community. 306

December 30, 2016: Report states that only 35,000 of available 50,000 work permits were issued, despite the availability to Syrians. While the government expected the permits to be all used in a short span of time, they are trying to figure out why the full 50,000 were not issued.

Evidence suggests it has to do with labor culture in Syria being more entrepreneurial and controlling over the labor, which may be hindered by permit obligations.  

2017

Late January 2017: Jordan forwards its 2017-2019 JRP to the UN, laying out an initial plan for Syrian refugee crisis management over the next three years. PIC Minister Fakhoury emphasizes that other countries should be ready and willing to accept some resettlements while also urging donors to fulfill commitments from previous year.

As of mid-March 2017, Jordan hosts 657,000 Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR. Momani cites 1.3 million Syrian refugees total, and discusses the economic hardships hosting them has caused and thanks the international community for support and emphasizes the moral high ground of supporting the cause.

April 5, 2017: During a press conference with President Trump, King Abdullah responds to a question about refugees in Jordan: “Well, I think as the President pointed out, most, if not all, Syrian refugees actually want to go back to Syria. And that what we're working with the United States and the international community is to be able to stabilize the refugees in our country, give them the tools so that, as we're working with the solutions in Syria, we have the ability to be able to send them back as a positive influence into their economies. And again, the President and the Europeans are being very forward-leaning in being able look after our host community...it’s been a tremendous burden on our country, but again, tremendous appreciation to the United States and the Western countries for being able to help us in dealing with that.”

April 2017: Jordan, UN, and several state representatives participate in the Brussels Conference, hoping to further build on the momentum of the London Conference 2016. PM Hani Mulki says, “Jordan has reached its maximum carrying capacity due to the Syrian refugee crisis whether in terms of available resources; fiscal space, existing physical and social infrastructure, or capacities of government services.”

Early May 2017: Aid agencies report a spike in the number of Syrian refugee deportations in recent months. International aid official says at least 30% of those who returned to Syria between January and April were forcibly deported. The Jordanian government confirmed there were deportations but did not specify the quantity, citing security reasons. The government says it complies with all international humanitarian laws while the deportees complain of a lack of due process.312

Late May 2017: PIC Minister Fakhoury says, “Jordan has reached the limit of its capacity to cope with the burden of hosting Syrian refugees.” This came on the occasion of Ambassador Nikki Haley’s first visit to the country.313

July 7, 2017: US, Russia, and Jordan apparently reached an agreement for “de-escalation zone” on Syria-Jordan border, which could lead to re-opening the Nassib border crossing, a key economic trade point for Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.314

Early August 2017: Jordan begins allowing Syrians to work in construction and agricultural sectors.315

Late August 2017: Jordanian Information Minister Mohammed Momani praised the recent cease-fire agreement and noted that ties between Damascus and Amman are headed for improvements, comments which have since echoed throughout the Syrian and Jordanian media. “Now, if the situation in southern Syria continues, God willing, to move toward stability, it will lay the foundation for a reopening of the crossings between the two countries,” Momani said. However, he added that it is ‘very hard’ to set a timetable, and appeared to suggest that a reopening of Nassib was contingent on continued stability and respect for Jordanian red lines, which include keeping Iran-backed Shia militias away from its border.

ILO and Jordan Gov establish first employment center for Syrian refugees and Jordanians on August 21, 2017.110

August 2017: 1,200 returns to Syria.316

September 2017: Jordan is the largest refugees host in the world per capita with a direct hosting cost that reaches $2 billion yearly, which accounts for 5% of the GDP and 20% of domestic revenues, said PIC Minister Fakhoury. Despite preserving its resilience, Jordan is facing several challenges such as the drop in economic growth rate, the increase of the public debt, and hike in joblessness rate, which altogether affects all aspects of life including public services. He added that Jordan has become a role model in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis and shouldering the burden, which is a universal affair, on behalf of the international community. He stressed that the host countries including Jordan are the largest donor countries, noting Jordan's commitment to the Jordan Compact and the Jordan Outcome Document adopted during Brussels Conference.  

September 2017: 1,078 returns to Syria.  

Late September 2017: Many Syrian children (36% of total registered refugees) are still missing many school days, a year after the Jordanian government reformed its education policies to allow more participation in school. A lack of funding fulfilments has been a key cause of this as the schools in Jordan are not able to pay for services and utilities in some instances.  

Early October 2017: Jordan denies wrongdoing in deportations of Syrian refugees, calls HRW report “baseless accusation.”  

October 2017: 750 returns to Syria.  

October 10, 2017: Jordan claims hosting the Syrian refugees has cost a total of more than $10 billion since 2011.  

Late November 2017: Lack of employment among Syrians still looms. One company reported that hiring Syrians subjects a company to additional levels of scrutiny from international organizations and government entities. Others reported low retention rates, with many of the

317 "Jordan- Planning Minister Participates in High-Level Meetings on Sidelines of UN General Assembly," MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network), September 25, 2017,  
320 "Jordan Rejects as Groundless Accusations of Deporting Syrian Refugees," Xinhua General News Service, October 2, 2017,  
322 "Jordan Says Hosting Syrian Refugees has Cost $10 billion," Digital Journal, October 10, 2017,  
hired refugees leaving the job within weeks. Considering the necessity for training, this represents a significant loss to company resources. Furthermore, the industrial zones are dominated by investments in the food, engineering, and textile sectors. The food processing sector, the highest value sector operating in the industrial zones, is not included in the agreement with the EU, in spite of it being a sector of comparative advantage for Jordan. Engineering firms, on the other hand, produce little exports as their work is mostly domestic or in immovable assets. As for the textile sector, only some textiles are included in the agreement. Major textile firms direct their exports towards the United States, with whom Jordan has a free trade agreement. Altogether, this leaves these industries with little incentives to hire Syrian labor.323

2018

March 1, 2018: Jordan introduces rules that caused a number of public healthcare services for most Syrian refugees to increase 2-5 times.324

March 5, 2018: MOI announces grace period to formalize status of Syrians who were registered but left camps without authorization prior to July 1, 2017. The formalization period was initially intended to run through the end of September 2018 but was extended through March 2019.325326

March 20, 2018: Jordan's Planning and International Cooperation Minister Imad Fakhoury said that his country hosts 3.5 million refugees, making 15.6% of the world's refugee population, Al-Bawaba reported.327

May-June 2018: Protests erupt against a new proposal for higher taxes based on IMF’s recommendations, leading to PM Hani Mulki’s resignation and his successor’s withdrawal of the proposal.328

June 4, 2018: FM Safadi met with the head of the Syrian Negotiations Commission to discuss the de-escalation agreement, emphasizing the importance of strict adherence to the agreement out of concern for Jordan’s border security and potential influx of refugees should further conflict take place in the border region.329

July 2018: One week after announcing that its borders are closed and no Syrians will be allowed entry (according to China state-controlled outlets330), PM Razzaz announces launch of nationwide campaign to aid the Syrians stranded at the border inside Syria.331 Separately, the government spokesperson Jumana Ghunaimat says the Jordanian army is delivering aid to Syrians stranded as well, as it is ”in line with Jordan's stand to support the Syrian brothers, strengthen their ability to endure difficult humanitarian conditions and enable them to bear the suffering caused by a new military offensive against their territories.”332

Late July 2018: FM Safadi insists no Syrians will be forced to return.333

Early August 2018: Chinese media states Jordan has prepared its borders to process Syrians wanting to return.334

August 2018: Russian news agencies attempt to present narrative of high number of Syrian returns from refugee host countries, citing establishment of refugee return centers in Amman.335 Russian media also claims over 80% of Syrians in Jordan are “ready to return to Syria.”336

---

September 2018: UNICEF cites a funding shortfall as it reduces aid for Syrian refugee children’s education from 55,000 children to 10,000.  

September 30, 2018: FM Safadi gives an interview after receiving $135 million pledge from Germany: "We are grateful to Germany and our other friends in the international community who provided support to us and our efforts to meet the needs of 1.3 million Syrians in Jordan. Jordan has embraced every Syrian who came to Jordan, we opened our hearts to them, we opened our schools, our cities, our job market, everything we can to ensure that they live with us in dignity, and their kids go to schools and they have the treatment that they deserve," Safadi said in an interview. According to Safadi, refugees have been a "tremendous burden" on the national economy. "We have an unemployment of 18.4%, and we have given work permits to over 100,000 Syrians. That is double the number of jobs our economy is able to create on an annual basis," he noted. The minister complained about insufficient support from the international community. "This year we are witnessing a dwindling of that support, and we warn against that, because of the implications on our ability to continue to meet the needs of refugees to the standards required," Safadi noted. He also noted that Jordan maintained regular contacts with Russia to facilitate the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their homes. "His Majesty King Abdullah and President Putin have built strong relations based on openness and trust. That allows us to address all issues in an effective and open and credible manner. Refugees are one of the issues that we have been discussing, and our position is that we encourage the voluntarily return of refugees to Syria," the minister pointed out.

October 15, 2018: Jordanian officials reopen border crossings with Syria.

Early December 2018: PIC Minister Mary Kawar reiterates that Jordan will not force Syrian refugees to return, citing international law, despite urging from Russia and Syria.

Mid-December 2018: Official government count of 5,703 returned Syrian refugees between October 15 and December 1, differing from the UN’s far smaller number of 3,852.

---

December 29, 2018: A survey reports that only 8% of Syrians are intent on returning to Syria within the next year.343

Between January 2016 and December 2018, nearly 21,000 Syrians returned from Jordan.344


Visual Supplement: Government Rhetoric Themes By Phase

Figure 1. Lebanon Rhetoric 2011-2012: Humanitarian Duty

Figure 2. Lebanon Rhetoric 2013-2015: Restrictions
Figure 3. Lebanon Rhetoric 2016-2018: Encouraged Repatriation

Figure 4. Jordan Rhetoric 2011-2013: Emergency Response
Figure 5. Jordan Rhetoric 2014-2015: Resilience

Figure 6. Jordan Rhetoric 2016-2018: Sustainment & Development
Bibliography


"Jordan- Planning Minister Participates in High-Level Meetings on Sidelines of UN General Assembly." *MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network)*. September 25, 2017. 


"Jordan Reached its Maximum Capacity Due to Syrian Refugees Crisis, says PM.” *Jordan News Agency (Petra)*. April 5, 2017. 


"Jordan to Offer Free Medical Care to Syrian Refugees." BBC. February 7, 2012.


"Jordan, Turkey Join Calls for Syria to End the Violence." CNN. August 15, 2011.


"Jordanian Denies Intention to Move Syrian Refugees to ‘Emergency Camp’.” *BBC.* October 9, 2011.  

"Jordanian Foreign Minister Comments on Syria, Hamas, Reforms." *BBC.* December 17, 2011.  


“Lebanon.” *UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service*.  


[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/64657.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/64657.pdf).

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70914.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70914.pdf).


[https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria](https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria).


"Syrian Families Cross into Jordan to ‘Escape Shelling’." *BBC.* August 12, 2011. 


“Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: Fatigue in Numbers.” *American University of Beirut Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs.* April 2018. 

“Syrian Refugees and Syrians Displaced to Lebanon.” Embassy of the Republic of Lebanon in Washington, D.C. Sent to Alex Shanahan via Email.


"UNHCR, Jordan to Discuss Building Camps for Syrian Refugees." BBC. February 1, 2012.  

"UNHCR Working with Gov't, Local Communities to Assist Syrian 'Refugees'." The Jordan Times. September 30, 2011.  


https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon.


