

TRANSCRIPT

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Gen. Brooks: The Army component of U.S. Pacific Command. You're mostly all familiar with that. We have a very long history in the Asia Pacific region. We're in our 117th year of continuous service in the Asia Pacific region. And as one can imagine from our projection out there in 1898 to the present, we've really been an expression of where U.S. interests are at any given point in time.

So whether it's the early experience in the Philippines or the movements to China and Siberia after that, the return in concentration to the Philippines, the relocation of some of the forces to Europe for World War I. The return back again to the Philippines in Hawaii. All of these things have been the guiding light that moved us around the region from time to time.

It's interesting, here we are on December 8th, the day after the date that lived in infamy, but depending on where you were in the world December 8th was really the day that really made the world change, and it certainly crossed the International Date Line in places like the Philippines and Guam and Wake Island. It was the 8th that really turned the world around, and of course it was the 8th when President Roosevelt talked about the attack that happened that really changed the world. But the Army had already been out there for 43 years at that point.

So my point in telling you that is that we are part of a very long base of experience in the region and continue to build on that in the present time.

We're part of the strategic rebalance, obviously. A very important land expression of the strategic rebalance. We've got about 106,000 people now. That's a significant increase from even 2013 when I arrived. Of those, 86,000 are uniformed military, and our civilian work force is a big part of that as well, so almost 20,000 of them.

But with that increase in the forces available to the Pacific we've tried to reconcile a few things that are competing. For example, we know that we have a need for increased engagement in the region. More and more countries are seeking a relationship with the United States military, and yet we have reducing resources, and pressure on the size of all forces, but certainly the United States Army. Declining budgets. In 2013 we had a government shutdown. Other things that were pointing in the opposite direction from engagement. So our challenge was to reconcile our need to engage with the resources that were being reduced.

We came up with some concepts to try to address that, and most notably the operation we call Pacific Pathways which is our mechanism of taking tailored ready forces and projecting them west of the International Date Line using a series of existing exercises as a way to gain presence, and from that presence the relationships that are so important to operating in the region, in pre-crisis and during crisis. The ability to rehearse our skills that are necessary for moving through the region, uploading and moving, downloading and moving through different countries, integrating with different partners and formations, and then moving again. Then finding ourselves in increasing demand in doing that.

So Pacific Pathways has now been going since 2014. We've done four such operations. Each operation lasting about three months roughly. And each operation including generally three different countries that we stop and conduct exercises in. And that has given us a presence west of the International Date Line, what I describe more faces in more places without more bases. That's the basic idea. More faces in more places without more bases, and trying to do this in a cost-informed way where we actually leverage existing funds for exercises and add to that the costs of transport that is required for a different kind of configuration than what we used to do. And we're finding from this endeavor, Pacific Pathways operations, that we're generating readiness in our units at multiple echelons of command in ways that we could not do in any other way.

So our core headquarters, for example. United States 1st Corps, is now assigned to Army Pacific and is continuously conducting operations throughout the year. It controls all of these operations.

Right now it's in Japan conducting exercises for our great partners, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force. That kind of exercise complexity and the iterations that happen by doing it over and over and over again gives us a depth of readiness that we would not be able to get by simply doing one warfighter exercise every two years for corps headquarters as an example. And we're finding it all the way down through the lowest tactical levels, that that is giving us iterations and building readiness at a much faster rate than we could if we were in a traditional training program.

One example that I'll give you and then I'll stop, I'd like to use the example of our unmanned aerial system operators. We've got unmanned aerial systems inside of our brigade combat teams, drones. And there is a progression that all drone operators have to go through to be able to operate effectively and safely. That progression would

normally take about two years to go through in a normal training environment. You might get all of your drone operators certified, but chances are you're going to have some of them change stations, some of them will be leaving the military, some will miss the training event. And in the case of our very first Pacific Pathways operation, all of the operators were certified within three months and accumulated the amount of experience they would normally have gotten in two to three years.

So the acceleration of readiness is the biggest outcome that we're seeing, even as we've reconciled these declining resources.

The region wants us around and as a result relationships are opening in ways that we might not have foreseen, even in 2013. For example, we have an excellent relationship with the Indian Army right now that's starting to increase. I'd say it's a hot relationship, Army to Army. We have to work through the paces of our own governments in terms of how much we're allowed to do, but our eagerness and willingness to do increased work with the Indian Army is rising.

We have constructive engagement, military to military engagement with the People's Liberation Army. And while it's very clear we have a competitive relationship also, especially in the air and maritime services and spaces, we have a cooperative relationship in the land domain with the People's Liberation Army, and just recently completed a disaster management exercise on the ground, troops side by side, working together in Washington State. The third such exercise. So it's an exciting and dynamic time out there in the region. We find there's plenty for us to do and we build on that long history.

Let me stop with that preamble and see what you want to ask me.

DWG: Thank you, sir.

So there's new Warrior Training Center open at Fort Shafter to provide realistic combat training to your forces. What does that give you and why was that necessary?

Gen. Brooks: We've got several of these mission training complexes, as we call them, around the region and they give us essentially a backbone for being able to do simulations and distributed training and tying various places together.

The one you're describing is at Fort Shafter Flats, which is an adjacent installation for where my headquarters is and it's principally where our Army Reserve Forces are located. So this enabled the Army Reserve troops to be able to have a much better engagement without having to move to the north part of Oahu in order to get that training done. Their presence is in the south part of Oahu adjacent to where my headquarters is. That added essentially another node, and that will give us a great benefit also to tie in -- We've got a fairly large assigned Army Reserve structure and that's unique among the Army's field commands. So having that standing command, the 9th Mission Support Command at Shafter Flats, this enables their readiness as well, and ties them into the broader network.

DWG: Thank you, General.

When do you anticipate a THAAD system being deployed in South Korea, and what advantages do you see in that regard as the concern about North Korea's missiles increase?

Gen. Brooks: Let me begin by simply talking about the concern about North Korea, its capabilities and its demonstrated willingness to use force. That's our biggest concern, as we saw in the provocation that happened in August, how far North Korea's willing to go. That's a very dangerous proposition. So knowing that we have long range ballistic missile capabilities, potentially even nuclear capabilities that we can't certify yet, but we have every expectation that they're moving that way. We have to have defenses in place.

Now your specific question has to do with the Republic of Korea. I really can't address that. That is the kind of discussion that the Republic of Korea is going to have, is having, will have if they're interested, with the U.S. government. We nevertheless maintain the capability, if asked to do that, if invited to come to the Korean Peninsula with that capability.

The number of THAAD batteries continues to grow, but slowly, and the importance of maintaining both the skill and preparation and how we build an integrated air and missile defense network with partners in the region and within the U.S. force jointly continues to be a concern for us.

So we haven't been asked to do that. We do have the THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Air Defense battery in Guam, and are proceeding towards a permanent stationing of that element in Guam.

They are technically rotational right now. We have one year long deployments from a composite task force, built primarily around a THAAD battery with additional leadership that's put on top of security forces, so it's a composite element there in Guam. And we want to get out of a rotational basis for that and get into a permanent station basis, so we'll be stationed in Guam. That will relieve some of the personnel and deployment tempo for the THAAD community and will make it possible for us to have more options for commitment of THAAD in other places in they've asked.

DWG: And is that, the desire to place a system there permanently, is that also driven by increased concerns about North Korea? OR is it more of a readiness and manpower issue?

Gen. Brooks: It's first about making sure we have a continuous presence, and this is important because we think about how we fund operations nowadays. We want as much as possible to use base budget funding and move further away from overseas contingency funding of our operations. The Pacific has generally not benefited significantly from overseas contingency operations but when you think about why that element is there it's because of a particular contingency that we have to be prepared for,

and that's an immediate provocation by North Korea especially that threatens U.S. bases, U.S. territories and regional partners.

So how should that be funded? Right now it's base. And our ability to have sufficient funding for a unit that comes from Fort Bliss or Fort Hood and picking up and going to Guam where it is not in periodic training cycles but in continuous operating readiness demands us to think about that base differently. So there's a fiscal aspect to this also.

The more costs we have to apply to rotation, the fewer dollars we have to apply to actual operations. So it's deterrence and preparedness against an existing threat, being able to operate continuously. And also it's a fiscal and manpower related consideration.

DWG: Genera, since Japan officially [reappropriated] its constitution to allow for more partnering with the United States, what have you seen that's different at the operational level? Is Japan increasing its cooperation in operations with Pacific Pathways?

Gen. Brooks: The Japan Self Defense Force I'd say is in the midst of transformation as are many of the militaries in the region. They've recognized the need for thinking more about how they cooperate among their various Self Defense Forces, so we're seeing a greater interest in what we'll refer to as joint operations, but that's perhaps too broad because it doesn't match the way the U.S. conducts joint operations. But let's say multi-service cooperation is increasing in the Self Defense Forces. A reorganization of their force structure so that they have modular units that can be tailored and task organized very differently.

I'd say that we've had a very strong relationship with the Ground Self Defense Force in my two years, and a couple of things that are notable about that. First is the increased dialogue in multilateral venues. So where we before were focused on a bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship, in many cases that has blossomed into trilateral and multilateral relationships, beginning with the U.S.-Australia-Japan relationship, for example. We continue to provide strong encouragement to see an improved U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea relationship. We've seen Japan increasing its own relationships with countries like the Philippines and the reconciliation of the well-remembered history of what happened. That has been demonstrated as something that Japan is ready to move past. Acknowledge but move past. And that other countries in the region for the most part are willing to begin moving forward as well, each in their own way with their own degrees of comfort.

We're also seeing, we have a great partnership with them for airborne forces. Our airborne forces in Alaska, for example, cooperate with the airborne forces in Hokkaido, a northern island of Japan. And that becomes very important when we talk about high altitude, cold weather joint forcible entry capability.

There's an increase in their focus on amphibious capability development led by our United States Marine Corps in cooperation with their Self Defense Forces also. So a lot of things are happening with Japan.

At the same time the focus is on Japan being able to defend itself. As we see, the legislation for peace and security was just passed a few months ago, does open the door for how they approach their relationships, but the focus is still [defensive].

DWG: If I could just ask a follow-up. In 2013 it was reported that bilateral U.S.-Japan defense talks at the Secretary level, that then Secretary Hagel urged Japan to not develop offensive capabilities. Has that changed? Is that still the U.S. position? How do you define offensive capabilities?

Gen. Brooks: I don't think we've really changed our position. The encouragement is really working with an ally on how it fits in the region and how the region views it. So I think the real expression here is one of careful development.

Offensive is in many ways a matter of intended purpose and mindset. We've heard very clearly from our Japanese colleagues, and my particular counterpart is the Chief of the Ground Self Defense Force. Their focus is defensive in nature, and that's to protect Japan, its territories and its interests.

Having said that, their ability and their authorities to cooperate with the United States if the United States is threatened, that certainly has changed in the recent months of legislative change. But of course that's being debated still inside of Japan and we very carefully do not push them in any direction too fast, and to move carefully with them as they're shaping their capabilities.

So one of the key ones is how they command and control their operations. We're in the middle of an exercise right now. As I mentioned, 1st Corps from Joint Base Lewis McCord is participating in Exercise Yamasakura. This is an exercise that happens every year. It is one that involves usually one of the regional armies of Japan, one of the five regional armies. This year it involves two different armies, so the cross-army cooperation is a change. There's cooperation and collaboration. There's a passing of knowledge and lessons from one year to the next. And the U.S. of course is the perennial partner in helping to bring this capability forward, and we've seen some advances in capability as a result of this.

DWG: General, I'd like you to take a step back and get out of the seaweeds of your current geographic command for a moment. From this side of the path you've had a pretty interesting career as a PAO. The older folks around the table may remember you as the face of Army Central Command during the 2003 and post-invasion. I'm wondering what you think about what's happening in Iraq now, all these years later. Then you became Chief of Army Public Affairs. Do your fellow four stars view you as an SME on dealing with the press? Has this been a blessing or a curse for your career?

And finally, you're the first four star there for the Army. How has that changed how you do your job and what you can accomplish in that billet?

Gen. Brooks: First, I am a recovering public affairs officer. The spokesperson experience was really an important, informative experience for me. Of course it was an

operations job, but I was the spokesperson without a doubt, and certainly got to appreciate even more how important it is for us to have an interface with the media and with the public. I learned a lot then, and I certainly did not become a subject matter expert. I just became experienced.

Hoping to move us forward in that as possible, when I was in the Joint Staff I was hopeful to have a departure from the Pentagon and go to combat with the 3rd Infantry Division in 2004, and was asked to stay on instead and move from the Joint Staff to the Army Staff and become the Chief of Public Affairs, which is not the kind of thing I would asked to have done, but I'm grateful that it happened. So I learned even more about the importance of this interface, and frankly, some of you who were around then may recall I used to speak quite a bit about the importance of the Army, and I'll speak for the Army, communicating with the public as directly as possible, while also making sure we're informing the press. Because it was our obligation, and we should not just yield that, ask someone else to speak on our behalf. We should speak also for ourselves.

Some of my colleagues considered that that was valuable experience and might consult me on it. I would say that we have had a very good track record of what happens with Chiefs of Public Affairs since then. I mentioned the 1st Corps Commander who's out in Japan right now. That's Lieutenant General Steve Lanza, who was also a Chief of Public Affairs. The Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division right now and the task force that responded to the Ebola crisis, a former Chief of Public Affairs of the United States Army. So there are several who have continued to serve, and our view is that we need to have leaders who have at least some experience. Not necessarily expertise, but experience in how to communicate publicly. So I think that has created a bit more of a culture of engagement. We still struggle with it as a service, but that nevertheless is there.

So I'd say overall for me it has been an asset, and I try to exhibit cultural engagement whenever I can.

On the four-star piece, it's very interesting. As I mentioned, we've got 117 years out there, so there have been ebbs and flows of all sorts of things in terms of how many troops we have out there, even how many four stars. So in the '70s we had four Army four stars. One in Korea, two in Vietnam, and one in Hawaii. And U.S. Army Pacific did have a four-star from 1957 to 1974.

After that time with the reduction of our forces in Vietnam and a very clear shift in our policy but a continued presence nevertheless, although at reduced scale, the position was lowered at first to a two-star position, then rose back up to a three-star position, and for many years there was a case laid forward on why it was important to have a four-star level command in Hawaii.

I'm fortunate that I was asked to move into the position as the four-star authority was returned, and that happened, of course, in the summer of 2013. It has made a difference. I have great respect for my predecessors who did the same work as lieutenant generals, but some more doors have opened as a result of the four-star level,

with Ministers of Defense, in some cases with heads of state, with Chiefs of the defense services in most countries, as well as access to the Army leaders in the region. And frankly, I think many of the countries in the region look to the United States as kind of an honest broker and a big brother. So an experienced military that they can turn to for advice and insights. And as a result of that our ability to, if you will, convene the huddle among various countries like our recent Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference or the Annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar. We bring people together. Or the Land Forces of the Pacific Symposium where we bring countries together and talk about issues of land forces has been enhanced by the four-star rank.

And certainly as we think about how we plan and conduct operations, the parity among the components of the air component, which is a four-star position, and I know General Robinson came through here not too long ago, General Lori Robinson, the maritime component and the land component now all have three four-star generals leading those functional components. So it alludes to the design that Admiral Locklear had also, Admiral Harris has carried forward, on functional competency in our operating style in addition to the very important service competency of providing for and generating training and equipping the various service forces that are out there. So it's been very helpful I that regard, to help us in warfighting.

DWG: I wanted to ask you about some recent comments that you've made, I believe it was last month, on the struggle you have with interoperability with the partners and allies in the region. So my question to you is what are you doing or what can you do to get after that problem at the moment?

Gen. Brooks: I often talk about the nature of interoperability and I try to simply define it as the ease with which we can work with other countries. There are several different characteristics of that.

First what we try to work on is in each one of those areas the technical interoperability that is necessary, where we try to encourage countries to procure or develop systems that can operate with our technically. Ideally, the same systems. Ideally, American systems. And that has happened in some cases.

We try to work through our exercises to achieve a procedural interoperability where our method of posting graphics or our method of providing updates and reports, our method of coordinating responses in a disaster response scenario, will be similar to theirs and that's why we practice it together. That's why these exercises are so important to build some degree of interoperability, the ability to work together easily.

We also seek where possible to get policy limitations that might constrain our ability to work together, relaxed when it's appropriate to do so. So when we think about things like DTTI as an initiative that allows for technology transfer with several militaries in the region, that goes a long way toward helping us build this kind of interoperability.

We also have to be thoughtful. In the Pacific we have a, I don't know if it's unique but it's certainly a complex challenge in that while we have five of the U.S.' seven treaty

alliances, they're bilaterals. So we don't have a standing set of agreements on operations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has. [STANEX], we don't have that.

And frankly, there is still a great deficit of trust in the Indo-Asia Pacific region among the countries. So you don't know who your partners are going to be until the issue arises. And often if the United States is an active participant then there's a chance that the coalition will be broadened, but you don't know who it's going to be.

So the type of systems that are necessary for us to be able to receive any number of players and still have our networks protected would still enable the partners that come out there, demands for some technological solutions, and we're in conversation with industry and with our acquisition team mates on what we need. So that's what we're doing about it. We're trying to articulate the problem, find creative work-arounds, which our soldiers are always able to do, they always find a work-around.

I gave one example of something I saw during my first Pacific Pathways Operation. It was done in Indonesia. You had the technical interoperability of the same FM radios, the Harris ANPRC 117-Golf Radio. Great. Two different countries working together, you got the same radio, we can actually talk to each other. However, we had a linguistic challenge at the other end of it. So even though their radios could talk to each other the people couldn't on either end of it. And our people found a way to work around it, so they actually exchanged individuals. We had some of our soldiers that spoke Bahasa Indonesian. They were then posted to be with the commanders of the Indonesian units so that orders being transferred in either direction would be less likely to be misinterpreted. The same thing, they had some Indonesian soldiers who spoke English and they were posted with the American leaders. And that gave us the ability to literally have a U.S. Infantry company underneath of an Indonesian battalion commander issuing orders to a U.S. and Indonesian platoon in a live fire with Hind helicopters and Apaches over top of them, beside a farm that was still active, on a non-standard range with troops on the ground and assault underneath a direct fire. It was pretty complex work.

Our troops will find ways to work around it. What we need is also some technological, procedural and policy support to make that possible.

DWG: And just to, I just wanted to follow up on something you said earlier about how you're leveraging existing funds in order to pay for Pacific Pathways. I'm wondering if you could elaborate a little bit about where you're pulling the funds from elsewhere for that.

Gen. Brooks: Some of them we've had to ask for. We think that for about \$39 million a year above the exercise costs we can conduct three operations. Each one of them is about \$13 million, and given three of them a year, about \$39 million. That did make it to the Program Objective Memorandum for the years '18 to '22, and we're asking to have that preserved.

In the mean time we've had to find other ways to fund it. So for '14 and '15, the first two years that we did this, the first two fiscal years, we had to move funds inside of the command. Some of that was by cost avoidance and cost savings. There is a cost savings, for example, in the approach to Pacific Pathways. Whereas we would normally have to prepare a unit for Pacific Pathways, generally fly that unit to the place where the exercise would be conducted, conduct the exercise with exercise dollars, and then fly it back; then pick a different unit for the second exercise and do the same sequence again; and then a third unit for the third exercise and do it again. What we consolidated is the transportation.

So the very first one was done with a commercial contracted vessel, contracted by the U.S. Transportation Command who provides us our transportation, and it moved us all three -- one vessel, one purchase, one time. It ended up being a cost savings. You've got to pay for that. You've got to pay for the vessel up front, but in time it was a cost savings and allowed us to carry a much larger payload than we would have if we were only going to fly back and forth with people. So larger exercise contingent. A greater capability. It included things like Stryker vehicles and helicopters which we previously were not including. You just wouldn't see those west of the International Date Line from the U.S. Army.

So that was the first example of it.

The second one we did was done with a gray-hulled ship, a U.S. Navy ship, again provided by U.S. Transportation Command as a mechanism for that crew and U.S. Transportation Command to build readiness in its own fleet. They've got legal requirements to balance what is contracted and what is done with naval ships. They took that into account and deemed that that one would be useful. That ended up carrying U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps equipment to exercises that we were doing commonly. It also ended up moving as we transported some of our Pacific Pathways troops to Korea, it backhauled some of the munitions we were trying to take off the Korean Peninsula. One vessel for five or six missions. So this is how we're moving money around. We're getting greater and greater leverage off of existing activity and building opportunities for other partners to generate readiness themselves. They would already be committing dollars for readiness. And they might not be transporting our efforts. It might be doing a sail out just to keep their ships in good order. Having them transport cargo to a mission while getting the same kind of mileage requirements, there's readiness in two categories. So we're finding we're getting more and more partners who are willing to come work with us in Pacific Pathways as a result.

DWG: I actually have a follow-up question on Pacific Pathways. You've talked about how you're funding more exercises. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about how those exercises are evolving, or how you hope to see Pacific Pathways evolving over time.

Gen. Brooks: We've described Pacific Pathways as part innovation, a new way of doing what we were doing before, which is our exercises in the region. And part experimentation. The experimentation is using these different methods of conveyance,

using different configurations of the force, bringing in other concepts where we can like are we going to sequentially move from one country to another? Are we going to move the division-level headquarters that controls these operations with them? Should we keep them in one place and move the unit around it in a region? What if we project in the opposite direction? So each one of these things is a different experiment.

The exercises are the basis upon which we do this. So do we have an agreement to do an exercise with Country A, B, and C? But how can we use that exercise as an opportunity to experiment?

Upcoming, we will participate in what the United States Army is engaged in. There's a campaign of leaning that the U.S. Army is engaged in and it includes everything from concepts development to actual techniques that are being shaken out to address the 20 Army warfighting challenges that emerged from our recently created Army Operating Concept. And we live many of those in the Pacific every day, so this year the Army will conduct an Army Warfighting Assessment, which is one of the deliberate methods to evaluate the Army as it is against what we want the Army to be by 2025, and that will be done in the Pacific. We'll use the existing activities that we have ongoing in the Pacific as the environment, the scenario, to be assessed and evaluated. And that will include several experimental activities. Supporting the projection of some of our regional partners into exercises that are occurring in the United States. Up to this point it's been our U.S.-based forces from Alaska, Washington State and Hawaii being projected into the region in Pacific Pathways. And while we'll do that twice this year, we'll have one of them that is concentrated on assisting three of our regional partners to project into a U.S. location, linking up with a U.S. force and conducting one of the U.S.-based exercises. That's an experiment. It also very clearly helps to export some of this knowledge on how do you organize, assemble, project forces. That can be very important as we think about what are the skill sets that are required to build the coalition. That's what we'll do this year.

DWG: If I could do a quick follow-up. You spoke a little about experimentation, and last year Army helicopter pilots made news doing training exercises with the Navy and doing cross [inaudible] and practicing operations there. So I'm wondering if you might be able to talk a little bit about that and how that might evolve. Are there plans to do more of that in the future?

Gen. Brooks: There are plans to do that.

First, we find that the way our operations need to occur in the Pacific and everywhere else in the world is we do it jointly. Where we can provide the capabilities of one service into the facilitation of operations by another service. That's where our competitive advantage is, frankly. That's our skill set in joint operations. So we know that things like Apache helicopters or even unmanned aerial systems like the Gray Eagle can make a difference if integrated correctly into maritime spaces, in support of maritime surface action.

We also know that we can do extended range medical evacuation, if we had a mass casualty at sea but needed to transport a large number of casualties and patients to land-based hospitals. So we practice those kinds of things.

We did participate in the world's largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific, in 2014 and we'll do that again in 2016 with our maritime partners.

So that's simply adding capability to the joint team. It doesn't displace anything. It's actually filling holes that are not otherwise able to be filled. We will continue to do that, and we think it's important in the Pacific region for our aviators to be experienced in over-water operations. So whether it's on the Korean Peninsula or it's off the coast of Alaska, it's going into the Arctic Circle, which we have to be prepared to do, or whether it's operating from Hawaii or anywhere else. Guam, doing work with our partners in Southeast Asia. All of them would demand that we have the ability to operate across traditional domains. So aviation in support of land operations is not all we do. The joint team and the operating environment demand that we are more agile and going cross-domain and bringing capabilities to bear. So we will do more of that as time goes on.

We've had to slow down some of that, to be honest with you, as we've gone through the Aviation Restructure Initiative, and some of the implementation of that as we're evaluating that at multiple levels nationally. So we are changing the configuration of aviation in the Pacific, particularly with an increase in the Apache helicopter being brought on board. So as that is fulfilled between now and 2018, that will increase the number of systems that are similarly equipped. It will increase the opportunities for partnering with other countries who have purchased the Apache helicopter, most recently Indonesia and India have chosen, I'm just using that one example of the Apache helicopter. There are others. That's one example of where we will have increased opportunity to share knowledge and skills and help to build the capacity of some of our regional friends in a better way.

DWG: Believe it or not, we're now down to 12 minutes remaining so we're going to have to go into the speed round at this point, forego the follow-ups, and we'll get to as many people as we can starting with Paul and then Jim.

DWG: You talk about exercises and operations and the experience that gives your soldiers, very much the same way that a combat commander talks about doing combat deployments. I'd be interested to get your perspective on how you need to be careful with that kind of rhetoric, and whether adversaries in the region like China have, what kinds of reactions they have when you have these sorts of operations.

Gen. Brooks: Well, we're known to have a lot of combat experience also, and we have that conversation frequently with the Chinese. They value that and they want to learn from our experiences. So that's interesting. We always make sure we highlight the realities of combat, not the glorious parts of combat that might be a bit more of a romantic notion of combat.

The readiness that we build we think is important, so we don't want to ever bluster, that's not useful. Rather, we simply are being realistic that it is generating readiness for us. Our edge gets sharper in the things that we need to do, and we still seek to be kind of a guarantor of peace, prosperity and stability in the region, not a threat.

Having said that, the capability to protect our interests should be evident. So we want to keep it balanced in that regard. That's been our American tradition anyway, but we want to keep it balanced. We have not found a negative reaction of the kind you may be alluding to in the question of having to be very careful about offending others. Rather, we have to be careful about being honest that hey, we don't know everything. We still have a lot to learn, too. That's why we're doing these exercises. We're still learning and training too. And some of that we can do together. We have things to learn from every one of the militaries in the region. There are things that they have to offer, so really communicating from a basis of mutual respect as professionals has been more effective than bluster on our behalf. That's how I'd address that.

I've got to give you one story, though, and I know we're into speed dating here, but --

There we were in the Guangzhou Military Region on Hainan Island with members of the Guangzhou Military Region conducting an HADR event. We had about 200 soldiers between the PLA and the U.S. on the ground together, working together, and I had lunch with a young woman who was a PLA soldier, a sergeant. So I asked her, what made you choose to join the PLA? I wanted to serve my country. I want to protect my country. That's great. And I wanted to go to combat. The Guangzhou Military Region Commander is a combat veteran from operations in Vietnam and was wounded in action there. He was sitting beside me, she was sitting beside me on the other side. I said to, I kind of looked at him and said, I guess she has to be careful what she's asking for. And I just talked to her about the realities of combat. And I can understand that every warrior wants to be challenged [inaudible], we all feel that way, but be careful what you're asking for. You're going to say goodbye to a lot of people you love and you really care for. This is why we have to have a relationship, so that we don't carelessly run into combat.

Sorry about that.

DWG: You mentioned your cooperative relationship with the land Army in China, but can you tell me a little bit about where you see their Army going in terms of organization, training and missions. Are they trying to become more deployable? Where do you see them --

Gen. Brooks: The People's Liberation Army?

DWG: Right.

Gen. Brooks: They've certainly expressed to us their desire to build smaller, modular formations. This is a movement that really almost all militaries in the region are undertaking. Smaller modular units and being more adept at task organizing them.

They have an expressed desire to increase their ability to conduct joint operations more skillfully. They want to use the U.S. model. We have some restrictions on that so we really can't have that discussion with them at the present time. In due time, if our relationship unfolds the right way we might have that conversation, and we've shared that with them. That under the National Defense Authorization Act 2000, that's not a subject we can go into with them. But I acknowledge your desire and your interest in that.

So these are the things that they're looking at. Greater jointness, more modular, the ability to move from different regions and operate that way.

They're on a journey for that. How they commit their resources to do that we'll have to watch and see. A lot of their resourcing is going into technology and technological advancements, especially in the air and maritime spaces and missile spaces. Less so, thus far, in our observation in building these different capabilities. So will they do that by the compression of reduced resources in their Army that then causes them to think about it in a different way? There certainly will be a pressure for that. So that is yet to be seen.

We've had some conversations. I went and spoke at the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army in January of last year, and there's a great interest and great curiosity out there in thinking through some of these complex problems. So I know that's what they're contending with, and to the extent that we're allowed to work with them we will, and where we have limitations, we'll stop.

DWG: I just wanted to ask about Burma. What do you see as the prospects of increased military to military cooperation or relationship there? Also to follow up on [inaudible], how much of an issue is the [inaudible] modernization of the Patriot system in Korea? And does that increase the need for the [THAAD] deployment there? And again, how much interest is there by the Japanese in the theater?

Gen. Brooks: First, Burma I think has potential. We've had a few fits and starts. We always operate within the envelope that policy allows us to, so when I first came into command I can recall being at an ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus event that was held in Hawaii. Secretary Hagel was the host of that event, and all the component commanders were invited to come. I literally had leaders from other militaries grabbing me by the hand and pulling me to the Burmese general who was there. The region really wants the United States to engage Burma and help them to move forward.

Now we have to move at the pace we're allowed to. They had their own issues. We had some additional human rights concerns that came up, we had the elections, all those things have caused us to be ready to move forward, but we haven't advanced very rapidly thus far. I think there's good potential, so we'll await policy guidelines on that. But it's a relationship that I really want us to have and I'm eager to be allowed to do that.

I've had one of my generals able to go and speak at their War College but I certainly would like to do more direct engagement myself and just kind of spend a bit more time

with them. We think there's an opportunity for us with Burma and with other militaries, even Sri Lanka as we're reopening our relationship, to export our professionalism. It's something that's well worth exporting, and our relationship with the media, our relationship with the public, our relationship with civilian control, our relationship with the approach to governance. WE think those things are worthy of export.

On THAAD, you asked specifically about Patriot upgrades and how that would affect THAAD decisions. I think they're really two different issues. So we are encouraging the upgrade of the Patriots anyway and how Republic of Korea would consider what additional defenses are needed, we'll wait and see where they think they want to go on that. Japan has an interest in that, obviously, and knowing that Japan is protected. But I've not been in any discussions with Japan about THAAD myself.

DWG: Lalit then we'll have to unfortunately finish up with Kuniyaki.

DWG: Thank you. [Inaudible]. Can you elaborate further on what kind of [inaudible].

Gen. Brooks: We begin with an annual executive steering group that decides what our agreed-to actions are going to be in a given year. I attend that personally. I've got an upcoming one in India here in I guess February.

From that we determine what do we want to work on together? I would say within that we've seen one key event that has been a perennial event for us to engage and that's Exercise UWS. Call it YA UWS. This has been the primary carrier for the U.S.-India relationship. Generally it's a peacekeeping scenario that has some traditional military activity inside of it and we alternate where it's done each year. One year it's in India, the next year it's in the United States, next year India, et cetera. We just concluded one in Washington State a few months ago, a very useful exercise. A larger contingent from India than we've previously had. The reason for that was because in our executive steering group we'd had a discussion about the potential for the Indian Army being transported by the Indian Air Force to Washington State with one of their new C-17 aircraft. And once there, that would create an opportunity for the Indian Air Force that transported them to have an exchange with a United States C-17 squadron and wing at the Joint Base Lewis-McCord. And they did that. On their own volition they coordinated this out and we were very pleased to see that as an increase. So a larger contingent came to UWS and a greater joint value came out of that exercise. The next one we do will be in India.

So we remain committed to those kinds of exercises as the foundation of a hot relationship. But cooperation in other areas, I mentioned the purchase of the Apache helicopter, an increase in Chinook helicopters, the M777 Howitzer co-production arrangement. These are all U.S. Army systems, and each one of them opens the door to a partner, if not an actual twin. The difference for me would be, a partner is a unit that's similarly equipped that we bring in for a period of time, but they don't have a long-term relationship. A twin is someone that literally grows with them. So one of our M777

Howitzer equipped units that's continuously related to one of their M777 Howitzer units over time. So we have the potential to do all of that.

Having said that, we'll move at the pace that our government allows us to move and we really want to have the pace set by India in this case. We're able to move as fast or as slow as they want us to at a given point in time because we have the resources in the region to do that now and that's a great opportunity for us.

By the way, humanitarian assistance and disaster response is a very important area of cooperation. We certainly saw that in the Nepal earthquake response where as we had anticipated, we had already been having these conversations with Nepal and with India and with China, that we would find ourselves one day on a rubble pile in Nepal and we should work together.

Right now we're in bilateral exercises and we do hope at some point in time to try to get to a multilateral exercise that prepares us for the next time that that occurs.

DWG: If you can allow me to cycle back to [inaudible] Japanese Ministry of Defense, Japan's Minister of Defense, notified [inaudible] he had an interest in the procuring of [inaudible] in the future. You said that you don't have any position formed [inaudible]. If the Japanese government decides to introduce a third missile into their soil, so do you think [inaudible] the U.S. Army, the U.S. military in terms of defending or enhance peace and security in the region given the fact that North Korea is aiming at Japan and U.S. bases in Japan as well as in Chinese missile buildup [inaudible] mainland China?

Gen. Brooks: Well anything that increases the defenses in the region against especially the North Korean threat is helpful. So again, I have not had any discussions about that with Japan. There may be some things that are being considered. I would suspect that it wouldn't be the only thing that they were considering. So an enhanced air defense scheme for Japan ideally integrated with a U.S. integrated air and missile defense system is I think what we're really after.

Clearly, Japan is in range and would be threatened, has been threatened, will be threatened again, and I think our ability to work through that is what's emerging right now.

We have a close relationship with the Air Assault Defense Force which preserves most of the Japanese air defense capability. We have in U.S. Army all the land based, principally the land based air defense capability, and we're working very closely with them right now. So we'd have to see which way that goes. That has not been one of the detailed discussions that I've been involved in.

DWG: Sir, clearly we could benefit from more time, but we do thank you for what you were able to offer today and we'd love to have you back sooner rather than later. It's been great.

Gen. Brooks: I appreciate it. Thank you all very much. Have a great day.

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