Many American scholars and pundits have recently concluded that the United States’ 40-year engagement strategy has failed to guide China to embark on the path of liberal democracy. Therefore, some scholars suggest that the United States separate itself from China, possibly through a policy of economic “disengagement,” or perhaps return to the containment policy. Such policies, however, could backfire and would not be conducive to China’s interests or to those of the United States and the Western world. It is still entirely possible for the United States to facilitate China on a path toward further political diversification, economic liberalization, integration with the Western world, and compliance with international rules.

Recently, Chinese attitudes toward the United States have become increasingly negative, according to surveys by some polling companies. Nationalist views dominate China’s internet and social media, and Chinese scholars who advocate friendly relations with the United States are afraid to air their views. Some Americans believe that this phenomenon is the result of the Chinese government’s policies of ideological control and news censorship. However, this is not the case. If the cause of the problem cannot be properly identified, misunderstanding and hostility between China and the United States will increase, causing more concern.

Misunderstanding China’s Anti-Americanism

Since the 1970s, the reasoning behind the United States’ adoption of the engagement policy toward China was based on three conditions. First, the two
countries could work together to resist the expansion of the Soviet Union. Second, the two could benefit from each other in economic and trade cooperation. Third, the United States believed it could make China more open and democratic through engagement.

The policy of engagement has brought about major changes in the lives of the Chinese people. Forty years ago, the private space of Chinese people was heavily interfered by the party-government, while today, Chinese people are free to choose their own careers, set up private enterprises, or express online dissatisfaction with government policies. Significant changes have also taken place in China’s political system. Forty years ago, China’s political system had nothing different from that of the Soviet Union, while today the deputies to the People’s Congress can criticize government officials sharply.

However, it seems as though the three conditions mentioned above no longer exist. In particular, many American politicians and academics complain that China’s democratization has not progressed in the last decade, and that China’s political system has not been continuing to move in the direction toward which the US has aimed.3

It could easily be assumed that the Chinese government’s control over information and censorship of news has both slowed China’s move toward democratization and led to misunderstanding among young Chinese netizens about the United States, influencing the rise of their nationalist and anti-American sentiments. The Chinese government has recently strengthened its control over various websites and social media platforms. However, the government only deletes articles that directly attack or defame the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and rarely deletes articles that rationally criticize certain policies of the government.

In China’s social media, many articles that criticize China’s domestic and foreign policies or that defend the United States are constantly being shared every day; these articles are even more popular than the articles published in the official media. Fifteen years ago, China had no social network sites. Ten years ago, Chinese people started using Renren, which is similar to Facebook. In the early 2010s, Renren was replaced by WeChat, which has since been installed on the mobile phone of almost every young Chinese citizen. Although the Chinese government has strengthened its control over what is published, only the articles and opinions on the social network that contain “sensitive words” will be deleted, and others could be easily disseminated among the netizens. The Chinese government simply does not have the ability to let any voice
dominate public opinion, nor can it eliminate all voices that are not conducive to the government. Instead, it must tolerate the diversification of views and opinions. The Chinese government has also made subtle changes to high school textbooks, such as downplaying the negative evaluation of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. However, the help that the United States provided China was not deleted from the textbooks. For example, the textbooks make it clear that the Open Door policy proposed by the United States in 1899 saved China from being divided by European powers. In 1908, the United States returned the Boxer Indemnity to China to support the development of Chinese education. At the Washington Conference in 1922, the United States helped China maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity by foiling Japan’s attempt to occupy Shandong province. After 1931, the US government opposed Japan’s occupation of Chinese territory, and in the 1940s, it sacrificed a large number of soldiers in the Pacific War and sent the Flying Tigers air force to China. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United States shared information with China to help it cope with the expansion of the Soviet Union. These historical facts are clearly written in textbooks. This is why many Chinese people were insulted when US Vice President Mike Pence listed these well-known facts in a speech to China in early October 2018; they already knew the information and felt they were being lectured to in a condescending manner.

China’s Pursuit of Democracy

The United States and other Western countries typically hold three inaccurate perceptions of China. The first is that the CCP and its leadership do not allow the Chinese people to enjoy democratic rights. The second is that Chinese civilization and tradition are incompatible with liberal democracy, making change impossible. The third is that the Chinese have not yet experienced the Enlightenment, so they have no basis for liberal democracy and are less prone to fight for democratic rights. The fact is, however, that these views exaggerate not only the differences between the Chinese and Western cultures but also the differences between the Chinese people and its government. Chinese civilization and democracy are naturally compatible, and the Chinese people’s desire for democracy has lasted for more than 100 years.

China’s modern history is divided into two stages. The first was from 1840 to 1919. China was defeated by Great Britain in the first Opium War in the 1840s and again by the British and French forces in the second Opium War in the 1850s. Chinese emperors, ministers, officials, and scholars agreed that China’s technological backwardness led to China’s fiasco. Thus, from the 1860s to the 1890s, the Chinese leadership launched the Westernization Movement to learn
advanced Western technology. However, China was defeated by Japan in the 1890s, thereby causing Chinese scholars to believe that China failed not merely on account of its backwardness of technology, but also on account of its authoritarian and corrupt political system.

Nearly 100 years ago, China became the first non-Western nation to establish a democratic regime. In 1911, Sun Yat-sen led the Revolution, overthrew the autocracy, and established the Republic of China, the first democratic regime in Asia. Thus, nearly 100 years ago, China became the first nation in the non-Western world to establish a democratic regime. This came about as a direct result of the Chinese people’s active interest to learn about Western culture. It was not transplanted by force by other countries or under the demands or coercion of Western powers.

After 1911, China’s democracy suffered many setbacks, but the Chinese never gave up on the pursuit of democracy. Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of China, believed that the parliamentary system led to administrative inefficiency, so at the suggestion of Frank Goodnow, then-president of Johns Hopkins University, he declared himself the emperor in 1916. The Chinese people refused to accept this return to monarchy, so his rule was quickly overthrown. The Chinese soon discovered, however, that democracy did not solve all of their problems.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the United States, Britain, and France did not prevent Japan from occupying the Shandong Peninsula of China. This incensed the Chinese people, and the well-known May Fourth Movement broke out. The Chinese finally realized that without a strong central government, China could not guarantee that it would not be bullied by foreign countries. Therefore, the Chinese significantly altered their views on democracy; they wanted to build a regime that could maintain a balance between the rights of individuals and the power of the government. As demonstrated by the Revolution of 1911—which eliminated the autocracy—concepts such as natural rights, democratic elections, local autonomy, and constitutionalism were deeply rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people. Nevertheless, the Chinese quickly discovered that without a strong nation, democratic rights were meaningless.

As a result, debates on how to make the country stronger began. Sun Yat-sen and others advocated a three-step process: first, defeat the warlords by force; then, establish a centralized government and a strong army; and finally, give the people the right to vote. Chen Jiongming and others had different views. He argued that a federal system similar to that of the United States should be established. However, many in the elite class did not endorse Chen because the warlords in
the provinces were reluctant to give up their vested interests and refused to establish a federation. Eventually, after Sun’s death, his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, turned Sun’s political proposition into reality and established a centralized government. With the aid of the United States, China defeated Japan in 1945 and became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

However, the Chiang government did not enjoy the support of the Chinese people. For one thing, the government did not substantially unify the country. At that time, Xinjiang, Tibet, and many provinces refused to obey the government’s decree. In addition, Chiang did not solve the problem of the gap between the rich and the poor in China; he specifically refused to protect the interests of the peasants, who accounted for the majority of the Chinese population. Certainly, it is hard to consider a government that cannot solve the gap between the rich and the poor as a democratic one. Thus, Chiang was destined to be overthrown and replaced by a new government that could truly safeguard national unity and protect the interests of the poor.

The Principle of “Great Unification”

What the Chinese are most proud of is the “Great Unification.” The period of unification in Chinese history lasted intermittently from the second century BC to today. Although the Chinese overthrew the emperor in the early 20th century and established a democratic-based republic, no one wanted to see division or instability in the country. The population was even willing to sacrifice their democratic rights to maintain the unity and stability of the nation. During the era of the Republic of China (1911–1949), China’s reunification and stability was not only not guaranteed, but the democratic rights of the vast majority of farmers and workers were also not reliably protected.

The Chinese people value their democratic rights, but they are more concerned about the unity of the nation. Maintaining the “Great Unification” means having a strong central government and a strong army to punish separatists. This is why Chinese and Westerners have a different understanding of democracy. It is often assumed that the Chinese did not strive to pursue democracy or that the Chinese government did not allow the Chinese to have democratic rights. However, in looking at China’s history of the past 150 years, it becomes clear that democracy and China are naturally compatible. The difference is that
Americans believe that individual rights come before the power of the state, and the logic of the Chinese is just the opposite, although Chinese also care about their rights, especially the rights that influence and restrain the behavior of the government.

However, the “Great Unification” was the highest ethic of ancient China and the source of the legitimacy of all dynasties. In other words, once a regime joined China, it was considered legitimate. The two dominant political theories of ancient China, Confucianism and Legalism, held that the “Great Unification” principle was to be valued above all else. Although Western values have had a great impact on China since the end of the 19th century, the country’s own traditional ethics still have a strong influence on China today. But the “Great Unification” does not contradict liberal democracy. Whether China will further embrace Western values in the future depends on if Western countries respect China’s traditional ethics.

**China Is Always Striving to Learn about the US**

In the 20th century, the Chinese would like to associate with the countries that respect the territorial integrity of China. After the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, Lenin promised to return the territory occupied by the Russian Empire to China. This is a promise that could not be fulfilled, but it made the Chinese at that time consider Russia as a holy place. Many Chinese went to Russia to study, causing Marxism to spread rapidly in China. Similarly, in 1922, the United States helped China maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity by thwarting Japan’s attempt to occupy Shandong. Then, the United States was a type of role model for China. Sun Yat-sen said in his last words that “We must unite with those countries that treat China equally,” by which he referred to the Soviet Union and the United States, distinguishing them from European powers and Japan. In the 1930s, Stalin divided with Japan the northern territories of China, making the Soviet Union’s reputation in China depraved, while the United States became the only country that substantially helped China fight against Japanese aggression. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States explicitly supported China in reclaiming all the territories occupied by Japan.

In the 1950s, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States blocked China’s reunification with Taiwan, leaving the American image in China in tatters. After that, China and the United States experienced twenty years of hostile relations from 1949 until Henry Kissinger’s visit to China in 1969 (and then-President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972). In the early 1970s, the United States informed China of the Soviet Union’s plan to invade China, and
in doing so, protected China’s security. This caused the Chinese to rediscover that Americans are trustworthy friends. Since then, the United States has continued to provide an exemplary regime and culture from which the Chinese can learn and benefit. To this day, the Chinese government sends a large number of officials to study in US universities, such as Harvard, every year, and China’s famous universities prefer hiring those who earn doctorates in the United States. The United States has, in turn, made important contributions in guiding China toward diversification and openness.

According to a Pew Research Center poll taken three years ago, the United States gets mixed reviews in China. Half give the United States a favorable rating, while 44 percent offer a negative one. Some scholars find that the Chinese view of the United States is two-faceted: US domestic culture and US foreign policy. The former image is largely positive, whereas the latter is distinctively negative. Those Chinese who criticize US policy toward China do not hate American values or its political system. Many people, in fact, like the United States; some have even studied or lived in the United States. But they are also patriots. They cannot tolerate US violations of Chinese values—in particular, the “Great Unification.” After 1922, the Chinese people grew increasingly fond of the United States because it helped China maintain unity, and after 1972, this goodwill rose rapidly because the United States essentially accepted China’s requirements for maintaining territorial integrity in the Shanghai Communiqué. Today, that same goodwill is fading as greater portions of the Chinese population feel that the United States does not accept Beijing’s stance on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. American politicians and scholars need to recognize this in order to prevent the gap between China and the United States from becoming wider.

The United States likens itself to “a city upon a hill,” and it does make a significant overall contribution to democracy and peace in the world. Today, most Chinese people would admit that the United States is the guarantor of the security of the world. Without the United States, the world would be in chaos. In principle, the Chinese are opposed neither to this role nor to liberal democracy in general, but they oppose the United States’ disrespect of China and its arrogant attitude when it addresses China.

Cultivating More Love for America in China

Like many other scholars, I have never agreed with Democratic Peace Theory, but I still believe that democracy and openness in both China and the United States will benefit relations between the two. Realists believe that the rise of China has led to US concerns and increased differences between the two
countries. However, China’s democratization could reduce these concerns and increase US security, which would also be in China’s interests.\textsuperscript{8} However, some of the current practices of the United States are counterproductive. The US failure to respect China’s future reunification is the main reason why Chinese people are opposed to the United States, and it is also the reason why it is difficult for Chinese to accept American values.\textsuperscript{9} In the eyes of Chinese nationalists, Washington adopts double standards in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, since the United States used to torture extremists in the war on terror, and Trump has adopted policies unfriendly to Muslims from many countries, among other questionable human rights records. Beijing’s domestic and foreign policies might not be correct or perfect, but this hypocrisy leads many in China to believe that the United States is not as concerned about human rights and instead has ulterior motives, namely trying to divide China. Washington should make it clear that it is not opposed to China’s unification, as many in China suspect, but rather is concerned about human rights. This clarification will restore some trust, and thus help further US interests in these areas.

The Taiwan issue is directly related to the interests of the United States, but the United States could also safeguard these interests while catering to those of China. The vast majority of Chinese believe that the United States has never given up its support for Taiwan’s separatism because the United States often sells weapons to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{10} I will not argue that the United States abandon its policy for Beijing to maintain the status quo, much less attempt to persuade the United States to acquiesce in Beijing’s use of force to unify Taiwan. However, the United States should, at least, explicitly condemn separatists and employ its position to promote dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan to achieve reunification (not necessarily unified by the CCP). If the United States were to do this, its interests would not be harmed. The Chinese, including both the people who support the CCP and those who dislike it, are eager for the Americans to make such a statement. This would boost America’s popularity among Chinese officials, scholars, and the general population.

In 2008, Washington pressured then-Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian’s government to abandon its policy of provocation against Beijing. Many Chinese were grateful for US help at that time. This spring, however, the White House and Capitol Hill instead have acted to encourage Taiwan’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, to continue with his provocations, which is dangerous for both
China and the United States. Since the US government recognizes the “One China” principle, it should also require Taipei to accept the “One China” principle. A Taiwan that recognizes the “One China” principle but maintains its autonomy is in the best interests of the United States, especially given President Trump’s attempt to influence China with trade policies. If the United States is willing to further accept Beijing’s request on the Taiwan issue, it is fully capable of making China concede in trade talks.

If Taipei accepts the “One China” policy, Beijing would find no excuse for using force to solve the Taiwan issue. I also suggest that Washington signal to Beijing that it would cut or stop military aid to Taiwan if Beijing promised to avoid the use of force on Taiwan. The United States does not need to make substantive changes in Taiwan policy at first, but it could make some verbal promises to Beijing. I do not want to try to convince Washington to accept Beijing’s standpoint entirely but rather suggest that it use its power to make some concessions to Beijing in areas that Beijing considers its core interests in exchange for Beijing’s concessions to Washington in areas outside China’s core interests in order to maximize the national interest of the United States.

Furthermore, although the US government has never publicly supported the separatist movement in Tibet, many Chinese believe that US policy toward Tibet is meant to undermine China’s unity. There is nothing to criticize about US concern for the human rights and religious freedom of Tibetans, but many Chinese believe that the real goal of the United States is to weaken China. There is nothing wrong with the United States asking the Chinese government to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama. However, the United States should at least explicitly declare that it denies the legitimacy of the Tibetan government-in-exile and state that it respects the unitary state system of China.

Washington should be aware that Beijing’s strategy regarding Tibet now is to attempt to appoint the next Dalai Lama. According to the custom that began in the seventeenth century, each Dalai Lama must be recognized by Beijing before coming into power. Although the exiled Tibetans would not agree with Beijing’s approach, Beijing has the capacity to convince most of the Chinese that its approach is in accordance with traditional procedure and customs. Therefore, Washington should take measures as soon as possible to move the Tibet issue in a favorable direction for the United States. If necessary, Washington should press the Dalai Lama to accept some of Beijing’s requirements. After the next Dalai Lama is appointed, the bargaining power of the exiled Tibetans with Beijing will be weakened. If the two sides reach an understanding before that happens, Beijing will be more likely to make some concessions and give Tibetans more autonomy.

Washington should focus on convincing the Chinese that it is genuinely concerned about human rights in Tibet and avoid making the Chinese think...
it is trying to split up China, even if Washington never had that intention. Washington should signal clearly to the Chinese that the United States would like to contribute to China’s unification, so that more Chinese will be grateful to it, giving it more opportunity to demand concessions from Beijing on other issues such as trade issues. Unfortunately, Trump recently signed the 2018 Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, which is cause for the Chinese to lose what minimal trust they had in the United States in this area.

The Xinjiang issue is also one of China’s core interests, and the United States should take a more cautious approach to it. Beijing does not deny that it is cracking down on terrorists in Xinjiang, and it has every reason to convince ordinary people that this is necessary. From 2010 to 2016, Beijing adopted a relatively moderate policy toward Xinjiang, but it proved to be a failure. Many Chinese at that time worried that the unity and security of the country were being threatened. After 2016, Beijing’s shift to tough policy has greatly improved security in Xinjiang. So even if Washington scolds Beijing’s policies, it is unlikely to make it re-adopt the policies as in 2010 to 2016. Nonetheless, Washington may be more successful in persuading Beijing to adopt a more moderate policy by making it clear that, in doing so, the United States is not attempting to divide China.

These are not arguments for the United States to abandon its efforts to promote its values. China simply requires respect for its unification, which itself is a value to China, from the United States. China has never rejected democracy, but the United States has always mistakenly believed that China has effectively done so because the CCP is unwilling to give up its own “dictatorship.” In fact, all governing problems in China must be understood from the perspective of maintaining a balance between unification and democracy.

There is still a lot of room for change in China, but the United States should make a greater effort to understand China’s values in order to further its own.

Avoiding the “Thucydides Trap” and Stability in China

Many Western scholars assume that news censorship and information control by the Chinese government have caused resentment of the United States in Chinese people. This is not the case. The Chinese government is not the source of the problem. In fact, the opposite may be true. On the internet, the vocal Chinese
are often more nationalistic themselves than the government, and you can often see they frequently criticize the government for being too weak. Some even worry that the Chinese government’s foreign policy will be hijacked by nationalism. The government has had to appease the people through official media in multiple instances to explain why it has not adopted excessively hawkish policies towards the United States, Japan, or India.

Chinese nationalism and anti-Americanism are not conducive to the interests of the United States. The CCP may sometimes use nationalism to increase the legitimacy of its foreign policy, but most of the time it can effectively restrict nationalism to prevent itself from being overtaken by its citizens. The CCP is based on pragmatism, and any ideology is only a tool for maintaining its domestic stability. If the CCP cannot effectively maintain domestic stability, the rise of Chinese nationalism will lead to serious damage to US and Chinese interests.

This is not an effort to persuade the United States to support the CCP’s rule over China, because the United States cannot act in violation of its own values. Nor is it an attempt to persuade the United States to give up its efforts to promote liberal democracy. Americans must, nevertheless, also be soberly aware that a China without the CCP will not necessarily lead to closer relations with the United States. The history of the twentieth century has demonstrated that only the CCP can effectively ensure the “Great Unification” of China, so the Chinese will not readily give up on the CCP.

The American government must also be aware that the majority of the Chinese population cannot accept US policies regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Even most of the liberal scholars in China cannot accept them. This distaste is not because the Chinese people are misled by the government, but because of the Chinese mindset and traditional beliefs. These also explain the failure of the US engagement policy, if the primary purpose of US engagement is to replace the CCP with a liberal democracy. China is large, and it is not Iraq, Libya, or Syria, which can be easily changed. The stability of China’s political order closely affects the vital interests of the United States. If an anti-American mass incident cannot be controlled by the government, the consequences would be unimaginable. It is in the best interests of the United States to support a Chinese government that can effectively maintain its domestic order. The United States should aid China in ensuring a unified, stable, and pro-American country and guide China toward democracy in this way—through the CCP, not against it.
US Engagement and Democratic Trends in China

The United States should not make the same mistakes of 1949. At that time, it was entirely possible that China remain neutral between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong had originally hoped to receive aid from the United States and establish normal relations with it, while the United States did consider it possible that Beijing might embrace American values. Yet, the entry of the US military into the Taiwan Strait in 1950, when President Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet ostensibly to prevent conflict after the outbreak of the Korean War, led to a complete reversal of the attitude of the Chinese toward the United States.

Today, many Americans believe that US engagement policy toward China has been a failure and has not met US expectations. Therefore, they advocate for decoupling with China and possibly even the adoption of a containment policy. Rather than abandon its engagement policy, the United States should reform it to make it more suitable. This is the best course of action for US interests, never mind China. The time has come to reflect on and ask how to reform US engagement policy.

First, the United States should realize that it can only make China more accepting of the values of liberal democracy, but not transform China into a country resembling the United States. There is a Chinese proverb that states, “more haste, less speed.” In this context, it means that only by respecting China’s own political traditions can the United States, in turn, make the Chinese people more accepting of American values. The Chinese have made various attempts throughout modern history and ultimately found that the CCP is the most suitable for China. The CCP has already abandoned its fundamentalism and radicalism, which were borrowed from the Soviet Union and adhered to during the Mao Zedong era, because they are not suitable for China, and it has now become the defender of Chinese traditional culture, which prioritizes unity and stability. The CCP government is not perfect, but it is the least bad for the interests of the United States.

Second, the United States should understand that the Chinese regard the “Great Unification” with the highest value, and this does not contradict liberal democracy. The Chinese are eager for democracy, but they hope to develop democracy under the premise of maintaining unity and stability. The United States should adjust its policies toward Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, but it does not necessarily have to fully accept the requirements of the Chinese government. The United States is correct to be concerned about human rights in China’s frontier areas, but it should avoid making the impression to the Chinese people that the US goal is to undermine China’s unity. Otherwise, American values will be rejected by the Chinese.
Third, when criticizing China, the United States should abandon abstract slogans and pay more attention to the issues that Chinese people really care about. For example, human rights is an abstract term to the Chinese people. The general Chinese population does not know how to assess the records of human rights, nor do they know why the United States always focuses on this issue. Today, many more concrete issues that concern the general public—such as asking the government to crack down on corruption, curtailing the privileges of officials, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and protecting the environment—are rarely discussed by the US government. Human rights are indeed important, but the United States should patiently explain to the Chinese people what falls under human rights and why these are important.

Fourth, when the United States asks the Chinese government to stop persecuting dissidents and cease censorship, it should also recognize the Chinese government’s efforts to maintain social stability. Most Chinese are more concerned about their own safety than the rights of a small number of dissidents. But the efforts of the United States backfire when the majority of Chinese people feel that the United States is prioritizing a few minorities at the expense of the Chinese people’s interests in unity and stability. The United States needs to change the vocabulary it uses to promote China’s openness and progress more effectively.

Fifth, the United States is fully capable of preventing a China-Russia alliance. Russia once occupied three million square kilometers of Chinese land, and the Chinese harbor strong resentment toward Russia. However, Russians have recently been more aligned with China than Americans because Russia respects the integrity of China’s territory and never supports the separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. In light of this, an increasing number of Chinese scholars believe that a China-Russian alliance is forming, although the two countries will not formally declare it.

In short, the United States does not need to give up its own values, but it can easily influence the Chinese to become more pro-American and less anti-American. And it should not give up in exasperation that the quest for democracy in China has failed or is over. If Washington were to respect China’s history and values more and be less impatient on American ideals then China would move in the direction that the United States wants. If Washington listens to these suggestions, the United States can actually help move China in
the direction of political diversification and economic liberalization and gain more strategic benefits from China.

Notes


11. In China, people who work in government and public institutions are better educated than others. Alastair Iain Johnston finds that the Chinese who are better educated tended to like the US more than the not as well educated Chinese. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans,” in Anti-Americanisms and World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 157-95.
