Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies

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To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257

Published online: 17 Jun 2021.

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One of the Biden administration’s top foreign policy challenges is to reinvigorate US alliances. Regional threats in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia have become more complex in recent years, just as President Trump hastened allies’ and partners’ doubts about US security commitments. It is tempting for officials in Washington and in allied capitals to think or hope that increasing the salience of nuclear deterrence can help to meet the challenges of deterring growing threats and assuring nervous allies. This temptation is especially pertinent in Northeast Asia, which lacks the multi-party alliance and nuclear sharing structures institutionalized in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Proponents of more nuclear salience argue that forward-deployment of US nuclear weapons or forming nuclear planning groups with Japan and South Korea would strengthen deterrence of North Korea and China. They argue that such steps would also assure worried officials in Tokyo and Seoul about the credibility of US security ties and would prevent leaders in Japan and South Korea from deciding that they need to develop their own, independent nuclear arsenals. In these prescriptions, elevating the role of nuclear weapons would improve security with relatively few risks or second-order consequences.

The broad diagnosis that growing threats require renewed US alliance deterrence and assurance initiatives in Northeast Asia is correct. Yet, is augmenting

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© 2021 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 44:2 pp. 143–158
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257
nuclear deterrence clearly the best among possible policy prescriptions? Or might such an approach worsen some of the problems it purports to solve, including by spurring greater interest among US allies in developing their own weapons?

In this essay, we recap the rationale for proposals to increase the prominence of nuclear weapons in the United States’ Northeast Asian alliances. We illustrate how nuclear-centered strategies embraced by the Trump administration did not allay ROK and Japanese concerns about nuclear credibility. In addition, we show that such strategies may actually backfire by exacerbating concerns that possible rash US actions could cause or worsen crises or by contributing to a slippery slope whereby allies over-value nuclear deterrence and then desire their own nuclear weapons. We conclude by considering options for managing these problems through alliance cohesion initiatives.

**More Nuclear Credibility, Stronger Alliance?**

The security environment for the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia appears increasingly complex and fraught. By any measure, military threats from North Korea and China are growing. North Korea’s advances in missile technology give it a capability to strike any target in the region, or indeed in the United States, with nuclear or conventional munitions. Pyongyang’s newer ballistic missiles might even be able to maneuver to evade US and allied missile defense systems. China, too, is modernizing and augmenting its conventional military and nuclear arsenals, and it has adopted a more aggressive military and diplomatic posture, whether by provocative naval transgression of disputed maritime waters, or by contesting the origins of kimchi.

Confronting these regional security challenges is harder after four years of the Trump administration’s periodic threats to withdraw military support from allies if they did not pay more of the costs of alliance defenses. Despite early efforts by the Biden administration to repair the damage, South Korean and Japanese leaders likely perceive the “end of US consensus on global deep engagement,” increasing fears of abandonment. The Japanese and South Korean national security communities have long actively debated how to protect against coercion from nuclear-armed adversaries in their region amidst possible US retrenchment. Both states have initiated defense procurement programs in recent years to provide greater independent military capability. These programs include precision missile capabilities of increasing range and, in the case of South Korea, submarines that could launch them. These programs likely help ameliorate immediate concerns about US abandonment, though in the case of South Korea, its adoption of conventional counterforce capabilities also raises
questions about crisis instability with North Korea. Such capabilities also reflect a form of security hedging, and they could provide platforms to carry nuclear weapons, should either state opt to proliferate.

Notwithstanding these enhancements of South Korean and Japanese capabilities, some international security experts posit that these countries will move to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. South Korean public opinion polls show consistent majority support for a nuclear weapons capability. Some former Japanese senior officials call for amending Japan’s three non-nuclear principles, by which Japan commits not to build, deploy, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. One recent report warns sharply, “if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.”

To deter new threats from North Korea and China as well as to strengthen assurance of allies, thereby preventing them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons, some American analysts prescribe augmenting the US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees provided to South Korea and Japan. Shane Smith and Brad Glosserman, for instance, argue for creating a new “trilateral mechanism tailored explicitly to enable nuclear-related crisis consultations among national leaders.” Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels suggest “establishing separate nuclear planning groups with Seoul and Tokyo and exploring Korean and Japanese receptivity toward the wartime sharing of nuclear weapons (under US control and within NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] limits).” Similarly, Brad Roberts argues that it is time to make US alliances in Asia more “NATO-like,” including by considering nuclear sharing and creating an analogue to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. A task force of former senior officials assembled by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs goes further, contending that Washington should review its “nonstrategic nuclear weapons posture in consultations with allies to assure the adequacy of its forward-based systems and commitments” and “create an Asian Nuclear Planning Group, bringing Australia, Japan, and South Korea into the US nuclear planning processes and providing a platform for these allies to discuss specific policies associated with US nuclear forces.”

In short, for many security analysts, increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in US alliance relations is the remedy for both deterrence and assurance problems. Yet, these analyses and associated recommendations are blind to problems that deserve more scrutiny. A nuclear-focused strategy in Northeast Asia may not effectively address allies’ specific sources of concern about US credibility.
Moreover, it could exacerbate allies’ entanglement concerns and actually drive them toward an independent nuclear arsenal.

**Assessing Credibility Concerns**

Traditionally, policy solutions aimed at improving the credibility of US extended deterrence in Northeast Asia have almost exclusively focused on demonstrating the durability of US presence in the region and the viability of its nuclear capabilities. Scholarly work on extended deterrence similarly often affirms that alliance durability, military capabilities, and especially threat credibility are essential ingredients. Past US presidents have taken pains to assure allies that the US nuclear security guarantees are credible, including by issuing declaratory statements; forward deploying nuclear weapons; or in the case of NATO, creating a nuclear-sharing capability that involves allies in nuclear planning and operations.

In Northeast Asia, US officials conduct regular political, military, and deterrence diplomatic visits and deliver public speeches reaffirming alliance commitments, base US troops and sophisticated military equipment in the theater, run regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and sustain budget-sharing agreements that emphasize the importance and strategic value of military cooperation. These demonstrations of US security guarantees are deemed essential not only for maintaining strong regional alliances, but also for keeping US allies from feeling the need to take steps toward military independence, such as by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Long-standing US policies toward Northeast Asia are partially aimed at preventing US allies from developing their own nuclear assets, as South Korea sought to do in the late 1970s, and from building up their conventional militaries outside of the alliance framework, as both South Korea and Japan have recently begun to do.

The goal of enhancing deterrence credibility featured heavily in some aspects of the Trump administration’s approach to US security commitments in Europe and Northeast Asia. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), for example, emphasized US commitments to allies more than 100 times and stated plainly that “potential adversaries must understand that aggression against the United States, allies, and partners will fail and result in intolerable costs for them.” Compared to the prior 2010 NPR, the 2018 version amplified a message on the strength and versatility of US nuclear capabilities, outlined a broader set of possibilities for US nuclear use against non-nuclear attacks, and strengthened US rejection of a “no-first-use” policy. Notably, the NPR also called for enhanced nuclear capabilities, including an expansion of low-yield nuclear options that
would purportedly be more relevant to extended deterrence challenges than existing weapons. Finally, the 2018 NPR referenced the possibility of future US nuclear deployments in Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{22}

While this comprehensive set of policies was initially lauded as reassuring to US allies,\textsuperscript{23} it does not seem to have effectively addressed allies’ doubts that the United States ultimately can be relied upon to fight in their defense.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, the Trump administration probably undercut the NPR’s message of credibility by threatening troop withdrawals and demanding larger allied contributions to burden-sharing—probably the two most important elements of allies’ perceptions of the durability of US security commitments—which policymakers and concerned publics in both South Korea and Japan continue to question. Polling in South Korea in 2020, for example, indicates that any moves that would decrease the public’s perceptions that the US alliance was “mutually beneficial,” such as the partial troop withdrawals that Trump threatened, would also decrease faith in the US nuclear security guarantee and diminish support for the alliance.\textsuperscript{25}

Advocates of an enhanced role for nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia tend to overlook this critical point—the Trump administration increased US nuclear capabilities and the centrality of nuclear weapons in its Northeast Asia strategy, but this did not diminish allies’ credibility concerns. None of the aforementioned policy papers outlining such proposals discuss the apparent failure of the 2018 NPR to satiate allies’ worries about US credibility through strengthened nuclear posture. Plausibly, the acute credibility problem is not about nuclear capability, but it instead reflects concerns about the durability of US political commitments. The continued basing of US non-nuclear military capabilities in the region through alliance burden-sharing arrangements remains the most important way to prove US commitment.

**Basing non-nuclear military capabilities remains the most important way to prove US commitment**

**The Backfire Effect of Increased Nuclear Salience**

Increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia may not only fail to adequately address durability and capability concerns about US extended nuclear deterrence but also could backfire. Allies not only want assurance that the United States would be willing and able to use nuclear capabilities in their defense; they also want reassurance that the United States will not rashly or precipitously use these capabilities, thus entangling its ally in conflict. Notably, the 2018 NPR’s
emphasis on expanding nuclear capabilities and perceptions about the increased “usability” of nuclear weapons raised fears in South Korea and Japan about whether these policies would make nuclear conflict in the region more likely.26

Though US security guarantees to European and Asian allies are intended to stymie nuclear proliferation, among other objectives, efforts to make extended deterrence appear highly credible can actually increase support in ally states for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, states worry that they will be dragged into conflict escalation initiated or provoked by their alliance partners, and they consequently seek reassurances that this won’t occur.27 (The traditional understanding of the entanglement problem in alliances—mainly about risks to the nuclear guarantor—overlooks this problem, which specifically stems from a situation in which an ally perceives escalation risks from a guarantor’s nuclear threats.) Under the Trump administration, Northeast Asian allies worried that Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric and inconsistent approach to denuclearization could have resulted in an unwanted, unnecessary, and possibly nuclear conflict with North Korea.28 After all, a majority of South Koreans would prefer not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, even in the event of a full-scale invasion.29

Second, worries about a rash US decision to use nuclear weapons could drive allies to seek greater military independence, including by developing their own nuclear weapons. At the same time, US over-valuing of nuclear deterrence can spur beliefs among allies that nuclear weapons are a necessary capability. South Korean and Japanese proponents of independent nuclear capabilities have highlighted their purported value for wresting greater control of the security environment, deterring conflict with North Korea, and avoiding the risks they perceive with the US alliance.

The combination of these two phenomena means that the US actions to increase the visibility of nuclear operations over the last decade have laid the foundation for a backfire effect. For example, the 2013 flights of US B-52 and B-2 aircraft over South Korean airspace and of B-52 aircraft over contested territory in the East China Sea seemingly had little positive effect on US credibility with its allies (and arguably no effect on deterring threats from North Korea).30 At the same time, these symbolic missions fed fears of crisis escalation and contributed to South Korean steps to strengthen its military capabilities independent of the alliance.31 Indeed, to the extent that these flights raised the perceived relevance of nuclear weapons in the face of North Korean threats, they also contributed to
bolstered calls among conservative South Korean politicians—and the solidification of majority public support—for a “South Korean bomb.”

Two original surveys of South Korean citizens—in 2018 and 2019—provide clear evidence for the potential proliferation consequences of efforts to increase the salience of US extended nuclear deterrence. In both surveys, respondents were more likely to prefer that South Korea possess its own nuclear arsenal, rather than rely on the United States’ nuclear capabilities, when US nuclear guarantees were presented as highly credible. This effect was even bigger among South Koreans who opposed the use of nuclear weapons against a possible North Korean invasion, demonstrating a clear linkage between South Korean desire for nuclear autonomy and concern that the ongoing reliance on the United States could entangle South Korea in an unwanted nuclear conflict with its northern neighbor.

There is some evidence to support the contention that prescriptions for additional or forward-deployed nuclear capabilities could also increase the perceived necessity of independent nuclear capabilities among allies. A 2016 public opinion survey in South Korea found 6 percent greater support for an independent nuclear capability than for US redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula. Though just one data point, this suggests that a backfire effect driving allied proliferation may be at play. Furthermore, South Korea has seen a rise in anti-Americanism from both the left and the right in the last few years, leading to distinct critiques of reliance on US security forces. In the context of this trend, calls for nuclear sharing by the United States may be more of a pretext for an independent South Korean nuclear deterrent.

Aiming for a Credibility Sweet Spot

Although these findings suggest that US policies amplifying nuclear deterrence could backfire, they do not necessarily imply that significantly weakening US security guarantees is the correct course. The aforementioned original surveys found that, for South Koreans who wanted to use nuclear weapons against a North Korean invasion, the traditional understanding of US security guarantees held. That is, these individuals were more likely to see sufficiently credible nuclear security guarantees as an acceptable substitute for South Korean proliferation and to support developing an independent nuclear arsenal at higher rates when the US promise to defend South Korea was not considered reliable. This suggests that finding the sweet spot of extended deterrence needs to account for the concerns of some about the durability of US commitments and its nuclear capabilities, while also recognizing how highly credible US nuclear security guarantees can exacerbate entanglement fears in others, thus propelling interest in an independent nuclear weapons capability.
US allies rely on the United States not only for nuclear deterrence, but also for broader extended deterrence covering a wide variety of salient threats. Prescriptions to apply broadly nuclear solutions to threats that are not solely or even mostly nuclear in orientation are simply not viable. The most probable contemporary security threats in East Asia are non-nuclear scenarios below the level of armed conflict that is likely to escalate, sometimes called “gray zone” contingencies. Analysts David Santoro and John Warden aptly observe that “South Korea and Japan respectively face threats that are persistent, prominent, and below the level at which the United States is willing to respond with military force.”

These are not threats that are easily or appropriately deterred with nuclear capabilities. As nuclear policy researcher Adam Mount argues, “because nuclear weapons are less credible as responses to limited aggression and their use would likely be contentious within the alliance, reliance on nuclear weapons exacerbates rather than addresses [the] risk” that Beijing or Pyongyang “perceives that it could prevail in a limited conflict.”

More serious (though less likely) threats, such as a Chinese or North Korean attempted territorial conquest backed by nuclear coercion, would be more likely to trigger US preparations to use nuclear weapons on behalf of the alliance. But even here, the primary modes of response would most likely be non-nuclear. Applying more nuclear deterrence to the problem, as the 2018 NPR sought to do, is unlikely to change the calculus in Beijing or Pyongyang. Two South Korean military officials affirm this view of the deterrence challenge and argue that the prescription is not necessarily more US nuclear deterrence, but instead a credible South Korean conventional military threat that “raises the expected costs of North Korea’s nuclear provocations and reduces the possibility of it achieving the desired political and military goals through the use of nuclear weapons.”

In other words, the stronger, more readily usable, and more cohesive alliance non-nuclear capabilities are—especially those built on trilateral coordination—the greater deterrent effect they would have, even in nuclear or other high-risk scenarios.

Proponents of increasing the salience of nuclear weapons within Northeast Asian alliances recognize the need to strengthen both broad spectrum deterrence capabilities and alliance coordination mechanisms. Roberts, for example, argues that the “effort to strengthen and adapt deterrence must account for the diversifying strategic deterrence toolkit, which now includes not just nuclear weapons but also missile defenses, non-nuclear missile strike systems, as well as capabilities in cyberspace and outer space.”

Related proposals to add bilateral (or trilateral) “NATO-like” nuclear planning groups to the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances could improve alliance coordination for extreme scenarios such as a fait accompli. However, such planning structures would probably add little to the efficacy of alliance deterrence.
vis-a-vis China or North Korea. That is, it is not clear why leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang would necessarily think that an alliance planning group would make the United States more likely to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression.

If alliance nuclear planning functions were used mainly to enable stronger conventional deterrence by clarifying the very narrow circumstances under which US nuclear weapons would be used, then problems with allies could be avoided while still strengthening US credibility. But if nuclear planning groups do have the effect of increasing perceptions about the utility and necessity of nuclear weapons, then the potential for such mechanisms to backfire by bolstering support in allies for independent nuclear arsenals makes their value questionable.

**Sustaining Credibility in an Evolving Security Environment**

The complex regional security picture in Northeast Asia requires that the United States and its alliance partners regularly adjust plans and, to a lesser extent, capabilities. Such adjustments require deep coordination as well as political sensitivity. Importantly, some potential changes the Biden administration might make to US nuclear posture—which relating to declaratory policy, capabilities, or other aspects—could trigger additional credibility anxieties with Japanese and South Korean counterparts. As a result, senior American officials will need to invest considerable time explaining their thinking and choices. Washington has done this before with some success. Within the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR, such consultations provided an opportunity to explain the retirement of the sea-launched, nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missile and to address concerns, from Japan in particular, that the loss of this capability would attenuate the effectiveness of US extended nuclear deterrence.43

Similarly difficult nuclear posture discussions are likely to be required in the next year, especially in the constrained, post-pandemic budget environment all three allies face. It is highly unlikely that the United States could afford, and that the Biden administration would choose to build, all of the nuclear and related capabilities imagined by the 2018 NPR.44 Allies will need to understand the rationale for any changes to existing plans, including how Washington intends to offset the changes such that there is no major diminution in perceived credibility of nuclear deterrence. Changes need not be interpreted as resulting in less effective or credible deterrence, provided Washington invests in assurance initiatives tailored to specific threats and concerns. These initiatives should
include reassurance that Washington would consult with allies during decision-making regarding use of nuclear weapons near their territories.\textsuperscript{45}

Rebuilding Japan-South Korea ties and strengthening trilateralism are clear pillars of the Biden administration’s approach to Asia. Yet this strategy must contend with varied preferences and challenging politics in Tokyo and Seoul.\textsuperscript{46} Their unresolved historical tensions, despite growing threats from China and North Korea, have created a need for the United States to prioritize fears of political decoupling over other objectives in each bilateral alliance.\textsuperscript{47} Specifically, each ally worries about where US priorities might lie if a conflict with North Korea or China involves only South Korea or Japan. Efforts to solidify trilateral nuclear deterrence—for example by creating a US-ROK-Japan nuclear planning structure—is probably a bridge too far.

Instead, it would be more immediately effective—and better for long-term sustainability of alliance credibility—to build greater conventional military jointness between the two alliances. For example, both bilateral and trilateral joint military exercises will continue to hold independent, important value for both credibility and deterrence purposes. These exercises could emphasize broad (as opposed to nuclear-specific) deterrence operations and response planning for gray-zone contingencies, focused on minimizing escalation risks.\textsuperscript{48} This approach would leave nuclear-related discussions mainly for bilateral dialogues, while setting the stage for continued trilateral cooperation on conventional deterrence under the nuclear shadow.

Of course, alliance consultations and initiatives at multiple levels must also address the potential for nuclear crises and war, especially nuclear coercion or \textit{fait accompli} scenarios. Changes in US strategic or theater nuclear capabilities or adjustments to declaratory language may not necessarily make US nuclear threats any more or less likely to deter, though they may come into play in how the United States might respond, should conflict escalate. Rather, greater investment in alliance cohesion and non-nuclear capabilities, especially through planning—or even exercises—designed to sustain conventional military operations during such contingencies, appears more likely to affect Beijing’s or Pyongyang’s calculus on the risks of aggression.\textsuperscript{49}

Efforts to sustain alliance credibility could include augmenting wargaming and military exercises for non-nuclear threats and for scenarios that could escalate to nuclear use, and involving senior political leaders in such gaming,\textsuperscript{50} establishing nuclear crisis consultation and coordination mechanisms that prioritize crisis de-escalation and enable the preservation of nuclear non-use,\textsuperscript{51} and re-formulating...
deterrence dialogues to discuss application of a broad deterrence toolkit to emergent threats, rather than focusing narrowly on nuclear deterrence. A primary objective of such efforts would be to shift allied thinking away from a one-dimensional view that extended deterrence is solely based on nuclear deterrence. Many of these initiatives would necessarily be bilateral, but if political relations between Japan and South Korea improve, augmenting trilateral initiatives would be sensible.

Finally, as other experts also counsel, the allies should invest in dialogues at multiple levels and in various forms. Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues (informal and typically off-the-record meetings involving a combination of government officials speaking in a personal capacity and non-governmental experts, or only non-governmental representatives, respectively) can be constructive. Bilateral and trilateral meetings such as those organized by Pacific Forum constitute an important investment in opportunities for experts to add context to discussions in formal (Track 1) channels, to speak more frankly than official positions permit, and to fill in some of the inevitable knowledge and perception gaps. Future informal dialogues like these should draw from a broader swath of opinions from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Relying just on one segment of elite opinion or making assumptions about contemporary views based on past preferences could exacerbate existing credibility challenges and result in deeper intra- and inter-alliance discord.

**Alliance Nuclear Prescriptions Could Frustrate Broader Policy Agenda**

Understandably, America’s Northeast Asian allies have concerns about the durability of US security commitments, the status of its nuclear arsenal, and the wisdom of its crisis decision-making. As the Biden administration looks to rehabilitate US credibility in the eye of its allies, sensitivity to these concerns must be central to its approach. As in most complex policy areas, there is no silver bullet that would address both perceived deterrence gaps against North Korea or China and assurance deficits with South Korea or Japan.

Proposals to increase the salience of nuclear deterrence in the context of US alliances might address some problems, but they could also make others far worse. The Biden administration, in working to fulfill the Democratic Party Platform pledge to reduce “overreliance and excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons” would be wise to recognize, as Mount observes, “the nuclear component of the alliance has generated significant strategic and political disadvantages that can be managed by reducing the salience of nuclear forces both in deterrence posture and as symbols of alliance commitment.” Avoiding worse outcomes, therefore, requires aligning US nuclear posture choices and alliance credibility efforts, backed by political and non-nuclear capability investments.
As we have outlined above, and as other experts have counseled, the current moment calls for a broad range of measures that are in the credibility sweet spot. Mostly, these measures relate to alliance political and military processes, not nuclear capability and posture. Such suggestions also reflect the considered views of some deeply experienced alliance extended deterrence managers such as Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elaine Bunn, who argues that “the precise make up … of the nuclear force [is] not likely to have the greatest impact on allies’ views of extended nuclear deterrence. That’s about the overall relationship: the peacetime consultations, the crisis management exercises … It’s about that whole web of interactions that we have with allies.”

Taking a broad approach to alliance credibility, rather than leaning heavily on increasing the salience of nuclear deterrence, is likely to avoid many of the problems discussed above, especially the potential backfire effect of inadvertently fueling allied proliferation. This approach would also reduce risks of triggering deterrence spirals and avoid other adverse consequences with adversaries that could leave the security of the United States and its allies worse off. (China’s harsh and punitive reaction to the US THAAD missile defense system deployment to South Korea in 2017 is instructive in this regard.) In addition, increasing the salience of nuclear weapons might scuttle other important policy priorities, including attempts to initiate arms control discussions with China or new diplomacy to curtail North Korea’s nuclear program.

Ultimately, questions of deterrence and allied reassurance in Northeast Asia are not merely technocratic problems—they are fundamentally political issues. In turn, the solutions to these pressing challenges must take into account the complex and evolving regional political environment as well as cross-linkages with other policy objectives such as nuclear nonproliferation. In this light, the potential credibility, deterrence, and reassurance benefits of increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances are overstated, may even backfire, and therefore do not merit the risks.

Notes


24. For discussion of US guarantees to Japan and South Korea, see Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Cornell University Press, 2018).
37. Dalton and Han, “Elections, Nukes, and the Future of the South Korea-U.S. Alliance.”
42. Roberts, Living with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea.
43. Santoro and Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” 151.
46. Smith and Glosserman, “Three’s Company?”
47. Santoro and Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” 156.
49. Smith and Glosserman, “Three’s Company?”
50. For the benefits of wargaming, see Daalder et al., Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies; for lower-intensity exercises such as planning for nuclear threats, see Bernhardt and Sukin, “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.”
51. Smith and Glosserman, “Three’s Company?”
52. This is a common suggestion; see, for example, Dalton, “Between Seoul and Sole Purpose”; Daalder et al., Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies; Heginbotham and Samuels, “Vulnerable US Alliances in Northeast Asia”; Smith and Glosserman, “Three’s Company?”; and Roberts, Living with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea.
54. Mount, Conventional Deterrence of North Korea, 14.