A Model Alliance? The Strategic Logic of US-Australia Cooperation

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To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2017645

Published online: 02 Feb 2022.
In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States captured the world’s attention with a technology and capability-sharing partnership known as AUKUS. For many, this was yet another example of the closeness of the alliance between the United States and Australia, which was initially formalized in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), from which New Zealand was suspended in 1986. Yet, however strong the public narrative seems, American and Australian officials have expressed concern and confusion about each other’s behavior in recent years, and well-connected scholars have warned of “complacency” and “expectation gaps” while identifying divergences in the interests, behavior, and outlook of the United States and Australia.1

During the 2010s, Australia regularly acted in ways that belied its loyal ally identity. Canberra consistently rejected US pressure to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea.2 It ignored direct US pressure and joined China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), agreed to a Free Trade Agreement with Beijing, and signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) to support the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra was privately skeptical about the US commitment to its region under presidents Barack Obama as well as Joe Biden, and explicitly

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© 2021 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 44:4 pp. 51–66
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2017645

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refused to support the Trump administration’s rhetoric on returning Beijing to its “proper” position. Australia also invited the US Marine Corps to rotate through Darwin from 2012 onwards, then haggled hard for several years over who paid the bills. When the port of Darwin was leased to a Chinese firm, the matter was treated as purely internal, much to Washington’s chagrin. Finally, when US officials so much as publicly hinted at the idea of developing long-range bomber and missile strike options from the Australian continent, three consecutive prime ministers quickly ruled out the idea. It is unsurprising, then, that until recently some in Washington asked, “Who lost Australia?” and felt “genuine disappointment and uncertainty about where Australia stands.”

The Biden administration’s support for AUKUS therefore represents an implicit acknowledgement that the relationship with Australia needed reform. Providing eight nuclear-powered submarines is a significant shift, given the move was ruled out as recently as 2016. In return, senior US officials briefed the media that they expect Australia to “play at a much higher level and to augment American capabilities” in the region. However, if Washington assumes providing new capability under AUKUS will now bind Canberra’s decision-makers, it is likely to again be disappointed.

Australia’s behavior during the 2010s happened despite its nearly unrivalled access to American intelligence services and participation in similarly high-end capability programs, such as acquiring 72 Joint Strike Fighters. Nor can it be assumed that Chinese pressure will force Australia into American arms. In 2020 at the height of Beijing’s trade sanctions on Canberra, the US-Australia ministerial meeting was still characterized by “starkly different visions of the alliance.” We must therefore look elsewhere to understand why US officials had come to see Canberra as a “great ally … everywhere in the world except Asia.”

This paper argues the expectation gaps and pattern of divergent behavior reflects two substantive disagreements between Canberra and Washington about Asia. First, they disagree over the nature of the problems emerging from the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Second, they do not have a common view on the desired position of the United States and China in the region’s future order. The origin of these differences can be traced back decades but, thanks to Asia’s new strategic order, their significance has come to the fore.

Given the warmth of the relationship, the Australia-US alliance clearly will not fail, but it does need further reform beyond AUKUS. This paper draws on verbal models to highlight the alliance’s strategic logic—the core bargain that binds the United States and Australia over how,
where, and why they are willing to use force. As both Andrew Marshall and John Boyd believed, models are especially useful for strategists as tools to create, overhaul and adjust our worldview.\textsuperscript{11} This paper sketches three distinct models and their policy and political implications. For much of its history, the Australia-US alliance has operated under a \textit{functional} logic, termed here the “Acheson” model after Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State who signed the 1951 alliance treaty. After exploring the challenges of sustaining a functional approach, the paper explores two alternatives: an \textit{enabling} model, named after US General Douglas MacArthur, who helped defend Australia in the Second World War, and a \textit{decentralized} model, following the efforts of Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley in the 1940s.

\section*{How Serious Are Australia-US Problems?}

Under the Acheson model the two parties trade \textit{functions}, or tasks of value (such as political support or basing access) rather than setting the unrealistic expectation that Australia directly contributes to US security. This model has defined the Australia-US alliance—or simply “the Alliance” as it is known in Australia—for most of its history. As researcher James D. Morrow explains, the key to this kind of asymmetric alliance is that the tasks of the smaller state must be of sufficient importance in advancing the options of the larger partner, so that it commits to the security of the smaller.\textsuperscript{12} After a slow start in the 1950s, Australia has helped promote US interests in Asia by offering substantial public support as well as modest military and intelligence contributions.

To that end, it has fought alongside the United States in conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, the two Gulf Wars, and Afghanistan. Diplomatically, Australia has worked to integrate the United States into Asia’s multilateral forums and stood beside it during many regional controversies on trade, nuclear testing and transport, relations with Muslim-majority nations, and as a public advocate of US military campaigns including the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Australia’s behavior was never demanded or subservient—as the popular dependence myth claims—but directly flowed from the common overlap of interests in understanding the nature and desired outcome of both the Cold War and the War on Terror.\textsuperscript{13}

In exchange, Australia obtained substantial access to US resources such as technology, intelligence, and an implicit guarantee of military assistance. That was largely sufficient for Australia, given it did not face any major power threats to its continent, and enabled it to retain a “technological edge” over other regional states. Australian leaders privately worried that they did not
know if the United States would come to its aid but could reassure themselves that a potential adversary would at least think there was a serious possibility.

Complicating matters, the ANZUS treaty possesses few mechanisms to clarify responsibilities. The treaty only requires each party to “consult together” and act “in accordance with its constitutional processes” in a crisis.\(^{14}\) The two countries also lack the institutions other US alliances use to coordinate their activities. Professor Stephan Frühling has shown that the relationship “has been far less ambitious in advancing forward-looking, political-military guidance for allied cooperation. There is nothing like a strategic concept or joint defense guidelines for US-Australia defense cooperation.”\(^{15}\)

In the new strategic environment of Asia, the tasks Washington now seeks from Australia, such as helping to deny the PRC a larger role in Asia or support high-end warfighting plans, impose significantly higher costs than Australia previously had to bear against the Soviet Union or al Qaeda. US analysts have speculated the AUKUS nuclear submarines could enable a new functional task, wherein Australia attempts to bottle up Chinese submarines in the South China Sea.\(^{16}\) Yet it is not clear why providing the capability to act will change how Canberra judges the political and strategic risks of acting. It was not limits on capability that led it to refuse FONOPS, accommodate Chinese institutions, or have doubts about the enduring US commitment to the region. Rather, the functional model of the Australia-US alliance is struggling because of disagreements about the nature of the problem China presents and the regional order these alliance tasks seek to create. It is to these two disagreements the paper now turns.

To the casual observer, Australia has spent the last decade bickering with and arming against the PRC. Yet at a fundamental level, Australia’s leaders accept the legitimacy of China’s long rise to prominence in Asia. In her rich archival study *Independent Ally*, analyst Shannon Tow shows that Australian officials have consistently welcomed and supported China’s rise over the last five decades, rejecting recurring US pressure to do otherwise.\(^{17}\) Australia accepts that China’s rise will change Asia’s regional order. This was reiterated by Prime Minister Scott Morrison in 2019: “The fact that China has become such a strong economic and military power, I’m constantly surprised at the surprise about this. I mean what was the point [of western engagement since the 1970s]? … This is the inevitable result of the path we deliberately got on. And so I think it is important in responding to it, not to get too emotional or outraged that this has occurred, but simply to...

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practically understand this is a natural consequence of where the world and global economy has got to. See when you look at it like that you see the trade rules have to be adjusted to respect that and the balance and cooperation of nations that sit within the Indo-Pacific, well, that will change a bit.”

Australia’s concerns about China—and they are many and growing—stem from Beijing’s specific behavior, rather than its long-term trajectory. Beijing’s domestic interference, public rebukes, defense spending, and economic coercion have driven Australian anxieties over the last few years. A future where China is the sole hegemon would be against Australia’s interests, yet it remains the Australian position that China’s emergence as a great power in Asia is legitimate. In the words of Australia’s longest serving foreign minister, Alexander Downer (1996–2007), “until recently, China had handled its prosperity and its newfound global status with great diplomatic skill” but had now “thrown much of this away” with its specific policy choices.

Canberra’s view thus sits in stark contrast with Washington’s, which now treats much of the cooperation agenda of the 1990s as a mistake and worries first and foremost about China’s challenge to its primacy. For the United States, China’s specific behavior is secondary to its challenge to American prestige. In 2011, while speaking to the Australian Parliament, President Obama offered a thinly veiled critique of China, saying that non-democratic systems will inevitably fail because they “ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy – the will of the people.” The Trump administration ramped up the criticisms of Chinese governance and set a goal that “China retains only its proper place in the world.” The declassified 2018 US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific makes clear the administration sought to “maintain U.S. primacy in the region.” President Biden has stepped back some of the harshest US rhetoric, yet likewise declared that “China has an overall goal … to become the leading country in the world … That’s not going to happen on my watch.” This reflects what great power expert Joshua Shifrinson has called “neo-primacy,” or a focus on “regaining the United States’ dominant post-Cold War economic-military position” above all other goals.

Australia, by contrast, has never liked hierarchical systems. Even under its most ardent advocate for the British Empire, Sir Robert Menzies (Prime Minister from 1939-41, 1949–66), the goal was a Commonwealth of equals. There is a perverse irony here in American ire at Australia’s support for China. A century ago, Britain was also angered by Australian support for another rising power, the United States. In the 1970s, as the Cold War abated in Asia and Australia began its transformational engagement with the region, Hedley Bull observed that “Australian official statements came gradually to recognize that Australia’s interests lay not simply in bolstering up the power and presence of the United States … but rather in an equilibrium among all the great powers.” That slightly
overstates it. Yet writing several decades later in January 2021, Foreign Minister Marise Payne struck a similar note that “Australia will benefit in the long term if there is a network of nations, with the US as a leading participant, that consistently and with strategic sagacity makes clear what constitutes legitimate behaviour under a rules-based system, even one that is evolving to take account of the interests of rising powers” (emphasis added). Note Payne’s use of the indefinite article “a leading participant” rather than singular “the” to describe US leadership in Asia.

If Australians accept China’s legitimate rise in Asia, they are necessarily willing to accept the end of US primacy in the region. While Australians have benefited immensely from US leadership and do not welcome the change, there is, in Canberra’s pragmatic strategic culture, a recognition that stability and elbow room for rising powers is more important. Not only do Australians reject the goal of reviving US primacy, many doubt its capacity to achieve it as well. The 2011 “Pivot to Asia” was announced by President Obama in a speech in Canberra, yet Australian elites remained among the most skeptical privately. Australian defense planning in both 2016 and 2020 has returned to themes of independent operations and self-reliance, conscious that it may have to act in regional circumstances where America cannot or will not provide assistance.

For most of the period from the end of the Cold War in Asia in the 1980s to the mid-2010s, the functional alliance model could continue without these two different perceptions being significant. The US position in Asia was not substantially challenged, Australia was not asked to undertake tasks to sustain it, and Canberra’s willingness to occasionally say no to Washington and yes to Beijing did not seem to matter in the larger scheme. Those easy days are now past, as the challenge of protecting Taiwan illuminates.

American officials have consistently made clear that if there is a fight over Taiwan, they expect Australia’s strong military support. Australian officials, meanwhile, publicly refuse to discuss such “hypotheticals,” and in 2004 and 2014 senior conservative ministers publicly stated they did not see Australia’s involvement as automatic. In recent years, Australia’s policy elites have conducted an extended closed-door debate about how to respond to a future Taiwan crisis, with divisions cutting across party and ideology. The Morrison government (2018-present) has begun to publicly support closer ties with Taipei, yet in May 2021, Morrison used Beijing’s formula of “one country, two systems” and in a follow-up interview emphasized that Canberra’s long-term position had not changed. This uncertainty is mirrored by the general public, among whom 78 percent view ANZUS as “very” or “fairly” important and 63 percent see China
as more of a security threat than an economic partner, despite which 57 percent believe their country should stay neutral “in the event of a military conflict between the United States and China.” Despite worries about China rising, public support for Australia acting “in accordance with our security alliance with the US” in a Taiwan conflict has actually decreased since 2013.

AUKUS may reflect a renewed Australian vote of confidence in the Joe Biden-led United States and a desire to play a larger role. However, cooperation on military capability and technology will not change Australian interests or risk perceptions. Even if the eight submarines are delivered before a conflict occurs (the first is not expected until 2040), they will not notably deter China from starting a conflict or change the likely outcome of such a conflict. China is expected to build an extra 33 submarines between 2015 and 2030, at least seven of them nuclear-powered. As American scholars Adam Mount and Van Jackson warn, AUKUS does not make intervention to aid Taiwan “more likely… or more capable.” If the Australia-US alliance is to remain strong, much deeper reforms are necessary.

How Can the Alliance Be Reformed?

To think through these challenges and future directions, this paper uses simple verbal models. Models play a central role in studying international relations. Models are not true or false, but rather are “tools or instruments, in particular like maps.” The accuracy of maps obviously matters, but they are necessarily only representations, ones that bring certain aspects into view (for instance, political or physical geography, street guides, and power grids) at the cost of obscuring others, hence the benefits of comparing and contrasting. While the future shape of the Australia-US alliance is unlikely to strictly adhere to just one model, clarifying the underlying strategic logic of each approach can bring order to the many moving parts of a complex relationship, helping think through the implications of AUKUS-style agreements.

Revising the Acheson Model

If a functional model is to remain in operation, with allies trading tasks of value, two pathways for change are open. First, there could be a significant change of attitude that brings the parties into alignment. As the relationship between Australia and China has continued to deteriorate, some in Canberra now believe China’s behavior is fixed on a new trajectory that is hostile to Australian interests. In turn, they may decide any further expansion of Chinese power or authority needs to be countered. To encourage further shifts, Washington will need additional mechanisms that change how Canberra judges risk. Former Prime
Minister Malcolm Turnbull has written that one reason for hesitancy over FONOPs was concern if an Australian vessel were confronted and “Washington hesitated.” An explicit American guarantee of support in such an instance, as well as the protection of Australian territorial security—as the Obama Administration provided Japan over the Senkaku Islands—could be significant. Still, will Canberra accept the full costs of such a historic shift, not least the potential loss of the 30 percent of Australia trade which goes to China?

Second, the underlying disagreements could be openly accepted, and alternative, less valuable tasks could be identified. The parties may decide that the focus of the Alliance remains intelligence sharing, and in return the United States would clarify and reduce the circumstances in which it offered direct military support for Australia. This is not just about Beijing; in 1999, Australia’s Minister for Defense was forced to bemoan “so much for the alliance” when it became clear the United States would not provide forces to assist in East Timor.

Revising the Acheson model is possible, but like all functional models, it offers a relatively weak bond to ensure a sufficient sense of responsibility and material contributions. The more Washington expects Canberra to undertake tasks that touch on their two core disagreements, the higher the price and difficulty of fulfilling these tasks will be. Contributions valued today by either party could easily change according to the whims of domestic politics. Or in a crisis, the value of peacetime functional tasks may be dismissed compared to the immediate need for help. While trying to keep the status quo may seem appealing, the risk is that the United States and Australia will continue focusing on easier areas of short-term cooperation, such as increasing capability, without squarely confronting long-term differences over where and how that capability will be used.

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MacArthur Model

Another model for the Australia-US alliance is enabling, wherein the smaller partner achieves its security by sustaining and enabling one specific, high-value role for the larger partner. In this case, Canberra would enable the United States to use Australia’s remarkable geography as a base for power projection into Asia. From 1941 to 1943, this was the model adopted by Australia and the United States in their coalition against Japan. As US General Douglas MacArthur made clear, the Australian continent has a value quite distinct
from the people who live upon it. “The United States … had no sovereign interest in the integrity of Australia. Its interest in Australia was from the strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base from which to attack and defeat the Japanese.”

Australia’s continent remains valuably located to serve US interests on the edge of East Asia. It offers secure access to the Indian and Pacific oceans and largely sits outside current Chinese missile range. Australia’s geography is also substantive enough to sustain US military needs throughout the Indo-Pacific, offering both the space for a wide variety of operations as well as the resources to provide logistics such as food, shelter, and munitions. In time, it could develop essential services such as battle repair and maintenance. In return for this enabling access, US forces would provide an explicit defense of the Australian continent and its people.

The MacArthur model could address the expectation gaps by re-orienting the Alliance away from a myriad of regional issues and instead toward an overriding primary task of enabling US power projection that is directly valuable to both states, clarifying and strengthening the basis of cooperation. Rather than continue to seek public displays of support from Canberra, the United States—at a moment of concern about relative economic and military decline—would gain access to far greater Australian support, albeit for a smaller number of high-end contingencies.

Military planners in the United States and Australia are already exploring the enabling model. In 2012 as part of the “Pivot to Asia”, Australia invited the United States to set up its first persistent armed presence on Australian soil, through a rotation of 2500 Marines in Darwin. In 2015, the US Assistant Defense Secretary told Congress that B-1 bombers and other surveillance aircraft would be based in Australia. The following year, the US Commander of Pacific Air Forces revealed that discussions for temporary basing of the B-1 were under-way. In 2019, and again in 2020, then-US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper speculated about placing intermediate range missiles in allied countries in Asia.

Partially obscured by AUKUS was the announcement at the 2021 AUSMIN meeting to upgrade US force posture on Australian soil. This included “the rotational deployment of US aircraft of all types in Australia” along with plans to establish “a combined logistics, sustainment and maintenance enterprise to support high-end warfighting and combined military operations in the region.” At the time of writing, the details and implications of these efforts remain unclear. When the above proposals for hosting US bombers and missiles became public, recent Australian Prime Ministers, including Morrison, were quick to rule it out. So, questions about how far Australia has shifted remain. Beyond mere presence are questions of purpose: What limits will be placed on the kinds of capabilities the United States may place in Australia?
What powers of veto does Australia seek over how its territory is used and to what ends? Depending on the answers, these enabling activities may become more important than nuclear submarines in changing the way the Alliance operates.

There are, however, serious challenges to the Australia-US alliance adopting an enabling framework. First, the smaller state must give up parts of its geography and sovereignty. The noise around the submarines and the vagueness of the AUSMIN 2021 force posture language helped the agreement pass with little notice, but once specifics become clear, the public debate is likely to be fierce. Australians have an often-prickly sense of sovereignty, leading to demands for “full knowledge of, and concurrence with” US intelligence facilities on Australian soil, a level of access well above what other allies have obtained. One well-placed scholar has compared Australia’s approach to that of France under General De Gaulle, given its reluctance to host US bases and desire for independent operational capacity.

Second, it is not clear whether the task is one the larger partner yet needs enabled. The MacArthur model offers reliability for conducting high-intensity conflict, at the expense of a focus on preventing conflict in the first place. For the foreseeable future, US and Australian strategy is focused on shaping the geopolitical competition through forward presence across the Indo-Pacific. Key airfields in Australia’s Northern Territory are over 2,000 miles from the South China Sea, and it is another 700 miles beyond that to Taiwan (over 4,000 km total). As such Australia’s geography may not be sufficiently valuable to justify an alliance based primarily upon its provision. It will also be many years before Australian industry can meet US warfighting needs and the Australian Defence Force would also have to make substantive changes to adapt to a new role enabling US posture.

Chifley Model
A third and final possible form for the Australia-US alliance to adopt is a decentralized model, wherein the alliance partners focus on what they can achieve cumulatively rather than collectively. From 1943 onwards, Prime Minister John Curtin and his successor Ben Chifley looked for ways to sustain Australia’s position within the British Empire. At the same time, they wanted to do more for local defense rather than leaving their security dependent upon a great power’s promise. These proud British-Australians were also trying to preserve and stabilize the Commonwealth, while recognizing it would never regain its pre-war strength and position.

Chifley’s proposal was for a series of “strategic zones”—effectively spheres of influence—where each dominion (e.g., Canada, South Africa, India, and Australia) would increase its self-defense and regional security contribution, while the
United Kingdom would protect the maritime zones in between. Australia and New Zealand began this process by signing the ANZAC Pact in January 1944. In 1946, Chifley claimed that “an entirely new concept in British Commonwealth relations is now emerging … [which will] reconcile full dominion autonomy with full British Commonwealth co-operation.” Ultimately, London (and Washington) opposed the decentralization logic given their desire to retain regional authority, and Chifley’s proposal was quietly abandoned by 1948.

Adopting a decentralized model for the Australia-US alliance would directly address the expectation gaps by establishing a clear new set of responsibilities, tied to enduring geographic interests. Under this strategic logic, Australia would face reduced pressure to cooperate in locations such as the Middle East or Taiwan, while accepting far greater responsibility for its own direct territorial security and operations in the South Pacific or maritime Southeast Asia. The “Federated Defense” project led by then-CSIS Vice President Kathleen H. Hicks identified several areas ripe for devolved responsibility, such as humanitarian and disaster relief, information and intelligence sharing, and cyber security. Many elements of AUKUS’s technology sharing and cooperation would fit in this model. Even the nuclear-powered submarines could remain within a decentralized model, supporting a variety of intelligence and deterrence missions within Australia’s vast maritime claims.

For the United States, the Chifley model offers two advantages today. First, it would require its wealthy ally to significantly increase burden sharing. This is a goal that US Presidents such as Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama have tried to achieve through the carrot and that Richard Nixon and Donald Trump sought through the stick. Despite being one of the richest countries in the world, Australia still only spends two percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) on defense. The Chifley model would force Canberra to rebuild the deep knowledge of, and influence in, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific it once had. At a time of significant domestic problems within the United States, this form of alliance bargain could help shift the burden of attention and resources from a distracted Washington to its wealthy allies in the region.

Second, the Chifley model offers the capacity to rethink American military strategy in Asia. Rather than needing an offensive strategy wherein the United States has to work out how to punch through the emerging defensive bastions of the region, the United States could shift to what scholar Eugene Gholz and co-authors have called a “defensive defense” posture, which builds the defensive capacity of its allies instead. This shift could go a long way to reducing tension with China while still meeting alliance needs. America’s service to Australia
would thus not be an insurance-style promise to one day assist, but rather as an engineer on site today helping to develop systems for immediate protection.

Adopting a decentralized model would be an intellectual and emotional challenge for both countries. In the 1940s, the United States didn’t want to consider restrictions on its leadership through carving up regions. In the 2010s, President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden explicitly rejected the idea of spheres of influence. Australians would also have to shift the Alliance from the comforting center of national strategic policy and reimagine their approach to Asia. Even assuming the United States and its allies embrace these new roles, the question of how the bargain would stick during a crisis would remain. If the decentralized model is based on sustaining ties in an era of weakness, will it do enough to actually keep the parties close, rather than see the Alliance lingering on in form only?

Serving the Interests of Both Parties

As professor Stephan Frühling has argued, despite the strong cultural, historical, and personal links between Canberra and Washington, turning the Australia-US relationship into an effective military alliance for Asia’s new strategic environment is a substantial challenge. The September 2021 AUKUS announcement generated a lot of attention, but it did not substantially address the expectation gaps nor divergences in purpose for the alliance. With a focus on expanding Australian capabilities and offering partial elements of both the functional and enabling models, it risks exacerbating the confusion. Before further work on the practice of the alliance is undertaken, more effort to agree on the purpose of the alliance is needed.

This paper presents three models to help clarify how the alliance could be regrounded on a new strategic logic that takes the genuine differences into account, overcomes or adapts to them, and maps out the implications of each approach. These models are offered under the provision, as the scholarly literature reminds us, that “all models are wrong.” Yet, by highlighting how the Australia-US alliance can serve functional, enabling, or decentralized forms, these models can help project how the alliance serves the core interests of both partners. If the United States and Australia can re-establish a clearer underlying strategic logic, one that is relevant to who these nations are today and how they see the world, the Australia-US relationship should continue as a model alliance.

Notes

1. See, for example, Michael J. Green et al., “The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia” Centre of Gravity (Canberra: Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National


10. This paper uses the regional description ‘Asia’ over the official ‘Indo-Pacific’ because it is in Asia that the alliance challenges are found. US-Australia cooperation within most of the Indian and Pacific Oceans is relatively straightforward. As such, using this much broader identifier could be misleading.


40. Clarke and Primo, A Model Discipline, 53.
45. Quoted in Peter J. Dean, Macarthur’s Coalition: US and Australian Operations in the South-west Pacific Area, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2018), 53.


52. Vincent, “Tony Abbott Confirms US Has No Plans to Send B-1 Bombers to Australia”; Packham, “Australia Won’t Host U.S. Missiles, Prime Minister Says.”


55. For example, United States Marine Corps, Marines Force Design 2030 (Washington DC, Department of Navy, March 2020); Australian DOD, 2020 Defence Strategic Update.


62. Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance?”