Conclusion: The Time Has Come for a New Security Paradigm

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A Fluid, Fluctuating World
It has been precisely thirty years since Eastern Europe experienced the Velvet Revolution, first in Berlin, then Prague, and finally Bratislava. Throngs of people flocked to the squares and a new spirit of freedom filled the air. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, offering dramatic evidence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implosion of the Soviet bloc, and the end of the struggle between the two major ideologies of the second half of the twentieth century.

The excitement in the West was so great that Francis Fukuyama attributed Hegelian significance to these events, penning *The End of History*. The world, including the former Soviet Union and even China, he wrote authoritatively, would now undergo a process of “convergence” and all nations would adopt the principles of liberal democracy. Indeed, consequent to the fall of the Iron Curtain, we witnessed “the third wave of democracy,” as Samuel Huntington called it, with no fewer than sixty nations across the globe joining the democratic club. The rush of optimism about the future reminiscent of the late industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, when social evolutionists—such as Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, and Henri de Saint-Simon—were sure that the change in human history was so dramatic that there would be no more wars.

But what was true then remains true today. Not long after the initial outburst of optimism following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, it became clear that a belief in the “the end of ideology” was naïve. At the end of the
previous century, and, even more so, at the beginning of the present one, the pendulum started swinging in the opposite direction. The principles of liberalism started to weaken and the number of democracies fell. According to Freedom House’s annual 2017 survey, the protection of human rights has weakened in at least 71 nations over the last twelve years. In 2017, only 39 percent of the world’s population lived freely. Formerly democratic nations had adopted illiberal, authoritarian, populist patterns, even proto-fascist models. Pessimists are now referring to this as the post-democratic era.

This phenomenon is not unique to Central and Eastern Europe—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Baltic states are prime examples—but is happening elsewhere too: Brexit in Great Britain, the ascent of Trump to the US presidency, and the gains made by extreme right-wing political parties and leaders in Western Europe (Italy and even Sweden are two examples of many). Leaders who were clearly neo-authoritarian or became so during their terms in office now rule, such as Modi in India, Erdoğan in Turkey, and, of course, Putin in Russia. In South America, which is well-versed in suffering under repressive military dictatorships, millions are again starting to believe that only the army can save their countries from economic crises, political chaos, and deep-seated corruption.

In the midst of all this, China’s sun continues to rise in the East. Accelerating economic growth and significant military and political expansions remain an intellectual challenge to anyone who continues chanting the old mantra: A capitalist economy can develop only in open societies and in political democracies. In the meantime, China is nipping at the heels of the United States, and it is all but certain that within a decade China will replace it as the greatest superpower in the world.

One should not downplay the importance of the phenomena happening right before our eyes—the weakening of the democratic model and the rise of authoritarian regimes, the toppling of the United States from its hegemonic standing, and the geostrategic challenge posed by China. Rarely does the world undergo such expansive, deep, and all-encompassing changes as the ones occurring now. The international order changed and was redesigned after World War I when the only existing empires crumbled and a new international system replaced them. This happened also after World War II, when a bipolar world—a democratic West and a communist East—emerged, while the southern hemisphere was decolonized and became the “third
world.” Already two decades now, we have again found ourselves part of a fluid, flexible global society that is breaking down and being shaped anew.

The reasons have been amply documented and analyzed: reactions to globalization; greater economic disparities between the top ten percent—or even the top 1 percent—and all the rest of society; the most serious economic crisis since the 1930s that occurred in 2008; and other shocks that have led to developed nations being inundated with refugees from less developed countries. Since the beginning of the new millennium, these factors have led to drastic changes all over the world, within democratic societies, in relations between nations, and in the international system as a whole. Toward the end of the second decade of this century, we are facing the classic question: *quo vadis?*

Even more worrisome is that accepted views, conceptual systems, and even old analytical tools have lost their validity. It is no coincidence that in recent years, both social scientists and journalists—two kinds of professionals who are supposed to have a finger on the pulse of social processes, understand what is happening, and also be able to identify future trends—failed to accurately foresee the outcomes of the Brexit vote, the last US presidential election, and the cracking of the European Union. In our fluid world, the concepts used to understand “reality” are outdated as are the analytical tools that go with them.

Here and there, however, new conceptualizations, relevant to the way the world is now, are being formulated. Thomas Wright, for example, a researcher at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC, wrote an interesting document in which he sketches the outline of the new world order that has been developing over the last few years. The emerging picture diverges from that of the post-World War II era when the West worked hard to establish a liberal world order based on the values of liberal democracy, a market economy, and free trade.

Today, says Wright, we are witnessing the construction of a very different world order with two political ideologies: the neo-authoritarian camp versus the neo-liberal camp. And where is the United States in all this? One would be hard describe Donald Trump’s United States part of the free world that supports the rule of law, fosters an open society, and encourages a free press; on the contrary, the United States is becoming increasingly similar to the other members of the neo-authoritarian club.
Unlike Wright, others take a more optimistic view, such as the British magazine, the *Economist*. In a special issue published in the summer of 2018 marking its 175th anniversary, the magazine surveyed not only liberalism’s accomplishments during that time but also presented a fairly rosy picture of the rebirth of liberalism in a different guise.

**The New Wars**

Similar to the global reality described above, warfare is also changing. Military researchers and practitioners have noted the transformations happening right before their eyes, but so far have not been able to create a complete, cohesive picture. Some of the pieces were covered in the eight chapters of this memorandum and will be briefly mentioned below.

**The players:** The main players in security used to be states, especially nation-states and, above all, the superpowers. Today, the range is much greater and includes not only non-state players but also (as described by Yaron Schneider in his article here) supra-state organizations, sub-state organizations, civil society organizations, pressure groups, interest groups, ethnic diasporas and their organizations (such as the Kurdish ethnnational diaspora in Germany, as Gallia Lindenstrauss analyzes here), trans-government networks, and more. Such civil society organizations also play as important a role as that of the state in arenas that were not meant to serve them to begin with (as Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky writes in her analysis of the case of Israel at the UN Human Rights Commission).

**The scope of the arena:** The scope of the arena has changed. Added to land, sea, and air are new dimensions: the underground, space, cyber, and social media. Social media has played a significant role in mobilizing youth in Europe to join international terror movements (as Yotam Rosner discusses in his article), and this is just one of the expressions of how social media has joined the world of war. Cyber, even more so, has had an immense, revolutionary effect on the future wars and already now it raises new questions that still do not have answers (some of which Ido Sivan-Sevilla addresses in his article).

**The global and regional dimension:** The changes in the international order in recent decades have led to the fragmentation of the global political system, replete with new combinations, alliances, and regional zones of cooperation. An example is the bloc of Shiite states versus the Sunni states
Conclusion: The Time Has Come for a New Security Paradigm

in the Middle East; the Central and Eastern European states versus Western Europe; the new regional zone of cooperation among Cyprus, Israel, and Greece, and between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan specifically in the field of energy. The importance of nation-states, which served as the foundation for the international system in the twentieth century, is waning (one example is the decrease in Egypt’s stateness, as discussed by Khader Sawaed).

For some years now, geopolitical competition has become heightened, as reflected, for example, by Russia’s aggressiveness in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Above all, one must not underestimate the significance of China’s growing strength and influence over dozens of nations through its One Belt, One Road initiative, connecting China with Western European nations in a modern silk road thanks to investments of one trillion dollars. The repeated warnings about Australia and New Zealand becoming China’s vassals would, not too long ago, have sounded wildly delusional.

**Technology:** One does not have to belong to the technological school thought in order to understand the depth of the impact of technologies on contemporary wars and, to an even greater extent, on future wars. Cyberspace, artificial intelligence, interconnectivity in all of its dimensions, unmanned warfare devices, robotics, and autonomous weapons to replace the sacrifice of soldiers—all concepts that nobody even imagined two decades ago, with the possible exception of science fiction writers. But, in the very near future, these will take center stage in military planning and practice, and even now, they raise new moral and ethical questions (such as those noted in Liran Antebi’s article, which deals with AWS based on advanced robotics).

**The type of warfare:** Throughout the twentieth century, we witnessed “third generation” wars, in which the militaries of nation-states faced each other on physical battlefields. By the end of the century, these industrialized wars had all but vanished, replaced by “fourth generation” wars, which—depending upon the component considered most important—include cognitive warfare, narrative warfare, lawfare, mediatized warfare, and more.5

In the twenty-first century, we can already speak of the “fifth generation” of war; that is, hybrid wars, which are characterized by threats from diverse coalitions of sub-state or trans-national groups, or subversive entities using revolutionary guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The style of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, in the Crimean Peninsula, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Middle East is a good example of hybrid warfare. Russia uses a combination
of combat troops, civilian fighters residing in the zone of conflict, soldiers masquerading as civilians, information warfare, sophisticated cognitive warfare using social media, cyberwarfare, and who knows what else.6

A New View of the Concept of “Security”

In tandem with the transformations in the physical, concrete world, significant ideological shifts have also taken place. In Europe, multiculturalism has collapsed; at the start of the current decade, the Socialist Party in the Netherlands was the first to erase the concept from its platform, while Germany under Angela Merkel announced it was abandoning multiculturalism as the organizing principle of government policy.

Concurrently, religion as a political phenomenon has strengthened. Religious groups and organizations have made tremendous gains in societies that were, until now, secular. This phenomenon has received support from intellectuals and academics who disagreed with the modernist school of thought, which distinguished between traditional society—in which religion played a respectable role—and modernity and secular enlightenment. In contrast, today’s academic approach views religion as an essential component of the new world and of late modernity.

Academic and theoretical disciplines have also changed. One dramatic example is what happened to the postmodern school of thought. At the end of the previous century, postmodernism was at its peak, but it has already now receded from the limelight. The discipline of international relations has been affected as well. The realist school lost its hegemony, while others, notably constructivism, have gained in strength. But despite the real world changes and the transformations in theoretical and academic fields, the theoretical field of security lags behind. There has not yet been an updated, cohesive conceptualization of national security. Although some interesting attempts have been made, they are only at the beginning. In Israel, the gap is still tangible.

In a 1997 article that has since become a classic, David Baldwin expanded the concept of security, which had narrowly focused on states and armies in the spirit of the realist approach and had characterized it until the end of the twentieth century. Thanks to Baldwin, security is now accepted as extending beyond ensuring the nation-state’s existence against the physical, existential threat looming from the army of an enemy state. Instead, security is now
defined as a broad and diverse concept encompassing many issues, including the economy, human rights, environmental concerns (such as desertification, climate change, water shortages, food security), the international drug trade and human trafficking, transmittable diseases, and so on.\(^7\)

Furthermore, unlike the realist approach, which viewed security as a Hobbesian phenomenon—an expression of collective anxiety, meaning fear but also pride and honor—today, the concept of security is much wider. Anthony Giddens has called it “ontological security,” referring to citizens’ sense of security, which is rooted in their need to preserve their collective identity. This situation is destabilized when players in the international arena lose a sense of security in their identity, future, and the context in which they live and function, or, in other words, when they are incapable of telling their story—where they came from and where they are going.\(^8\) The reaction of American whites to Hispanic immigration, or of European Christians to Muslim newcomers are classic examples. Extremist populist right-wing leaders speak explicitly of the danger of losing their identity. In the United States,
even Judaism has been hijacked for the cause, as the new nationalists and supremacists speak of the danger posed to “our Judeo-Christian heritage.”

A major innovation in the new theoretical developments is the idea of security not as a given, objective, external, and essential reality but rather as a structured concept; that is, a social creation. For example, when Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, spoke of Israel’s security in the early 1950s, he included agriculture and education in the concept and this was seen as obvious. It enabled him sending female soldiers to teach in schools in the immigrants centers (Ma’abarot), or to commend army units to grow tomatoes.

The statement that security is a structured concept is far-reaching, because, if it is true, we must ascertain when and in relation to what the concept of security is used, what the field of security consists of, and when does an issue considered “security” cease being such. It also means we must ascertain who has the power, ability, and authority to determine that an issue has security significance. And especially important, we must ascertain what interests motivate those who presume to make these determinations, and who gains and loses as a result.

Among those who first started examining these questions were researchers of securitization theory, also known as the Copenhagen school. Since its establishment, theoretician have questioned the validity of this theory, which stresses the linguistic dimension of securitization; that is, what gives security significance to any topic is actually its definition as such. Even among its proponents, opinions differ as to the theory’s components and especially its methodology. Nonetheless, the widespread use of security reasons, whether justified or simply pretexts, demands fresh critical thinking of the securitization theory.

The need to expand the concept of security emanates from the growing recognition that, in late modernity, the public’s sense of security has diminished. Changes in all aspects of life are fundamental and occurring much faster than they did in the past. “Reality” has become more fluid and the main function of social institutions—to create and preserve the social order—has become more difficult than it was. This disorder causes anxiety among many people and longing for the “old world” of the past, which created order and promised certainty (as Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan write in the opening article of this volume).
A new school of thought, which is critical of the securitization theory, relies on the work of political sociologists such as Ulrich Beck, who named contemporary society “risk society,” and Zygmunt Bauman, who used the phrase “liquid fear”—also the name of his 2006 book—to describe the new state of affairs. According to Bauman, current reality is a “liquid modernity”; unlike the previous modernity, which created order and promised stability, the new modernity adds uncertainty, creates chaos and confusion, and increases anxiety.

But anxiety does not affect all in the same way, and some are more anxious than others, such as white Americans who feel the American dream of continuous upward mobility has been shattered and fear that their children’s economic situation will be worse than their own. This is also true of the extremist Christians in Europe, who are terrified that foreign values will replace traditional Christian European beliefs. And there are others: In 2014, these anxious classes were renamed “precariat”; that is, a new social class consisting of people who, even if they are employed, lead economically precarious lives and lack the tools to foresee and predict their future. This causes them great insecurity—both material and psychological. The term, made famous at the beginning of this decade by Guy Standing, is a portmanteau of “precarious” and “proletariat.” According to Standing, people in this class are responsible for the growth of the new populism.

This brings us back to the description at the onset of this article: What is the social and political response to this anxiety and fear that have characterized millions of people for the past two decades? The answer is not new as humanity has known similar situations in the past, most dramatically in the 1930s, which witnessed tribal, nationalistic divisions; greater faith in a supreme power as well as in various conspiracy theories; building walls and fences to keep out “the other” portrayed as a dangerous enemy; the fostering of separatism and economic defenses. All are techniques familiar from the days when democracies collapsed and authoritarian and totalitarian regimes took their place.

Like then, we are now witnessing phenomena of restricting liberty and harming individual and civil rights; the weakening of regimes’ checks and balances systems; labeling criticism “treason”; the revering of hegemony; and the delegitimizing of opposing views. This ends in conceding the principles and procedures of representative democracy and supporting the
new authoritarianism and the populist strongman. As has been true of leaders since the dawn of time, and certainly of those regimes that have cast off the oversight of gatekeepers and the threat of watchdogs, a range of strategies will be used to entrench their status, weaken their rivals, reduce the scope of the discourse, and oppress their opponents. One of the most convenient and effective tools of these regimes is the use of “security.” Harping on imaginary threats and exaggerating real ones, while labeling them all “existential,” has always been the most common tool used by political leaders to rally citizens around the flag.

But security consists of more than just physical security in the face of a military threat. Necessary and even essential components of national security, which must be considered, are environmental dangers and climate change; foreign intervention in the national decision-making process by means of cognitive warfare; control by technological corporations, such as Google and Facebook, of the day-to-day activities of almost every human being on earth, and so on. National security also includes Israel’s standing in the international community, the future of our relationship with diaspora Jewry, the moral force of the Zionist project, and the younger generation’s sense that they are facing an exciting, brilliant future in which the biblical question “Shall the sword devour forever?” is answered with an emphatic “no.”

The Israeli Context
Planning Israel’s future cannot start with Israel alone. First, one must identify global processes and construct scenarios of far-reaching global changes (the rise of China is an important example that has yet to receive the attention it deserves from Israel’s security community). Second, it is necessary to surmise the regional developments and only then focus on “us” in the “here and now.” The realization that security is not an externally imposed concept but rather one that we have created demands that we assume a proactive stance and develop an initiated strategy, while also considering the non-military components of security—what Joseph Nye calls “smart power.”

For example, the equation of “land for peace” fundamentally asks what will provide Israel with more security. The concept of security is being invoked in its old style as physical security in the face of a military danger from external enemies that can be confronted only by military means. One cannot ignore this critical component, but given the changes in the concept
of security presented here, it is obvious that the equation must include other components too, such as the social dimension. One must examine which solution will mitigate—if not stop—the current processes in which the divisions within Israeli society are deepening and the liberal democratic mechanisms are being weakened, as well as the dangers we face by continuing a state of non-decision. It is no coincidence that in recent years, it was actually the former chief of staff, Gadi Eizenkot, who noted the social problems of Israeli society and their effects on the IDF as a threat of the highest order, even more than the external military threats. This approach, however, has not been given the appropriate attention within Israel’s political and public discourse.

This kind of social consideration shaped the policy of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, when he confronted the Algerian security issue in the 1960s. Unlike the platform he had presented during the election campaign, he decided to concede Algeria and support independence for the strip of land that had been considered an inseparable part of la patrie. Indeed, with this courageous decision, de Gaulle managed to heal the deep rift in France that had led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and several attempted military coups. The end of the “cold civil war” in France allowed de Gaulle to begin a new chapter in the nation’s history and build a new Europe. Germany, which had been France’s most bitter enemy for centuries, turned into a close partner and ally. Algeria—once considered an existential security problem—vanished as if it had never existed.

Of course, no two historical situations are ever identical and there are many differences between France of the 1960s and Israel on the verge of the 2020s. But the story of Charles de Gaulle supports the major assertions made in this memorandum: The concept of national security is complex; it is socially constructed; we must confront security dilemmas in a proactive, comprehensive fashion; and above all, the story shows that we must examine the concept using new analytical tools.

Notes
2  See the article by Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan, “Dangers, Risks, and Bears in the Woods: National Security in the Global Era.”
3 Ibid.