analysis of Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt) by the brilliant Sir Isaiah Berlin.

The non-rhetoricians, moreover, provide laudable specimens of criticism that is only tangentially rhetorical. But it is perceptively analytical and readable. Witness, for example (and my choices are quite at random), Richard Rovere's report on President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins University of April 7, 1965; Walter Lippmann's and James Reston's columns on the President's speech in New York City on February 23, 1966; Sander Vanocur's analysis of President Kennedy's "Voyage of Discovery"; or some of Edward R. Murrow's wartime reports from London.

I am not saying that these studies are master's theses or doctoral dissertations. They are not. But I submit that they contain certain ingredients of interest, readability, and sensitivity to the power of the spoken word that we academics, in our reproachfully smug ways, sometimes shrug off with a convenient pooh-pooh.

To the young men and women who are working in the area of speech criticism, I welcome you to this challenging field. It needs the talents, rhetorical ingenuity, and sensitivity that young minds with fresh ideas and insights can supply. I wish you well.

3 The New Yorker, 41 (April 17, 1965), 160-169.
4 Harper's, 228 (April 1964), 41-46.

Rhetorical Criticism and Historical Perspective

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One of the persistent problems confronting scholars in speech is the charge that they have no field of their own, but are hybrids, now writing in the field of psychology, now in philosophy, now in English, now in history, now in political science. University presses have declined to set up editorial boards for speech series. Editors committed to the discipline of literature find little of value in the criticism of such ephemeral stuff as political speeches. Historians do not understand the role of rhetorical criticism in evaluating such a speech-oriented leader as Robert G. Inger-
Philosophers, more and more committed to abstract mathematical logic, fail to see the role of probability-reasoning in rhetoric.

Rhetoricians, of course, have a ready answer. Such criticisms are as old as Plato's dialogues, and very few new arguments have been advanced since his time. Yet public speaking has continued to play a major role in human affairs, never more so than in our own time—the age of Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, and Roosevelt. Moreover, in the contemporary world, through the medium of television, political leaders are able to speak not only to their own people but to vast areas of the world.

As a matter of fact, rhetoricians may, if they wish, make a good case that other disciplines have from ancient times to the present hacked away at the traditional scope of rhetoric and then have complained that the rhetoricians have been trespassing on their territory. Logic, which once dealt primarily with human affairs, has largely abandoned this field for the more easily delineated field of mathematical abstraction. The history of the Boylston Chair of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard is clear evidence that Departments of English owe their origins to rhetoric. The first statement of social psychology is found in Book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Finally, as Swarthmore Classics Professor Helen North has pointed out, history, too, owes an immense debt to rhetoric. Its origins in fifth century Greece were rhetorical, its early style and modes of reasoning were derived from rhetoric, and in Rome, history made much use of the "good man" theory as set forth by Quintilian.¹

Of course, the history of rhetoric by itself is not an adequate defense of rhetorical criticism as a separate field of inquiry. Each of these disciplines may argue with considerable accuracy that its rhetorical origins have long since been overlaid with a methodology developed in the modern period and often quite remote from the prime source. There should be no complaint, then, if rhetoricians choose to exercise their long-established rights within the broader field.

Perhaps the most persistent and perplexing point of conflict with other disciplines is determining the relationship between the writing of rhetorical criticism and the writing of history. What use should the rhetorical critic make of the writings of historians? Should the rhetorical critic write historical narrative? If so, should it be written for its own sake or only incidentally to form a base for criticism?

Part of the answer to these questions may be found by examining the relationship of history and historians to other disciplines. In the preface to the first volume of his *History of the Labour Movement in the United

¹ Helen North, "Rhetoric and Historiography," *QJS*, 42 (October 1956), 234-245.
States, John R. Commons, himself an economist, acknowledges his indebtedness to thirty-three authors of various articles on which the six compilers of the volumes had relied. Of the thirty-three, only one is identified as a professional historian. Eleven are identified as teachers or university researchers in economics. Several are listed as government employees, some (not specifically identified) are authors of papers published by government bureaus, and a few are not identified in any way.

A very large number of university departments are engaged in some kind of historical research and teaching. At the University of California, Los Angeles, the Department of Economics lists courses in "The History of Economic Theory," "The Development of Economic Institutions," and "The History of the Labor Movement." Also at the University of California, Los Angeles, the Department of English offers six "age" courses, which are concerned not only with the literature of the "Age of the Stuarts," for example, but also with the history of the society out of which this literature came. Similarly, to name only a few, the Department of Music, Art, and Theater all teach a number of historically-oriented courses. It is, therefore, to be expected that departments of speech should offer their students an opportunity to study the history of rhetorical theory and public address.

The point is that there is not now, never was, and by the nature of learning can not be a rigid box placed around any academic discipline. To place such an artificial restriction upon research and writing is to stultify the growth of thought and the dissemination of knowledge. Rhetorical critics, along with literary critics, economists, and artists, must be free to study and at times to write history when they are qualified to do so. By the same token, historians who have an understanding of rhetoric ought to comment on the nature of the influence exercised by public speakers throughout the course of history.

As a matter of fact, however, historians have shown little interest in rhetorical events in recent years. As Frederick George Marcham, Goldwin Smith Professor of English History at Cornell University, pointed out in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, "The modern historian, in his search for the first causes of historical change, reads the record of technological inventions, of new expressions of material needs, of changing concepts of intellectual, moral or social improvement. With his eyes on these, as he sees them, more elemental forces, he regards kings and generals and law-makers not as prime movers in human affairs, but as men who are moved." Marcham further points out that the first nine volumes of the

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2 New York, 1935-1946 (4 vols.).
3 Frederick George Marcham, "History and Speech: Collaborative Studies, Present and Future," QJS, 35 (October 1949), 284.
Journal of the History of Ideas contained but one article dealing with speeches, while the Bibliography of Historical Writings Published in Great Britain and the Empire, 1940-1945 contained fewer than twenty items out of 5,315 that dealt with any aspect of public address. A spot check of my own of the American Historical Review for 1957-62 showed no distinctly speech-oriented articles, although two dealt with the content of Congressional debates—one with 1856 campaign strategy and one with the significance of Lincoln's Freeport question. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review for the same period showed a similar pattern.

Even such a personality-oriented historian as Barbara Tuchman devotes little attention to speeches in her book, The Proud Tower. To be sure, she does describe the speaking characteristics of some persons with whom she deals, but only hazy images emerge. Writing of Johann Most, the anarchist whose philosophy included a heavy emphasis on oral agitation, she merely reports Emma Goldman's emotional reaction to his speaking.4 She devotes more attention to the parliamentary speaking of the French anti-Dreyfusard leader, Compte Albert de Mun, but in the end she dismisses his oratory as theatrical performances. "His oratorical duels against two major opponents, Clemenceau and Juarés, were spectacles of style and drama which audiences attended as they would Sarah Bernhardt playing l'Aiglon."5 With this comment she appears to have exhausted her vocabulary of rhetorical criticism, for she employs the same figure to describe Lloyd George: "the Bernhardt of the political platform who ravished audiences with Celtic lilt and strong emotion."6 Of specific speeches and speaking situations, she says almost nothing.

Some historians of ideas, however, have given more attention to speaking. The rhetorical critic may profit by reading Parrington, and he can find useful studies of Puritan ideas as expressed in sermons. But the writers of these studies are for the most part oriented toward literature rather than history as a major field of interest.

Contemporary biographers also have little interest in evaluating speeches. Unlike Morley or Carlyle, they emphasize ideas and motivations with little analysis of the speaking situations out of which the ideas rose. Biographers, like other historians, find it simpler to define their subjects as products of their times, rather than to assess the influence they may have exerted through their speaking. And, of course, since they ascribe no influence to the speaking, they are relieved of the obligation to evaluate its quality.

5 Tuchman, p. 191.
6 Tuchman, p. 370.
In general histories, speech events warrant scant comment. John D. Hicks, in *The Federal Union* (1952), devotes three-quarters of a page to the Webster-Hayne debate. He summarizes Webster's argument in less than 200 words, and then quotes in full Webster's "magnificent peroration," a passage which any rhetorical critic knows represents only a very limited part of Webster's rhetorical skill. In the same work, the Lincoln-Douglas debates are given two pages and the arguments by the contestants are sketched briefly, but the Cooper Union Institute speech is ignored completely. Aside from these two sections, almost no discussion of oral argument or agitation appears.

I know of no extensive treatment of American public address by a historian since Marion Mills Miller's fourteen-volume *Great Debates in American History* (1913). This work deals with all the major public issues from the founding of the United States to the early years of the twentieth century. Although there is little criticism of speakers or speeches, the work quotes long passages from Congressional debates and other public speeches, and the role of the debates in framing public policy is set forth. Among contemporary historians, Richard Hofstadter, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the University of Chicago compilers of *The People Shall Judge*, and a few others have shown interest in rhetorical discourse. Usually, however, historians treat speeches like any other document—as a record of ideas rather than as a persuasive force.

The contemporary lack of interest by historians in speeches and public debate is a reflection of changing fashions in the historian's art. The first Greek historians were uncritical chroniclers more interested in a lively tale than in truth. With Thucydides a more critical concept was introduced, and an effort was made to describe the causes of the decline of Greek civilization. Thucydides' debt to rhetoric was shown in his fictionalized debates. Instead of summarizing the content of arguments leading to political and military action, he constructed speeches according to the accepted standards of rhetoric and put them into the mouths of the political leaders of the day. He did not claim that these speeches were actually delivered, but he created a realistic picture of the dynamics of Greek politics through this device. One can find out far more about the nature of the Athenian assembly from reading Thucydides than about the nature of the American Congress from reading Hicks.

Meanwhile, Jewish chroniclers of Judah and Israel were developing a theological concept of history which was to dominate historical writing through most of the Christian era. The culmination and enduring in-

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7 Boston, 1964, 4th ed.
8 New York, 1913.
fluence of this concept came in the work of St. Augustine, *The City of God*. Hans Meyerhoff has expressed this view: “History is not an arbitrary succession, a meaningless conglomeration of events, but it is an intelligible process guided by an inherent law or the transcendent design of a Divine Intelligence.” In the theological concept there was a place for great men moved by Providence to guide and direct the destinies of mankind through great speeches.

The Renaissance rationalists also sought an intelligible pattern of history. Instead of the guiding hand of God, Reason was the moving force. If events seemed unreasonable, it was because of the fragmentary and limited vision of man. In this view, also, there was acceptance of the concept of strong personal leadership exercised through public address. For example, it is rational that Britain in 1940 would turn to the man who was able, as Ed Murrow put it, to “marshal the English language” in the cause of freedom.

In contrast to these ways of viewing history was the nineteenth century concept of *historicism*. In Meyerhoff’s words, “The subject matter of history is human life in its totality and multiplicity. It is the historian’s aim to portray the bewildering, unsystematic variety of historical forms—people, nations, cultures, customs, institutions, songs, myths, and thoughts—in their unique, living expressions and in the process of continuous growth and transformation.” To some nineteenth century historians, Macaulay for instance, historicism meant that a “truly great historian would reclaim the materials which the novelist has appropriated.” Macaulay believed that the historian should try to recreate the period by submerging himself in the materials available to him and drawing on imagination and sympathy to bring it back to life. To most historians, however, historicism meant interest only in verifiable facts—what really happened—devoid of speculation, art, entertainment, or morality. Perhaps historians holding to this definition believed history could become an empirical science.

In actual fact, history as an empirical science has proved unattainable. Although modern historians have developed valuable critical standards for analyzing the raw materials of history, it has become apparent that these materials themselves are often far from being objective data. Even such empirical facts as census reports may be influenced by subjective judgments about what should be counted and in what form the data

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10 Columbia Record Album, *I Can Hear It Now*, v. I.
11 Meyerhoff, p. 10.
12 Meyerhoff, p. 11.
should be preserved. No amount of objective analysis can remove the subjective quality of letters, diaries, and personal memoirs. Eyewitness accounts are inevitably influenced by the personal bias of the observers. Historians can balance one against another, but they cannot remove the subjectivity of their basic materials. Moreover, since space and time limit the amount of material which can be presented, the historian's frame of reference introduces another subjective factor.

The main contribution of historicism, therefore, has been a methodology—the development of a critical sense—the unwillingness to accept as fact a statement unverified from another source. But precisely the same attitude has developed simultaneously in the writings of literary critics, Biblical scholars, and (as our field of investigation has matured) rhetorical critics.

In addition to changing fashions in historical research, another factor has caused historians to abandon the field of public address as an area for study, and that is the changing character of education. Prior to the twentieth century, the rhetorical art was still being taught in colleges, sometimes directly through speech training, sometimes through participation in literary societies, sometimes indirectly through training in written composition, and nearly always obliquely through the study of the classics, particularly the orations of Cicero. Of these, only training in written composition is still widely required, and even here very little attention is paid to the basic rhetorical concept of persuasion. Thus, few historians are trained in the analysis of rhetorical discourse. At the graduate level, historical training emphasizes cognate study in economics, sociology, and political science, further accentuating the trend toward interpreting history on the basis of impersonal forces.

If it is true, then, that historians are no longer interested in public address, what should be the relationship of public address scholarship to that of history? I think we may begin with some axioms. First, a speech or other persuasive document is an event, taking place in a particular setting and addressed to a particular audience. Within this definition, a speech, a Jehovah’s Witnesses tract or a political pamphlet by Samuel Adams may be studied by the rhetorical critic using rhetorical concepts to discover persuasive impact. Second, the central function of the rhetorical critic, of which he can never lose sight, is to evaluate the source, content, and

13 One may make a literary criticism of a speech without considering a “particular audience,” and I would agree with Edwin Black that there are times when one ought to do so. But I cannot agree that John Jay Chapman’s Coatesville address, delivered without an audience and virtually forgotten for half a century, is a persuasive communication by any meaningful definition. Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York, 1965), pp. 78-90.
structure of rhetorical discourse as effective instruments of information, entertainment, and primarily of persuasion. Third, the critic seeks to evaluate speakers, speeches, and other rhetorical documents, not to prove their eloquence. One of the justifiable criticisms sometimes leveled by historians against public-address scholars is that we are self-conscious about the art of rhetoric and claim too much significance and influence for the rhetorical event. The role of the rhetorical critic is to balance the record by filling in the gaps left by historians, not to unbalance it in another direction. Furthermore, the rhetorical critic may learn from experimentalists that negative results may have as much value as positive ones. A rhetorical explanation for failure may have as much value as one for success.

Given these axioms, then, what specific historical research is clearly within the scope of the rhetorical critic? In the first place, I do not think that even the most antagonistic historian would suggest that the history of the art of rhetoric should be written by one who was not himself thoroughly immersed in the art. For the ancient period, the ideal scholar is a classicist such as Harry Caplan, thoroughly conversant with the ancient languages, but at home also with those who teach the art in the twentieth century. But there are few Caplans, and many of the classical scholars have concentrated on the sterile rhetoric of style. For this reason, it is perhaps better that rhetorical scholars trained in the modern tradition should become expert in the use of classical sources. In recent years, a small but growing group of competent young scholars with this type of training has been emerging. Although there are fewer problems in the writing of the rhetorical history of the United States and Great Britain, probably only speech-trained scholars are likely to make worthwhile contributions to this field.14

A second area of historical writing, the history of public speaking, can be written only by historical scholars with an interest in and knowledge of the rhetorical tradition. The recent publication of Robert T. Oliver’s *History of Public Speaking in America* highlights the urgent necessity of additional writing in this field. Oliver’s book, as is common with general histories, relies heavily upon the three-volume *History and Criticism of American Public Address* and on published articles in the various speech journals. Thus, the book is strong in areas where public-address scholars have done considerable research. It is weak in those where research is lacking. When the projected volumes of studies of public address in the colonial period, of Southern oratory, and of speaking in the age of the Great Revolt, approved by the Speech Association of America, are com-

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pleted, our information about colonial oratory, Southern oratory, and
the radical oratory of the nineteenth century should be substantially in-
creased. The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece (1963) by George Ken-
nedy, a speech-oriented classicist, has helped to fill a gap in the history of
ancient public address. Desperately needed is a history of British public
address. Although the situation here was improved by the Goodrich re-
prints, this material needs re-examination; the period of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries is a total blank. There is no probability that any
historian will fill this gap, and even if one did, it is unlikely that his study
would be of use to rhetorical critics.

A third area of research is partly historical and partly literary. It is the
compilation, authentication, and preservation of texts of speeches. A few
speakers have interested historians—Lincoln, for instance. Literary his-
torians have studied such rhetorical remains as seventeenth century ser-
mons and the lectures of Dickens, Mark Twain, and Emerson. But neither
the historians nor the literary critics are interested in these documents as
speeches. Collections of speeches, even some by rhetorical scholars, have
been almost totally lacking in authenticity. Revisions after delivery and
before publication make the published speeches of Wendell Phillips of
dubious authenticity, yet hardly any republications of these texts acknowl-
edge the deficiency. As if it were not difficult enough to study Webster’s
Congressional speeches with inadequate reporting and editorial revision,
antologies frequently publish truncated versions without even indicating
the place of deletions and say nothing of the length and content of the
material deleted. Some anthologies publish versions of speeches so muti-
lated that one cannot even get an adequate picture of the content, and the
style is distorted by the deletion of all but "memorable passages." There
is certainly a place in public-address research for definitive editions of
the speeches of individual speakers and for collections of speeches dealing
with a particular theme, presented in their entirety or with deletions
clearly marked and described. If rhetoricians cannot accept Frederick
Marcham’s idea that compilation, authentication, and preservation of
texts is the primary contribution the speech critic can make, we can
at least be sure that historians would benefit from such definitive studies
and would welcome this aspect of rhetorical scholarship as a proper and
useful contribution to history.

15 The difficulty of getting accurate texts will be appreciated by anyone who has
tried to get approval of a recorded text from a contemporary speaker. One speaker wrote
me about such a text, "I did not speak as carefully as I normally would." Another indi-
cated, "The transcript is not worthy of me or of your book."
16 Random House is currently engaged under the editorship of Don Geiger in
preparing a series of issue-oriented collections of speeches with the general title, Issues
and Spokesmen.
17 Marcham.
So far, we have been dealing with research which is clearly not going to be done by professional historians, because they lack either the skill or the interest to do so. A more debatable area is the writing of biography and biographical essays and descriptive studies of speakers and speaking situations. Typical of these are the essays in the Brigance and Hochmuth volumes and the narrower studies in Antislavery and Disunion (1963). There are wide differences among these essays as to content, form, and method of criticism. In general, however, they seek to describe the characteristics of the speakers in terms of their training, knowledge, character, and personality as these qualities were reflected in their speaking; they seek to describe one or more speaking situations in detail, including both the general and specific climate of opinion likely to influence the audience; they describe the content, structure, and style of the speech, including the nature of the relationship between the speaker and the audience; and finally, they seek to assess the effect of the speech and to explain that effect in terms of the other points made. A long study may interrelate a number of speaking situations and make some generalizations about the speaker's rhetorical skill and its effect upon his career.

If the rhetorical critic is dealing with a figure of major importance, he may find some of this material in historical or biographical writing. The Lincoln-Douglas debates, the Webster-Hayne debate, and Franklin Roosevelt's acceptance speech in 1932 are examples of rhetorical events which often interest historians as integral parts of the social situation of the day. Specific settings of speeches, however, do not interest historians except in unusual circumstances. It is necessary for the speech critic to seek out for himself specific facts about the audience in order to establish the rhetorical tools available to the speaker. Here, he must use the same critical methods employed by the historian; he must, in effect, write a vignette of history. For the next step—analysis of the content, style, and structure of the speech—the rhetorical critic is clearly better qualified than the historian. Finally, in the assessment and explanation of effect, the historian and the rhetorical critic may be in conflict, with the historian dismissing the personal element entirely and the speech critic sometimes attributing too much to the speech.

The two points of view are not entirely incompatible, and the careful critic must not over-react to the historian's rejection of rhetorical influence. By the most carefully devised rhetorical standards the critic may sometimes be forced to acknowledge that the success or failure of a particular persuasive communication may very well be foreordained by the rigid quality of public opinion at the time the speech was delivered. Such was the case in San Francisco in 1856 when opponents of the vigilance
committee faced an impossible rhetorical task. Yet their failure should not obscure the accomplishments of speakers supporting the committee. After the vigilantes had returned to their usual occupations, disdaining politics and public speaking, pro-vigilante speakers filled the political void. Through their speeches they organized a new party and gave structure and continuity to a movement which would have disintegrated without articulate spokesmen.¹⁸

Not only does the historian denigrate the influence of speakers on history, but he often disregards speakers who held no public office, occupied no prominent pulpits, or tried no sensational cases in law courts. Unfortunately, rhetorical critics have done little to correct the omission. In spite of a better than average training in English history and literature and an ancestry rooted in the weavers of northern England, it was not until I began to teach a course in British public address that I became aware of the major role which agitational speakers played in nineteenth century England—speakers such as Henry Hunt, Richard Oastler, Joseph Rayner Stephens, and Feargus O’Connor. Of these, only Hunt ever held public office, and he for only one short term. Yet the speaking of these four men and many other even less-known figures gave articulate form to the political and social agitation known as Chartism, pinpointed the evils of the factory system and the poor laws, and awakened in the English working class an awareness of the potential power of a mass movement. Furthermore, as Henry Jephson has pointed out,¹⁹ the agitators brought pressure to bear upon Parliament, and strengthened the voices of the radical minority in Parliament headed by Sir Francis Burdette, William Cobbett, and others.

When historians look at this period, they are interested in determining with the greatest possible accuracy exactly what was the social and economic condition of the working classes in England—say, in 1837. When they find that the condition was actually somewhat better than it was made to appear in the speeches of Stephens or O’Connor, they are inclined to dismiss these men as demagogues. To the rhetorical scholar, this single piece of evidence is not enough. Was Stephens talking to a mythical average workingman, or to that segment of the people well below the average? Did not the contrast between his listeners and the better-fed and better-housed members of the community seem grossly unjust to them even before Stephens spoke? Was it not apparent to them that though they might be no worse off than their handloom weaver fathers and grandfathers, the equality of the earlier day was destroyed by the factory system in which

some profited by the labor of others? In this context, regardless of what the actual social and economic situation of the workers may have been, Stephens appears as the articulate and eloquent spokesman of the inarticulate and frustrated masses.\(^{20}\)

The same circumstances are repeated in the interpretation of late nineteenth century United States history. A large group of names make a line or two in general histories, and a few specialized analyses of agitational movement like Hicks' study of populism\(^{21}\) have been written by historians. But why should there not be detailed study of agitational speeches made by Albert Parsons, one of the anarchists executed after the Haymarket riot in 1886? A hostile witness, Allan Pinkerton of the detective agency, identified him as early as 1878 as "capable of making a speech that will tingle the blood of that class of characterless rascals that are always standing ready to grasp society by the throat."\(^{22}\) Dennis Kearney is deserving of more study,\(^{23}\) as are Henry George,\(^{24}\) Johann Most, Emma Goldman,\(^{25}\) Daniel DeLeon and a host of even less well-known radical orators. The record of their agitational speaking needs to be studied in depth, and their influence on the early twentieth century progressives traced. Only rhetorically oriented scholars are likely to do so.

Perhaps my enthusiasm for historical-rhetorical studies has led me to overstate the case. If so, in summary, let me restore the balance. First of all, it is clear that scholars in the fields of economics, sociology, literature, and many other disciplines write histories of their own fields and interpret general history from the points of view of their respective interests. There is no reason why rhetoric should be an exception. It is also evident that either from lack of interest or lack of training, or both, historians do not write about speech events, or interpret political and social change in terms of the catalytic effect of the spokesmen who debate the issues. It is also evident that a speech is a social event, and, as such, it is proper material for either the rhetorical critic or the historical scholar. But the rhetorical

\(^{20}\) For a detailed account of Stephens' speaking, see the unpubl. diss. (University of California, Los Angeles, 1966) by Michael Taylor, "Joseph Rayner Stephens: Political Preacher."

\(^{21}\) John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (Minneapolis, 1931).

\(^{22}\) Allan Pinkerton, *Strikers, Communists, Tramps and Detectives* (New York, 1878), pp. 388-389.

\(^{23}\) See Charles W. Lomas, "Dennis Kearney: Case Study in Demagoguery," *QJS*, 16 (October 1955), 234-242.

\(^{24}\) George is the subject of an excellent biography by Charles Barker (New York, 1955); also see the unpubl. diss. (Northwestern, 1952) by A. J. Croft, "The Speaking Career of Henry George."

\(^{25}\) There is no adequate rhetorical study of Emma Goldman, but a recent biography by Richard Drinnon, *Rebel in Paradise* (Chicago, 1961), contains much information about her persuasive career. It does not, however, evaluate the quality of her persuasion adequately.
critic brings to this event a specialized training which enables him not merely to record a description of the event more precisely than the untrained observer, but to interpret the rhetorical basis for whatever effect the speech may be shown to have had. Although historians properly caution rhetorical critics against overestimating the significance of persuasion in any given event, the critic seems justified in charging that historians have failed to give persuasion its proper due. The insight of the rhetorical critic is needed to balance the record.

The problems posed by this analysis can not be lightly brushed aside. Perhaps the ideal solution would be for a substantial number of historians to receive rhetorical training. I venture to suggest that the writing of history would be improved if historians included courses in argumentation, persuasion, rhetorical theory, and rhetorical criticism in their training.

But such a millennium is not likely to come soon. The other alternative, and one which Departments of Speech can control, is to improve the historical abilities of rhetorical scholars. I believe that every rhetorical critic ought to be thoroughly conversant not only with the facts of history in the period of his study, but also with the methods used by historical scholars. Part of this education may be achieved in courses with such titles as "Introduction to Graduate Study." Recent books written for such courses have good chapters on historical method, and careful application of the principles they set forth would do much to improve the scholarly quality of research in public address. But perhaps of even more value are the supplementary bibliographies of historiography in these books, which ought to lead the critic more deeply into the theory of history. I would also recommend the anthology by Hans Meyerhoff, from which I quoted earlier, *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*. A careful reading of this collection of theoretical essays by historians and philosophers should make it clear that the historian's craft is by no means a monolithic one, and that there is still room for differences in approach.

Rhetorical critics need not abandon their central function in order to write good history. But we do need to establish more rigid critical standards. As more and more young scholars become aware of this need, critical dissertations in rhetoric will win the respect of scholars in other disciplines, the writing in our journals will be read with approval outside of our field, and university presses will publish more books by rhetorical critics. As an added dividend, Speech Departments will be able to stop fighting for existence and will win an accepted and respectable place among the humanities and the social sciences.