RHETORICAL HISTORY AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM: A DISTINCTION

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RECOGNIZING that critics considered oratory partly an art, partly a branch of literature, and partly a power for making history, Herbert Wichelns set about to define the goals and procedures for rhetorical criticism in 1925. Arguing that “rhetorical criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) and literature,” and that “a speech is a man’s response to a condition in human affairs,” Wichelns sought to separate rhetorical and literary analysis. In defining both rhetoric and eloquence in terms of effects upon audiences, Wichelns determined the course of rhetorical analysis for three decades.

Stewart’s charting of the course of rhetorical criticism through this century reveals a steady erosion of Wichelns’ position, and a veritable scramble for revolutionary analytical methods. The attacks and resulting diversity certainly must undergird Scott and Brock’s pronouncement. “We are in the midst of a disintegrating tradition. Perhaps rhetorical criticism now is transitional, from it will grow a fresh tradition. Of the latter point, we cannot be certain.

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8 J A Hendrix, “In Defense of Neo-Aristotelian Rhetorical Criticism,” Western Speech, 52 (Fall 1988), 246-52; Carroll C Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus, O: Charles E Merrill Pub Co., 1974), and Forbes I Hill,
the Wichelns-Thonissen-Baird approach to rhetorical analysis has found elegant and even brilliant defense, but nevertheless Scott and Brock's sense of disintegration seems prevalent.

What has happened in the last fifty years of rhetorical criticism is the result of both iconoclasm and creativity. Recent excursions into various dimensions of symbolicity—explorations undertaken by anthropologists, mythicists, linguists, philosophers, social critics, historians, and literary critics—have tended to expand our visions of "rhetoric," "rhetorical discourse," "rhetorical acts," and "rhetorical occasion" well beyond Wichelns' conceptions.

My purpose is to isolate a principal result of the present confusion, the confounding of two classes of standards-of-judgment one can use in analyzing rhetorical discourse. Further, I seek to explicate a problem resting at the heart of ontological controversies over rhetorical criticism. This essay is generated by the notion that, harbored inside the usual metacritical questions (is criticism descriptive or prescriptive? does the critic analyze or judge? can rhetorical criticism be intrinsic as well as extrinsic? is rhetorical criticism monistic or pluralistic?) is another: Can one generally distinguish between the history and the criticism of rhetorical discourse? In suggesting a positive answer to this question, this essay at once returns to Wichelns' polemic, recognizes with Stewart that a multitude of specific methods are appropriate to rhetorical analysis, and picks up several contemporary threads of metacritical thinking.

The Speech Association of America sidestepped the issue in 1943 by entitling the first of its landmark volumes A History and Criticism of American Public Address, subsequent editors of later volumes kept the "and," which submerged any question of troublesome distinctions. Today, we use other devices; many replace the "and" with a hyphen (especially in theses), discussing "historical-critical" or "historical-rhetorical" studies. Others say that they are carrying out "rhetorical analyses," and some jump on the journalistic bandwagon by adopting the ubiquitous god-phrase, "the rhetoric of . . . ."

I shall argue that, conceptually, rhetorical history (the study of the historical effects of rhetorical discourse) and rhetorical criticism (the analysis of rhetorical discourse and acts for a series of essentially normative or advisory purposes) must pursue different goals, ought to be judged by differing criteria, and usually employ varying sources of evidence. In some studies, I believe, one is justified in assessing both historical effects and rhetorical artistry (see the discussion of generic criticism below), but I shall defend the proposition that, most of the time, analytical studies of discourse ought to be predominantly either exercises in rhetorical history-writing or critical ventures into interesting problematic, or insightful aspects of discourse. This thesis will be approached principally through an examination of the kinds of knowledge rhetorical analysis can generate and of the modes of inference employed in history-writing and in critical judgment.

Rhetorical History

By "rhetorical history" I refer to any examination of discourse or rhetors which essentially or primarily is extran-
s, to any analysis which finds most of its confirming materials outside a rhetorical artifact. Such traditional studies as those of a speaker’s background, methods of speech preparation, examinations of psycholinguistic bases for a given message, recreations of situations demanding certain sorts of discourse, measurements of speeches’ effects upon immediate and long-range audiences, campaigns’ and institutions’ effects upon the course of social-political history, and so on, fall into this general category of rhetorical analysis. The category is defined, not by reference to its parentage (neo-Aristotelian, Burkean, Freudian) or its communicative focus (linguistic, intentional, nonverbal), but by its kind of critical inference, these studies describe, explain, account for, and judge a rhetorical artifact or discourser principally by references to the “real” world outside symbolic manipulations, texts, and subjective feelings about eloquence. Ultimate judgments in rhetorical history-writing are descriptive-causal, subject to tests of truthfulness or falsehood.

Granting for the moment the obviously objectivistic bias inherent in this position, one can note that such studies in rhetorical history generally are carried out for one of three reasons.

(1) Appreciation. Because humanity apparently has an unsatiable desire to know and understand its collective past, the primary goal of history-writing may be the satisfaction of human curiosity. Simply put, we want to know the history of cake decoration and weaponry, of calligraphy and pottery, of mythic heroes and orators. Such curiosity is often termed “idle,” yet its power for generating historical investigation cannot be over-estimated; even if one “merely” seeks to understand and explain mankind’s experiences, history-writing becomes more than names, dates, and chronicling. As we satisfy our innate curiosity about the good old days, we are drawn into the questions of evidence and inference, of causes and effects, which constitute serious history-writing. In the process of appreciating the thundorous periods of a Cicero, the eloquence of a Burke, the inspiration of a Roosevelt, or the alliteration of an Agnew, the rhetorical historian soon faces other questions concerning Cicero’s megalomania, Burke’s liberal and/or conservative social vision, the effects of Roosevelt’s reconstruction programs, and Agnew’s role in polarizing contemporary American society. Idle curiosity can produce rhetorical history well worth writing and reading, justifying many so-called “recreative” studies.

(2) Generation of Theory. History, then, can be written to provide knowledge and understanding of the past in terms of the past. It can also have what historians call a “presentist orientation.” Historical studies can serve a “pre-


8 For a discussion of recreative studies, see Black, esp Chap III.

9 For a discussion of “presentism” and hus-
scientific function" by generating predictions which the social scientist can test. When a rhetorical analyst argues that most successful speakers of the past began by advancing their own propositions when faced with like-minded audiences but begin by refuting opposing propositions when faced with hostile audiences, a social scientist can test the generalization in his laboratory. Rhetorical history-writing can thus be used to build hypotheses capable of scientific verification as humanist and scientist establish a presumably symbiotic relationship.

Many philosophers of history would want to stop here, urging that problems of historical uniqueness and evolution, as well as the evils of historical determinism, limit the potency of historically gained knowledge. At least possible in principle, however, is a third goal for history-writing.

(3) Historical Explanation In principle, the study of history (including rhetorical history) generates knowledge coequal with that discovered by the probabilistic social sciences. Briefly, the argument runs as follows: Ideally, humanity would like to have what Bergmann calls "process laws," high-level theoretical statements which, on the basis of a single observation of phenomena in a uni-

verse or system, could predict the state of that system at any other time. If we possessed process laws of human development, for example, we could observe and then predict the course of that child's life. We have, however, no such general process laws of human development.

Human beings in search of systematic, predictive generalizations, consequently, can follow one of two other courses: On the one hand, they can turn to laboratory experimentation. The standard procedure—hypothesis / measurement-of-variables/manipulation/remeasurement-of-variables/prediction—offers a utilitarian alternative to process laws, because the experimental method operationalizes, controls, and measures variables in such a way that the accumulated wisdom of practice and the speculations of new-thinkers are rubbed against each other in "critical" studies.

Because laboratory experimentation has some shortcomings, so the argument runs, we often turn to a second class of approximations of process laws, that class is made up of historical laws or historical explanations. An historical explanation relies upon two or more observations, in the form "If A now and B earlier, then C later." Typical of historical laws are Freud's laws of psychoanalysis and Toynbee's explanations of.


13 Scientific predictions are generalized rather than aimed at a specific case, difficult to use in situations where variables cannot easily be isolated, controlled, and measured, as in studies of mob behavior, troublesome when the experiment treats four or five variables at once, because of the probability of "chance" results, and plagued with problems of operationalization, as witness continuing controversies over intelligence studies. See the works in notes 9, 11, and 12 for discussions of these problems.
the rise and fall of civilizations. While historical explanations are limited by our ability both to measure precisely the interaction among variables in previous epochs and to accumulate all the relevant data in many instances, nevertheless historical laws have two important virtues unlike statistical laws they do pretend to predict the next case, and they can work in situations containing many variables. A model example of historical explanation is George Rudé's _The Crowd in History_. Rudé explored a dozen different characteristics and activities of English and French rural, urban, religious, secular, economic, political, and social riots between 1730 and 1848 in the first half of his book, the second half then attempted generalizations and predictions based on all the variables he could isolate and whatever helps he could find from sociologists and others.

It is possible, then, to argue that historical studies can generate more than the appreciation inherent to recreational studies, and more than theories worth testing in other ways, they may furthermore offer us fully packaged, sophisticated, predictive knowledge—historical laws. Like the social psychologist and the political scientist who have been working incessantly from "field" data to establish historical explanations, perhaps the rhetorical historian ultimately must be concerned with contributing to generalized knowledge.

A rhetorical historian can draw descriptive-causal conclusions about such matters as a speaker's background and its effects upon a mature career, about the methods of speech preparation and the likelihood of rhetorical successes, about situational contexts, settings, climates-of-opinion, and demographic composition of audiences, and their influences upon message-reception, about inventional and linguistic techniques employed by successful and unsuccessful pressure groups and institutions in various positions, about verbal and nonverbal symbolic strategies practiced by agitators and defenders context by context. If, in sum, the rhetorical historian casts conclusions in terms of rhetorical laws, which in turn can be blended with those from studies carried forward by other specialized historians, then this analyst may well be contributing generally to the complete history of human events. Ultimately, such studies will help answer questions concerning the roles of rhetors and of discourse as causes among all other causes precipitating historical effects and processes broadly conceived.

The model here proposed, of course, has strong "scientific" or "objectivistic" biases, at a time when Bormann's "fantasy theme analysis" almost celebrates intuitive chaining and a Nixon speech has generated metacritical disputes over

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14 See esp Bergmann, pp 124-30
16 Additional support for this thesis is offered by Rodrick Hart in his "Theory-Building and Rhetorical Criticism" (paper presented to the Speech Communication Association convention, Dec. 1974)

various truth-criteria relative to the critical act, this call for old-fashioned positivistic history-writing may seem out of place. I do not mean to cast out subjectivistic analyses or abandon the search for truth understood as integrity or fidelity. I do mean to assert, however, that such studies, as well as many other types to be mentioned shortly, are not "historical" in the technical sense of that term. I do believe also that rhetorical history-writing (dominant among our theses and dissertations though less so in our journals) still represents an intellectually defensible and emotionally satisfying analytical activity when done well.

Rhetorical-historical studies, as viewed here, then, are predominantly extrinsic analyses, seeking to give us knowledge about the relationships between discourse or discoursers and the "real" world. To be sure, elements of discourses such as logic, proofs, linguistic strategies, patterns of arrangements, and styles of delivery often are examined by the rhetorical historian, but only insofar as they may account for the reception or influence of that message. As soon as the rhetorical historian does something other than merely chronicle anecdotes, events, and rhetorical behaviors, he or she is inextricably bound up in questions of influence, causation, and connection—in questions of discourse and historical process. For the rhetorical historian to do less is either to eschew the notion of contributing useful knowledge or to abrogate the responsibility for writing "good" history. The rhetorical historian's focus must constantly be upon descriptive-causal inferences and externally verifiable conclusions if he or she is to contribute when possible to a fund of predictive generalizations.

Rhetorical Criticism

I define "rhetorical criticism" as including any examination of discourse and rhetors which essentially or primarily is intrinsic, any analysis which finds most of its confirming materials inside a rhetorical artifact. Such traditional studies as those of rhetorical structure, typologies of strategies, most generic classifications, linguistic categories of analysis, the integrity of ideas, and discourses as cultural phenomena fall into this general category of rhetorical analysis. The category is defined not by its parentage (poetic, rhetorical, dramatic, philosophical) or its communicative focus (linguistic, dispositional, cultural), but by its kind of critical inference. These studies organize, reconstitute or


restructure, or distill the essence of a rhetorical artifact principally to render aesthetic, artistic, ethical, or metacultural judgments. Ultimate judgments in rhetorical criticism are not descriptive-causal but rather valutative-advisory-philosophical, not subject to tests of truthfulness or falsehood but to tests of consistency and insightfulness. Such studies generally are carried out for three reasons:

(1) Appreciation of Structure. Again, one can refer to our innate desire to know when discussing rhetorical criticism’s goals, but the knowledge here appealed to is of a kind different from that which motivates historical investigation. Humanity apparently preconsciously seeks structure and organization. The search for structure—visible in the classical theorist’s grammatical rhetoric, in medieval disputation and metaphysics, in 18th-century neoclassicism, and in art work generated by programmed computers—is explained by Gestalt psychologists and undergirds any number of artistic and literary schools. Corbett expressed such a concern for understanding rhetorical structure when he defined rhetorical criticism as “that mode of internal criticism which considers the interactions between the work, the author, and the audience.

When rhetorical criticism is applied to imaginative literature, it regards the work not so much as an object of contemplation but as an artistically structured instrument of communication. It is more interested in a literary work from what it does than for what it is.”

What such an understanding of inter-

active and dynamic interrelationships within literary or rhetorical transactions “does” for a reader is to bring a sense of fulfillment and insight. Anyone who can capture the fluidity of the rhetorical experience, whether or not that person can account for specific causes or effects of that experience, has provided a valuable service. Even if the critic operates on a patently impressionistic or subject level of dynamic recreation, he or she may leave the reading mind at ease and with a sense of completeness. Gilbert Highe’s celebrated venture into Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address certainly did not explain its reception (effect), yet Highe’s structuring of that work around the birth-death-rebirth archetypal metaphor nevertheless tells us something intuitively important about the work, perhaps because the isolation of such metaphors reveals some aspect of our own deeply seated, preconscious feelings toward it and similar discourses. In so discussing the Gettysburg Address, Highe has told us little about Lincoln, but much about ourselves.

(2) Generation of Norms. Less subjective is a second goal for criticism: generating norms or productive guidelines for others. Either a single figure or a set of discourses can be examined to reveal some standard-for-judgment which the reader can apply to other discourses or to his own practice. When the call is made to alter one’s own practice in light of the norm, as when our students are asked to read and emulate sample speeches at the back of textbooks, we term the study “pedagogical.” When two relatively similar addresses are examined together, using one as a standard against which to judge the other, we say an “analog” study has been pro-

duced. And, when the critic dissects discourses to determine the outlines, habitual strategies and forms, and general conditions giving rise to a species of discourse, we label the study "generic." Studies of Fourth of July oratory, inaugural addresses, gallows speeches, and the like abound in our journals principally to generate norms for judging other discourses of the same type.

One might ask, however, do we not carry out generic analyses to determine patterns-of-effect, and hence are not generic studies "historical" in the sense that term is being used? The answer could be "yes" if one stresses that genres are set patterns of rhetorical or poetic or philosophical messages which have a popularity and power precisely because an audience has come to expect and appreciate them, if genres are isolated by rhetorical analysts primarily to account for "effectiveness," then the study certainly is concerned with historical process. One also could answer "no," however, by arguing that the kind of expectation being discussed here often is very different from questions of "effect" mentioned earlier (because "expectations" are learned patterns which lead to understanding and comprehension more often than influence and persuasion), and that a genre's characteristics often can be violated without necessarily reducing the "effectiveness" of a given discourse. For example, our culture has come to expect election eve speeches of a particular configuration. Yet, Edmund Muskie's violation of those expectations, when in 1970 he de-emphasized partisan appeal and offered instead a moral disquisition on the status of politics and American dreams, probably made his discourse more rather than less effective. Similarly, in "On the Crown" Demosthenes chose not to answer Aeschines' charges point by point, in the usual manner of legal defense, but rather submerged the charges in one of the most brilliant speeches ever given by a human being. We often, therefore, seek out genres of discourse principally to teach cultural expectations and to isolate normatively our modes-of-expression in order to classify or type problematic discourses and their structures, in an essentially grammatical exercise, there usually are better ways to understand effectiveness.

(3) Advocacy. A small but important step beyond norm-generation is a final goal for criticism: advocacy. In the last ten years, particularly when treating controversial subjects such as war and controversial rhetors such as Malcolm X and Richard Nixon, critics in our journals have begun using critical analysis as a vehicle for urging a social truth or ideology. The phrase "as a vehicle" is the key concept, for when billing themselves as advocates, these critics at least.


26 All rhetorical analysts, in a sense, are "advocates," as Campbell (n 18, pp 21-23) and Rosenfield ("Anatomy") argue. The use
implicitly believe they are addressing society rather than a rhetorical event, and believe they are using the study of past discourse to affect our feelings and cognitions about the current world-at-large. The critic as advocate undoubtedly hopes either to gain adherents or to stir counter-argument. This sort of critical stance has been described by Wander and Jenkins.

The critic, as orator [i.e., advocate], is to assist us in discovering a vision more at one with truth than the vision imposed on us by our social and political institutions. [A work should express] a coherent point of view, and, whether or not we agree with each judgment, [should invite] us to engage in a dialogue on social issues which ought to concern us.

Out of his personal experience, the critic offers a view of social reality. Through his criticism, the critic invites his reader to share in this reality.27

At this level, the rhetorical critic has evolved into a specialized social critic, perhaps fulfilling mankind's need to transform all descriptive data into value-laden experience, to reshape society. Marie Nichols concluded her vigorous analysis of rhetorical criticism in the fifth of her lectures at Louisiana State University in 1959 on a similar note. "[The critic] must serve his society and himself by revealing and evaluating the public speaker's interpretations of the world around him and the peculiar means of expressing that interpretation to his generation."28

Assuming, then, that rhetorical criticism can have as its goals identification of rhetorical structures, norm-generation, and advocacy, what analytical methods are appropriate to such enter-

of the terms "advocate" and "vehicle" here, however, reflects the usage of Wander and Jenkins (n 18).

27 Wander and Jenkins, pp 445-50 passim

28 Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge La State Univ Press, 1963), p 78

prises? What sorts of inferential processes are operative?

All the types of studies mentioned earlier—structural, typological, linguistic, ethical, textual, and cultural—have in common the activity of isolating and categorizing operationally discrete and theoretically significant aspects of discourse and discoursing. Like rhetorical historians, rhetorical critics first describe surface or embedded features, but they part ways with their historical colleagues in what they do with what they describe. Their inferences, as we noted earlier, do not lead to descriptive-causal generalizations but rather to personal or public insights, values, and norms.

By "insight" I refer to some critics' attempts to recreate their own feelings within their readers. The search for linguistic expressions capable of engendering such feelings often produces highly metaphorical criticism. Thus, in his lively lectures on English prose style, James Sutherland frequently resorted to vivid figures, as for example when discussing Bishop Hall's style: "The old rolling periods have disappeared Hall is jerking and stabbing at the reader's attention, giving him no rest, forcing him either to concentrate on what is being said, or else to throw the book down in despair. What the reader cannot do with such prose is to lie down and let the pealing organ go sounding through the nave and aisles."

Such "insights" as these may seem wholly impressionistic, yet critics usually provide readers with exemplary passages upon which they base judgments. For that matter, a critic can call additional witnesses in support of emotionalized inferences, as did Lord Morley when discussing Richard Cobden.

After all, it is not tropes and perorations that make the popular speaker, it is the whole im-

29 James R. Sutherland, On English Prose (Toronto Univ of Toronto Press, 1957), p 54
pression of his personality. We who only read them, can discern certain admirable qualities in Cobden’s speeches, aptness in choosing topics, lucidity in presenting them, buoyant confidence in pressing them home. But those who listened to them felt much more than all this. They were delighted by mingled vivacity and ease, by the charm, so effective and so uncommon between a speaker and his audience, of personal friendliness and undisguised cordiality.

Critics such as Sutherland and Morley, at first glance, may seem to be describing “effect,” and in a sense they are. But that effect is non-cognitive, it is affective, perhaps idiosyncratic, and certainly not capable of generalization, because it springs from a Longmanian rather than an Aristotelian tradition.

The search for “insights” in these passages, I think, is the *sine qua non* of any undulaterated form of rhetorical criticism. Whether one’s insights are presented appreciatively (“I like you and think you will, too”), aesthetically (“I think you is beautiful by some standard and you ought to also”), pedagogically (“Orator Jones was superb and ought to be emulated”), generically (“X is an example of justificatory discourse”), culturally (“The essence of 19th-century America’s mythical vision can be seen in Webster’s ‘The Character of Washington’”), or argumentatively (“Orator Jones is without scruples in polarizing this country with half-truths and short-circuited reasoning”), the inferential process never varies. No matter what the critic’s particular goal, he or she moves from a rhetorical object to an essentially extra-rhetorical conclusion via an imposed value-standard.

The examination of rhetorical discourse, therefore, provides the rhetorical critic with an excuse for saying something about the human condition, about artistry or the state of excellence in expression, about the limited range of human inventiveness, about cultural tastes, or about social values (democratic or otherwise). The critic can be faulted, actually, only if the inference-building lacks a solid descriptive base and coherence or if the product leaves us unaffected, misreportage, inconsistency, or dullness, theoretically, are the critic’s only possible sins.

**Implications**

The distinctions proposed between “rhetorical history-writing” and “rhetorical criticism” are simple ones, really, yet they might go a long way in resolving, say, the dispute engendered by Nixon’s 3 November 1969 speech on Vietnam. So-called traditionalists have a habit of locking horns with modernists, those calling for evaluative social analyses berate their critical brethren who seek objectivity and generalizability. Hence, Baskerville stands on descriptive analysis until one earns the right to criticize, while Wander and Jenkins attempt to make us relevant instruments of social reorientation, Croft urges the careful matching of discourse against accepted rhetorical theory, while Ratcliff replies that no theory or objective standard can describe or evaluate a real piece of discourse. Now of course all of these metacritical theorists are functioning in Wichels’ mode (defining their particular interests negatively, by destroying those of others), but because each at least implicitly seeks a sort of monolithic

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31 See n. 18

view of the rhetorical-critical enterprise, each tends to have a blind spot which obscures the entire product and which reduces rhetorical discourse ontologically to Substance A or Substance B or whatever. In urging a recognition of the worth of both objective and subjective approaches to rhetorical analysis, of both the descriptive-causal and the evaluative-normative, this essay has attempted to suppress such ultimately empty—i.e., merely verbal—disputes

It likewise has attacked the opposing tendency in contemporary critical theory to unite all descriptive-causal and evaluative-normative approaches to rhetorical analysis under a single method. Donald Bryant, for example, recently wrote “Rhetorical criticism, then, is directed (1) to discovering and explicating the elements and forms of particular discourses, (2) to generalizing particular discourses, or their informative-susory dimensions, into the wider phenomena of the rhetorical, especially public address; (3) to showing how particular discourses participate in families of didactic and susory discourse to which they may be related; and finally (4) to support value judgments.”38 The notion, inherent to Bryant and explicit to Campbell34—that the complete critical act must include both descriptive-causal judgments and normative-evaluative statements—seems unworkable if we keep in mind distinctions between (1) the kinds of knowledge (cognitive and predictive vs non-cognitive and evaluative), (2) the tests-of-adequacy (objectively verifiable vs. subjectively insightful), and (3) ultimately, then the forms of inference (externally validated vs internally consistent) which inhere to historical explanations and critical impulses, respectively. The only way to argue the “completeness” thesis is to urge either that there is no such entity as “objective truth” or that all judgments in the final analysis are objective in that their soundness can be “tested” in some fashion, I am not, of course, ready to collapse the objective-subjective distinction in either direction

A third implication of the propositions here defended relates to the teaching of rhetorical analysis. I think it imperative to teach analysts not simply “methods” and “approaches” but, more importantly, a good deal about the personal, aesthetic, normative, predictive, and social functions of rhetorical analysis. Only then can the various methods which we have produced in the wake of Wíchels be understood for what they are: alternative perspectives, viewing discourse for varied purposes and producing knowledge of myriad sorts. Just as the rhetorical tradition is rich with “rhetorical theories”—each of which presumably examines human communication from a particular vantage in order to emphasize and explore the communicative process from a distinct point of view—so also is metacritical theory beginning to demonstrate a fulsome ness and variety equally diverse, equally exciting, and equally productive of special knowledges. Indeed, this essay’s discussion of kinds of knowledges and forms of inference ultimately finds its justification in our pedagogical needs. The instructors of courses in analysis who

38 Donald C. Bryant, Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism (Baton Rouge: La State Univ Press, 1973), pp 34-35. Bryant separates the analysis of how a discourse works from the valuation of it, yet, esp on p 39, he apparently arranges effectiveness-criteria and valuate-criteria on an antecedent-consequent continuum

34 See Campbell, Critiques, pp 13-23, for her three-stage analysis of criticism, cf Black, pp 8-9, where, in his disagreement with those who advocate objectivity, he stresses the need for humanistic evaluation in criticism.

35 For an expansion of this view of rhetorical theory, see Otis M. Walter, “On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or Progressive,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (Dec 1963), 567-82
can separate "rhetorical history-writing" from "rhetorical criticism" (or, if those terms trigger misleading associations, "objective or . . . rhetorical analysis" from "subjective or . . . rhetorical analysis") will, I think, both simplify and de-mystify the rhetorical dimensions of criticism.

Perhaps, indeed, as Baskerville intimates, speech communication is ready for "schools" of rhetorical analysis analogous to those in other arts, sciences, and literatures. The idea of schools recognizes a variety of ends proper to rhetorical analysis and allows for a pedagogy which sorts through rhetorical-critical literature via relatively discrete categories. The articulation of such categories (and this essay but suggests directions for categorization) would start the entire field on Scott and Brock's journey into academic and public services.

36 Baskerville, pp 116-17